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SUMMARY 
This research investigates the policy response to the 2007-2010 sanitary crisis in the Chilean 
salmon industry, the second largest producer and exporter of salmon in the world. This 
industry is an emblematic case of the possible consequences of employing an intensive natural 
resource model for development. 
The research draws upon the two literatures on policy learning and policy change, and crisis 
and disaster management, and upon the system failure to explain the causes and 
consequences of the sanitary crisis in the industry. The thesis employs the qualitative method 
of case study and utilises primary and secondary sources of data and information. 
The main argument of the research is that the process of policy learning during and following 
catastrophic events is very different from the process of the policy learning during normal 
times. The main findings are, firstly, in the case of the Chilean salmon industry, the sanitary 
crisis disrupted the industry governance processes, including the regulatory framework of the 
industry, opening a window for radical institutional change. Secondly, potentially radical 
measures were part of a set of policies that emerged as initial responses, after which a set of 
more incremental policy responses were developed and applied. Moreover, the sanitary crisis 
was not transient nor episodic but was enduring, persistent and dynamic. Thirdly, the policy 
responses to the sanitary crisis destabilised the consensus in the Chilean industry causing 
conflict and ambiguity over policy responses. 
The thesis contributes to the policy learning and policy change literature in the context of 
catastrophic events by extending the view this literature offers on dramatic events such as 
crises, by considering them as dynamic and persistent situations, analysing their potential as 
precipitators of radical policy change, and providing a means for considering the timing and 
processes by which this radical policy change may occur and be directed toward better social 
outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter is organised in five sections. The first section explains the motivation 
of this research. Section 2 presents the research problems, whilst Section 3 poses the 
objective, framework, research method, methodology and data. The fourth section explains 
the argument of the research and main contribution to knowledge, and the final section 
outlines the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1. Motivation of the research 
This research studies governance issues of a resource intensive biological production system. 
The central topic of this thesis is how actors respond to a natural resource industry crisis 
through the processes of learning linked to institutional change, with special reference to 
salmon farming in Chile. Salmon farming is an example of an intensive development of a 
biological production system that has offered an important opportunity for developing 
countries to develop export-oriented industries and commerce to generate economic 
development and social changes towards industrialisation. The governance of such industries 
is important because of their potential for causing ‘tragedies of commons’ (Hardin, 2009) due 
to overuse, degradation and externalities that arise from the intensive use of resources. 
Existing literature has extensively considered mixtures of government-led and self-governance 
for resource intensive activities that cause the direct externality of overuse (e.g. Ostrom et al., 
1999 and Feeny et al., 1990, studying common use resources by individuals who pursue their 
own interests but who are aware of the potential for collective externalities. The overuse of 
common resources is only one of the possible externalities associated with intensive biological 
production systems. Disease is an important externality that has received some attention 
especially in the aquaculture literature (e.g. Murray and Peeler, 2005 and Pizarro and Zolezzi, 
2003, studying the development and transmission of diseases in intensive aquaculture 
systems). However, disease as an externality has not yet been examined in depth as a cause 
for governance reformation, for example, the setting of appropriate policies either by the 
actors in the system or by external authorities such as governments. 
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This thesis addresses a specific case in which governance reforms were undertaken in response 
to a specific crisis related to fish disease. Although the nature of this sanitary crisis and the 
measures taken were influenced by a variety of factors depending on the context, this analysis 
of the process of governance reform offers important lessons that may be translated into 
other contexts and constitute the foundation for generalisations from this thesis. 
In Chile the origins of salmon culture go back to 1850 when there were some attempts to 
introduce exotic fish species into the country. Between that time and the early 1920s, several 
activities such as the import of salmon eggs, release of young fish in rivers in the south of the 
country, and the construction of fish pools were conducted. In 1921 governmental 
organisations took a more active role in the incipient activities of farmed salmon bringing Coho 
salmon (a type of Pacific salmon) eggs into Chile from the United States. This public initiative 
allowed the placing of fish in southern rivers; this later made sport fishing possible (Vera, 
2010). 
In the 1920s and 1930s there were attempts to introduce other salmon species into Chile, such 
as Chinook salmon and sockeye salmon, but without success (Achurra, 1995; Vera, 2010). In 
the 1940s the first successful production of Atlantic salmon and brown salmon eggs was 
achieved and further fish pools were built in the 1950s (Vera, 2010). In the late 1960s Chile 
obtained international cooperation from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
to continue activities to introduce Coho salmon. This cooperation was focused on the technical 
and economic feasibility of salmon farming in Chile and human resource development to 
support those activities (United Nations, 2006). Between 1972 and 1981, as part of this 
cooperation programme between Japan and Chile, an attempt to introduce Pacific salmon into 
the country using the ranching system was made, but it did not work as was expected 
(Achurra, 1995). In the 1970s the initial development of the regulatory framework for the 
fishing sector was started. In 1976 the Undersecretary of Fishing and in 1978 the Fisheries 
Service were created, both under the authority of the Ministry of Economy. 
In commercial terms, in 1974 the country built the first private commercial fish pool (Escobar, 
2009). In the early 1980s the public-private organisation, Fundación Chile, made efforts in 
open system cultivation but it did not give positive results. Then, through research and 
development, Fundación Chile transferred and adapted the intensive salmon culture in cages 
system from European countries (e.g. Norway, Scotland) creating a firm. With the support of 
Fundación Chile, 1982 marked the beginning of the first firms to cultivate Pacific salmon, and 
in 1984 the first commercial harvest of Pacific salmon occurred (Escobar, 2009). The creation 
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and supporting of firms by Fundación Chile opened up a new area of the Chilean economy. 
With this demonstration effect (i.e. to produce salmon that was commercially viable) private 
investment was encouraged to create similar firms in the incipient industry (Achurra, 1995). 
Thus, the early stages of the industry were characterised by the development of technical 
feasibility of domestic production and technical knowledge through transfer, imitation and 
adaptation of technologies. Influenced by the ideology of the Entrepreneurial State1, the 
Chilean government took the lead in conducting active actions and research for the 
introduction of the salmon fish into the country and development of the aquaculture sector. 
Since the 1980s the strategy of an open, competitive and free-trade oriented economy was 
adopted by the country. The State’s interests were concentrated on the development of non-
traditional sectors to diversify the Chilean economy. With this intention the industrial initiation 
of salmon activities was a priority and the entry of Chile as a viable commercial salmon 
producer was developed by this strategy. Part of the strategy consisted of a vertical orientation 
policy aimed at developing commercial opportunities from comparative advantages that 
already existed in the country, and the policy was carried out by the semi-public organisation 
Fundación Chile (Achurra, 1995). This involved introducing an export-oriented model as part of 
the trade policy reforms that opened markets and supported the development of local 
capabilities for the Chilean salmon activities. New knowledge allowed the specialisation of 
firms and the development of related firms (i.e. supplier development). This led to the 
consolidation of an industry.  
Public funds were spent to conduct research and development and continue with 
technological improvements. One of the major technological advances was the national 
production of eggs that gave national producers greater independence. In the same way, the 
greater efforts to expand into export markets led to the development of greater knowledge in 
areas of certification and improvement in other quality standards. As part of the aim to expand 
the industry, the State’s interests were oriented to the attraction of investment and the 
exploration of new markets. In this effort, more regulation came to the sector, mainly to 
organise the functions of the institutions that supported the industry and make the 
institutional platform more efficient.  
                                                             
1 According to Mazzucato (2011), an Entrepreneurial State is one that can be considered as a ‘creator of the 
knowledge economy’ (p.20). It is one that is targeted, proactive and takes risks to promote economic growth. Then, 
the ideology of the Entrepreneurial State can be understood as a set of ideas and beliefs based on the leading role 
of the State to promote economic growth through the development of an economic sector. 
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In 1989 the first General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Law N° 18892) to promote growth of 
aquaculture in the context of environmental sustainability was published. This law was 
complemented in the 2000s with regulation on environmental and sanitary areas. As a result, 
the Chilean salmon industry reached high productivity and profitability as well as a rapid 
insertion into the global economy. From experimental production to mass production, in 1992 
Chile became the second larger producer and exporter of salmon in the world with a 
production of 23,715 tonnes of Atlantic salmon, 22,165 tonnes of Coho salmon and 15,515 
tonnes of rainbow trout (Knapp, Roheim and Anderson, 2007; FAOSTAT). 
The combination of comparative and competitive advantages explains the success of the 
Chilean salmon industry. Achurra (1995), Montero (2004) and Knapp, Roheim and Anderson 
(2007) discuss some of these advantages: 
· a capacity of production on a large scale based on the access to an extensive and 
suitable natural resource water (extensive coastline with suitable sea sites, rivers and 
lakes in terms of topography, water temperature, salinity and luminosity) to perform 
the hatchery and fattening phases, easy access to fishmeal for salmon feed; 
· low-cost skilled labour, entrepreneurial business initiative, collective organisation 
capacity to create the Association of Salmon Industry; 
· favourable regulatory environment and public support, technological learning, 
development of supplier products and services, specialised human capital and logistic 
systems to ship products; 
· minimum interference with other fishing activities (i.e. commercial and recreational) 
to develop salmon farming activities; 
· little pressure from environmental groups; 
· permanent promotion of markets and efforts aimed at meeting the preferences of 
customers (i.e. provide high quality products in attractive and convenient formats); 
and  
· the possibility of supplying markets with fresh products in the opposite season to 
those salmon industries located in the northern hemisphere, since Chile is located in 
the southern hemisphere and its seasons are opposite to those of the northern 
hemisphere. 
The features of industry development with a historical intensive production system 
characterised by high concentration and density, which means overcrowding of fish in farming 
cages as well as farming centres in a territory, has provoked the development of diseases with 
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the critical point being the onset of a sanitary crisis that affected the industry in 2007. The 
crisis was caused by Infectious Salmon Anaemia (hereafter ISA), an exotic disease that became 
endemic in the industry and required governance response. 
The principal questions of this thesis arise from the examination of that governance response 
to this crisis, an analysis that requires looking at both actors’ interests and policymaking 
processes. The thesis examines the period between 2007 and 2013, i.e. from the onset of the 
sanitary crisis until the time when the consequences of the governance response can be 
examined. It considers a variety of actors involved in the production of salmon such as the 
industry (producers and suppliers), the government, several associations, non-governmental 
organisations (hereafter NGOs), knowledge providers and banking sector, to name but a few. 
 
1.2. Research problem: policy responses through policy learning and policy change 
processes precipitated by a sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry  
In 2007 the Infectious Salmon Anaemia virus (hereafter ISAv), a biological agent that kills 
salmon, was introduced into the Chilean salmon farming industry and since then the industry 
has become chronically vulnerable to further outbreaks of the disease. The virus rapidly spread 
throughout the industry and became an epizootic (widespread outbreaks) causing a sanitary 
crisis in the industry that was followed by a financial and social crisis.  
This sanitary crisis was, in part, a negative externality of the overexploitation of the natural 
common pool resource water; however, the conditions that explain the origins of the crisis are 
diverse and interdependent suggesting a systemic failure in the industry. The history of the 
Chilean salmon industry is a clear example of how the modern tendency of development in 
natural resource-based industries was successfully achieved. At the same time, it reveals the 
perils that arise when that success has been achieved at the expense of the overuse of a 
natural common pool resource, alongside a poor management of ecological conditions. 
The sanitary crisis in the industry renewed the historical conflict between environmentalists 
and the industry, and between the environmentalists and the government, and at the same 
time precipitated a process of policy learning and policy change. Industry and government 
reacted to the crisis and responses were applied in two phases. The short-term policy 
responses were potentially radical and aimed at attending to the contingency of fish mortality 
due to the virus and stop the epizootic. The long-term responses were more incremental and 
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aimed at updating the industry’s regulatory framework to include a more preventive approach, 
to develop and implement new policies, as well as modifying existing policy instruments to 
deal with ISAv and its effects.  
The sanitary crisis was a turning point in the industry trajectory suggesting that a more 
sustainable approach in policy through an ecological view was needed, as opposed to the 
neoliberal approach taken by the industry and the government. With a sustainable-oriented 
discourse the crisis became the policy window for reforming the industry regulatory 
framework. The permanent conflict among environmentalists, industry and government during 
the process of policy reform and the evolutionary stages of the sanitary crisis became the main 
sources in influencing the progress of those reforms. 
The responses to the sanitary crisis caused different consequences in the short and long term 
for a variety of industry actors and society. The short-term consequences were related to the 
problems in introducing the new regulatory framework into practice, and the conflict and 
ambiguity generated by the design and delivery of the potentially radical policy responses 
developed in the first stages of the crisis. The long-term consequences were related to the 
adjustment of policy responses with an attempt at reducing the conflict and ambiguity among 
actors and make the responses politically and technically feasible. 
 
1.3. Objective, framework, research method, methodology and data of the research 
This research analyses the learning and change in policies in response to catastrophic events. 
Specifically, it analyses the policy responses in the Chilean salmon farming industry during the 
period 2007-2013 caused by an industry sanitary crisis. An important aspect of this analysis is 
to examine and explain whether those responses produced radical or incremental changes in 
policy. 
Section 1.1 has explained the motivation of this study and briefly reviewed the context of the 
development of the industry as a background to the thesis. From that account three research 
questions have emerged that will be examined in the context of the Chilean salmon industry. 
Firstly, how do industry natural resource crises precipitate processes of policy learning and 
policy change? Secondly, how are policy responses stimulated by industry natural resource 
crises developed and implemented? Finally, what are the consequences of policy responses 
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stimulated by industry natural resource crises for industry participants and society (e.g. local 
environment and jobs)? 
An overarching argument of this thesis is that, in the context of catastrophic events, the 
process of policy learning is very different from the process of policy learning during normal 
times. In the literature of policy learning and policy change, catastrophic events such as crises 
are viewed as transient disturbances or episodic events: they are viewed as ‘focusing events’ 
(Kingdon, 2003). This research categorises this as the view taken during normal times. The 
comparison of policy learning during normal times, and policy learning in the context of 
catastrophic events, is made by examining and explaining whether the sanitary crisis of the 
Chilean salmon industry was a transient disturbance or episodic event as the literature views. 
The framework of this research draws upon literature on policy learning (Heclo, 1974; Sabatier, 
1988; Rose, 1991; May, 1992; Hall, 1993), policy change (May, 1992; Bennett and Howlett, 
1992; Hall, 1993; Kingdon, 2003), and crisis and disaster management (Faulkner, 2001; 
Quarantelli, 2006). Insights from the system of innovation literature, particularly the system 
failure approach (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005), offer some useful guidance for 
explaining the causes of the sanitary crisis. However, this theory is found to be incomplete 
because it does not consider the role of unexpected factors, which in natural resource 
industries and industries working with biological systems such as aquaculture and salmon, 
constitutes a crucial aspect in policy making. The role of ‘unexpected factors’ is incorporated 
into the system failure approach for the purposes of this research, as explained further in 
Chapter 2.  
The research questions posed above propose that the policymaking process needs to be 
examined in relation to the precipitating effect of the crisis, the short and long term policy 
responses to the crisis, and the consequences that those responses caused. This suggests that 
the research questions are established in time in three phases of observations. Each of these 
phases draws upon a distinct policy studies theoretical literature. 
In the first phase, using an adaptation of the system failure approach (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen 
and Gilsing, 2005) and causal stories (Stone, 1989), a characterisation and diagnosis of the 
Chilean salmon industry was conducted to understand the nature of the crisis and its 
relationship with the structural characteristics of the industry at the time of the crisis. In the 
second phase, the policy responses to the crisis were analysed using a policy learning and 
policy change approach (Hall, 1993; May, 1992; Kingdon, 2003) in order to explain how a policy 
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learning process in the industry was precipitated by the crisis and how the responses were 
developed and applied. Finally, in the third stage the consequences of the policy responses to 
the crisis were analysed from a ‘conflict and ambiguity’ perspective. In this perspective, 
conflict emerges from inconsistent views that actors have when more than one actor sees a 
policy as directly relevant to his interests, whilst ambiguity occurs when there is 
misunderstanding in policy goals or roles of bureaucrats, as well as uncertainty in the 
resources to perform the activities to implement the policy (Matland, 1995). 
The reason for selecting different theories related to policymaking processes for each of the 
phases is that the empirical findings make more sense when they are interpreted using the 
different theories. Different theories were needed because, as the phases progress, new 
elements or processes were emerging in the policymaking process and there were also 
consequences in the way in which the policymaking process was conducted. To address these 
elements or processes, an historical approach of the policymaking process and the role of 
actors having interests in the outcomes of these processes will be employed.  
This design (explained more fully in Chapter 4) takes policies at the industry level as the main 
unit of analysis, and disagreements or incompatibility of interests, values and understandings 
among actors over policy issues as the main unit of observation. It applied a longitudinal 
design to observe the dynamic and evolution of policies in terms of their development and 
delivery. The primary source data was gathered from the interviews conducted with a 
complete set of industry actors. This was complemented with secondary data such as reports 
from governmental institutions, associations and firms, newspapers, enacted laws and records 
of parliamentary processes to passage of these laws. 
 
1.4. Argument of the thesis and main contribution to knowledge 
This thesis argues that the process of policy learning in the context of catastrophic events is 
very different from the process of policy learning during normal times. Catastrophic events 
that are enduring, persistent and dynamic disrupt governance processes; they open policy 
windows for potential radical changes in which new actors and new ideas emerge. The 
argument is demonstrated using the case of the Chilean salmon farming industry where a 
sanitary crisis precipitated policy learning and policy change processes, stimulating an 
opportunity for radical and incremental changes in industrial policy. 
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This thesis makes its main theoretical contribution to the literature of policy learning and 
policy change. It extends this literature in considering catastrophic events as dynamic 
situations as opposed to stagnant events as the literature treats them. The dynamic of the 
catastrophic events creates a pattern for dynamic policy learning and policy change.  
In more general terms, and connecting with the motivation of the thesis, it is possible to say 
that catastrophic events such as crises are particular examples of the consequences of 
intensive exploitation of biological production systems. It was not thought by the actors 
involved that a consequence of intensive exploitation of such systems could cause a crisis. This 
suggests that if these sorts of issues can be addressed, crises can be anticipated, avoided or 
limited in their extent. Thus, examining and learning about the role of crises as this research 
does also contributes to the discussion of potential crises, crisis anticipation and ways to avert 
crises. 
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is composed of eight chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction that presents the 
motivation of the research, the research problem, the objective of the research with a 
summary of the framework, research design, methodology and data employed, the argument 
of the thesis, its contribution to knowledge and structure. The theoretical discussion is mainly 
focused on the policy learning and policy change processes stimulated by catastrophic events.  
Chapter 2 considers catastrophic events as dynamic, persistent and enduring situations that 
challenge the assumptions adopted by the policy learning and policy change literature in which 
catastrophic events are viewed as transient disturbances or focusing events. The case of the 
sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry, which made the industry vulnerable 
after the introduction of the ISA virus, developed over time (i.e. it was not transient) and 
provided multiple stimuli (and responses) to policy change (i.e. it provided multiple foci). This 
sanitary crisis represents a specific crisis that was not new in the world.  
Chapter 3 presents the background of the infectious salmon anaemia, the context of the 
sanitary crisis in Chile and the impacts of this disease on the local industry. 
Chapter 4 develops the research design and methodology to answer the research questions. It 
also justifies the case study as the research method of this thesis, explains the selection of the 
case study and the organisation of the context, and discusses the reliability, validity and 
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generalisability in qualitative research. It also presents the sources of data and information, 
and the methods by which the data and information was collected and analysed. 
Chapter 5 is the first analytical chapter. It analyses how the sanitary crisis of the Chilean 
salmon farming industry became the policy window to reform industry regulations and 
precipitated the industry policy learning process. It offers an explanation about causes of the 
crisis from a system failure perspective. Evidence shows that the crisis in the industry cannot 
be assigned to just one direct cause. There were interdependent conditions corresponding to 
different categories that together contributed to the emergence of this crisis. This constitutes 
an alternative explanation from those provided in the literature. 
Chapter 6 is the second analytical chapter and analyses the short and long term policy 
responses to the sanitary crisis for the Chilean salmon industry. It examines the incremental 
and potentially radical measures, and discusses whether the measures taken to respond to the 
crisis produced a radical policy change. 
Chapter 7 is the last analytical chapter and analyses the consequences of the policy responses 
to the industry sanitary crisis from a conflict and ambiguity perspective. Moreover, it discusses 
the evidence of industry policy learning and policy change and the closing of the policy window 
that was opened by the sanitary crisis. 
Chapter 8 is the final chapter of the thesis and concludes by revisiting the motivation for the 
research and summarising the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of this 
research to knowledge, and outlining some limitations and possible future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLICY LEARNING AND POLICY CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 
“We can think of policymaking as a process that usually involves three central 
variables: the overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field, the 
techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals,  
and the precise settings of these instruments” 
(Hall, 1993 p278) 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, this research contributes to the policy learning 
literature and is concerned with how actors respond to an industry natural resource crisis 
through the processes of learning linked to institutional change. The questions that guide this 
research are the role of natural resource industry crises as policy learning and policy change 
precipitators, the development and implementation of policy responses triggered by those 
crises, and the consequences of those policy responses for industry participants and society. 
To answer these research questions, this chapter introduces “policy learning” and “policy 
change”, and “crises and disasters management” literatures. It argues that these literatures 
provide a rich theoretical lens through which to study processes of learning in policies 
following industry crises provoked by natural resource crises, and sanitary crises in particular. 
Some of the policy learning and policy change literature has been framed as a response to 
catastrophic events, variously termed as catastrophes, crises and disasters (Birkland, 2006; 
Farley et al., 2007; Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009; Keeler, 1993; Kingdon, 2003). However, it 
has a limited view of these situations, considering them as focusing events that are transient 
or episodic disturbances. This view does not take into account that catastrophic events may 
evolve and create dynamic processes of policy learning and policy change. On the other hand, 
although the existing literature on policy learning and policy change does refer to radical policy 
change and the potential of catastrophic events as accelerators of radical policy change, it 
does not analyse in detail the timing or steps by which radical policy change is likely to occur 
after a dramatic event. As a result, we still lack a deeper understanding of policy learning and 
policy change stimulated by dramatic events; this is because the literature on policy windows 
and the processes of policy learning and policy change they trigger still remain as a black box. 
This research attempts to fill these gaps by analysing the evolution of crises and the dynamic 
they create for policy learning and policy change processes, specifically radical and incremental 
changes. The research provides and adds a deep analysis of radical and incremental policy 
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changes stimulated by crises. To do so, this study bridges the policy learning and policy change 
literature with the literature related to crises and disasters management. This draws upon the 
policy learning and policy change literature (May, 1992; Hall, 1993; Kingdon, 2003) and partly 
on a broader literature relating to crises and disasters management (Faulkner, 2001). This 
research argues that, due to the nature of the policy window that crises open, the process of 
policy learning in the context of crises is very different from the process of policy learning in 
their absence. 
The research uses the term crisis instead of disaster or catastrophe because, as Faulkner 
(2001) discusses, crises are events induced by the actions or inactions of organisations. This 
term considers the role of human action where involved actors have some control. Fieldwork 
conducted for this research revealed that the role of the human action over the untoward 
event experienced by the Chilean salmon farming industry was crucial in understanding its 
causes where involved actors had some control over the development of the conditions that 
stimulated the event. 
This research refers to a crisis as ‘an event, natural or man-made, sudden or progressive, which 
impacts with such severity that the affected community has to respond by taking exceptional 
measures’ (Carter, 1991 quoted in Faulkner, 2001, p.138). Although this is Carter’s definition of 
disaster, it may be applied to crises since the definition considers all the relevant aspects of 
catastrophic events equally if they are called crises, disasters or catastrophes that according to 
Faulkner (2001) are needed to identify and respond to them. Also, Faulkner (2001) says that 
the characteristics of disasters may be equally applied to crises. 
The first section of the chapter presents the definition of sanitary crisis that this research will 
employ, highlighting the features of natural resource industry crises. Then the chapter turns to 
the role of crises as focusing events and policy window as the main theme of the second 
section. It is followed by the third section that analyses the role of crises in precipitating 
processes of policy learning and policy change, and in creating opportunities for radical policy 
change. The fourth section discusses traditional explanations of the origins of natural resource 
crises, and, in addition to a discussion, provides an alternative explanation on how they create 
the basis for policy responses. 
Crises stimulate policy responses, and the fifth part of the chapter analyses this process 
classifying them into short and long term responses. Responses to crises cause consequences 
that can also be analysed in the short and long term; the sixth section refers to this. The 
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seventh section of the chapter examines evidence of policy learning and policy change after 
crises and the closing of policy windows opened by catastrophic events. The last part of the 
chapter re-states the research questions to be answered in this thesis. 
 
2.1. Sanitary crisis as a type of industry natural resource crisis 
This section helps to answer the first research question on how industry natural resource 
crises precipitate policy learning and policy change by defining a specific type of natural 
resource industry crisis, a sanitary crisis. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
sanitation ‘refers to the maintenance of hygienic conditions’ (World Health Organisation, 
2014b) and ‘hygiene refers to conditions and practices that help to maintain health and 
prevent the spread of diseases’ (World Health Organisation, 2014a). Thus, diseases result from 
poor sanitation and unhygienic conditions. 
For fish, including salmon, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
points out that ‘the production of safe and quality fish and fishery products requires effective 
hygienic practices throughout the food chain. Hygienic measures are aimed at preventing or 
reducing fish contamination and microbial growth and in this way the development and 
dissemination of diseases’ (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2014). 
This research employs a sanitary crisis in the context of salmon farming as the type of industry 
natural resource crisis to be further examined. The natural resource involved in this particular 
type of crisis corresponds to the common-pool resource (CPR) ‘water’. Adapting the definition 
of crisis employed by this research (see p.23) to fish sanitation and hygienic settings, this thesis 
refers to a salmon sanitary crisis as ‘an event, natural or man-made, sudden or progressive, 
which impacts hygienic conditions attempting against health and facilitating the development 
and spread of diseases with such severity that the affected community has to respond by taking 
exceptional measures’. In this case the ‘affected community’ may refer to humans, salmon or 
other living entities linked to the salmon industry. However, since this research employs the 
sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon farming industry caused by the infestation of farmed 
salmon with ISAv as the case study, the affected community that had to respond to the 
outbreaks and spread of the ISAv corresponds to the actors related to the salmon farming 
industry (e.g. industry and government), although the salmon itself is the affected community 
in the first place. The possibility of humans affected by ISAv as ‘affected community’ has been 
discarded, since ISAv does not infect human beings (European Commission, 2000). 
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The sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon industry accounts for the negative externalities 
associated with the intensive use of natural common-pool resources, in this case, water. 
Although salmon farming involves the insertion of human artefacts (pens and nets) into the 
natural environment water, it does not isolate the salmon from there. This is the feature that 
makes the disease ISA endemic and raises the more general issues concerning externalities. 
This research documents this disease crisis as another example of negative environmental 
externalities related to intensive natural resource use, but also as an example of negative 
biological externalities linked to this intensive exploitation. As will be seen later in Chapter 7, 
the theoretical consequences of these biological externalities will have policy implications that 
will derive insights for the policy learning and policy change literature. 
Biological externalities are the effects that two or more species in an area have on each other. 
This is based on the ecological fact that the existence of species has effects on the 
development of other species. A positive biological externality occurs when a species provides 
something that benefits other species. On the other hand, a negative biological externality 
occurs when a species harms other species (Tullock, 1971). In ecological terms the appearance 
of a disease is understood by the breakdown of the ecological triad, which is the relationship 
of the host, pathogen and environment (Hedrik, 1998). In this view biological externalities are 
seen as the effects of the host, pathogen and environment on each other. Chapter 5 analyses 
these biological externalities through an ecological policy paradigm lens. Chapters 6 and 7 will 
discuss the policy implications of biological externalities in the Chilean salmon industry.  
The following table shows the possible negative biological externalities between host, 
pathogen and environment. It contributes to the argument on the different effects that 
pathogens may have on different hosts. Policy responses to sanitary crises that do not take 
these differences into account will be contested and ineffective, such as those in the Chilean 
salmon industry (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
In the disease crisis of the Chilean industry there was a set of negative biological externalities 
between pathogens, hosts and environment. Although the pathogen that caused the crisis was 
identified as the ISA virus, it was also demonstrated that the sea lice caligus acted as a vector 
of the virus. The virus and the sea lice affect the three species of salmon that are mainly 
commercialised in Chile (Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow trout) differently, and 
they also had an effect on the environment water.  
 
26 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Biological externalities between pathogen, host and environment 
 Who receives the externality 
Who produces the 
externality Pathogen Host Environment 
Pathogen 
The effects of a 
pathogen on other 
pathogens are negative 
and unknown 
A pathogen can act as a 
vector of other 
pathogens 
The pathogen may 
infect the host and 
make it sick 
The pathogen may 
infect the host but not 
make it sick 
The pathogen 
contaminates the 
environment 
Host 
The host may 
reproduce the 
pathogen 
The host may act as a 
vector of the pathogen 
The host may transmit 
the pathogen to other 
hosts 
The host may release 
the pathogen into the 
environment and 
contaminates it 
Environment 
The environment 
disseminates the 
pathogen 
The environment acts 
as a mechanism of 
pathogen transmission 
to a host 
The environment 
disseminates pathogens 
to the environment 
Source: Own elaboration based on Nylund, Wallace and Hovland (1993), Nylund et al. (1997; 2003), Jarp and Karlsen 
(1997), Murray, Smith and Stagg (2002), Stagg (2003), McVicar (2003) and Rolland and Winton (2003). 
Summary: 
This section has defined what this research understands by a sanitary crisis. It has been 
pointed out that this type of natural resource industry crisis impacts the hygiene of industries 
through the development and spread of diseases, in the case of this research, the spread of 
ISAv in the Chilean salmon industry. Industry and government actors are the affected 
community that has to respond to the crisis by taking exceptional measures. However, how 
crises start to be considered as a problem to be faced by those actors is an open question and 
the topic of the next section. 
 
2.2. The role of crises to policy learning and policy change 
In the policy learning and policy change literature, the study of Kingdon (2003) on agenda 
setting in the United States analyses how problems capture the attention of policy makers, 
why policy makers take notice of some subjects and not others, and why some items rise while 
others fall on their agendas. He found that sometimes problems are not self-evident for 
governmental officials including policy makers, and that they need a ‘push’ to get the attention 
of people in and around the government. One mechanism that gives this ‘push’ are what he 
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calls ‘focusing events’. These are events that take the attention of people in and around the 
government and raise the issue in the governmental decision agenda, prioritising it on the 
agenda. He specifies that crises are powerful focusing events.  
Based on the work of Kingdon, Birkland (2006) analyses a series of catastrophic events and 
how policy follows them. Referring to focusing events he explains that ‘a disaster can often do 
in an instant what years of interest group activity, policy entrepreneurship, advocacy, lobbying, 
and research may not be able to do: elevate an issue on the agenda to a place where it is taken 
seriously in one or more policy domains’ (p.5). Thus, in the policy learning literature, focusing 
events such as crises have a transitory effect; they last a relatively short time and, at their 
onset, rapidly seize the attention of government officials and people around the government; 
they are events that demand immediate attention and about which something should be 
done.  
According to Birkland (2006) focusing events such as crises attract attention because they 
provide evidence of policy failure. A direct, but not entirely satisfactory way of resolving what 
the response to such failure might be is to view crises as policy windows. Defined by Kingdon 
(2003), policy windows provide ‘an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet 
solutions, or to push attention to their special problems’, or in other words they become 
‘opportunities for action on given initiatives’ (Kingdon, 2003 p.165-166). Kingdon (2003) argues 
that major changes in policy occur when those opportunities are present, and that these policy 
windows are usually unpredictable because no one knows when a crisis may come. As Kingdon 
(2003) says ‘the timing of the crisis is uncontrollable and only partially predictable’ (p.190). 
Moreover, the window opening is uncertain and if there are no solutions or political support to 
address the defined policy problem the window rapidly closes (Kingdon, 2003). Considering 
this, we may say that industry natural resource crises abruptly open the policy window, since 
the crisis itself, and the failures revealed by the crisis, suddenly take the attention of 
government officials who decide to do something about it.  
On the other hand in the crises and disasters management literature, Faulkner (2001) states 
that crises usually have a negative connotation. In a common use of the concept it is related to 
danger, difficulty, problem, bad situation, damage and failure (Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, 
2014). However, he also states that crises may also have a positive potential, and they can be 
considered as turning points or opportunities as well as stimuli to innovations. Policy learning 
and policy change literature may take this view and consider that crises may be good 
opportunities for policy change and policy innovation. Indeed, if a crisis serves to reveal 
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practices that were inherently unsustainable or risky, its occurrence may prevent even larger 
losses from the continuation of such risky or unsustainable behaviour. This research examines 
the sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon farming industry as a turning point and good 
opportunity for a radical industry policy change. 
Birkland (2006) argues that crises are likely to build gradually over time (as opposed to 
disasters that are mostly sudden). This argument is based on the belief that prior to crises it is 
possible to detect indicators or signals of the problem, even if no action is immediately taken. 
Deutsch (1966), May (1992) and Kingdon (2003) discuss the role of feedback and indicators in 
policy, indicating that usually this is the way by which government officials and policy makers 
are informed about certain problems. In the case of crises we may find the same: frequently 
some time before crises occur, different actors provide feedback and indicators to government 
officials and policy makers about problems related to the crises. As Kingdon (2003) explains, 
policy-makers and government officials recurrently receive feedback that may be systematic 
and formal, by way of studies or reports, or more informal, by way of complaints, 
denunciations and caseworks. Moreover, the experience of bureaucrats is also an important 
source of feedback for government officials. However, in the case of crises, even when 
different actors are permanently providing feedback and indicators on failures linked to those 
crises, many times this is not enough to take the attention of policy makers and place those 
issues on the governmental decision agenda (i.e. issues to be faced by policy makers). 
According to Kingdon (2003) indicators and signals are subject to interpretation, and different 
actors may interpret the same indictors and signals in different ways. This may add ambiguity 
to the process of identifying crises. At the end, it is the interpretation of data and signals that 
actually transform feedback from conditions to problems to be faced by policy makers (i.e. 
policy problems). Birkland (2006) explains that whether an event is defined as crisis is a matter 
of how the relevant actors interpret that event, their indicators and signals, and whether these 
events are defined as policy problems. Interpretation of signals and ambiguity in diagnosing 
crises may be crucial in the timing of planning and developing policy responses to address 
those events. Indicators and signals that are interpreted early as warnings of coming 
catastrophic events might help to prevent, address early, or reduce the magnitude of those 
situations. 
In the definition of crisis used by this research (see page 23), the ‘progressive’ aspect of crises 
allows for the interpretative facet in defining them as policy problems, including the possibility 
of dismissing (deliberately or unintentionally) indicators, signals and feedback that may prove 
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that a crisis is occurring or will occur. A long time before the emergency of the sanitary crisis in 
the Chilean salmon industry, NGOs were giving feedback about the poor environmental and 
sanitary conditions in which the industry was operating. How this feedback was received by 
government officials is an issue that will be seen in Chapter 5.  
An important aspect of disasters highlighted by Quarantelli (2006), which may also apply to 
crises, is their feature to be qualitatively and quantitatively different from routine 
emergencies. In crises, actors must be quickly mobilised and sometimes they need to connect 
with other (familiar and unfamiliar) entities; a convergence of actors in crises is required. 
There is a loss of autonomy or freedom of actions of some actors (for example the private 
sector may be required to follow the actions proposed by the government). Crises require the 
application of different rules, such as faster responses, and it is likely to observe a closer 
relationship between the public and private sectors.  
The conceptual framework of this research involves the mobilisation of different local actors 
(e.g. industry and government) and their connection with other national and international 
entities (e.g. the Canadian salmon farming industry), the restriction of the industry in 
producing salmon, the development of different and additional measures, and the partnership 
between the industry and the government. Chapter 6 discusses these issues for the Chilean 
salmon case as part of the analysis of policy responses development to address its sanitary 
crisis. 
Essential characteristics of crises are mentioned by Faulkner (2001, p.138) based on the 
studies of Wiener and Kahn (1972), Fink (1986) and Keown-McMullan (1997). Applying this to 
the Chilean salmon crisis context, the following table shows some of the characteristics that 
will be further examined in this research.  
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of crises 
Characteristics of crises 
(Faulkner, 2001 p.138) 
Some characteristics of the sanitary crisis in the 
Chilean salmon industry 
The need to take exceptional measures referring 
to non-routine responses 
The development and implementation of 
measures aimed at controlling the ISA virus 
The creation of stress due to the suddenness of 
the change 
Concern for the sudden high level of salmon 
mortality in the industry 
The pressure on adaptive capabilities The pressure of the industry on adapting to the 
new scenario after ISA crisis 
A triggering event, which is so significant that it 
challenges the existing structure, routine 
operations or survival of the organisation 
The opportunity to challenge the established 
policy paradigm and regulatory framework of the 
industry 
High threat, short decision time and an element of 
surprise and urgency 
The urgency in stopping the epizootic2 caused by 
ISAv involving the short time to decide what to do 
and how to do it 
A perception of an inability to cope among those 
directly affected 
The potential perception of an inability of the 
government to impose rules to producers to stop 
the epizootic 
A turning point, when decisive change, which may 
have both positive and negative connotations, is 
imminent 
The turning point in the industry for a policy 
change 
Characterised by fluid, unstable and dynamic 
situations 
The potential for dynamic conflict and ambiguity 
over policy issues 
Source: Own elaboration based on Faulkner (2001, p.138). 
The characteristics of crises posed in the above table have implications for the policy learning 
and policy change literature. Those implications, as will be discussed later, are related to the 
type of policy response that dramatic events trigger. We argue that more radical or potentially 
radical responses are linked to urgent responses, exceptional and non-routine measures, the 
challenge of existing structures and turning points as the time in which crucial changes may 
take place. 
Summary: 
This section has explained two roles of crises to policy learning and policy change. Crises play a 
role as focusing events, seizing the attention of policy-makers and elevating the issue in the 
governmental decision agenda, and crises play a role as policy windows providing 
opportunities to push attention on specific problems. The next section will take forward the 
idea of focusing events and policy windows to begin constructing a framework for 
                                                             
2 ‘An outbreak of disease affecting many animals of one kind at the same time. It is the analogous term ‘epidemic’ 
which is applied to human populations’ (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/epizootic Last accessed: 2 
March 2014). 
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understanding how industry natural resource crises accelerate policy learning and policy 
change processes (first research question). 
 
2.3. Policy learning and policy change from crises 
The last section put forward the notion that crises act as focusing events and policy windows, 
also that they are sudden events that require non-routine responses or exceptional measures 
and decisive changes to deal with them. This reflection can be extended to industry natural 
resource crises and it can be said that these events push decisive changes at the policy level 
that challenge existing structures and routines. When the crisis comes, and if there is a policy 
ready to respond to the crisis (that policy should have been developed before the crisis 
comes), the policy is implemented without delay. However, if there is no policy ready to deal 
with it, natural resource crises push sudden changes in policies to deal with the crisis and 
correct the failures revealed by it. Like policy change stimulated by natural resource crises, 
policy learning processes may also be precipitated by those crises because when there is no 
policy ready, relevant actors start a process in which they search for knowledge and 
information to formulate that policy. May (1992) states that changes in policies providing 
evidence of policy failure require social and/or instrumental policy learning involving an 
understanding of the social construction of the problems to be faced by policymakers and an 
understanding of the policy instruments. 
Policy learning and policy change is a body of literature interested in addressing a specific set 
of problems related to how policies change and adapt overtime through processes of 
knowledge accumulation. Sabatier (1993) and Sanz (1995) highlight that changes in policy 
reflect the accumulation of knowledge from the interaction, interdependence and 
participation of different actors. This course of knowledge accumulation is part of a collective 
learning process to which, following Heclo (1974), we may refer to as policy learning. 
There is no a single definition or conceptualisation of policy learning. May (1992) indicates that 
in the policy literature it is said that the discussion on policy learning began with the work of 
Karl Deutsch (1966) on ‘the role of feedback in enhancing governmental learning capacity’ 
(p.332). Based on Deutsch’s work, Hugh Heclo (1974) defined and studied the political learning 
and social learning examining the social politics in Britain and Sweden. Since then policy 
learning concepts have emerged within the policy literature to challenge conflict and power 
theories in explaining policy making processes, as indicated by Bennett and Howlett (1992). 
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Without neglecting the role of the power in making policies, Heclo (1974) observed that 
policies are the result of a process of learning from political interaction, and that policy 
development processes were not just stimulated for power relationships but also from a 
variety of triggers outside the power domain. 
The concept of policy learning has evolved since then, and there is no a single 
conceptualisation of policy learning. These conceptualisations have led to different 
understandings of what policy learning means, and consequently to define different types of 
policy learning. Because of this, and as noted by Bennett and Howlett (1992), there are several 
different explanations of policy change based on these different conceptualisations of policy 
learning. Bennett and Howlett (1992) and Birkland (2006) state that the four key 
conceptualisations of policy learning are political learning (works of Hugh Heclo and Peter 
May), lesson drawing (works of Richard Rose and some work of Hugh Heclo), social learning 
(works of Peter Hall, Paul Sabatier, Peter May and some work of Hugh Heclo), and government 
learning (works of Lloyd Etheredge). So, in the literature, policy learning means different things 
but when this research uses it, it means social policy learning in the conceptualisation made by 
Peter Hall, and complemented with the works of Paul Sabatier and Peter May as explained 
below. 
An important premise of the policy and policy learning literature is that these processes of 
learning occur consciously and intentionally rather than by accident (as named in other 
literatures as muddling through). These constitute, as Hall (1993) indicates, ‘a deliberate 
attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new 
information’ (p.278). For Hall, changes in policies are the result of processes of learning and 
they may occur at three levels. The first, and simplest, policy change refers to changes in the 
setting of the policy instruments. At the second level, changes are made in the policy 
instruments, whilst more radical changes are said to occur at the level of the goals guiding 
policy (shift in the policy paradigm as will be explained later). However, unlike Hall, in policy 
windows opened by crises, these adjustments respond directly to the crises and more 
indirectly to past experience and new information. Policy responds to the crisis in the first 
place.  
Hall (1993) explains that one of the principal factors affecting policy is past policy. He 
exemplifies this by saying that ‘policy responds less directly to social and economic conditions 
than it does to the consequences of past policy’ (Hall, 1993, p.277). However, considering 
crises as an intervening variable between policy learning and policy change, we may say that, 
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in crises, policy responds less directly (or indirectly) to past policy, or consequences of past 
policy, and directly to the crisis. For example, in the case of the Chilean salmon industry, we 
argue that the policy responded less directly to the industry’s social, sanitary and 
environmental conditions than it did to the crisis, as will be investigated in this research. When 
the crisis provided evidence of policy failure then the policy responded to the consequences of 
past policy. We argue that had the sanitary crisis not happened, it is unlikely that policy would 
have changed in the way it has.  
Therefore, this research employs an adapted definition of Hall’s policy learning as ‘a deliberate 
attempt to adjust the goals or techniques or instruments or establish new goals and create 
new techniques of policy in direct response to external dramatic events like crises and 
indirectly to past experience and new information’. This adaptation is made considering that, 
in the case of the Chilean salmon industry, the policy responded directly to the sanitary crisis 
(an external event) and indirectly to the past experience of the industry.  
Another dimension that Hall (1993) explores in his study of policy learning is the role of the 
actors in pushing forward the learning process. He criticises the conventional model of social 
policy learning in this respect since this model states that the experts in a given field policy are 
the key agent mobilising and/or influencing the process of learning. According to Hall, ‘[the 
state theorists’ model] tends to downgrade the role of politicians in social learning and to 
attribute particular importance to the officials or experts who specialise in specific fields of 
policy’ (p.277). However, neither the conventional model of social policy learning criticised by 
Hall, nor Hall’s model of social policy learning, take into account the role of other “actors”, 
different from experts and politicians, pushing forward policy learning processes.  
As argued in Section 2.2, in crises, a closer relationship is likely to exist between the public and 
private sectors. This suggests that, like the public sector (e.g. politicians and bureaucrats), the 
private sector may also play a very active role in making policy and pushing forward the 
learning process; this is because they may provide valuable evidence on, for example, the 
technical and political feasibility of policy responses. Also NGOs, researchers and consultants, 
to name but a few, may also play an important role in pushing forward policy learning. 
In terms of the autonomy of the state from outside factors such as societal pressures, Hall 
(1993) mentions that ‘Heclo rejects the view that outside factors, such as socioeconomic 
development, elections, political parties, and organised interests, play a primary role in the 
development of social policy’ (p.278). However, as we will see later in Chapter 5, in the case of 
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the sanitary crisis of the Chilean industry it was precisely an outside factor (i.e. the crisis) that 
played the primary role in developing policy since the policy reacted to it. 
In the policy learning and policy change literature, several authors have referred to different 
facets of crises and the relationship between these facets and institutional changes. The 
following account introduces some approaches to crises from a constructivist perspective and 
the role of narratives in interpreting crises (Widmaier, Blyth and Seabroke, 2007; Hay, 2013; 
Boin, t Hart and McConnell, 2009; Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell, 2014; Birkland, 2006; Farley et 
al., 2007), the role of ideas in policy change related to crises (Menahem, 2008; Nohrstedt and 
Weible, 2010; Penning-Rowsell, Johnson and Tunstall, 2006), and how crises provoke a 
paradigm shift (Walgrave and Varone, 2008; Boin, t Hart and McConnell, 2009; Wilson, 2000). 
From a constructivist approach and the role of narratives in interpreting crises, Widmaier, 
Blyth and Seabroke (2007) discuss the meaning of wars and crises as constructed meanings for 
changes in policy. They argue that wars and crises do not occur in a context free of 
interpretation. Exogenous shocks (such as wars and crises) are endogenous constructions 
shaped by the interpretation of what actors understand a crisis to be. In this interpretation 
framework, actors compete with each other to convince and persuade the meaning of a crisis 
and what should be done when a crisis arises. Positions of actors and their interests are part of 
this context. Hay (2013) also notes that ‘crises are, in effect, what we make of them; and what 
we make of them determines how we respond’ (Hay, 2013, p.23). 
Boin, t Hart and McConnell (2009) discuss how actors exploit the opportunity the crises offer 
to change policies in their aftermath. They argue that when a crisis occurs, different frames 
contest with each other in explaining the origins of the crisis and the actions to be taken. The 
framing of this contest explains the policy outcomes from crises. The authors explain that 
actors fight to have their frame accepted and, in this way, to position their narrative as 
dominant. Actors exploit the disruptions of the governance made by the crisis to defend their 
beliefs and to have a better position over authority; thus putting forward new policies. The 
dominant narrative may imply either significant or minor changes in policies. 
Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell (2014) state that narratives (which are coming from ideas) play a 
role in shaping the existence of a crisis, the perception of actors about a crisis, how policy fails 
in solving a crisis, and the proposals put forward to solve the crisis. From the work of Hall 
(1993), the authors propose a framework for analysing a paradigm shift and explaining, from a 
more constructivist approach, how and why policy change takes place. Their explanation of the 
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conditions under which institutional change occurs employs a constructivist perspective by the 
construction of narratives. As the authors observe, crises may create the conditions for grand 
policy change because, at that time, it is more arguable that the existing paradigm is not 
adequate, and the credibility of this paradigm is challenged giving the opportunity for an 
alternative paradigm to be placed. They state that the role of narratives is a key one because 
crises are events that need to be interpreted, narrated and explained to focus the attention of 
relevant actors. A successful narrative may instil the perception that a crisis is occurring, offers 
explanations about why this event should be considered as a crisis, and what can be the 
solutions to solve the crisis. For paradigms, narratives are important because they may 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the paradigm. However, these narratives need to be credible 
and offer alternatives to replace the existing paradigm.  
Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell (2014) state that it is suggested by the literature that one 
alternative narrative dominates the process of replacing a policy paradigm. However, from 
their study of UK energy policy, they found the existence of more than one crisis narrative 
influencing the process of policy change. This finding can explain in more detail the process of 
policy change as a less linear process and the structure of the new paradigm emerging from a 
crisis. After a dramatic event, the new paradigm can be something complex with internal 
tensions due to the existence of new ideas, which are combined with old ones that persist in 
the system.  
Birkland (2006) draws attention to how different interpretations of crises arise and how these 
initiate policy change and policy learning following catastrophic events. They examine a variety 
of disasters, crises and catastrophes (both natural and man-made), drawing upon the work of 
Kingdon and a variety of other authors, such as May and Sabatier, to highlight the role of 
catastrophic events in focusing the policymaking process. In this study, Birkland (2006) is 
interested in the analysis of how catastrophic events change the perception of problems and 
policy, and whether these events led to policy change as a result of policy learning, or whether 
policy change took place without learning. Similarly, Farley et al. (2007) examine the case of 
hurricane Katrina (again employing the idea that a dramatic event, in this case a disaster, 
serves to focus attention) with the aim of explaining policy responses and the opportunity for 
ecological economics to influence those responses.  
In the same line, Boin, t Hart and McConnell (2009) explain that crises have the feature to be 
perceived by a large number of members of diverse communities. These members may 
perceive the crises as threats for their values or the structure of their communities. The 
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authors highlight that it is important to note that crises and their effects are not perceived 
uniformly by the communities or by the members within the same community. These different 
perceptions that actors have reflect the distinct values and positions of actors, which is crucial 
to exploit the crisis as was previously mentioned. From these studies, and others like them 
(e.g. Kingdon, 2003 and Keeler, 1993), it is possible to derive the idea of crises as ‘policy 
windows’ to reform policy and identify the role of pre-existing ideas for how to deal with these 
untoward events. In general, these studies frame catastrophic events as focusing events, which 
are episodic situations where policy responds with urgent and short term measures. 
From the perspective of the role of ideas in policy change related to crises, Menahem (2008) 
elevates the role of the ideas as the driver of policy change and shifts in policy paradigms. He 
argues that they are an independent driver and endogenous factor for policy change. Findings 
show that, in the literature of policy change, it is recognised that exogenous factors (like crises) 
play a key role in dramatic changes. However, even though external factors may pressure for 
changes in policies, actually, the changes in policies are often shaped by ideas. Ideas matter, 
and they do not just influence the policy choices responding to exogenous factors. In the 
absence of those factors, ideas also pressure for changes.  
Menahem (2008) points out that there are two types of ideas: cognitive ideas and normative 
ideas. Following Schmidt (2002, 2008) cognitive ideas indicate ‘‘what is and what to do’ 
providing recipes for action’ [whilst] normative ideas are those ‘that attach value to political 
action and serve to legitimate policies and programs through reference to their 
appropriateness’’ (Menahem, 2008 p.503). According Menahem (2008), this distinction is 
important in explaining why some ideas that are promoted by policy entrepreneurs became 
dominant over others. 
Nohrstedt and Weible (2010) also refer to the role of ideas in policy change related to external 
events. They link external events to policy change and policy subsystems, employing Sabatier’s 
advocacy coalition framework as theoretical lens. The authors note that, in the literature, it 
has been assumed that crises have a substantial impact on public policies, and that policies are 
difficult to change because they are rooted and embedded in settings that are already 
developed and institutionalised; there is an equilibrium that cannot be changed from inside. 
Stimuli for major changes come from factors external to the policy subsystem. According to 
them, this assumption is partially explained due to the literature not being accurate when it 
talks about external shocks, which may cover a large variety of events. External shocks are 
called ‘external events’, ‘external perturbations’, ‘external shocks’, ‘focusing events’ or ‘critical 
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junctures’. Findings show that, after crises, different coalitions compete for framing the causes 
and effects of crises, but changes rarely promote new policy problems and new solutions. In 
fact, crises open windows of opportunity for actors to promote their pet problems and 
solutions that already exist in the system. Naming external shocks differently suggests the 
existence of different conceptualisations of crises; this may lead to a lack of understanding of 
the particular characteristics of these events and how those characteristics are related to 
policy responses. 
In their analysis of the UK flooding crises and their impact on policy change, Penning-Rowsell, 
Johnson and Tunstall (2006) argue that crises generate ‘windows of opportunity’ for catalytic 
policy change. At those times, the rate of changes in policy can be accelerated due to the 
increase in the range of actors and the new ideas they bring to the system. Their findings show 
that no new ideas were introduced to the system despite the presence of new actors: the 
changes in policy were already around. The authors conclude that, at the current time, it is 
possible to identify those ideas that will be implemented as policy responses when a crisis 
comes. Those ideas can be seen as signals of the policies that will be accelerated in the future 
in a context of crisis. The framing of the role of ideas as drivers of policy change, and the 
perspective that actors try to convince each other about the causes of crises, may help to 
understand better how policy makers define problems and why policy responses are designed 
in a particular way. 
From the perspective of how crises provoke a paradigm shift, Walgrave and Varone (2008) 
studied how much attention from a crisis is needed to provoke major changes in policies. They 
tested Baumgartner and Jones’s theory of punctuated equilibrium in a political context 
(Dutroux case in Belgium) different from the original study (United States), arguing that the 
sole increase in issue attention, policy images3 and new policy venues4, do not lead 
automatically to major changes in policy. They conclude that the role of political parties was 
determinant in the Belgian context to explain major policy change. A critical issue for policy 
change is the political issue attention where the political actors should invest resources such as 
money and time prior the policy change. On the other hand, according to Boin, t Hart and 
McConnell (2009), actors feel and decide whether a crisis gives an opportunity for major policy 
change or just incremental ones. In the case of a dramatic change, this will depend on how 
powerful the narratives around are to destabilise and delegitimise the existing policies. 
                                                             
3 ‘[They] are policy communities’ shared ideas about the policy at stake. They explain what the issue is about, how it 
should be seen, and which solutions are appropriate’ (Walgrave and Varone, 2008 p.367). 
4  ‘[They] are institutional arenas where decisions on an issue can be taken’ (Walgrave and Varone, 2008 p.367). 
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Wilson (2000) discusses paradigm shift from a policy regime perspective. He employs the 
international regime literature and Kratochwil and Ruggie’s definition of regime as  
‘...governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and 
organize aspects of international behaviour in various issue-areas. They thus comprise 
a normative element, state practice, and organizational roles. Examples include the 
trade regime, the monetary regime, the oceans regime, and others’ (Kratochwil and 
Ruggie, 1997 p.32 quoted in Wilson, 2000).  
According to Wilson (2000), policy regimes have four dimensions: a power dimension or its 
arrangement, the policy paradigm dimension, the organisation dimension within the 
government, and the dimension of policy itself. He argues that in order to have a policy regime 
change, the presence of stressors or enablers is needed, which create conditions for change. 
His apparent view is that a change in a policy regime occurs in phases, however, this cannot be 
seen as a linear process and some phases may occur simultaneously.  
The first phase involves the presence of a stressor that challenges and weakens the policy 
regime. This stressor discredits the dominant paradigm, giving actors the opportunity to raise 
new problems and an alternative paradigm. There are many types of stressors. One of them 
corresponds to crises that alter the routine or status quo and promote the shift in power. A 
policy regime change does not occur automatically, or just because of the existence of 
stressors such as crises. However, as said before, they create the conditions for change, and 
their function is to stimulate a shift in the policy paradigm that supports a change in the 
regime. Paradigm shifts occur when stressors become inconsistent with the dominant 
paradigm; they (the stressors) can be explained better or in a more convincing way for an 
alternative paradigm that may exist at the same time of the dominant paradigm. The second 
phase in a policy regime change corresponds to the ‘legitimation of crisis’. This basically occurs 
because of the loss of confidence actors have in the dominant paradigm. The following phase 
consists in the shift of power. There is a considerable variety of possible shifts in power and 
some of them may occur at the same time. Finally, the last phase occurs when there are 
changes in the organisation of the implementation of policies and in the goals of those policies.  
It seems that Walgrave and Varone (2008), Boin, t Hart and McConnell (2009), and Wilson 
(2000) frame radical policy change as a political process. This view may limit the analysis of the 
timing or steps by which radical policy change is likely to occur. More technical issues 
regarding crises may be linked to the different phases of these events. 
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The above discussion has identified some important work around policy learning and policy 
change associated with catastrophic events. In the following section we identify four areas in 
which there are gaps, and discuss possible ways to take our understanding further. In the 
identification of these four gaps, Birkland (2006) is an exception to the rest of the policy 
learning and policy change literature, because he limits his study and focuses on policy 
responses after dramatic events. For this reason, the work of Birkland can be related to each of 
the identified gaps. 
The first gap in the literature is that, theoretically, the concept of crisis has not been discussed 
in detail. As mentioned before, Nohrstedt and Weible (2010) note that the literature has 
vaguely discussed the concept of external shocks, which may cover a large variety of events. It 
implies that the particular features of crises (see Table 2.2 on page 30) have not been related 
to policy responses in a policy learning process. We argue that policy responses to crises are 
directly related to their characteristics, which guide the policy responses at a certain point in 
time. Birkland (2006) discusses the concepts of crises, disasters and catastrophes, and 
considers the particular features of several disasters and how these features had an effect on 
the development of policy. For example, regarding the 11 September 2001 attacks in the 
United States, he notes that a distinguishing feature of that disaster was that substantial policy 
efforts were undertaken prior to the attack to attempt to prevent a terrorist attack on the 
homeland, but that these failed to anticipate the specific features of the disaster that actually 
occurred. Nonetheless, he does consider issues of social and instrumental policy learning and 
how existing ideas prior to the attacks led to the development of new policy instruments. 
The second gap is that the causes or origins of crises have not been explored to inform a more 
general analysis on the definition of problems to be faced by policymakers, and how those 
causes guide the design of policy responses to address the crises. According to Boin, t Hart and 
McConnell (2009), in the aftermath of crises, actors exploit the opportunity to change policies. 
A framing contest occurs and actors try to persuade and convince each other about what they 
think the origins of the crisis were and what actions should be taken. Considering the claim 
made by Penning-Rowsell, Johnson and Tunstall (2006) about crises as ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for catalytic policy change, and taking into account their argument that, when this 
window is open, the rate of changes in policy can be accelerated, we extend this view of crises 
as policy change accelerators and argue that, in the same way, they can be considered as 
policy learning precipitators. We argue that crises are powerful events that create 
opportunities for accelerating the reform of regulatory frameworks and trigger policy learning 
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processes. This research adopts Keeler’s definition of policy reform as ‘policy innovation 
manifesting an unusually substantial redirection or reinforcement of previous public policy’ 
(Keeler, 1993, p.434). This definition is consistent with the positive connotation of crises as 
events to make innovations, turning points and stimuli for radical changes. As said before, 
crises as policy windows constitute opportunities for major changes (Kingdon, 2003) and an 
opportunity for a shift in the policy paradigm (Hall, 1993), as will be seen later. 
Birkland (2006) mentions the underlying causal theory of public problems. He relates this to 
social policy learning as conceptualised by May (1992), pointing out that if social policy 
learning takes place, there will be a better understanding of the causalities in problems. Taking 
again the example of 11 September 2001, Birkland states that this terrorist attack led to 
policymakers, and people in general, thinking about terrorist attacks in a different way; ways 
that were not thought of in the past were from that moment considered. Despite this, Birkland 
focuses on how policy responded to the attacks from a better understanding of terrorism, 
defined as a policy problem without too much relationship between that policy problem and 
its causes.  
The third gap is the limited view that the literature has on catastrophic events. It considers 
them as focusing events that take the attention of policymakers (Kingdon, 2003): they are 
events that last for a relatively short period. We identify these as ‘transient or episodic 
disturbances’. The policy learning and policy change literature lacks any further analysis on 
how crises evolve over time and the relationship between that evolution and policymaking 
processes. This implies that the distinct phases of crises have not been connected with the 
processes of policy learning and policy change and the forms that these processes may take, 
which leads to a limited understanding about how and why policy responds to crises according 
to their different stages.  
We argue that crises are dynamic, enduring and persistent events, and that the evolutionary 
phases of crises create a dynamic process of policy learning and policy change. We also argue 
that developing this relationship would allow a more comprehensive and systematic analysis 
to study learning and changes in policy stimulated by catastrophic events. For instance, this 
would improve understanding about how more radical, or potentially radical, as well as 
incremental changes might be made in policies, and when it is more likely to expect an 
incremental policy change or a paradigm shift in policy, as will be discussed later. Birkland 
(2006) draws his study on the work of Kingdon and the role of catastrophic events as focusing 
events. In all cases he explains how the disasters rapidly seized the attention of relevant actors 
41 
 
 
 
to develop policy. Nevertheless, the cases focus on the salient feature of disasters, but not on 
how those disasters evolved over time and how policy responded to that evolution. 
The fourth gap in the literature is the absence of a deep analysis about the role of catastrophic 
events in creating opportunities for radical policy change. The existing literature on policy 
learning and policy change refers to radical policy change and the potential of catastrophic 
events as accelerators of radical policy change. However, it does not analyse in detail the 
timings or steps by which radical policy changes are likely to occur after a dramatic event. We 
argue that crises are powerful events that create opportunities for radical policy change, and 
that they alter the timing of decision-making for introducing those substantial changes. The 
changes in policy are linked to the phases of crises.  
Birkland (2006) discusses how policy dramatically changes after disasters. For example, in the 
case of aviation security, he reports how 09/11 effected many policy changes in aviation 
security that led to new policy instruments. However, he explains that the design of these 
instruments was a result of a collection of ideas and experience accumulated and developed 
before the 09/11 attacks to improve security in aviation, but that had not been applied. He 
concludes that 09/11 shows some evidence of learning in developing policy responses but a 
failure in implementing that learning. 
Summary: 
This section has explained the role of crises as precipitators of policy learning and policy 
change. Especially when there is no policy ready to respond to crises, these events push 
sudden changes in policy and provide the opportunity for major changes to occur. The section 
has also posed four gaps identified in the policy learning and policy change literature. The next 
sections take forward the particular features of crises, the causes of crises to inform policy 
responses, the evolutionary stages of crises in developing and implementing policy responses, 
and the opportunities for radical policy change after dramatic events to continue to answer 
the research questions. 
 
2.4. Causes of crises as the basis for policy responses 
This section takes forward the idea of causes of crises to discuss how these causes inform the 
design of policy responses. The variety of responses that policymakers start to consider after a 
crisis may have their origins in the conditions that stimulated the crisis. The section begins with 
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a discussion of traditional explanations about why resource crises occur. The second section 
proposes an alternative explanation to the traditional ones. Finally, the last section discusses 
how explanations of resource crises may be taken into account to design policy responses. 
2.4.1. Traditional explanations of causes of resource crises 
In the environmental politics literature, the studies of Irving and Priddle (1971), Ophuls (1977), 
Sprout and Sprout (1978), and Garner (2000), indicate that resource crises are mainly linked to 
issues such as resource scarcity, pollution and resource depletion and degradation, including 
the overexploitation of resources. Garner (2000) points out that the focus of the studies within 
that literature is the human impact on the natural environment. Hardin’s tragedy of the 
commons and Ostrom’s collective action theory are the traditional lenses by which this 
phenomenon has been studied. These studies deal with individual issues. For example, 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons deals with the self-interest of actors exploiting a common 
resource, and Ostrom’s collective action theory deals with a form of actors’ organisation to 
exploit a common resource in a more sustainable way. However, since these individual issues 
are strongly linked with ecological systems, a systemic view is needed to complement these 
traditional explanations and include more aspects that may also play a role in the issues under 
study. For example, in the case of Hardin, more detail of the conditions that lead to actors to 
behave in a self-interested manner, such as the regulatory environment and social norms, 
could be interesting to analyse. 
Hardin (2009) states that, in the ‘tragedy of the commons’, common resources tend to be 
abused through over-exploitation. This abuse is usually translated as a self-destructive logic of 
the common resource due to its overuse, and/or the creation of negative externalities (e.g. 
pollution) produced by rational self-interest and individualistic views, which, in turn, lead to a 
competitive overexploitation and degradation of the resource. 
Since the common resource is not unlimited, both its competitive overexploitation and 
degradation through pollution end in a mutual resource crisis. The tragedy occurs because of 
the unsustainable ecological exploitation and management of the natural resource. To deal 
with, and avoid, this tragedy, Hardin argues that personal freedoms need to be impinged by 
restricting the liberty of access and use of the common resource through the institution of 
private property (i.e. privatisation), or its management as public property in which the 
allocation of usage and access rights are government decisions. 
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Iizuka and Katz (2010, 2011) and Katz, Iizuka and Muñoz (2011), point out that the sanitary 
crisis of the Chilean salmon industry is a new version of the tragedy of the commons. Focusing 
mainly on firm behaviour, they state that the sanitary and environmental mismanagement by 
producer firms was the direct cause of the crisis. According to them, the increase in world 
salmon prices strongly incentivised an increase in salmon production, which was achieved 
through an increase in fish density (fish per cubic metre of water). The results of this increase 
in fish density were translated in a significant increase of the profitability of the firms, and at 
the same time in a more intensive use of the common resource of water that eventually ended 
in its overuse5. The intensive use of the water caused the deterioration in the conditions of the 
production environment that led, in the end, to a higher vulnerability of fish pathogens, higher 
levels of fish mortality and, cumulatively, to a decrease in the productivity of the whole 
industry. They assume that all the firms behaved independently and in an individualistic and 
profit maximisation manner. 
This view is shared by Vera (2010) who points out that two out of the three main causes of the 
crisis were the profit maximising behaviour of firms. Little attention was paid to biological-
sanitary issues and the excessive desire of the firms to reduce production costs and increase 
profits at the expense of a delicate biological resource such as salmon. In Iizuka and Katz 
(2011), and in Vera’s perspective, in a certain way the crisis revealed a biological-sanitary or 
biological-environmental mismanagement originating from inadequate farming practices by 
the firms. 
The focus on firm behaviour, and the assumption that all firms behave in the same way, might 
be an oversimplification of a more complex problem of an industry that is part of an ecological 
system such as salmon farming. Kemp (2004) explains that one of the most important factors 
of ecology is the interdependence of different organisms including humans and the 
relationship among them and with the environment. Taking Kemp’s explanation into account, 
an analysis of a more complete set of actors, the relationships between them and with the 
water as a resource, and with the regulatory environment that regulates that resource, rather 
than just considering isolated actions of producer firms, might offer insights that are 
unavailable from the approach based on an analysis of firm behaviour. 
                                                             
5 This thesis considers salmon production by farming methods in which volumes of water are enclosed. Water is not 
the limiting factor since these enclosures are typically open to the ocean. However, this turns out to be part of the 
problem because the virus studied (ISAv) can be transmitted to other marine organisms that are not contained in 
the enclosures. 
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For example, Dahlman (1991) strongly criticises Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, arguing that 
the common resources were not really common and that there was no tragedy. According to 
Dahlman, on the one hand, in the open systems such as those described by Hardin, at that 
time in history there were different rights in place over the use of those resources (e.g. 
common pasture and common estuary). Moreover, those rights were neither universal nor 
unlimited. By contrast, there were rights that belonged to, and were limited to, the owners or 
tenants who lived in the villages where the resources were located, and therefore outsiders 
did not have rights over the use of those resources. 
On the other hand, Dahlman argues that there was no tragedy because the rights and rules 
implemented helped to prevent the overuse of the common resources. Rules to limit rights 
over the resources by, for example, limiting the number of animals grazing in an area, and 
rules to avoid resource overuse were embedded in practice. In this way, rights and rules were 
meant to control and protect the overuse of common resources through two mechanisms: 
limiting free access and restrictions on the quantity of rights. However, Dahlman notes that 
even with norms and rights in place, the overexploitation of the commons could still happen. 
This would occur due to ineffective attempts to regulate the resource because the limits were 
too liberal or not properly enforced. Liberal limits and proper enforcement are not just failures 
of local regulation but also of state regulation. This might be related to under-developed 
government structures with lack of capacity (i.e. resources), and capabilities (i.e. 
competencies) of regulators and bureaucrats to ensure a correct design and implementation of 
laws and regulations: these are usually a feature of developing countries. Finally, Dahlman 
points out that if the common resources were overused and exhausted in the way that Hardin 
describes, they would have had no economic value. However, historic records show that those 
resources had an important economic value. 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, and Dahlman discussion on Hardin’s tragedy, suggests that 
whether a resource crisis occurs is partly due to a failure to develop suitable rules and 
regulations to control the resource, to develop a system to allocate private ownership or 
property rights, or a lack of enforcement of coercive laws to protect the resource. When rules 
and regulations are developed by the government, regulatory capture might occur. Levine and 
Forrence (1990) and Laffont and Tirole (1991) discuss the regulatory capture theory in which 
the government makes decisions on behalf of the narrow interests of group users. In the case 
of a natural resource crisis, regulatory capture may occur when the government is ‘captured’ 
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by favouring the interests of some users through a convenient design and implementation of 
regulation rather than protecting the resource from overexploitation or degradation. 
The two solutions proposed by Hardin to solve problems of overuse (government ownership 
and privatisation) imply a system to determine who uses what, for how long and under what 
conditions. The government ownership solution assumes a capacity for government ownership 
that may not be feasible in a development context due to limits on the resources available for 
enforcement (as said above), or the possibility of political destabilisation in extending 
enforcement. 
In the tragedy of the commons, Hardin’s prediction of the inevitable destruction of common 
resources is based on the assumption that all the individuals concerned are rational, behave in 
the same selfish manner, and want to maximise their results in the short-term. However, 
Ostrom et al. (1999) point out that even when this is possible, in most situations there are 
likely to be a variety of users that have different norms of behaviour; for example, some users 
might be more altruistic in taking care of the resource in order to maintain a positive result for 
the group. In that particular case, the self-interested behaviour may be dominant only where 
the proportion of those who are self-interested is higher than the proportion of the other 
users, such as an altruistic group. Thus, the destruction of common resources as portrayed by 
Hardin may not always be the case, and therefore there may be other alternatives in which 
rational individuals voluntarily look for cooperation towards a sustainable management of 
common resources. 
Challenging Hardin’s assumptions, Ostrom (1990) developed a theory based on collective 
action. In her theory, individuals will cooperate and develop norms and rules by themselves to 
solve Common-Pool Resource (CPR) dilemmas such as resource overuse. Resource overuse has 
been pointed out as one of the main causes of natural resource crises (e.g. Hardin, 2009; 
Ophuls, 1977), such as the sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon industry. According to Ostrom 
et al. (1999) CRPs are ‘natural and human constructed resource systems in which the exclusion 
of beneficiaries through physical and institutional means is especially costly (excludable) and 
the exploitation by one user reduces resource availability for others (subtractable)’ (p.278).  
This is the case of aquaculture, farmed fish and salmon farming in which it is costly but not 
impossible to exclude other beneficiaries such as artisanal fishery and the tourism sector from 
the use of fresh or salt water. Since those resource systems such as fresh or salt water are 
subtractable they face overuse problems. Ostrom’s theory is an alternative different from the 
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government ownership or privatisation alternatives proposed by Hardin. In this theory of 
collective action solutions for CPR problems involve the restriction of access to the resource, 
and the creation of incentives to resource users who would prefer to invest in the common-
pool resource rather than to exploit it. Ostrom et al. (1999) state that, commonly, this 
restriction of access and the creation of incentives is made by allocating rights to the users or 
shares in the common resource. In the new version of the tragedy of the commons for the 
Chilean salmon industry, described by Iizuka and Katz (2011), they point out that ‘lack of 
collective action and institutional arrangement to monitor and manage the CPR [water] 
eventually damaged the long term sustainability of the industry’ (p.281). 
To sum up, the commons approach tells us that natural resource crises are due to a blind self-
interest of individuals, or institutional failures to look after common resources and avoid their 
overuse. This approach may be extended to the interest of states in developing sectors and 
industries based on natural resources in an unsuitable manner by putting economic priorities 
before ecological ones. On the other hand, the collective action theory tells us that the tragedy 
of commons can be avoided if actors do not act in a self-interested manner. At the same time, 
it suggests that a failure of resource users in voluntarily organising themselves towards a 
sustainable exploitation and management of common resources creates the conditions for 
natural resource crises. However, in complex ecological systems such as salmon farming, the 
overexploitation and degradation of natural resources, as well as failures of institutions and 
collective action, seem to be partial explanations about why and how resource crises occur. 
There could be other distinct causes from just the misuse of resources due to the blind self-
interest of users and the state, institutional failures and lack of collective organisation by 
resource’ users. This motivates the next section in which an alternative explanation to the 
traditional explanations of causes of resource crises is provided. 
 
2.4.2. Alternative explanation of causes of resource crises 
Sprout and Sprout (1978) and Garner (2000) indicate that multiple and interdependent factors 
(that we may call failures) are involved in the origins of resource crises. This suggests that it 
would be a mistake to consider that the origins of an industry natural resource crisis are likely 
to be caused by just one failure, or that those failures are unrelated to each other. This 
multiple interdependence of failures suggests that a system perspective to look at these 
problems is missing. There is a need to consider a more holistic and systemic perspective to 
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analyse the failures over natural resources, and the causes of natural resource crises 
stimulated by those failures, and in this way to offer a more complete explanation about them. 
In fact, in this research, primary data gathered in extensive fieldwork revealed that the sanitary 
crisis of the Chilean salmon industry cannot be assigned to just one direct cause, for example, 
water overuse or an institutional failure. On the contrary, all the industry actors interviewed 
reported a variety of interdependent conditions (which actors deliberately portrayed as 
failures of the industry and the sector in which the industry is embedded), corresponding to 
different categories, and identified interactions between them and different actors and 
institutions that together contributed to the emergency of the crisis.  
The existence of a variety of interdependent failures, a variety of failure categories, and the 
interaction between actors and institutions suggests that the sanitary crisis in the Chilean 
industry was not just a consequence of a resource overuse or failure of collective action, as is 
suggested by the explanations provided by Iizuka and Katz (2010, 2011) and Katz, Iizuka and 
Muñoz (2011), but rather it was a consequence of a more complex process. These 
consequences included the poor and strong interaction among different actors (e.g. producers, 
universities, bureaucrats), the lack of organisational and technical capabilities in producers and 
bureaucrats, the lack of an adequate infrastructure to control the industry, the failure of the 
industry regulatory framework, a lack of trust among producers and issues related to nature 
(e.g. weather conditions) to name a few. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Like innovation, which rarely occurs in isolation and whose unique points of failure are difficult 
to identify when they appear (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1997; Smith, 2000), the causes of an 
industry natural resource crisis can rarely be attributable to a unique direct cause given the 
multiple interdependence of failures that can be found in ecological systems. Natural resource 
crises do not occur by just a single cause but by systemic failures. 
The system approach to innovation and, in particular, the system failure analysis has become a 
way by which it is possible to study and understand weaknesses, fragilities and vulnerabilities 
of systems. This literature has been mainly applied to manufacturing sectors (e.g. Malerba, 
2002; Smith, 2000), and more recently extended to service sectors (e.g. Rubalcaba, Gallego 
and Hertog, 2010). This suggests that it may also be applied to ecological systems, and be a 
suitable approach for analysing the causes of natural resource crises, since it allows the 
interdependent analysis that is needed in studying ecological systems. Moreover, natural 
resource systems as sources of production may also be considered as sources of innovation. 
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In the system of innovation literature Metcalfe (2005) and Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing 
(2005) point out that a system failure can be understood as systemic imperfections that can 
occur in an innovation system that affect its efficiency. Applying this understanding to a 
natural resource system, we may say that natural resource crises occur through a system 
failure because there are systemic imperfections that alter the efficiency of those natural 
systems and make them unsustainable, for example reducing their quality and quantity. 
As noted by Redclift (1992), sustainability and sustainable development are concepts with a 
wide interpretation. This ambiguity comes partially from the object of concern; for many the 
concern of sustainability has a natural resource base and for others it is related to levels of 
production and consumption. As a consequence, there are conflicting opinions on the manner 
in which sustainability and sustainable development might be achieved. As will be seen later in 
Chapter 5, this research shows a tension between these interpretations of sustainability and 
sustainable development. 
Authors such as Johnson and Gregersen (1995), Breschi and Malerba (1997), Smith (1997; 
2000), Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) and Edquist et al. (1998) have paid attention to the 
different types of failures in innovation that Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005) 
summarises as follows: 
· Infrastructural failure: related to physical infrastructure that is needed to conduct 
innovation; 
· Institutional failure: classified into hard institutional failures (i.e. formal institutional 
instruments that could be barriers to innovations, for example, regulations, policies 
and standards), and soft institutional failures (i.e. social and political context that can 
obstruct innovations such as social norms and values); 
· Interaction failure: related to links and networks that stimulate or hamper innovation, 
classified into strong and weak networks; 
· Capabilities’ failure: related to competencies of the actors to conduct innovation. 
Applying the above taxonomy to natural resource systems, the failures that can lead the 
system (in this case an industry) to a natural resource crisis are: 
· Infrastructural failure: related to the physical system needed for the sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources, their operation and development; 
· Institutional failure: refers to ‘the rules of the game’ in which natural resources are 
exploited, managed, controlled and used. The rules that regulate the behaviour of the 
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resource users. Hard institutions refer to the formal rules (e.g. regulation, policies, 
laws and standards) over natural resources. Soft institutions or social norms refer to 
the social and political context that can obstruct the sustainable development of 
natural resources involving the values and beliefs that shape policy; 
· Interaction failure: related to the interaction among resource users and other actors 
related to the resource (e.g. regulatory bodies and NGOs). A weak interaction follows 
poor coordination and connectivity among actors that prevents synergies towards the 
sustainable development of the resource. A strong interaction follows a dominant 
dependence among actors that may also prevent the sustainable development of the 
resource; 
· Capabilities’ failure: a lack of competencies and capacities of the resource users and 
managers (e.g. private sector and public agencies) to sustain the natural resource and 
its development. 
The four categories mentioned above address the variety of failures associated with natural 
resources. However, natural resource systems deal with a considerable degree of uncertainty 
(e.g. unexpected factors such as natural conditions and natural disasters), which the 
innovation system failure taxonomy, and its adaptation to natural resource systems, posed 
above does not take into account. It is crucial to include this uncertainty in the analysis of both 
natural resource and innovation systems. In both systems the uncertainty may lead to 
‘unexpected failures’. Adding this category of failures to the system failure taxonomy and its 
adaptation to natural resource systems corrects the deficiency of the approach.  
The following table summarises the failures in both system of innovation and natural resources 
systems. 
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Table 2.3: Failures in innovation and natural resource systems 
Failures System of innovation Natural resource systems 
Institutional 
Hard 
Formal institutional instruments 
that act as barriers to innovation 
(e.g. laws and risk management 
rules) 
Formal rules of the game that 
regulate, control and manage 
resources (e.g. The Chilean General 
Law of Fishing and Aquaculture) 
Soft 
Social and political context that 
can obstruct innovation (e.g. 
social norms and values) 
Social and political context that can 
obstruct the sustainable 
development of resources (e.g. blind 
self-interested behaviour of salmon 
producers) 
Infrastructural 
Physical infrastructure needed to 
conduct innovation (e.g. science 
and technology infrastructure) 
Physical system needed for 
sustainable development of 
resources (e.g. lack of infrastructural 
resources such as boats of the 
sanitary authority to control salmon 
farms)  
Interaction 
Weak 
Lack of interaction that obstructs 
innovation (e.g. poor interaction 
among organisations in a system) 
Poor coordination and connectivity 
among actors related to resources 
(e.g. poor connection between 
scientific knowledge providers and 
salmon producers) 
Strong 
Strong interaction that prevents 
innovation (e.g. myopia due to 
internal orientation) 
Dominant dependence of actors 
related to resources that prevent 
their sustainable development (e.g. 
complicity between clients and 
providers of environmental reports) 
Capabilities 
Competence of actors to conduct 
innovation (e.g. learning potential 
and resources) 
Lack of competencies and capacities 
of actors related to resources (e.g. 
lack of knowledge to grow out 
salmon in a sustainable manner) 
Unexpected 
Unexpected factors that hamper 
innovation 
Unexpected factors affecting the 
sustainable development of 
resources (e.g. natural conditions 
such as a hotter season than usual) 
Source: Own elaboration based on Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005). 
To sum up, since the commons and collective action approaches offer partial explanations 
about natural resource crises, this research has proposed an adaptation of the system failure 
approach to ecological systems. This adaptation includes the addition of a category to consider 
unexpected failures that are crucial to ecological systems such as natural resource systems. 
This ecological system failure approach offers a more complete analysis to explain natural 
resource crises since it adopts a more holistic perspective involving different interrelated 
factors that may play a role in industrial natural resource crises. Moreover, it considers a more 
complete set of actors and institutions, and their relationships, that may play a role in causing 
an industry natural resource crisis. Although the ecological system failure approach offers a 
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good basis for explaining causes of natural resource crises, it says little for how those causes 
are interpreted and how problems to be faced by policymakers are defined. The next section 
takes forward the system failure analysis and discusses how the causes of natural resource 
crises can be transformed into policy problems. 
 
2.4.3. Basis for policy responses to resource crises 
The interdependence of failures revealing problems in natural resource crises suggests that, in 
an industry natural resource crisis caused by an ecological system failure, the understanding 
and solutions over crises are complex matters. Policymakers may understand and interpret 
failures and their connections differently and therefore make different causal links to translate 
those failures into problems to be faced (i.e. policy problems). Stone (1989) analyses how 
causality is made in defining policy problems. In her study she proposes a typology in which 
she categorises the actions into unguided and purposeful, and the consequences of those 
actions into intended and unintended. The combination of actions and consequences results in 
four types of narrative about how individuals define problems. The following table shows an 
adaptation of Stone’s (1989) framework about causality in defining policy problems. Each box 
contains a different narrative about the explanations of policy problems. 
Table 2.4: Narratives 
  Consequences 
  Intended Unintended 
A 
c 
t 
i 
o 
n 
s 
Unguided 
Mechanical cause: 
Policy problems are explained by 
indirectly guided actions through an 
intervening agent that have caused 
intended consequences 
Accidental cause: 
Policy problems are explained by accidents 
or events that just occur, for example, 
natural disasters 
Purposeful 
Intentional cause: 
Policy problems are explained by 
purposeful actions of humankind that 
achieve the required consequences 
Inadvertent cause: 
Policy problems are explained by wilful 
actions which have caused unexpected 
(negative) consequences 
Source: Own elaboration based on Stone (1989). 
The construction of these narratives may be explained by the dynamic of three dimensions: 
cognition, awareness, and beliefs and values. Each dimension contains elements that have 
been classified and grouped into the three dimensions in order to organise the processes used 
by actors to build their systems of references about means and ends into different but 
interdependent schemes. The following figure presents these elements grouped into the three 
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dimensions.
 
Figure 2.1: Construction of narratives in policymaking process 
Source: Own elaboration based on Sanz (1995), Slembeck (1997, 2003), Kingdon (2003) and Howlett, Ramesh and 
Perl (2009). 
Cognition refers to the processes by which knowledge and understanding are developed by the 
actors according to their experiences and relationships with others. As discussed by Kingdon 
(2003) and Slembeck (1997), this involves interpretations, understandings and perceptions 
that actors have regarding a particular phenomenon or situation. Awareness refers to interests 
and priorities defined by actors. Sanz (1995) points out that while ideas may define choices, 
interests and priorities shape and constrain them. As discussed by Slembeck (1997, 2003) and 
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009), beliefs and values include beliefs, values, ideologies and 
preferences that actors have. According to Slembeck (1997, 2003) beliefs construct mental 
models about how the world is perceived, interpreted and understood; they also allow 
communication with others. In this approach, problems emerge due to discrepancies between 
how people perceive the world and how the world actually is, or how the world is and how 
people believe it ought to be.  
The interaction of the three dimensions of interpretations, interests and preferences implies 
that there is interdependence among cognition, awareness, and beliefs and values. Each 
dimension affects the others. Cognition is shaped by awareness and beliefs and values. Beliefs 
and values may change as they are influenced by cognition and awareness. Interpretations 
about the world are framed into how the world is perceived and how it is believed the world 
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ought to be. Beliefs and values orient interests and priorities that are referenced to how the 
world has been constructed. 
In addition to explaining the construction of narratives in policymaking, cognition, awareness, 
and beliefs and values contain the elements that interplay in the manner of how conflict and 
ambiguity arise in defining policy problems and, more generally, in the policymaking process. 
The outcomes of the interaction of these three dimensions are explanations about why conflict 
and ambiguity arise in defining policy problems, and the way in which choices to solve those 
problems are shaped and constrained. Conflict and ambiguity in defining policy problems and 
in the policymaking process emerge when there are discrepancies or divergences among 
cognition (i.e. interpretations, perceptions and understandings), awareness (interests and 
priorities), or beliefs and values (including ideologies and preferences). Slembeck (2003) 
indicates that those discrepancies and divergences come from the variety of interests, 
ideologies and interpretations existing in the system. 
Surel (2000) defines cognitive frames as distinct forms of thoughts or forms of understandings. 
We may say that narratives are linked to cognitive frames, which are based upon premises that 
underlay narratives and arguments. These premises are built within paradigms. Defined by Hall 
(1993), paradigms represent ‘world views’ establishing how the world operates based on 
certain understandings, interests and beliefs. As stated by Surel (2000), one of the functions of 
the cognitive frames and paradigms is the construction of specific identities among actors. 
Since actors are connected by particular understandings, interests and beliefs that allow them 
to make sense of the world, they develop communities whose dynamics, principles and 
possibilities of action are bounded by the way they see and understand the world, the 
paradigm. This function of paradigms in this approach is a good complement to Sabatier’s 
definition of advocacy coalitions: ‘people from a variety of positions (elected and agency 
officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system, i.e. a set of 
basic values, causal assumptions, and problems perceptions, and who show a non-trivial 
degree of coordinated activity over time’ (Sabatier, 1988, p.139). In this way cognitive frames 
and paradigms lead to the formation of coalitions. According to Sabatier (1988), coalitions will 
try to translate their beliefs into policies influencing the processes of policy formation and 
policy implementation. 
Combining the elements discussed above (i.e. failures, narratives, cognitive frames and 
paradigms) about how individuals define policy problems, the following figure shows the 
hierarchy of those elements in making social constructions towards the definition of policy 
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problems in which paradigms are built according to cognitive frames, which are built as a 
response to failures that are explained through narratives. In the figure failures appear 
external to the triangle because this means that they are rationalised within the frame of a 
certain paradigm through the construction of narratives, which become cognitive frames. This 
leaves a question about the existence of multiple paradigms for multiple actors, or whether 
there is a single paradigm that is universal and what differs are the narratives and hence 
cognitive frames of different actors. This also leaves a question about how a diversity of 
failures may create divergent narratives that explain the causes of natural resource crises. 
 
Figure 2.2: Paradigm 
Source: Own elaboration based on Stone (1989), Hall (1993), Surel (2000) and Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing 
(2005). 
In the explanations about causes of crises, crises interact with pre-existing perceptions of 
failures that are seized and exploited in the construction of narratives. This suggests that crises 
act as amplifiers of past issues, bringing to the present issues that have been latent for some 
time. This was the case with the sanitary crisis in Chilean salmon farming where the crisis 
renewed the conflict between ecological and neoliberal positions on industry issues such as 
the approach of the industry policy, as will be seen in Chapter 5. 
To sum up, as the previous sub-section explained, the origins of an industry natural resource 
crisis cannot be attributed to just one cause due to the multiple interdependence of failures 
that characterised ecological systems. A systemic approach is needed to analyse the origins of 
the crises of ecological systems, such as salmon farming, to take into account the 
interdependence of failures that may play a role in the onset of these events. This sub-section 
has explained that explanations about causes of the crises depend on the narratives that 
relevant actors construct according to their own cognitive frames, which follow the ways in 
which they understand how the world operates (paradigms). These narratives are based on 
how the actors understand and interpret failures and make causal links to translate those 
failures into policy problems. The existence of a variety of narratives explaining the causes of 
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Cognitive Frames
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natural resource crises may guide the design of policy responses that may diverge according to 
those narratives. The next section discusses how policy responses to crises are designed and 
implemented. 
 
2.5. Policy responses to crises 
The previous sections have indicated that crises can lead to changes in policy, proposing that 
those changes will emerge as a learning process. Also, the effects of crises through a system 
failure approach have been reviewed, indicating that a variety of narratives to explain crises 
may lead to divergent policy responses. However, what is likely to emerge or to be 
precipitated from the changes induced by crises has not been discussed. This section attempts 
to construct a theory of how the focusing events and policy windows from crises lead to 
change, and in this way answers the second research question related to how policy responses 
stimulated by crises are developed and implemented. In short, previous sections have 
indicated that, after crises, changes in policy will occur, without saying what changes will be 
chosen or what form they will take. This section discusses a theory of what policy response or 
form of policy change to crises is likely to be. 
In the policy learning and policy change literature, Hall (1993) analyses the different forms that 
policy learning may take according to distinct but related changes in policies. In his study on 
economic policymaking in Britain, Hall examined the goals of economic policy, the policy 
instruments employed to achieve those goals, and the characteristics of those instruments. He 
found that the policymaking process involves three variables: the central goals that guide 
policy, the policy instruments to achieve those goals, and the settings of those instruments. 
According to this it is possible to distinguish a learning process related to simple changes in the 
settings of policy instruments from learning related to more significant changes in the policy 
instruments or policy goals. 
We can take advantage of this analysis to develop some hypotheses about how the learning 
process in policies after crises might proceed. However, to do that, and as was pointed out in 
Section 2.3, in order to develop a systematic analysis about the forms that policy learning may 
take linked to institutional changes, at the same time we need to consider crises as enduring 
and persistent events that evolve over time, and look along their evolutionary phases and the 
features of these phases. 
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Literature on policy learning and policy change does not provide a view of crises as enduring 
and persistent events, but literature on crises and disasters management provides some 
insights about this, pointing out that catastrophic events evolve over time from a critical 
period of urgency to a period in which normality is restored (Faulkner, 2001). Based on Fink 
(1986) and Roberts (1994), Faulkner (2001, p.140) proposed a framework on responses to a 
disaster at a community level in the context of the tourism industry. In this framework 
catastrophic events are seen as dynamic events with clear stages that evolve over time. In 
these stages the features of catastrophic events are described according to the particular 
needs of the affected community, and some insights are provided to satisfy those needs. 
Interpreting those insights about how to satisfy the needs of the affected community at each 
stage, it is possible to think about responses to catastrophic events as being more radical or 
incremental. In Faulkner’s framework the causes of the crises are not considered in the 
analysis of how they may guide the responses. 
We can take advantage of Faulkner’s framework and apply it to a context of industry natural 
resource crisis. The result of this adaptation is a framework composed of seven stages grouped 
into three phases. The purpose of the classification of grouping the stages of the responses 
into three phases is to organise the processes used by actors to respond to crises into different 
but consecutive and progressive schemes, and link them to processes of learning and 
institutional change. 
Phase One. Prevention: 
Stage 1. Pre-event: when actions can be taken and policies can be designed to prevent industry 
natural resource crises or protect industries from natural resource crises. For example, 
contingency plans, or plans aimed at mitigating the effects of potential crises, may be 
developed at this stage.  
Stage 2. Precursor: when it becomes apparent that an industry natural resource crisis is 
inevitable. As different actors may interpret signals from the environment differently, what is 
apparent for some individuals is not for others. 
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Phase Two. Reaction: 
Stage 3. Stabilisation: The point of no return when the crisis has hit and damage limitation is 
the main objective. When the immediate effects of the crisis have been felt and rapid actions 
have to be taken. 
Stage 4. Normalisation: When short-term needs of the affected community must be dealt 
with. The objective at this point is to restore the system to normality as quickly as possible (see 
page 59 to clarify what ‘restore the system to normality’ means).  
Phase Three. Recovery: 
Stage 5. Improvement: Continuation of the normalisation stage, but items that could not be 
addressed quickly are attended to at this point.  
Stage 6. Adjustment: New policies and implemented actions to deal with the crisis are tested 
and corrected in the light of experience and new information.  
Stage 7. Resolution: Routine restored, or new improved state of the system (see page 59 to 
clarify what ‘routine restored’ means). 
These three phases show the evolution of crises through different stages demonstrating (as 
opposed what the literature on policy learning and policy change points out), that crises have a 
greater effect than to momentarily focus attention. Crises produce stimuli that require 
learning rather than simply a response within existing cognitive frames and paradigms. This 
suggests that policies may react differently according to the distinct stages in the evolution of 
crises, and thus respond through different forms of policy learning and policy change according 
to the particularities of each stage. It implies that policy responses to crises are also developed 
and delivered in different stages. 
Although Faulkner’s framework does not include the adjustment stage, it is important to 
include it in a framework of policy learning and policy change after industry natural resource 
crises because, usually, when there are changes at the policy level and new policies are 
developed and delivered before the restoration of the routine, there is a period of adjustment 
in which policies may be tested in practice and dummy run periods are considered. This period 
allows errors to be corrected and gives time for actors to familiarise themselves with the 
changes. Usually during this period problems in turning new policies into practice may be 
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expected. The adjustment stage has been added to the industry natural resource crisis 
framework that this research proposes. 
For a dynamic approach of policy learning and policy change, Faulkner’s framework may be too 
linear. In dynamic processes stages can usually go backwards and have long feedback loops. 
For example, the implementation of policies may be accompanied by a series of adjustments. 
However, Faulkner’s framework provides a good starting point from where dynamic processes 
of policy learning and policy change can be illustrated and explained. 
Hypothesising from the above discussion how the learning process in policies after 
catastrophic events might proceed, we may say that once the crisis has occurred, the attention 
of individuals in and around the government has been raised and policy makers have decided 
to do something about it, it becomes a policy problem. Since the policy window is open due to 
the definition of the crisis as a policy problem, a group of actors is mobilised to find and 
propose alternatives to solve the crisis itself and the problem(s) caused by the crisis. If those 
policies were preventively developed at the pre-event stage (first phase of the crisis) they are 
put in place at the stabilisation stage (second phase of the crisis) to address the crisis. This type 
of learning might be called ‘proactive policy learning’. However, if no previous preparation was 
made to prevent the crisis, proposals are developed at the stabilisation stage and corresponds 
to a process that we might call ‘reactive policy learning’.  
As seen in Section 2.4.3, a main theme in the literature is that policy problems are framed 
according to the understandings, interests, and belief and values of the relevant actors. For 
example, Sabatier (1988) defines these relevant actors as the policy subsystem, the set of 
involved actors who deal with a specific policy problem. Sanz (1995) points out that the 
framing of policy problems in a particular way will shape the choices of alternatives to be 
looked at to solve them.  
According to Meltsner (1972), the definition of policy problems, beliefs and values play a 
significant role in developing alternatives because they define orientations and frame options 
into desirable outcomes. Actors accept and support ideas and proposals insofar as they agree 
with the beliefs, interests and understandings they have, Kingdon (2003) states. Braun and 
Benninghoff (2003) and Kingdon (2003) say that beliefs, interests and understandings can be in 
conflict, and that the recognition of this conflict makes this process neither linear nor entirely 
rational, but bounded or constrained by the self-interests of the actors.  
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Matland (1995) points out that policy goals and policy instruments could not be agreed-upon 
given the incompatibility of understandings, interests and beliefs of actors. According to 
Sabatier a crucial role in limiting the conflict among actors is played by the policy brokers in 
‘keeping the level of political conflict within acceptable limits and with reaching some 
“reasonable” solution to the problem’ (Sabatier, 1988 p.141). Although policy learning and 
policy change literature is an alternative lens to conflict theories privileging the role of ideas in 
policy, we argue that policy processes are not free of conflict among actors given their 
disagreements over policy issues. 
It is expected that in earlier phases of crises more radical rather than incremental changes 
occur. This is because it is in the first stages of a crisis that exceptional responses to attend the 
non-routine problems are needed to be developed and where actors are quickly mobilised. To 
support this process, this may include the formation of working groups involving local experts, 
the connection with international organisations and experts and information campaigns, as 
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) states for the development of policy alternatives.  
By definition, immediate and short-term policy responses will be those that are developed and 
applied during the reaction phase of the crisis. Further, during the stabilisation stage there 
continues to be emergency issues and urgent problems that demand immediate attention and 
action. It is during this stage that urgent responses are developed aimed at immediate 
implementation. It is expected that immediate responses will produce immediate effects.  
In the normalisation stage, non-urgent but short-term needs of the affected community must 
be addressed with the aim, as Faulkner (2001) indicates, of ‘restoring the system to normality’ 
as quickly as possible. Faulkner (2001) indicates that normality in the context of a catastrophic 
event can be understood as achieving a similar state to that prior to the event. However, 
normality is a subjective assessment and presents ambiguities related with its measure. Actors 
may differ about what they see or think of as being normal. For example, some may think that, 
after a crisis, ‘normality’ is what they used to be able to do and can do no longer (this is along 
the same lines as what Faulkner indicates as normality). In some cases, this can be infeasible if 
the changes brought about by the crisis required changes in actor behaviour. 
To reduce the problem of subjectivity associated with the term ‘normality’, for the case study 
being studied (Chilean salmon industry), this research adopts the levels of production as the 
measurable criterion of output measure to assess normality. Thus, ‘normality’ is an indicative 
goal that the actors are attempting to reach. At the normalisation stage it is likely that there 
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will be more discussion around policy ideas that need to be translated into short-term specific 
policy instruments. It is expected that they will produce short and medium-term effects.  
Sometimes in the ‘reaction’ phase governments may react slowly to crises due to rigidities (a 
kind of government failure) in the policies being implemented at that moment. A reason for 
this may be that there is no previous direct experience of the crisis, which leads to difficulties 
in interpreting the signals and recognising that a crisis is actually occurring, and a lack of 
knowledge about what to do. If the crisis occurs in a particular context for the first time and 
there is no experience of it, relevant actors will look for alternatives (e.g. policy instruments) in 
those contexts where the crisis has occurred before, for example a different country that 
experienced the same or similar crisis ten years ago. Rose (1991) refers to this as knowledge 
transfer process in which local responses are inspired by those foreign experiences which are 
being examined. This process may take a positivist approach that, as Freeman (2006) said, 
‘assumes that a thing exists in time and place and is picked up and carried over-transferred- 
and used in another time and/or place’ (Freeman, 2006, p.379). The outcome of this process 
may be new policies or programmes to address the crisis. However, according to May (1992 ) if 
there was no understanding of the policy instruments to be transferred and the context from 
where they are transferred and being implemented, this process may lead to ‘superstitious 
learning’, ‘copying’ and/or ‘mimicking behaviour’. 
Policy learning and policy change are processes of historical dependence. Policy choices are 
made based on ideas and interests that are organised in policy paradigms (Hall, 1993). 
According to Edquist (2001a, 2001b) institutions and the political environment constrain and 
shape the policy choices, which, as pointed out by Sanz (1995), strengthen or inhibit the policy 
learning and policy change. In this relationship of mutual embeddedness between actors and 
their institutional environment, industries and countries develop trajectories according to 
what they did in the past. Lundvall and Borras (2005) state that best practice and policy 
transfer cannot be simply transplanted from one system to another; this is because the social 
and historical perspective is a cumulative process and context dependent. In the words of 
Freeman (2006) this may refer to a constructivist approach in which policy is treated as 
emergent, ‘policy does not exist somewhere else in finished form, ready to be looked at and 
learned from, but is finished or produced in the act of looking and learning’ (Freeman, 2006, 
p.379). 
Accordingly, as the phases of the crisis evolve they are worked towards the system’s normality 
(see page 59 for a clarification of what normality means for this research). It is expected to find 
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more incremental changes than in earlier phases of crises as there is a re-evaluation process in 
the light of experience and new information of what has already been developed. This is also 
because the environment in which decisions are taking place is more stable than in the 
previous phase of the crisis, where the urgency to do something was present. This is consistent 
with what Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) observes as ‘normal policymaking’.  
By definition, longer-term policy responses will be those developed and applied during the 
recovery phase of the crisis. Further, during the improvement stage the issues that could not 
be quickly addressed are addressed using a post-mortem analysis, self-analysis and healing as 
Faulkner (2001) indicates. In these stages, policy responses are aimed at reassessing, repairing 
and reconstructing the system. In the adjustment stage the new policies will be tested and 
corrected in the light of experience and new information, whilst in the resolution stage it is 
supposed that the system has achieved normality or there is a new improved state of the 
system that may include new established routines. 
Since in the recovery phase non-urgent issues are addressed and it involves the reassessment 
and correctness of policies, actors are not quickly mobilised as in the reaction phase, and the 
discussion of policy ideas may take a long time. It is in this phase that non-urgent responses 
are developed and we can expect some delay in their implementation since there is a system 
of trial and error in the process. It is expected that the responses at this phase will produce 
long term effects. 
However, there may be some cases in which, during the first phases of the crisis, we may 
expect more incremental than radical changes. Two cases are identified. In the first case this 
might occur when more radical and non-routine responses are preventively developed in the 
prevention phase of the crisis (i.e. before the crisis occurs); once the crisis comes they are 
adapted and applied. In this case, proactive policy learning has taken place. In the second case 
this might occur when policies that were already developed, but not for the particular crisis, 
are adapted and applied when the crisis comes. An example of this case is the first outbreak of 
ISAv in Scotland (United Kingdom) in 1998. At that time the country already had a specific 
regulation for fish diseases and some measures to deal with ISA. This was because ISA was 
listed as an exotic disease in List I for the European Union in 1991, and Scotland, as part of the 
European Union, had to develop some regulation for this. This permitted regulations that were 
developed in principle to deal with furunculosis6 in wild salmon in Britain, were adapted for 
                                                             
6 ‘A bacterial disease of salmonids that is usually characterized by boils or furuncles on the skin of affected fish, 
although this is not always the case. The causative agent is the bacterium Aeromonas salmonicida. Furunculosis is 
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other diseases in fish farming, such as ISA, and that immediate measures could be 
implemented to control this disease when it first appeared (McVicar, 2003; Stagg, 2003). 
Following the crises phases posed above, after a catastrophic event we may say that there are 
three types of policy responses to crises: immediate or urgent responses, short-term 
responses, and long-term responses. The immediate or urgent responses are related to the 
stabilisation stage (phase two), short-term responses are related to the normalisation stage 
(phase two), and long-term responses are related to the improvement, adjustment and 
resolution stages (phase three). In the reaction phase (phase two) the policy reacts to the 
crisis, whilst the prevention phase corresponds to responses that need to be prepared before 
the occurrence of the event and allow for proactive policy learning and policy change. In the 
recovery phase the policy is still reacting to the crisis but attending to problems that have been 
defined through the discourse of policymaking. The next section discusses the immediate, 
short-term and long-term policy responses to crises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.                                                                                                                                                                    
systemic in nature as it travels through the bloodstream and affects all parts of the body, especially the vital organs. 
The rapid multiplication of bacteria in the bloodstream causes smaller blood vessels to rupture allowing the bacteria 
to spread to surrounding tissue. When allowed to advance to this stage, the disease is always fatal’ 
(http://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-153-10364_52259_10950-27389--,00.html Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
63 
 
 
 
The following figure shows the framework about how policy responds through processes of 
policy learning, and institutional change after dramatic events. 
 
Figure 2.3: Policy learning and policy change framework in the context of catastrophic events 
Source: Own elaboration based on Rose (1991), May (1992), Hall (1993), Matland (1995), Faulkner (2001) and 
Kingdon (2003). 
 
2.5.1. Immediate and short-term policy responses 
Following Hall’s definition of policy learning and policy change, this research refers to radical 
policy change as a shift in the policy paradigm. According to Hall, policy paradigms are 
‘frameworks of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of the policy and the kind 
of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems that 
policymakers are meant to be addressing’ (Hall, 1993, p.279). A shift in a policy paradigm is a 
type of policy change and a form of social policy learning that occurs when the overarching 
goals that guide policies in a particular field are altered (Hall, 1993). Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 
(2009) point out that this is an atypical type of policy change whose origins are found outside 
the formal policymaking process, and in which radical changes are expected.  
Hall’s paradigm shift is similar to Sabatier’s core aspects of a policy which states that 
‘…changes in the core aspects of a policy are usually the results of perturbations in non-
cognitive factors external to the subsystem such as macro-economic conditions or the rise of a 
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new systemic governing coalition’ (Sabatier, 1988, p.134). However, Sabatier specifies that 
‘significant perturbations external to the subsystem are necessary, but not sufficient, cause of 
change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program’ (Sabatier, 1998, p.103).  
Hall’s paradigm shift is also similar to May’s (1992) social policy learning, because both 
concepts are related to the framing of policy and how this framing guides policy actions. For 
May (1992), social policy learning entails ‘a new or reaffirmed social construction of a policy by 
the policy elites7 of a given policy domain’ (p.337). For May (1992) social constructions 
represent beliefs, preferences and perceptions over policy aspects such as policy ideas, 
outcomes and objectives. However, if we consider the interest perspective mentioned by Sanz 
(1995), social constructions may also represent the interests and priorities of actors over policy 
aspects. According to May (1992) social learning occurs when ‘beliefs among policy elites 
about key aspects of policy within a given policy domain are either reaffirmed or changed’ 
(p.338). The policy problems, the scope of the policy or policy goals are the central aspects of 
May’s social policy learning. May’s social policy learning is similar to Sabatier’s policy-oriented 
learning that refers to ‘relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions 
which results from experience and which are connected with the attainment (or revision) of 
policy objectives (Sabatier, 1988, p.133). 
For Hall (1993) a shift in policy paradigm also implies changes of policy instruments and 
changes in the settings of policy instruments. However, as he indicates, changes in policy 
instruments and their settings do not imply a change in a policy paradigm. If there is no 
improved understanding of the policy instruments, the process may lead to superstitious 
learning, copying or mimicking behaviour, according to May (1992). 
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) criticise Hall’s model of policy learning saying that the model 
is useful but confusing, and the logic of the model would actually lead to four types of policy 
change rather than three (i.e. policy goals, policy instruments, and setting of policy 
instruments). Changes referring to the ends of policymaking would correspond to changes in 
policy goals or programme specifications. Changes referring to the means of the policymaking 
would correspond to changes of policy instruments and the settings of existing policy 
instruments. The presence of new ideas and ways of thinking in policy deliberations bring 
options that address policy goals and instrument types, related to more significant policy 
                                                             
7 ‘The policy elites consist of the governmental actors - elected officials and relevant agency officials - and the 
leaders of relevant organisations with a continuing stake in the issues that comprise a policy domain’ (May, 1992, 
pp.334-335). 
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change. Changes in programme specifications and instrument components or settings are 
more related to the status quo and incremental alterations in policy. For instance, shifts in 
paradigms or atypical policy changes are facilitated by the entrance of new actors and new 
ideas into the system. 
Thus, shifts in policy paradigms are related to changes in the core aspects of policy. This may 
occur through changes in the goals of policy through the introduction or consideration of new 
ideas and beliefs in policies. According to Hall (1993), this implies changes in the policy 
instruments and settings of those instruments to attain those goals. In the context of crises the 
conditions under which relevant actors start to consider new ideas in policy, or question the 
dominant paradigm, occur when exceptional measures and urgent actions are needed to 
respond in a non-routine way to new problems faced due to the crisis. This usually occurs in 
the first stages of crises (i.e. reaction phase of the crisis; see page 57). Thus, policy responses 
at these stages may be expected to be more radical, or potentially radical, than incremental 
since non-routine measures start to be developed and applied, either from just the local 
experience or looking at other contexts. 
However, as Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) highlight, a crucial factor affecting substantial 
policy change is the policy subsystem structure. This structure changes with the entrance of 
new actors who bring new ideas to policy debates. The nature, motivation and ideas of policy 
subsystems are determinants of the policy alternatives to be considered in the governmental 
decision agenda, the policy problems to be solved, and the types of instruments to address the 
policy problems. Hall (1993) and Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) explain that alterations in 
the policy subsystem structure are related to the fragmentation of authority over policy 
decisions. Shifts in paradigms are likely to be characterised by conflicting opinions from 
experts and politicians regarding authority over policy issues, as indicated below. 
Apart from the high levels of conflict, ambiguity is also part of a paradigm shift process since 
actors may understand the policy objectives and policy instruments differently, and there may 
be confusion and uncertainty in how to use the new policy instruments, their effects and the 
roles of the organisations related to those instruments (Matland, 1995; Slembeck, 1997). 
Based on Hall (1993) and de Vries (2005), Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) propose the 
characteristics of a general scheme of policy regime change related to a paradigm shift: 
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· Regime stability: the established ideas or views are institutionalised, and the changes 
in policy are largely made according to this by a closed policy subsystem, and experts 
and officials close to the policy subsystem. 
· Accumulation of real-world anomalies: the established ideas and views of the policy 
cannot anticipate and explain anomalies, and therefore they threaten the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of those established ideas and views. 
· Experimentation: the policy subsystem makes efforts to stretch the established 
paradigm to justify the anomalies. 
· Fragmentation of authority: experts and governmental officials are questioned, and 
new actors challenge the existing policy subsystem and paradigm. 
· Contestation: the discussion of policy ideas involves a larger process, including other 
arenas. 
· Institutionalisation of a new regime: after a while, the advocates of a new regime gain 
authority positions in the decision making, and shift the existing agreements in order 
to institutionalise the new paradigm. 
In the context of an industry natural resource crisis it is possible to say that the crisis causes 
unusual problems that disrupt the industry governance processes of the industry, including the 
established industry regulatory framework (i.e. the regular way in which the industry 
operates). This disruption challenges the industry policy paradigm allowing the entrance of 
new participants and new ideas. The disruption of industry governance processes causes 
conflict among actors allowing the opportunity to change or reorder their interests, priorities 
and power. It may also introduce substantial ambiguity in policy processes and policy 
outcomes due to the novelty of the ideas, the possible lack or uncertainty of resources, or 
uncertainty in the effectiveness of the results to be achieved. Conflict and ambiguity may 
trigger processes of negotiation among actors over policy processes and policy outputs. 
Considering radical policy changes in the context of natural resource crises is important 
because shifts in policy paradigms may change the direction of the management, control and 
access of the resource, which may reorder the interests and power of involved actors.  
Part of the analysis of this research will look at whether the sanitary crisis in the Chilean 
salmon industry as an exogenous stimulus disrupted the industry governance processes, and 
whether the immediate and short-term responses to the crisis led to a paradigm shift in the 
industry. 
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2.5.2. Long-term policy responses 
Following Hall’s definition of policy learning and policy change, this research refers to 
incremental policy change as the changes in policy instruments, and changes in the setting of 
policy instruments, without changes in the goals or scope of policy (i.e. paradigm shift). Policy 
responses to crises related to incremental policy change may take the form of new or 
amended policy instruments and their settings. This definition may be related to May’s 
instrumental policy leaning as ‘new understandings about the viability of policy interventions 
or implementation designs’ (May, 1992, p.335). While Hall (1993) points out that alterations to 
policy instruments and their settings are improved or changed to achieve the policy goals, May 
(1992) states that instrumental learning does not need to be goal oriented.  
When incremental policy change takes place, superstitious learning, copying and/or mimicking 
behaviour (concepts pointed out by May, 1992) may also occur if there is no improved 
understanding of the new or amended policy instruments. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) 
point out that more incremental changes in policy are in the more formal policymaking process 
as opposed to processes of paradigm shifts. 
As Hall (1993) indicates, the conditions under which incremental policy change are most likely 
to occur in the context of crises, is when more radical, or potentially radical, responses have 
already been developed and they need to be adjusted and improved in the light of experience 
and new information. This usually occurs when the urgent issues of the crisis have already 
been addressed and the system goes to achieve normality. 
To consider incremental policy changes in the context of natural resource crises is important, 
because changes in instruments and their settings from experience and new information may 
make those instruments more technically and politically feasible, and therefore more 
implementable towards addressing the crisis, the problems revealed by it and thus avoid a 
future crisis. Hall’s categorisation of policy change as changes in policy instruments or settings 
of policy instruments is useful to know and understand when there were alterations or 
creation of instruments and/or adjustments in their settings. However, the simplicity of this 
categorisation does not allow the observation of a relationship pattern that might be useful to 
anticipate advantages and disadvantages, difficulties and facilities in the application of certain 
instruments over others, know where the actors’ capacity and capabilities are placed, and, 
finally, the consequences of the decision to design and apply certain instruments over others. 
A way to cope with this is to know a general variety of instruments that can be outcomes of 
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the policy change process. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) present a policy instrument 
taxonomy adapted from Hood (1986) that may benefit Hall’s categorisation of policy change. 
The following table presents this taxonomy. 
Table 2.5: Instruments taxonomy 
Instruments Taxonomy 
Nodality or information-based instruments 
Public information campaigns 
Exhortation 
Benchmarking and performance indicators 
Commissions and inquiries 
Authority-based policy instruments 
Command-and-control-regulation 
Delegated or self-regulation 
Advisory committees 
Treasure-based policy instruments 
Subsidies: grants, tax incentives, and loans 
Financial disincentives: taxes and user charges 
Advocacy, interest groups, and think-tank 
funding 
Organisation-based policy instruments 
Direct provision 
Public enterprises 
Quangos 
Partnerships 
Family, community and voluntary organisations 
Market creation 
Government (re)organisations 
Source: Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009). 
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) state that nodality or information-based instruments are 
those policy instruments that involve the use of resources related to the information available 
to governments. Authority-based policy instruments are those policy instruments through 
which governments use their authority to reach their targets. Treasure-based policy 
instruments refer to the financial resources of governments and their ability to raise and 
distribute funds. Finally, organisation-based policy instruments refer to policy instruments that 
impact governmental organisation, for example, changes in the bureaucracy and the creation 
of public firms. 
This section has discussed policy responses related to policy learning and policy change, which 
is summarised in the following table. It was argued that, in the reaction phase of crises, it is 
most likely to expect more radical, or potentially radical, changes in policy, as opposed to the 
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recovery phase during which more incremental changes are most likely to occur. Depending on 
the context, policy learning may adopt a more positivist or constructivist approach. Immediate, 
short and long term responses to crises may have different consequences for industry actors 
and society: this is the topic of the next section. 
Table 2.6: Policy responses along the evolutionary phases of crises 
Crisis phase Crisis stages Description of the crisis stages 
Policy change 
(Normal or 
atypical) 
Policy learning 
Reaction 
Stabilisation 
The point of no return when 
the crisis has hit and 
damage limitation is the 
main objective. When the 
immediate effects of the 
crisis have been felt and 
rapid actions have to be 
taken 
Immediate and 
short-term 
policy 
responses: 
More radical, or 
potentially 
radical, 
responses 
linked to 
paradigm shift 
(overarching 
goals that guide 
policies are 
altered) 
Social policy 
learning 
Policy transfer 
More positivist 
approach  
More constructivist 
approach  
 
Normalisation 
When short-term needs of 
the affected community 
must be dealt with. The 
objective at this point is to 
restore the system to 
normality as quickly as 
possible 
Recovery 
Improvement 
Continuation of the 
normalisation stage, but 
items that could not be 
addressed quickly are 
attended to at this point 
Long-term 
policy 
responses: 
More 
incremental 
responses 
(changes in 
policy 
instruments, 
and changes in 
the setting of 
policy 
instruments, 
without changes 
in the goals or 
scope of policy) 
Social policy 
learning 
Policy transfer 
More positivist 
approach  
More constructivist 
approach  
 Adjustment 
New policies and 
implemented actions to 
deal with the crisis are 
tested and corrected in the 
light of experience and new 
information 
Resolution 
Routine restored or new 
improved state of the 
system 
Source: Own elaboration based on Faulkner (2001), Sabatier (1988), May (1992) and Hall (1993). 
 
In the literature, policy responses to crises exemplify the approaches and types of responses 
taken by governments to face dramatic events. For example, Jacob and Hellström (2000) and 
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van Zwanenberg and Millstone (2001) report on the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE8) 
crisis in United Kingdom in the 1990s. They argue that the British government did not take a 
precautionary approach to respond to the crisis, even though the BSE disease appeared 
several years ago in the cattle industry. When the epidemic began, the government needed to 
make immediate and urgent decisions in the short term. Regulations came in the long term 
and they were considered as late responses. It was a criticism that few resources were 
invested in scientific research and that the participation of scientists was discouraged. Van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone (2001) point out that policies responded to a political rationale in 
the first place, and the goals of those responses were to reduce the negative impact of the 
disease on the profitability of the industry. Moreover, controls of the disease were not aimed 
at its eradication but to reduce the risk of the disease. 
In the case of the Fukushima nuclear disaster that occurred in 2011, Hayashi and Hughes 
(2013) discuss the short- and long-term policy responses to this disaster and the effects of 
those policies on energy security in Japan. They explain that the short-term measures taken by 
the government helped to avoid blackouts in the country, although other sources such as fossil 
fuel increased the cost of the electricity. The long-term measures produced a dramatic shift in 
Japan’s nuclear policy and they gave the opportunity to promote renewable energy. 
Fukushima’s accident is an example of how policies applied in a country may influence the 
development of policies in other contexts; it is also a case from which to learn about energy 
security policy. 
Even though the two crises mentioned above are good empirical examples of policy responses 
to dramatic events, they differ from the case study employed in this thesis (policy responses to 
the ISA crisis in the Chilean salmon industry) due to the nature of the crises and the types of 
resources involved in those crises. A key issue to develop the policy responses in the Chilean 
case was the intensive exploitation of a natural common-pool resource (water), which 
produced in the policy making process a high level of conflict and different consequences from 
the measures for the distinct actors who were users of the common resource. 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 ‘Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) also known as ‘Mad Cow Disease’ is a chronic degenerative disease 
affecting the central nervous system of cattle’ (Jacob and Hellström, 2000 pp.303).   
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2.6. Consequences of policy responses to crises 
This section helps to answer the third research question of this study. It is related to the results 
caused by policy responses stimulated by crises for industry participants and society. To 
answer this question, first, how conflict and ambiguity have an effect on evolutionary 
processes of policy learning and policy change triggered by catastrophic events is explained, 
including the evolution of policy responses according to the conflict and ambiguity. Second, 
short-term consequences of policy responses are distinguished from those in the long-term to 
give a more comprehensive analysis of industry policy learning and policy change. 
Conflict and ambiguity are two features inherent in the policymaking process and have been 
central to explaining models of decision-making such as the rational and incremental models 
(e.g. Allison, 1969 and Lindblom, 1959). We argue that the conflict and ambiguity over policy 
issues can be observable at each stage of the crises, and that the consequences of the process 
and outcomes of policy responses to industry natural resource crises can be examined from a 
conflict and ambiguity perspective. Also, that policy learning is not a neutral process based 
solely on the role of ideas and knowledge, but one strongly influenced by the power 
relationships among actors.  
As discussed by Matland (1995) and Slembeck (1997), conflict over policy issues emerge when 
there is incompatibility of policy goals, interests, values and activities, disagreements over 
policy means, and restriction on the behaviour of the addressees. Ambiguity emerges when 
there are misunderstandings or uncertainty in policy goals, policy instruments and the settings 
of the policy instruments, when different actors interpret the goals or instruments of policy 
differently, when there is misunderstanding or uncertainty in the role of actors, uncertainty in 
the capability or capacity and resources to reach policy goals or implement policy instruments, 
and when there is ambiguity in the language of policy. 
We argue that both conflict and ambiguity over policy issues have diverse sources and they 
evolve over time along the phases of the crises. They change as actors’ knowledge, interests 
and values of problems and options evolve over time and through experience (see pages 52-
53). Although knowledge and interests are more variable, actors’ values and beliefs may be 
more stable. 
Conflict and ambiguity are often seen as negatively correlated; as Matland (1995) points out, 
ambiguity is a way to limit conflict. As long as the policy goals are diffuse the levels of conflict 
will be low. The clearer the goals are the more likely it will be that they lead to conflict 
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(Matland, 1995). As seen in Section 2.4.3, interests and understandings of actors change over 
time and, after a period, conflict again emerges according to the specific interests and 
understandings of actors at that point in time. To reduce the conflict, the ambiguity will be 
increased, which after a while will again cause conflict.  
In policy responses to crises, conflict and ambiguity can be observable during each of the 
evolutionary phases of crises. For instance, in the stabilisation stage the urgency ‘to do 
something’ to address the crisis may lead to high ambiguity and low conflict on the immediate 
policy responses to be developed and implemented. However, when the urgency is over and 
the actors have gained some experience in implementing the responses, the ambiguity will 
decrease while conflict may increase due to the interests of actors having changed over the 
framing of new issues that arise at that point in time. This dynamic between ambiguity and 
conflict may be repeated through all the stages of crises. Conflict and ambiguity re-emerge 
over time and change the direction of policy responses, stimulating further industry policy 
changes and continuing with the industry policy learning process. 
In his attempt to synthesise the policy implementation literature, Matland (1995) developed a 
conflict and ambiguity model in which, depending on their intensity (low or high), conflict and 
ambiguity lead to different types of policy implementation. Policy learning and policy change 
literature may take advantage of this model and adapt it to explain the consequences of policy 
responses through the policy learning process triggered by catastrophic events. The following 
table shows the characterisation of policy consequences from policy responses. 
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Table 2.7: Conflict and ambiguity from policy responses 
 Conflict: 
- Incompatibility of policy goals, interests, values, activities 
- Disagreement over means 
- Restriction of the behaviour of the addressees 
Low High 
Ambiguity: 
- Misunderstanding and/or 
uncertainties in policy goals, 
instruments, instrument 
settings 
- Different interpretations of 
policy goals, scope and/or 
instruments 
- Misunderstanding and/or 
uncertainties in the role of 
actors 
- Uncertainty in capability 
and/or capacity and resources 
to reach policy goals and/or 
implement policy instruments 
- Ambiguity in policy language 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
Straightforward policy 
responses 
Emergence of divisions 
among actors over policy 
responses 
High Vague policy responses that are not contested by actors  Chaotic policy responses 
Source: Own elaboration based on Matland (1995) and Slembeck (1997). 
Policy responses have consequences that can be mapped in the conflict and ambiguity 
perspective matrix posed above at different points in time (e.g. short and long term). The 
evolution of the dynamic of conflict, ambiguity and their interrelation along the evolutionary 
phases of crises through changes in policies is visualised as the movement of a consequence 
from one quadrant to another. Like policy responses, their consequences can be categorised 
into short-term consequences and long-term consequences. Following the crises phases posed 
in the previous section, by definition, immediate and short-term consequences are related to 
the reaction phase (i.e. stabilisation and normalisation stages), and the long-term 
consequences are related to the recovery phase (i.e. improvement, adjustment and resolution 
stages); this will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2.6.1. Short-term and long-term consequences of policy responses 
In the short-term, during the reaction phase of crises, actors develop policy responses to 
address the urgent and short-term problems caused by the crisis. Conflict and ambiguity may 
emerge from the design of those responses. Since mainly at the beginning of the crisis urgent 
responses are required and rapid action has to be taken, it may be expected that those 
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responses will be designed and decided by a close group of actors excluding others with the 
belief of rapidly reaching consensus. In situations with low degrees of conflict, the close group 
of actors can take decisions that other actors will accept because they are effectively 
representative of those who are not included. However, in situations with high conflict the 
need for a close group of actors may cause conflict due to disagreements and lack of 
consensus over policy responses that have been decided by others, and which affect their 
interests and values. Moreover, ambiguity over policy means (e.g. resources), how to address 
the crisis and over policy instruments may also be expected to influence short-term 
consequences.  
In the long-term, during the recovery phase of crises, it is supposed that the system moves to 
restore its normality. As was pointed out earlier, normality is an ambiguous concept (see page 
59), and it will depend on how different actors understand it. It may include the routinising 
and updating of policy instruments, governance processes, and balancing the interests of 
actors that were destabilised by the crisis. Moreover, normality, for some actors, may also 
involve the process of reducing the ambiguity of policy instruments. For example, it may be 
required that all actors understand the new policies in the same way as they were intended, to 
ensure capacity and resources to put the policy responses into practice, that actors and 
organisations are clear about their roles, and that the language of the policy and instruments is 
clear. However, the reduction of conflict and ambiguity of policy responses could not always 
be achieved. 
Conflict and ambiguity, as noted by Matland (1995), are crucial in implementing policy. 
Difficulties in putting policy into practice can be found in both the short and long term 
responses. In the context of crises, since especially at early stages of crises policy responses 
may be more radical, or potentially radical, to address the non-routine problems, it is expected 
to find more difficulties in implementing those responses. From a conflict-ambiguity 
perspective, Slembeck (1997) points out that difficulties in putting policies into practice and 
implementing them in the same way as they were intended may be caused by principal agent 
problems9, while Kingdon (2003) notes that this also may be due to the technical and political 
infeasibility of policies. 
                                                             
9 ‘Conflicts of interest and moral hazard issues that arise when a principal hires an agent to perform specific duties 
that are in the best interest of the principal but may be costly, or not in the best interests of the agent. The 
principal-agent problem develops when a principal creates an environment in which an agent has incentives to align 
its interests with those of the principal, typically through incentives. Principals create incentives for the agent to act 
as the principal wants because the principal faces information asymmetry and risk with regards to whether the 
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Kingdon (2003) also states that some difficulties in putting the policy into practice are a 
consequence of unsolved points during the period during which policies have been designed. 
These points are those in which actors did not reach agreement and therefore the conflict was 
passed to the implementation stage. Problems in putting policies into practice call for further 
changes in policies in order to adjust them to what is workable and politically acceptable, and 
actors will try to negotiate and influence the implementation and adjustments of policies. 
To summarise, it was argued that conflict and ambiguity is a suitable perspective to explain the 
consequences of policy responses to crises since both the conflict and the ambiguity can be 
observed over the stages of crises. In the short-term, it is likely that conflict and ambiguity 
emerge from the design of the policy responses, while in the long-term they will emerge in the 
process of routinisation of policy. Conflict and ambiguity may be found in the implementation 
of policy responses due to a variety of reasons, both in the short and long term. 
 
2.7. Evidence of policy learning and policy change and the closing of the policy window 
Policy responses and their consequences may give convincing evidence of changes in policies 
responding to industry natural resource crises. However, whether those changes produce 
learning is contestable and depends on the interests, understandings and beliefs of different 
actors. This section discusses how evidence about policy learning and policy change can be 
developed, and how it might complement the answers to the second and third research 
questions of this study. Birkland (2006) points out that tangible evidence of policy change 
constitutes new legislation, new regulation and modifications in regulations or standards. 
Thus, amendments to legislation, creating updated versions of legislation, are also evidence of 
policy change. However, legislation that has been passed and published does not mean that 
learning has actually taken place.  
According to Birkland (2006) it is difficult to observe outcomes of policy learning if this process 
is not accompanied by policy change: however, changes in policies can also occur without 
learning. May (1992) argues that, for instrumental learning, this occurs when policy 
instruments or implementation designs have been modified without an improved 
understanding of those instruments and designs. He refers to this as superstitious learning, 
copying or mimicking behaviour. For May (1992), prima facie evidence of instrumental learning 
2.                                                                                                                                                                    
agent has effectively completed a contract’ (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/principal-agent-problem.asp 
Last accessed: 10 September 2014). 
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would be the redesign of the policy involving changes in the policy instruments, whilst for 
social policy learning, prima facie evidence of learning constitutes the redefinition of the policy 
goals or policy scope. 
Relating to dramatic events such as crises, Birkland (2006) points out that ‘there is prima facie 
evidence of learning if policy changes in a way that is reasonably likely to mitigate the problem 
revealed by the focusing event’ (p.22). Moreover, that there is learning when there is a high 
probability that changes in policy mitigate the problems caused by the focusing event. In the 
case where policy learning was triggered by policy failure, it is said that learning has occurred 
‘when the proximate causes of the policy failure revealed by the event are subsequently 
addressed by changes in policy’ (Birkland, 2006, p.166). However, different actors may 
understand differently and disagree on the problem(s) revealed by the crisis. This may lead to 
some actors seeing that changes in policy do not actually mitigate the problem(s), and that 
superstitious learning or mimicking behaviour has taken place instead of learning.  
As will be seen later in Chapter 7, this was the case in the salmon industry in Chile where 
changes in policies following the sanitary crisis were seen by some actors (e.g. NGOs) as 
mimicking behaviour by the Chilean industry in respect to other salmon industries (see section 
3.2), who implemented measures to deal with ISAv before Chile. The following table presents 
the typical evidence of learning in the policy process. 
Table 2.8: Typical evidence of learning in the policy process 
Organisation or Institution Evidence of Learning 
News media 
Stories about the problem 
Changes in the nature of news coverage (people quoted, substance of 
news coverage) 
Interests groups 
Changes in appearances at congressional hearings 
Increased attention from news media (generated by the group) 
Congress 
Legislative change 
Change in the substance of debate 
Change in the topic areas of hearings 
Regulatory and 
implementing agencies 
Issuance of new and proposed regulations 
Change in nature and substance of the regulation being issued 
Change in procedures and in the interpretation and implementation of 
statutes and regulations 
Source: Birkland (2006). 
Regarding the closing of the policy window, Kingdon (2003) points out that the policy window 
may close for a variety of reasons, including: 
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· Actors believe that if they made a decision or enacted legislation then they have addressed 
the problem; 
· Actors are not getting attention to make changes, decisions or enact legislation and 
therefore they are not willing to continue investing time and energy on it; 
· The events that opened the window are no longer relevant; 
· There are no available alternatives to deal with the problem(s); 
· A turnover of relevant actors that opened a window is followed by another turnover of 
actors. 
In the case of crises, since the policy window is opened by defining the crisis as policy problem, 
the policy window may be closed if actors believe that by enacting legislation they have 
addressed the crisis, if the crisis is no longer a relevant issue, or if there are no solutions 
available to solve the crisis. Also it is possible to think that the policy window may close if there 
is a turnover of the actors that defined the crisis a as policy problem and the incoming actors 
do not believe that the crisis is a problem to be faced by them. 
To summarise, evidence of industry policy learning and policy change will depend on the type 
of policy learning taking place. For instrumental learning, prima facie evidence of learning 
would be changes in the policy instruments, whilst for social policy learning that would be 
redefinitions of policy scope or policy goals. Policy change may take place without learning; 
May (1992) refers to this as superstitious learning, copying or mimicking behaviour. In the case 
of catastrophic events, Birkland (2006) points out that the mitigations of the problems 
revealed by the event may constitute prima facie evidence. However, this may be contestable 
if actors disagree on the problems revealed by the event. On the other hand, the policy 
window opened by crises may close for a variety of issues, all of them related to the 
interpretation, interests and beliefs of actors in addressing the crisis. 
 
2.8. Research questions 
This research draws on the case of the regulatory reform in the Chilean salmon farming 
industry stimulated by a sanitary crisis that the industry faced between 2007 and 2010. The 
research questions that this research will answer are: 
· How do industry natural resource crises precipitate processes of policy learning and 
policy change? 
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This question is focused on how the sanitary crisis of the industry accelerated the processes of 
policy learning and policy change. It has been argued that industry natural resource crises, 
such as the sanitary one that affected salmon farming in Chile, become windows of 
opportunity to enact policy changes that with the time and experience gained by the actors 
may be seen as radical or incremental. The underlying question is what was the nature of the 
policy change triggered by the opening of this policy window? 
· How are policy responses stimulated by industry natural resource crises developed and 
implemented? 
This question is focused on how actors respond to an industry natural resource crisis through 
processes of learning linked to institutional change, and how those policy responses are put 
into practice. It has been argued that crises, such as the sanitary one of the Chilean farming 
industry, are events that evolve over time through different phases. This suggests that policy 
learning and policy change stimulated by crises are also dynamic processes that evolve, 
perhaps in distinct ways, throughout the phases of crises. The underlying question is how do 
policy responses triggered by crises progress? 
· What are the consequences of policy responses stimulated by industry natural resource 
crises for industry participants and society (e.g. local environment and jobs)? 
This question is focused on the effects of policy responses to crises by different actors. It is 
argued that consequences of responses to crises, such as those in the Chilean salmon industry, 
can be examined by employing a conflict and ambiguity perspective. The underlying questions 
are, what are the features that have an effect on dynamic policy learning and policy change 
processes triggered by crises, and how the policy responses evolve over time according to 
these features? 
 
2.9. Synthesis of the chapter 
This research contributes to the policy learning literature and is concerned with how actors 
respond to an industry natural resource crisis through the processes of learning linked to 
institutional change. It draws on the case of the regulatory reform in the Chilean salmon 
farming industry stimulated by a sanitary crisis, and argues that the process of policy learning 
in the context of crises is very different from the process of policy learning in their absence. 
The study is guided by three research questions, and to answer them the policy learning and 
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policy change literature and the literature related to crises and disasters management are 
bridged. Although in the policy learning and policy change literature there are several 
conceptualisations of policy learning, this research uses policy learning in the social policy 
learning conceptualisation context made by Peter Hall, where changes in policy may occur at 
the levels of the setting of policy instruments, policy instruments or policy goals. 
The first research question of the study is related to the role of industry natural resource crises 
as policy learning and policy change precipitators. In the literature, crises are considered as 
focussing events, seizing the attention of policymakers and raising the issue in the 
governmental decision agenda, and as policy windows providing opportunities to push 
attention on specific problems. It is argued that crises may also act as precipitators of policy 
learning and policy change pushing sudden changes in policy and providing actions on specific 
initiatives where major changes may occur. 
The second research question is related to the development and implementation of policy 
responses triggered by industry natural resource crises. In the development of responses it is 
argued that causes of crises may inform a more general analysis of the definition of problems 
to be faced by policymakers, and that those causes may guide the design of policy responses to 
address them. Explanations about causes of the crises depend on the narratives that relevant 
actors construct, which are based on how the actors understand and interpret failures related 
to the crises, and make causal links to translate those failures into policy problems. Policy 
responses may diverge due to the existence of a variety of narratives. In complex ecological 
systems such as salmon farming, the origins of an industry natural resource crisis cannot be 
attributed to just one cause due to the multiple interdependence of failures.  
To explain causes of natural resource crises this research has proposed an adaptation of the 
system failure approach with the addition of a category to consider unexpected failures, which 
are crucial to ecological systems. This approach has been proposed as an alternative to 
traditional explanations of resource crisis, such as Hardin’s tragedy of the commons and 
Ostrom’s collective action theory. It is argued that the proposed approach offers a more 
complete analysis to explain natural resource crises since it adopts a more holistic perspective 
involving different interrelated factors that may play a role in those crises. Moreover, it 
considers a more complete set of actors, institutions and their relationships that may play a 
role in causing an industry natural resource crisis. 
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Responses that are prepared before the occurrence of the event allow for proactive policy 
learning and policy change. However, if they have not been developed prior to the event, 
policies react to crises. It is argued that policy responses to crises are also guided by the 
characteristics of crises, and that crises are dynamic, enduring and persistent events with 
evolutionary phases that create a dynamic process of policy learning and policy change. This is 
opposed to how the literature considers crises, as focussing and stagnant events that last for a 
relatively short period. Crises seen as dynamic events imply that policy responses are 
developed and delivered in different stages. Policy responses may be classified into immediate 
or urgent responses, short-term responses and long-term responses. When policies react to 
crises it is most likely to expect more radical, or potentially radical changes, in policy, as 
opposed to later stages of the crises in which more incremental changes are most likely to 
occur. Depending on the context, policy learning may adopt a more positivist or constructivist 
approach. 
The third research question is related to the consequences of policy responses to industry 
natural resource crises for industry participants and society. Policy responses may have short 
and long term consequences. It is argued that conflict and ambiguity is a suitable perspective 
to explain these consequences, since both the conflict and the ambiguity can be observed over 
the stages of crises. In the short-term, it is likely that conflict and ambiguity emerge from the 
design of the policy responses, while in the long-term they will emerge from the process of 
routinisation of policy. In the short and long term, for a variety of reasons also linked to 
conflict and ambiguity, it may be difficult to implement the policy responses in the same way 
as they were intended. 
Evidence of policy learning and policy change will depend on the type of policy learning taking 
place. For instrumental learning, prima facie evidence of learning would be changes in the 
policy instruments, whilst for social policy learning that would be redefinitions of policy scope 
or policy goals. Policy change may take place without learning, thus constituting superstitious 
learning, copying or mimicking behaviour. Finally, the policy window opened by crises may 
close for a variety of issues, all of them related to the interpretation, interests and beliefs of 
actors in addressing the crises. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SANITARY CRISIS IN THE CHILEAN SALMON FARMING INDUSTRY 
“During the winter of 2007, unexplained mortalities were 
registered in market-size Atlantic salmon in a grow-out 
site located in Chiloé in Region X of Chile” 
(Godoy et al., 2008) 
This chapter outlines the history of the infectious salmon anaemia virus in farmed Atlantic 
salmon in Chile, which caused the sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry. The 
first part of the chapter mainly explains the nature of the infectious salmon anaemia, how ISAv 
has affected the Norwegian, Canadian and Scottish industries, the susceptible host species and 
carriers, and the mechanisms of transmission. The second part of the chapter reviews the 
spread of infectious salmon anaemia in Chile and the onset of the sanitary crisis in the salmon 
farming industry. The third and last part of the chapter examines the impacts of the crisis. 
 
3.1. Infectious salmon anaemia 
The Infectious Salmon Anaemia (ISA) is a viral disease of farmed Atlantic salmon (salmo salar) 
produced by the infectious salmon anaemia virus (ISAv). ISAv belongs to the genus Isa virus in 
the Orthomyxo viridae family (Nylund et al., 1997). 
ISAv develops mainly at the stage of the salmon’s life spent at sea. It does not affect other fish, 
molluscs or sea products (Subpesca and SalmonChile, 2008), and is not able to survive in 
human beings10 (European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, 
2000). In freshwater, horizontal transmission of the disease has been achieved experimentally 
(Brown et al., 1998 quoted by Cipriano and Miller, 2003, p.4), and a rapid transmission of the 
virus has been observed between infected fish and non-infected smolts (young fish that have 
not been in contact with the virus); asymptomatic fish may still infect naïve parr (young salmon 
over a year old) 18 months after the original exposure (Griffiths and Melville, 2000). 
                                                             
10 Gastric pH in humans does not allow the activation of the virus (Hastings, 1998; Torgersen, 1993; Eliassen et al., 
2000), since the virus presents its maximum levels of replication at 15°C. It does not replicate at temperatures of 
25°C or above; a corporal temperature in humans of 37°C means that the virus cannot replicate (Falk et al., 1997; 
Hastings, 1998). The virus has been present in other salmon producers who have continued exporting salmon 
without evidence of adverse effects in human health on people consuming the salmon, or people working in 
aquaculture (Hasting, 1998). 
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ISAv was first recorded in autumn 1984 in a farming centre on the south-west coast of Norway. 
Outbreaks are characterised by severe anaemia, a chronic course of the disease and high 
mortality (Thorud and Djupvik, 1988). The mortality caused by ISAv may vary in different 
farming centres and in the same farming centre. A common daily mortality of between 0.5% 
and 1% is characteristic in affected cages that may increase overtime. In severe cases, 
cumulative mortality may exceed 90%. When no measures to control the disease are taken, it 
seems that mortality increases and peaks in early summer and winter (World Organisation for 
Animal Health, 2012). 
Since its first appearance in Norway in 1984, the virus has been reported in Canada (New 
Brunswick) in 1996 (Byrne et al., 1998; Mullins, Groman and Wadowska, 1998), United 
Kingdom (Scotland) in 1998 (Rodger et al., 1998), Canada (Nova Scotia) and the Faroe Islands 
in 1999 (Lyngøy, 2003), United States (Maine) in 2001 (Bouchard et al., 2001; Miller, 2003), 
and Ireland in 2002 (Rolland and Winton, 2003). In Chile the virus was recorded in 1999 and 
2007 (Kibenge et al., 2001; Godoy et al., 2008). See next section. 
World Organisation for Animal Health (2012) points out several susceptible host species11 for 
the virus. Natural outbreaks have been reported just from farmed Atlantic salmon; however, 
the virus has also been isolated from rainbow trout in Ireland in 2002 and Coho salmon in Chile 
in 1999. Also, wild species such as Atlantic salmon, brown trout and sea trout (S. trutta) have 
been identified with the virus. Experimental infection of other species (such as Artic char 
(Salvelinus alpinus) and Atlantic cod (Gaduos morhua)) has demonstrated the replication of the 
virus (Plarre et al., 2005). The disease infectious salmon anaemia is listed in the Aquatic Animal 
Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health, and therefore control measures 
should be implemented by the countries in which ISAv exists (World Organisation for Animal 
Health, 2012).  
It has been found that the disease spreads horizontally by salmon lice (Caligus elongates and 
Lepeophtheirus salmonis) from one farm to another (Nylund, Wallace and Hovland, 1993), 
organic material via skin (e.g. mucous membrane and abrasions), urine and faeces (Nylund, 
Wallace and Hovland, 1993), animal waste, effluents (blood or somatic cells or organic 
particles infected with the ISA agent) from farms and slaughter plants (Vågsholm et al., 1994), 
                                                             
11 ‘Susceptible species means a species of aquatic animal in which infection has been demonstrated by natural 
causes or by experimental exposure to the pathogenic agent that mimics the natural pathways for infection’. 
Glossary of Aquatic Animal Health Code (OIE, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.oie.int/index.php?id=171&L=0&htmfile=glossaire.htm#terme_manuel_aquatique Last accessed: 9 
December 2012). 
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passive transmission in seawater and blood from fish processing plants (Nylund, Wallace and 
Hovland, 1993; Jarp and Karlsen, 1997). Blood and mucous contain large amount of the virus 
and may transmit the disease more effectively than faeces, plankton and salmon lice (Rolland 
and Nylund, 1998 quoted by Cipriano and Miller, 2003, p.4). In virulence experiments, blood 
was found the most infectious element in passive transmission. Sea lice are suggested as a 
vector12 since they feed on the blood of the salmon (Stagg, 2003). 
World Organisation for Animal Health (2012) points out that it has been suggested that the 
spread of the virus may be via transportation of smolt, which could be infected prior to 
shipping, or by wellboats (specialised boats with tanks for the transport of live fish) 
contaminated with ISAv. In this way the virus can be spread over long distances. Wellboats 
may be contaminated by the transport of infected fish, or from taking water from areas 
contaminated with the virus (Murray, Smith and Stagg, 2002). Along the same lines, Nylund et 
al. (1997) point out that the spread of the virus in Norway can be explained by the transport of 
infected salmon. It has been demonstrated that the virus is still viable in infected salmon fillet 
(muscle) after being kept at -20°C and thawed. For this reason it is important to eliminate the 
virus before the fish is sold or transported. Therefore there is a risk in exporting Atlantic 
salmon from areas where the virus exists to other producer countries of Atlantic salmon. Other 
proposed significant risk factors are the use of smolt from different suppliers (Jarp and Karlsen, 
1997) and contact with contaminated equipment or equipment from individuals handling 
infected fish (Subpesca and SalmonChile, 2008). 
Vertical, or transgenerational, transmission has also been suggested for the spread of the virus 
in the Norwegian (Nylund et al., 2007) and Chilean (Vike, Nylund and Nylund, 2009) industries. 
Based on the mechanisms of transmission mentioned above, some disease control measures 
that have been proposed involve having one fish generation per site, maintaining a minimum 
distance in grow out sites for Atlantic salmon, and preventing smolt production in lakes at risk 
of ISAv. The distance in grow out sites can be different for each area according to currents and 
environmental factors (Vike, Nylund and Nylund, 2009). A minimum distance of 5 Km between 
aquaculture units is suggested in order to reduce the spread of the virus through the water, 
since passive transmission may occur over 5-10 Km after 6-12 months. Therefore separation of 
areas with different status of ISAv is needed.  
                                                             
12 ‘An organism that transmits the causative agent or disease-causing organism from the reservoir to the host’ 
(http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Vector Last accessed: 28 May 2013). Epidemiologically speaking, carrier 
and vector are synonyms. 
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Also, oceanographic studies should be conducted to understand the relationship between the 
location of sea sites and the spread of the virus through the water better. Disinfecting water 
coming from slaughterhouses and processing plants is also suggested. It has been found that 
the risk is greater when the water is not disinfected. There are different systems or methods to 
disinfect water and inactivate the virus. Treatments with heat, sodium hydrochloride, ozone, 
or ultraviolet radiation quickly reduce the infectivity, whilst treatments with formic acid or 
sodium hydroxide require more time to be effective (Vågsholm et al., 1994; Jarp and Karlsen, 
1997). World Organisation for Animal Health (2012) suggests the use of UV irradiation and 
ozone as effective inactivation methods since the virus is sensitive to this.  
Since some studies have shown that ISA transmission is related to aquaculture practices 
(World Organisation for Animal Health, 2012), in addition to the earliest diagnosis of the virus, 
and after the disease has appeared, biosecurity measures should be implemented (Vågsholm 
et al., 1994) to depopulate the site without delay (Jarp and Karlsen, 1997). World Organisation 
for Animal Health (2012) suggests the disinfection of eggs according to standard procedures as 
an important control measure. In order to control the disease and its prevalence, the 
implementation of measures via regulation or husbandry practices on the movement of fish, 
mandatory health control, transport and slaughterhouse activities is also suggested. Specific 
suggested measures are restrictions in all types of farms (i.e. affected, suspected and 
neighbouring), enforced slaughtering, all-in-all-out13 and disinfection of disposal material (e.g. 
offal and water) from slaughterhouses and processing plants. 
In 2001 commercial vaccines against ISA became available (Rolland and Winton, 2003). 
However, vaccination as an effective measure has been questionable since it seems that those 
available do not offer complete protection in Atlantic salmon (World Organisation for Animal 
Health, 2012). Kibenge et al. (2004) note vaccines also may act as virus carriers. 
Nylund et al. (1997) report that experiments have been conducted in laboratories to find out if 
ISAv can be propagated in other species different from Atlantic salmon, for example, rainbow 
trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss). They conclude that the virus can be replicated and propagated in 
this specie and that this specie can act as a reservoir14. However, it seems the virus does not 
cause significant mortalities. The lack of mortality can suggest that the virus can be present in 
                                                             
13 ‘Each production site is limited to only one generation of salmon’ (http://salmon-from-the-faroe-
islands.com/all+in+all+out.html Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
14 ‘A reservoir host or reservoir of infection, an alternate or passive host or carrier that harbours pathogenic 
organisms, without injury to itself and serves as a source from which other individuals can be infected’ 
(http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Reservoir Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
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the host for a long time and therefore this specie can act as a carrier. They also point out that 
experiments have demonstrated that the virus can be propagated in salmo trutta (salmon 
trout). Nylund et al. (1997) stress that it is crucial to know whether the virus can be 
propagated and persist in other species with the aim of improving the management of the 
disease in Norway, and the spread of the virus to other countries. On the other hand, Kibenge 
et al. (2001), Rolland and Winton (2003) and Plarre et al. (2005) report that, in wild species, 
ISAv usually produces an asymptomatic infection and for that reason these species can also be 
reservoirs of the virus.  
Rolland and Winton (2003) stress the importance of determining the risk of Pacific salmon 
(they involve several species among them there is Coho salmon) being affected by ISAv in 
order to prevent a potential introduction of the disease into western North America. This is 
because ISAv is a major disease in Atlantic salmon and there is an increased international 
movement of fish. It was shown that Pacific salmon are considerably more resistant than 
Atlantic salmon to ISAv, and apparently Pacific salmon are at low risk in terms of the spread of 
ISAv to the western areas of North America where these species are generally found. Because 
of this, the study suggests that Pacific salmon are good aquaculture alternatives in places 
where ISAv is present.  
 
3.2. Infectious salmon anaemia in the world 
As mentioned in the previous section, the ISAv has existed in the world since 1984. The first 
countries experiencing the virus were Norway, Canada and the United Kingdom (Scotland). A 
brief account of each of these country’s experience is as follows: 
Norway 
Thorud and Håstein (2003) and Lyngøy (2003) report that the first outbreak of ISAv appeared 
in the southern part of Norway in 1984, in a farm located in Hordaland County. Later on other 
farms that received smolts from the original infected farm experienced similar outbreaks. The 
counties of Hordaland and Sognog Fjordane were the first to be affected. Between 1997 and 
2002, 56% of the total Norwegian outbreaks were reported by these counties. In the north of 
Norway the disease appeared in 1988, although it is believed that there was a case in 1986 but 
it was not diagnosed. The following figure shows the number of sites subject to restrictions 
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due to ISA diagnosis in total, and in the counties of Hordaland and Sognog Fjordane (the first 
counties to be affected). 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of sites subject to restrictions due to ISA diagnosis in Norway totally and 
in the counties of Hordaland and Sognog Fjordane 
Source: Lyngøy (2003). 
Thorud and Håstein (2003) explain that in Norway ISA spread slowly. From one cage to 
another, the disease spread in about one month, and in neighbouring farms in about 6-9 
months. It was common to observe the first outbreak after the fish were treated with 
medication for other diseases. The disease exploded in 1989 and had a peak in 1990 with 80 
outbreaks (as can be seen in Figure 3.1). The spread into new areas was observed after 
infected smolts were acquired, or in farms near slaughterhouses and processing plants. It was 
also observed that the explosion of the disease in 1989 occurred a year after widespread 
movement of cages in an attempt to escape from an algal bloom event. 
Lyngøy (2003) reported that instances of ISA became notifiable events in 1988, when it was 
demonstrated that the disease was contagious. This allowed for regulations involving 
measures to control and manage outbreaks and prevent its spread. Since ISA was a new 
disease observed in the industry, no vaccines were available to deal with it; the knowledge to 
develop regulation was based on previous experiences of the transmission of infectious agents 
and epidemiological studies on infectious diseases in farmed fish. Reported by Vågsholm et al. 
(1994), Jarp and Karlsen (1997), and Thorud and Håstein (2003), in 1992 there was an intensive 
eradication campaign of the virus. However, it was clear that more scientific knowledge was 
needed. 
Thorud and Håstein (2003) explained that the studies of Vågsholm et al. (1994) and Jarp and 
Karlsen (1997) were crucial. Through these studies it was demonstrated that the location of 
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the farms was an important risk factor for the spread of the disease. The risk of a farm getting 
the virus was increased when it was located closer than 5km from an infected farm, and 5km 
from slaughterhouses and processing plants. The risk was lower in the vicinity of 
slaughterhouses that disinfected their water, but the same results were not observed for 
processing plants. Particular management practices were also shown to be a risk factor 
increasing the probability of spread. These practices included sharing staff among farms, 
removing deceased fish less than once a day, mixing smolts from more than one farm, and the 
receipt of fish previously kept in other seawater locations. 
Lyngøy (2003) and Thorud and Håstein (2003) report the following measures taken by Norway 
to reduce outbreaks and the spread of the disease: 
· proper handling and disinfection of eggs; 
· disinfection of supplied seawater in hatcheries; 
· the performance of at least 12 health assessments per year; 
· the use of more exposed sites with better currents rather than shallow and low current 
sites; 
· disinfection of seawater intake in smolt farms with ultraviolet light; 
· daily remove of mortality and installation of silage15 tanks; 
· ensuring that production sites were 3km apart; 
· restocking allowed only after the affected farm was depopulated, cleaned, disinfected and 
fallowed; 
· prohibition of the movement of fish among sites; this was allowed for slaughter that was 
authorised by local authorities. In addition, when a farmer had been selected to have his 
fish slaughtered, hygienic procedures should be authorised for that slaughter; 
· disinfection of offal and water waste from slaughterhouses and processing plants; 
· the movement of fish after they were transferred to seawater was prohibited. A regulation 
was introduced for transport vehicles, particularly wellboats; 
· disinfection of wellboats. 
McGeachy and Moore (2003) stated that, in 1994 in Norway, a plan known as ‘Stop ISA-
Norway 1994’ was implemented. Thorud and Håstein (2003) and Lyngøy (2003) explain that in 
1996 official guidelines were introduced such as the harvest or culling of affected fish. The 
harvest was accelerated when the mortality exceeded 1 fish per 2,000 per day per pen. This 
                                                             
15 Fish are ground into a slurry and the pH is reduced by adding acid such as formic or propionic (Carswell, Willow 
and Ekkert, 1990). 
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means that the fish of that cage should be slaughtered. If the mortality was lower than 1 fish 
per 2,000, the fish could continue growing and the harvest was prolonged. 
According to Thorud and Håstein (2003), since it has been demonstrated that infection could 
be transferred into neighbouring sites, it was important to segregate the sites. Two types of 
zones, combat and observation zones, were defined; official guidelines introduced in 1996 
were meant to be implemented in all the zones. A combat zone was established within a 5km 
radius from an affected location. Smolts could not be placed in sites located in combat zones. 
Restocking the zone was allowed after depopulation, disinfection and at least one month of 
fallowing. Lyngøy (2003) points out that, because of the fallowing policy, firms that did not 
have alternative sites had losses in Gulen and Nordfjord (Sognog Fjordane county). 
Surveillance on all farms was conducted with a primary focus on sites located in combat zones. 
Wellboats transporting smolts could not pass closer than 20km to the affected site, and fish for 
slaughtering could not pass closer than 5km (Thorud and Håstein, 2003). In 1996 insurance 
indemnification programmes were introduced to help the farmers reduce losses due to the ISA 
virus (Lyngøy, 2003). The following figure shows the outbreaks of ISA in Norway between 1984 
and 2002, and the measures adopted over time. 
 
Figure 3.2: Outbreaks of ISA in Norway 1984-2002 and adopted measures 
Source: Thorud and Håstein (2003). 
It can be seen from the figure that between 2000 and 2002, there was a new period of 
outbreaks, but not as severe as those observed in 1989-1992. This re-emergence 
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demonstrated that the measures adopted were not sufficient to permanently eradicate the 
disease. Thorud and Håstein (2003) point out that it is suspected that the outbreaks in the 
2000s were related to the transport of smolts and fish to slaughterhouses, and/or the use of 
vaccines against other diseases that allowed the spread of ISA through infected fish that were 
not detected. Reported by Thorud and Håstein (2003) and Lyngøy (2003), in the 2000s the 
government and industry agreed to replace the regulation with a contingency plan, which was 
implemented in 2003. The aim of this plan was to reduce the risk of the disease spreading. 
According to Cipriano and Miller (2003) the annual cost of ISA outbreaks in Norway was US$ 11 
million. 
 
Canada 
The following account is based on McGeachy and Moore (2003), who reported the Canadian 
experience of ISA in New Brunswick in 1996, the first time that ISA was reported outside 
Norway. The Canadian industry established 22 Bay Management Areas (BMAs) within the 
south-western part of the Bay of Fundy. This organisation was made to facilitate single year 
class16 farming and agreements of code of practice. 
In the summer of 1996, two sites, Lime Kiln Bay and Bliss Harbour, located in two different 
BMAs, experienced high levels of unexplained mortality in Atlantic salmon of the 1995 year 
class. Disease investigations were concentrated on bacterial assays before viral, toxicological 
and histological ones. Other farms in these two bays also started to experience sustained 
levels of mortality. In late 1996 lesions in the kidneys and livers of fish were identified, and it 
was possible to describe a distribution on the mortality events. The lesions observed in the fish 
were not consistent with other known disease agents, and therefore the observed condition 
was termed as Hemorrhagic Kidney Syndrome (HKS). Some researchers thought that this 
condition was a new clinical presentation of Bacterial Kidney Disease (BKD)17 because a 
number of farms with HKS had BKD. Antibiotics were used to treat the fish but this did not 
reduce the HKS. 
                                                             
16 ‘The group of young of one kind of animal produced during one year — used chiefly of fishes’ 
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/year%20class Last accessed: 13 February 2013). 
17 ‘A disease of trout and salmon caused by the bacterium Renibacterium salmoninarum. The disease is systemic but 
derives its name from off-white bacterial lesions in the kidney. In later stages many organs may become affected 
and the body cavity may become filled with fluid’ (http://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-153-
10364_52259_10950-27345--,00.html Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
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In September 1997 the Research and Productivity Council isolated and identified ISAv, which 
was demonstrated to be the causative agent for HKS. The National Veterinary Institute in 
Norway confirmed this finding. Based on the Norwegian experience and the risk factors 
identified at that time, New Brunswick implemented control and management strategies to 
deal with ISA. Different complementary programmes were implemented. They included: 
· an Integrated Management Plan based on detection, containment, control and prevention. 
It was based on the programme Stop ISA-Norway 1994 and the revision of risk factors; 
· an Eradication Programme based on the depopulation of clinically infected fish placed by a 
Ministerial order; 
· an ISA Management and Control Programme by the industry and New Brunswick 
Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture. This programme considered husbandry, 
harvesting, processing and transport practices, as well as disinfection of equipment, 
replacement of wooden cages, wooden harvest barges and wooden feed boats. This 
programme was based on the Norwegian experience and advised by the Fish Technical 
Committee. It involved: 
- an ISAv Surveillance Programme with the aim of detecting subclinical outbreaks of ISA in 
cages and sites at the earliest opportunity, and to detecting early clinical outbreaks in 
cages;  
- ISAv tests were performed at the New Brunswick Department of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture on weak and moribund fish; 
- the restructuring of the industry on a single year class; 
- a Compensation Programme for stock depopulation by the Canadian government. The 
government and the Province of New Brunswick funded a compensation programme for 
a period of three years. In 1999 it was mandatory by regulation for farmers to secure 
self-compensation. In 2003 an indemnification for ISA and other exotic diseases was 
proposed; 
- disinfection of materials and equipment; 
- the control of vectors such as sea lice; 
- research on ISAv, particularly on the identification of strains, virus transmission from 
broodfish, methods of virus detection and epidemiology;  
- the treatment of blood, water and waste in processing plants; 
· a Market Protection Programme by the industry. Human health and consumer perceptions 
were addressed by a comprehensive plan developed by a public relations firm hired 
specifically for that purpose; 
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Some measures adopted by the Canadian industry were: 
· the depopulation (removal of salmon from the water; emptying a site) of infected stock, 
followed by fallowing of those areas for 10 to 12 months before restocking; 
· disinfection and harvesting procedures; 
· implementation of zones or areas of concern in which there was some degree of early 
mandatory harvesting of marketable fish, and smolt placement restrictions by Ministerial 
orders; 
· the implementation of a fallowing period of four months for many affected BMAs, 
however, at that time there was no scientific data on the minimum effective fallow period. 
In 1998 a Fish Health Technical Committee was established, composed of industry 
veterinarians and government representatives. This committee was in charge of fish health 
issues in the Bay of Fundy and of advising the New Brunswick Minister of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture. The depopulation of total sites was not considered as an option, however, the 
industry and government agreed on the elimination of infected salmon, cage by cage, in order 
to reduce the spread of the virus within and between sites. 
By the end of 1999, approximately 58% (50 out of 86) of the farms in New Brunswick were 
affected by ISA and the virus continued to spread slowly. During the period 1997-2002, 55% of 
the farms in New Brunswick were affected by ISA. According to Cipriano and Miller (2003), the 
annual cost of ISA outbreaks in Canada was US$ 14 million. 
 
United Kingdom (Scotland) 
Stagg (2003) reported that the first outbreak of ISAv reported in Scotland was in Loch Nevis in 
May 1998. From there the virus spread to 11 farms that were confirmed (i.e. farms showing 
clinical signs of the disease) and 25 farms that were suspected (i.e. farms with evidence of 
infection but inconclusive results to prove clinical disease) of containing the virus. The peak of 
confirmed cases was in June 1998. The characteristics of the site where the first outbreak was 
detected, and therefore the conditions that allowed the emergence of the virus, were high 
densities, multiple fish movement in seawater, multiple generations of fish used in continuous 
stocking.  
Stagg (2003) pointed out that the origins of the virus in Scotland are unknown. It could have 
been transferred from Norway by contaminated wellboats, or emerged from a wild fish benign 
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infection. According to Stagg (2003), since the first outbreak of the virus, the industry and 
government worked together in a working group and developed a code of practice to prevent 
new ISA outbreaks and the spread of the disease. This code involved the movement of fish and 
equipment, the management of areas using a tidal excursion model, and practices for 
harvesting, processing and waste disposal. The code also provided guidance for fallowing and 
the adoption of a single year class. 
Scotland was the first country within the European Union to present ISA (Norway is not part of 
the European Union). In 1991, ISA was listed as an exotic disease in List I for the European 
Union. Therefore the management of the disease, including contingency plans, should have 
been based on surveillance to identify the disease at the earliest opportunity, the application 
of biosecurity measures to prevent spread, and the elimination of sources of infection via an 
immediate depopulation programme. This programme involved the removal of fish from 
affected farms, thus managing the risk of spreading the disease in processing and disposal. 
Depopulation of affected farms was required, but this decision was made according to the 
available logistic facilities. The farm was allowed to harvest and/or sell the fish if they did not 
show signs of the disease, otherwise the fish were culled and ensiling in formic acid to 
inactivate the virus. 
Based on the Norwegian experience, flexible depopulation of individual cages on affected 
farms was discussed. The depopulation in phases and the use of vaccines was allowed. Doing 
this, it was possible to ensure a rapid depopulation over 21 days, which was an important 
factor in eradicating the disease compared to other countries that waited for harvesting 
(McVicar, 2003; Stagg, 2003). 
ISA in the European Union is covered by two European Commission Directives: one related to 
trade in aquaculture products since 1991, and other related to control of fish diseases since 
1993 (Stagg, 2003). These Directives were incorporated into the United Kingdom through the 
1992 Fish Health Regulations, 1994 Diseases of Fish Control Regulations, and 1997 Fish Health 
Regulations (McVicar, 2003), although ISA has been a notifiable disease to the Official Service 
since 1991 under the Diseases of Fish Acts 1937, 1983 (McVicar, 2003; Stagg, 2003). This 
means that at the time of the first outbreak of ISAv in Scotland in 1998, the United Kingdom 
already had a specific regulation for fish diseases and some measures to deal with ISA. Thus, 
immediate measures could be implemented to control the disease. 
93 
 
 
 
McVicar (2003) and Stagg (2003) explain that the UK Diseases of Fish Acts 1937, 1983 were, in 
principle, developed to deal with furunculosis18 in wild salmon in Britain. However, it proved to 
be highly flexible and adaptable for other diseases in fish farming, such as ISA. They allowed 
changes to deal with ISA when it was seen that aspects of the European Union regulations 
were impractical. In this way, the existing UK legislation needed to be adjusted in order to 
define zonification (i.e. define affected zones) and fallowing periods.  
When the determination of the affected coastal zones (i.e. zonification) was required, there 
was no hydrographic data easily available and there was little information about the passive 
transmission of the virus. With basic information available about horizontal transmission and 
generic information on tide currents, a model was developed based on the distance of 
confirmed or suspected farms and their risk to other farms. This model was established to 
define control and surveillance zones.  
On the other hand, since some farms had a high number of fish by 2000, the regulation was 
amended to put it in a more practical way and, in accordance with the Competent Sanitary 
Authority, a schedule for fish depopulation was established. Complementary to this, Scotland 
was advised by Norwegian and Canadian regulators, but with some precautions since there 
were some differences among those industries, such as the hydrography, ecosystems and 
farming practices. Given these differences, a different spread and effects of ISA could be 
expected in Scotland compared to other countries. 
Since some regulations already existed, the Competent Sanitary Authority already had the 
powers to ensure the successful management of outbreaks and it was possible to implement 
control measures immediately. The powers of the authority involved the establishment of 
requirements for notification of confirmed or suspected cases in any specie, the introduction 
of measures in affected areas including surveillance zones with depopulation of affected sites, 
the provision to investigate the origins of the outbreaks and their risks to the transfer of fish, 
and the provision for fallowing sites before being restocked.  
Early warning was critical in managing the disease. Therefore, the regulation stated that 
evidence of the disease, or suspicions of it, should be notified to the official authority without 
                                                             
18 ‘A bacterial disease of salmonids that is usually characterized by boils or furuncles on the skin of affected fish 
although this is not always the case. The causative agent is the bacterium Aeromonas salmonicida. Furunculosis is 
systemic in nature as it travels through the bloodstream and affects all parts of the body, especially the vital organs. 
The rapid multiplication of bacteria in the bloodstream causes smaller blood vessels to rupture allowing the bacteria 
to spread to surrounding tissue. When allowed to advance to this stage, the disease is always fatal’ 
(http://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-153-10364_52259_10950-27389--,00.html Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
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delay. An important aspect of the regulation was to cover all susceptible fish species. Thus, 
immediate measures were applied to affected farms, suspected farms and farms sharing 
coastal water with confirmed and suspected farms. These measures involved the prevention of 
fish movement, equipment, personnel, boats and dead fish, the fallowing and disinfection of 
farms, and the immediate depopulation of confirmed farms (fish could be either harvested for 
sale if that was possible or destroyed). 
Stagg (2003) states that the establishment of fallowing periods was based on the Norwegian 
experience, and McVicar (2003) points out that six months was the fallowing period required 
by the Competent Sanitary Authority for confirmed farms. However, different fallowing 
periods were established in suspected farms and where there was no evidence of infection, as 
well as in control and surveillance zones. Thus, according to Stagg (2003), the fallowing periods 
were between three and six months, and they were determined by a risk assessment. The 
criteria for this risk assessment were the geography and hydrography of farm sites, the 
evidence of infection transmission to wild fish, the density of farms, and the common use of 
facilities. McVicar (2003) points out that the risk assessment was the base of the development 
of the measures in Scotland. Each outbreak was re-evaluated via risk assessment. 
As reported by Stagg (2003), cages, nets, and all structures and equipment that were in 
contact with infected fish were required to be cleaned and disinfected; nets were required to 
be transported to specific sites for cleaning with the possibility of leaking being prevented. 
McVicar (2003) states that in 2001 the possibility for indemnification or compensation for 
depopulated stocks was introduced, but at the time of the outbreak in 1998 it was not possible 
to do this in either the European Union or United Kingdom. According to Cipriano and Miller 
(2003), the costs of the 1998-1999 ISA epidemics in Scotland was valued at US$ 32 million 
(Cipriano and Miller, 2003). 
 
3.3. Infectious salmon anaemia in Chile and the sanitary crisis of the salmon farming 
industry 
As seen in the previous section, infectious salmon anaemia is a viral disease of marine-farmed 
Atlantic salmon. However, there are other species distinct from Atlantic salmon, such as Coho 
salmon and rainbow trout, that, although they do not develop the disease, may act as carriers, 
vectors and reservoirs causing negative biological externalities such as the dissemination of 
ISAv. 
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Chile mainly produces and exports three different types of salmon species: Atlantic salmon, 
Coho salmon and rainbow trout. Figure 3.3 provides a picture of the main physical features of 
these species and their productive cycle. They are all exotic species to Chile19 and were 
introduced for sport and commercial purposes20.  
Atlantic salmon 
(Salmo salar) 
 
Coho salmon 
(Oncorhynchus kisutch) 
 
Rainbow trout 
(Oncorhynchus mykiss) 
 
   
The average length of an Atlantic 
salmon is 45 cm and 7 kg in 
weight. Its colour is brown, 
green or blue on the back, its 
flanks silvery and its belly is 
silvery white (SalmonChile 
website). 
Its production cycle is 8-16 
months for the freshwater 
phase, and up to 24 months for 
the seawater ongrowing phase 
(FAO 2004-2012). 
The average length of a Coho 
salmon is 45 cm and its average 
marketed weight is 5 kg. Its 
colour is brown, green or blue 
on the back, it has silvery sides 
and its belly is silvery white 
(SalmonChile website). 
Its production cycle is 8-12 
months for the freshwater 
phase, and 10-12 months for the 
seawater ongrowing phase (FAO 
2006-2012). 
The average length of rainbow 
trout is 30-40 cm and its 
marketed average weight is 3 kg. 
Coloration blue to olive green 
above a pink band along the 
lateral line and silver below. 
Back, sides, head and fins 
covered with small black spots. 
Colouration varies with habitat, 
size, and sexual condition (FAO 
2005-2012). 
Its production cycle is performed 
on the land for the freshwater 
phase and in coastal marine 
environments for the ongrowing 
phase. The ongrowing phase is 
nine months approx. to reach 
marketable size (FAO 2005-
2012). 
Figure 3.3: Salmon species produced in Chile 
Source: SalmonChile (2014), FAO (2004-2012), FAO (2006-2012) and FAO (2005-2012). 
From experimental production, Chile has become the second largest producer and exporter of 
salmon in the world after Norway. This achievement has been possible by the intensive 
exploitation of the natural common-pool resource water, which has inevitably caused negative 
ecological externalities. For Atlantic salmon from a production of 41 tonnes in 1987, by 2000 
Chile became the second largest global producer after Norway with 166,897 tonnes. Chilean 
Atlantic salmon production peaked in 2008 with 388,847 tonnes. For Coho salmon from a 
                                                             
19 Atlantic salmon naturally inhabits in the North Atlantic Ocean and adjacent waters, including the Great Lakes in 
the United States and Canada. Coho salmon is a native species of the northern Pacific coast. Rainbow trout is native 
to the Pacific drainages of North America ranging from Alaska to Mexico (Knapp, Roheim and Anderson, 2007; FAO, 
2004-2012; FAO, 2005-2012; FAO, 2006-2012). 
20 Atlantic salmon and rainbow trout were introduced to the country from Germany in 1935 and 1905 respectively 
for recreational angling, whilst Coho salmon was introduced from the United States in 1970 onwards for 
aquaculture purposes (FAO, 2005-2012). 
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production of 49 tonnes in 1978, Chile became the largest global producer in 1993 with 25,150 
tonnes, followed by Japan. Chilean Coho salmon production peaked in 2009 with 156,960 
tonnes. For rainbow trout, from a production of less than 0.5 tonnes in 1970, Chile became the 
largest global producer in 1996 with 54,429 tonnes. Chilean rainbow trout production peaked 
in 2010 with 220,244 tonnes (FAOSTAT). The following figure shows the production of these 
species over time. 
 
Figure 3.4: Production of main Chilean salmon species over time 
Source: Own elaboration based on FAOSTAT. 
In Chile, and in the southern hemisphere, the first detection of ISAv goes back to 1999 when 
the virus was found in marine-farmed Coho salmon. It was demonstrated that it belonged to 
the North American genotype similar to the Canadian ISAv. Even when ISAv was isolated from 
clinically sick Coho salmon it was observed that the presentation of the clinical disease was 
different from that observed in Atlantic salmon (the natural specie for the virus). ISAv in Coho 
salmon has only been associated with a clinical condition called Icterus Syndrome21. The 
origins of ISAv in Coho salmon in Chile are unknown (Kibenge et al., 2001; Godoy et al., 2008). 
However, the ISAv that caused the sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry was 
found in 2007 in farmed Atlantic salmon. The ISA sanitary crisis in Chile as an industry natural 
resource crisis was an event, natural or man-made, sudden or progressive, which impacted the 
hygienic conditions of the salmon industry attempting against health and facilitating the 
                                                             
21 ‘The presence of jaundice seen in the sclera of the eye. Yellowing of the skin and the whites of the eyes caused by 
an accumulation of bile pigment (bilirubin) in the blood; can be a symptom of gallstones or liver infection or 
anaemia’ (http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Icterus Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
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development and spread of the infectious salmon anaemia with such severity that industry 
and government had to respond by taking exceptional measures. 
In farmed Atlantic salmon the first report of ISAv in its typical presentation appeared in mid-
June 2007 in two cages in a grow-out site owned by Marine Harvest (the largest salmon firm 
located in Chile at that time) located in Lemuy Island (Central Chiloé – Region X. Figure 3.5 
shows this location). This is considered as the index case22 of the sanitary crisis in the Chilean 
industry, although the Fisheries Service (Sernapesca for its Spanish acronym) states that on 25 
July 2007 the industry reported positive signals of the disease (Sernapesca, 2012). Those fish 
were recovering from an outbreak of Piscirickettsiosis23 and treated several times for Rickettsia 
using antibiotics that prevented death from Piscirickettsiosis. The fish were removed after four 
weeks and the cumulative mortality in those cages was between 70% and 82%.  
There was a high mortality attributed to amoebas24 and flexibacteriosis25 in other farming 
centres in the same area, which added confusion to the diagnosis. Since the firm decided to 
harvest all the remaining cages in advance, independent of the clinical status of the fish, the 
mortality of the farm was just 13%. It cannot be said that the Piscirickettsiosis contributed to 
the pathologic findings observed as ISA (Godoy et al., 2008; Sernapesca, 2008b; La 
Tercera.com, 2009). 
                                                             
22 ‘It refers to the first disease case in an epidemic within a population’ 
(http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih1/diseases/other/glossary/act1-gloss3.htm Last accessed: 5 
January 2013). 
23 ‘Piscirickettsiosis is a disease of salmonids caused by Piscirickettsia salmonis that was first reported in farmed 
Coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch). The disease was initially described in 1989 from fish in Chile’ 
(http://www.cefas.defra.gov.uk/idaad/disease.aspx?id=4 Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
24 ‘Genus of protozoa, but also an imprecise name given to several types of free living unicellular phagocytic 
organism’ (http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Amoebas Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
25 ‘The causal agent of flexibacteriosis is generally thought to be a Flexibacter sp. This group is comprised of several 
genera. They are usually chromogenic, filamentous bacteria that can cause disease conditions as diverse as 
columnaris, fin rot, coldwater disease and gill disease’ (http://www.cefas.defra.gov.uk/idaad/disease.aspx?id=12 
Last accessed: 28 May 2013). 
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Figure 3.5: Geographical location of the index case 
Source: Godoy et al. (2008). 
There are studies that conclude, and information that suggests, that ISAv was present in Chile 
prior to the appearance of the index case in 2007. As mentioned previously, according to the 
studies of Kibenge et al. (2001) and Godoy et al. (2008), ISA was detected in the country in 
Coho salmon in 1999, although not in its classical presentation. 
The study conducted by Kibenge et al. (2009) identified that the Chilean ISAv had seven 
distinct strains and they belong to the European genotype. Using a phylogenetic analysis the 
similarity between the Chilean isolates and the Norwegian isolates reported in 1996 was 
noted, and around 2005 (two years before the index case) the virus was quickly disseminated 
in the Chilean Atlantic salmon industry. Godoy et al. (2008) specify that the Chilean ISAv was a 
different variant from common European and North American genotype ISAv isolates26. 
ISAv of the North American genotype was detected in Lake Llanquihue between 2001 and 
2003. Lake Llanquihue is not the same place in which the index case appeared in 2007. It is not 
known why this ISAv did not produce outbreaks in the Chilean industry at that time like those 
                                                             
26 ‘The Chilean ISAV responsible for the ISA outbreak in Chile in 2007 is unique in that it has a 33-nucleotide (or 11-
amino acid) insert in the middle of RNA segment 5 which encodes the F glycoprotein’ (Godoy et al., 2008, p.9). 
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in Canada and United States, or why the virus was not spread in the Atlantic salmon industry in 
Chile (Godoy et al., 2008). 
Vike, Nylund and Nylund (2009) conclude in their study that the ISAv they isolated in 2008 in 
Chile must have been transmitted to Chile from Norway through infected Atlantic salmon eggs 
in the previous 10 years. The conclusion of this vertical or trans-generational transmission is 
based on the following factors:  
i) the Chilean ISAv isolates group with contemporary Norwegian ISAv genotypes; 
ii) there is a large export of eggs from Norway to Chile; 
iii) all salmonid species were introduced in Chile and therefore there is no possibility for 
natural reservoirs in Chile; and  
iv) there are other studies that document the vertical transmission of ISA virus, for 
example, the study of Nylund et al. (2007) in which it is suggested that, in the 
Norwegian industry, vertical transmission played a major role in spreading the virus. 
Vike, Nylund and Nylund (2009) point out that this result shows a need for restructuring the 
production of Atlantic salmon in Chile and reduce the introduction of exotic diseases into the 
country. There is a need for having better control of the import of eggs or the reduction of 
import of embryos from those places with a natural population of salmon, and then the risk of 
importing diseases is reduced. Another measure suggested by the authors for the Chilean and 
Norwegian industries is to produce brood stock in a controlled environment free from ISAv. 
This can avoid the circulation of the pathogen in the production cycle by screening brood stock 
for ISAv. It will be seen later that both the import of eggs and the production of brood stock in 
a controlled environment were controversial topics in the Chilean salmon industry. The vertical 
transmission proposed by Vike, Nylund and Nylund (2009) is shared by Godoy et al. (2008) who 
state that the Chilean ISAv from Atlantic salmon in 2007 differs from the Chilean ISAv from 
Coho salmon in 1999, and therefore it is unlikely that the virus from 1999 was the source of 
the virus in 2007. Both viruses (1999 and 2007) differ in their RNA. 
Alvial et al. (2012) report that some laboratories detected ISAv in Atlantic salmon in Chile prior 
to 2007, however, these detections were not reported because they could not be confirmed. 
Also they state that around 2004 there was an increase in fish mortality for non-identified 
causes, particularly in areas with a large number of farms. 
The following figure shows the monthly mortality by specie for the period 1998-2011. 
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Coho Salmon Atlantic Salmon Rainbow Trout 
Figure 3.6: Monthly mortality by specie for the period 1998-2011 
Source: Garate (2011). 
In an interview to the press, the Managing Director of Marine Harvest Chile at that time27, 
pointed out that, since 2004, the industry had shown a decrease in productivity caused by fish 
diseases that started to kill fish. To deal with diseases and lower productivity results, the 
industry used a larger amount of antibiotics and smolt. As a consequence, there was an 
increase in fish densities per area. He affirms that the identification of the index case in a 
farming centre owned by Marine Harvest did not mean that the virus started in that farm. He 
asserted that the firm was able to detect the virus because it had the mechanisms and 
experience to do so; also, since the firm produced 25% of the total local production at that 
time, there was a high probability of detecting the virus there (La Tercera.com, 2009). 
The following figures show the productivity of the Chilean industry between 2000 and 2011, 
and the productivity of Chilean and Norwegian industries, respectively. 
                                                             
27 Álvaro Jiménez was the Managing Director of Marine Harvest Chile between April 2008 and January 2011 
(http://www.marineharvest.com/en/Investor1/Press-releases/2011/Appointment-of-new-Managing-Director-in-
Marine-Harvest-Chile/ Last Accessed: 6 January 2013).  
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Rainbow Trout Atlantic Salmon Coho Salmon 
Figures 3.7: Productivity (kg harvested/smolt entered) of Chilean industry between 2000-
2011 
Source: Garate (2011). 
A decrease in the productivity of Coho salmon and rainbow trout in 2003-2004 and of Atlantic 
salmon between 2006 and 2009 has been observed. 
 
  
Chile Norway 
Figure 3.8: Productivity (kg harvested/smolt entered) Chile versus Norway between 2001-
2011 
Source: Garate (2011). 
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The above figure shows that since 2003 the productivity of the Chilean industry was lower than 
the Norwegian industry, with noticeable difference since 2004. The lowest productivity of the 
Chilean industry was in 2008. The decrease in productivity of the Chilean industry suggests, on 
the one hand, that the sanitary crisis of the industry was partially a man-made event. This is 
because the mortality of fish and its effects were inadequately managed through an increased 
use of antibiotics and fish density, which led the industry to exploit natural resource water 
more intensively. On the other hand, it suggests that, although the first outbreak of ISAv 
suddenly appeared in 2007, the conditions to reproduce the virus were progressively 
developed over a long time. In this way the decrease in productivity and the emergence of 
ISAv can be considered as implications of a production-intensive model. 
A large number of individuals interviewed during fieldwork (e.g. from producer firms, 
bureaucrats, NGOs and Associations) mentioned that before the index case, the industry was 
showing a high level of Caligus. It has been said that this louse acts as a vector of ISAv, which 
suggests the virus could have been present and progressively developed prior to its report in 
2007. Like ISAv, the caligus affects the Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and trout differently. The 
susceptible species for caligus are Atlantic salmon and rainbow trout. Certainly the presence of 
caligus in the industry was a negative biological externality (a concept discussed by Tullock, 
1971) to disseminate the ISAv across the industry. 
The following figure shows the evolution of caligus for the Chilean industry. A steady increase 
in caligus levels since 2006 with a peak in July 2007 (few weeks later than the index case) can 
be seen. 
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y-axis: number of caligus per fish 
Figure 3.9: Evolution of Caligus for all the species period 2006-2011 
Source: Garate (2011). 
Since the appearance of the index case in June 2007 other grow-out centres started to test 
positive for ISA and the number of farming centres peaked in August 2008. As Figure 3.10 
shows, at the end of 2007 the accumulated outbreaks reached 10 and by the end of 2008 
there were 108 outbreaks detected in farms. 
 
Figure 3.10: Number of outbreaks of ISAv for 2007-2012 
Source: Own elaboration based on Sernapesca (2008b) and Sernapesca (2013) 
Several interviewees, such as some producer firms, a representative from the media and a 
consultant, reported during fieldwork that, at the beginning the report, the virus was ignored 
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as a signal of a serious sanitary problem affecting the entire industry because it was believed 
to be an isolated case of ISAv at just one firm. An interviewed producer firm states that there 
was also a lot of ignorance in diagnosing the disease, whilst several individuals pointed out 
that the information about the existence of the disease was concealed by the industry for 
several months. An interviewed NGO was more specific on this point, saying that the 
employees were actually the ones that denounced to the authorities the unusual fish 
mortality, in amount and unknown reasons, reported an epidemic and the urgency of firms for 
early harvesting. Yet, it was concluded that this situation was obeyed by the ISA, and policy 
makers publicly denounced the situation that generated the alarm. 
Adolfo Alvial, who was the Technical Director at Marine Harvest Chile in 2007, reported the 
first confirmed case of ISAv in Atlantic salmon to the authorities (Aqua.cl, 2010b). He pointed 
out that, when veterinarians in the firm informed him of the suspicion of ISAv, the firm 
immediately took action to confirm it with international laboratories. Laboratory confirmation 
was made using PCR and cell culture. He said that it would have been irresponsible to give this 
information without confirmation, that the confirmation of the disease abroad took a couple 
of weeks, and when the firm got the results it arranged a meeting with the Association of 
Salmon Industry (SalmonChile) and sanitary authority (Sernapesca) on the same day to inform 
them about it. Alvial points out that Marine Harvest Chile alerted SalmonChile about the 
sanitary crisis, and that it could not be believed that the virus would exist just in one cage in 
one firm given its nature. In that meeting it was said by the firm that ‘the only thing we can do 
in the light of the international experience is to see if we –as an industry–can survive 
eliminating the cages that present the signals of the disease...there, we made a mistake as a 
country...we should have eliminated the entire farming centre, that one, and the next one and 
the next one...’ (Adolfo Alvial Interview, 18 May 2011). 
After the index case, new outbreaks were detected in a short period of time in farming centres 
owned by firms other than Marine Harvest (the first one reporting the virus to Sernapesca), 
demonstrating that the first report of ISAv was not an isolated case of just one firm but an 
industry problem. As is a feature of viruses, ISAv rapidly spread across firms and Regions X and 
XI. 
An interviewed producer firm pointed out that, apart from industry practices, natural 
conditions helped in the dissemination of the disease, such as the geography of the country 
that does not allow natural barriers (unlike Norway whose geography forms a natural barrier 
between fjords), and the currents. 
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In 2007 the Infectious Salmon Anaemia was an exotic disease in the country, and private and 
public veterinaries were inexperienced in detecting the clinical presentation of the disease in a 
timely manner (Sernapesca, 2010b). At the beginning, the dismissal of the virus as a serious 
sanitary industry problem, the ignorance in diagnosing the disease, and the time used to get 
international confirmation of the disease, resulted in several months delay in the development 
and implementation of measures to face the virus.  
Between July 2007-July 2008, 18 firms had farming centres with outbreak(s) of ISAv. As it is not 
difficult to think, the majority of these centres (38.6%) were owned by Marine Harvest as 
shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Outbreaks for firms and regions July 2007-2008 
Firm 
Outbreaks 
Region X Region XI Total % 
Marine Harvest 17 0 17 38.6% 
Aguas Claras 1 0 1 2.3% 
AquaChile 1 0 1 2.3% 
Cultivos Marinos Chiloé 3 0 3 6.8% 
Invertec 2 0 2 4.5% 
Mainstream 5 1 6 13.6% 
El Golfo 0 1 1 2.3% 
Multiexport 2 1 3 6.8% 
Pacific Star 4 0 4 9.1% 
Salmones Humboldt 1 0 1 2.3% 
Camanchaca 1 0 1 2.3% 
Holding & Trading 0 0 0 0.0% 
Congelados del Pacífico 2 0 2 4.5% 
Salmones Maullín 0 0 0 0.0% 
Fiordo Blanco 1 0 1 2.3% 
Granja Marina Tornagaleones 0 0 0 0.0% 
Salmones Friosur 0 0 0 0.0% 
Salmones Antártica 1 0 1 2.3% 
Total 41 3 44 100.0% 
Source: Sernapesca (2008b). 
Out of 44 outbreaks of the disease, 41 (93.1%) occurred in Region X, whilst the remaining 
outbreaks (3) occurred in Region XI. The farming centres showing positive for ISAv in the XI 
Region were not owned by Marine Harvest, as Table 3.1 shows. No ISAv outbreaks in farming 
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centres were present in XII Region during 2007 and 2008. Figure 3.11 shows the monthly 
outbreaks for Regions X and XI. 
 
Figure 3.11: Monthly outbreaks per region July 2007-July 2008 
Source: Own elaboration based on Sernapesca (2008b). 
A generally shared view across interviewed actors was that the most prominent signal that a 
sanitary crisis (as opposed to an isolated sanitary problem) was occurring, was the high levels 
of salmon mortality in the industry that were occurring in different farms that belonged to 
different firms. This signal contributed to transform the first ISAv outbreak into an industry 
problem. The confirmation of ISAv in Chile from international laboratories also helped to 
persuade the industry that the isolated first outbreak was an industry problem, because at that 
moment the industry was already aware of the experiences of other salmon-exporter 
countries -such as Norway and Canada, which had experienced an ISA crisis in the past ‘(see 
the previous section).  
When ISAv was confirmed in Chile, ISA outbreaks became a priority issue in the government 
decision-making agenda, and it was understood that additional specific measures were needed 
to control the virus and solve this sanitary crisis. Vaccines were not available in the country at 
the time of the crisis, nor did the sanitary, environmental or other regulations include specific 
measures to deal with ISAv (outbreaks and spread). This triggered policy responses as will be 
seen in the next chapter. 
Chile was the last of the global salmon producers and exporters to experience ISA, a virus and 
disease that was not new worldwide as there had already been more than 20 years history of 
its existence. However, there are three main differences between the sanitary crisis in Chile 
and the sanitary crises experienced by other global salmon producers such as Norway, Canada, 
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the United Kingdom and the United States. The first two following points were widely 
mentioned by interviewees during fieldwork. The last point was concluded after the review of 
literature on ISAv. 
At the time of the sanitary crisis in Chile, the Chilean industry was considerably larger in size 
compared to other global salmon producers when they experienced the crisis. For example, 
the scale of production of Atlantic salmon in Chile was about 15 times larger than Norwegian 
production, and about 9 times larger than Canada’s production. Because of this, the economic 
loss to the Chilean industry was greater than the other global producers. The following figure 
shows the Atlantic salmon production in countries that experienced ISA showing output (in 
metric tons) of the countries according to year when their respective industries suffered from 
the crisis (hence the observation for Chile is much larger). 
 
Figure 3.12: Atlantic salmon production of countries experiencing ISA at the year in which 
the ISAv problem was most acute 
Source: Own elaboration based on FAOSTAT. 
The management of the epizootic by the state, and the government response in Chile, were 
less effective than in other countries. According to some interviewees, such as a 
representative from the banking sector, a bureaucrat from Sernapesca, a representative from 
a laboratory and an interviewed NGO, in the Faroe Islands, for example, the state took the 
radical decision of enforcing complete salmon depopulation for the industry. In Chile this was 
not the case; early harvest and the elimination of affected fish cage by cage were preferred 
rather than elimination by centre or the complete industry. In Scotland it was demonstrated 
that rapid depopulation was an important factor in eradicating the disease compared to other 
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countries that waited for harvesting. An interviewee from the Banking Sector and Financial 
Advisors group opined that Chile made a good decision in this respect, because harvesting fish 
instead of destroying them, producers were able to generate cash flow by selling the harvest 
fish with ISA. A producer interviewee pointed out that at the time of the first outbreak of ISA in 
Chile, the sanitary authority (Sernapesca) did not have the powers to enforce depopulation of 
affected fish, unlike other countries. According to an interviewed lawyer, the harder measures 
taken for other countries were facilitated by the fact that, in other countries, there are fewer 
producers than in Chile. Also those countries had lower production than Chile at the time of 
the first outbreak, as was indicated in the previous discussion. 
On the other hand, other countries implemented compensation programmes for stock 
depopulation, cleaning and disinfection of materials and equipment (McGeachy and Moore, 
2003; McVicar, 2003): Chile did not do this. Instead of a compensation programme, the state 
approved a US$ 120 million security plan for salmon firms to fund sanitary investments and 
environmental management (Aqua.cl, 2008b; CORFO, 2013). As will be seen later in Chapter 7, 
this plan was strongly criticised and questioned by NGOs. 
Apart from Chile, countries that are global farming salmon producers also have wild salmonid 
species populations. This means that in those countries the appearance of ISA led the 
attention of government officials and other actors (such as wild salmon fishermen) to other 
potential salmon populations that could be affected by ISA and the wild carriers of the disease. 
 
3.4. Impacts of the infectious salmon anaemia in Chile and the sanitary crisis of the salmon 
farming industry 
The ISAv and sanitary crisis produced a range of impacts at local and global levels. The impacts 
were observed in terms of local and global production of salmon, local exports, jobs, financial 
effects for the Chilean salmon producers and its suppliers, and even in the images of the 
Chilean industry and the country. The following sections present these impacts. 
3.4.1. Production, exports and global market 
In 2005 the Chilean industry was responsible for 31.6% of the global production of Atlantic 
salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow trout, a level that, because of the sanitary crisis, decreased 
to 25.8% in 2009 (FAOSTAT). Production decreased from 630,575 tonnes in 2008 to 604,963 
tonnes in 2009, and dramatically fell to 466,221 tonnes in 2010 (FAOSTAT). In the same way, 
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exports fell from US$ 2,389,637 thousand FOB in 2008 to US$ 2,098,809 thousand FOB in 
2009, and 2,025,086 thousand FOB in 2010 (TechnoPress S.A., 2008, 2009, 2010; SalmonChile, 
2007). 
Figure 3.13 shows the production of Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow trout between 
2006 and 2010. 
 
Figure 3.13: Production of main Chilean salmon species between 2006-2010 
Source: Own elaboration based on FAOSTAT. 
It is appreciated that the dramatic decrease of Atlantic salmon production between 2008 and 
2009, a specie affected by ISA virus, caused the significant increase of Coho salmon and 
rainbow trout over the same period, since these species are not affected by ISAv. Like Norway, 
the Chilean salmon industry has become a major export sector of the country, with shipments 
to more than 65 destination markets in 5 continents. According to Achurra (1995), in the 
Chilean salmon industry there are three phases that show the importance of salmon farmed 
species to export. In the first phase (1982-1989) the industry focused on the Coho salmon 
culture. In the second phase, which began in 1990, Atlantic salmon became more important 
and took advantage of US market expansion. In the third phase (since 1991) rainbow trout 
demonstrated a significant production increase and the majority of production was intended 
for the Japanese market. 
Of the 384,454 tonnes of Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow trout exported in 2011, 
141,645.2 tonnes was Atlantic salmon (36.8%), 112,594.9 tonnes was Coho salmon (29.3%), 
and 130,213.8 tonnes was rainbow trout (33.9%) (TechnoPress S.A., 2011; SalmonChile, 2007). 
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Figure 3.14 shows the exports for Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow trout for the 
period 1997-2011. 
 
Figure 3.14: Exports Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow trout 1997-2011 
Source: Own elaboration based on TechnoPress S.A. and SalmonChile several years. 
In 2006, before the ISA crisis, returns accumulated total exports equivalent to US$ 2,198,532 
thousand FOB for Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow trout, while in 2007 (the year in 
which the ISA crisis began) they were equivalent to US$ 2,238,014 thousand FOB for the same 
species, a number that tripled exports in comparison with a decade earlier (US$ 665,000 
thousand). In 2010 (after the crisis), exports were equivalent to US$ 2,025,086 thousand FOB. 
It can be appreciated that the decrease in exports for Atlantic salmon (the specie affected by 
ISAv) corresponds to the increase in Coho salmon and rainbow trout, which were not affected 
by the virus. In 2009, 179,869.7 tonnes of Atlantic salmon were exported; this is 15.6% less 
than in 2006 (pre-crisis stage). In 2011 the three main species accounted similarly in the export 
basket of the industry in terms of quantity (141,645 for Atlantic salmon, 112,595 for Coho 
salmon and 130,214 for rainbow trout). However, as expected, Atlantic salmon contributed 
with a higher value (1,208,178 thousand FOB) compared to the other species to the total 
exports (TechnoPress S.A., 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011; SalmonChile several years). 
In 2013, the specialised media for Chilean aquaculture, Aqua, reported that the sanitary crisis 
implied a loss about US$ 5 billion for the industry (Aqua.cl, 2013j). In 2008, the same media 
also reported that, during the first half of 2008, Marine Harvest Chile registered a loss of US$ 
50.2 million in its operating profit (Aqua.cl, 2008c), and that in the same period the four firms 
that at that time publicly reported their results totalled losses of US$ 30.4 million. These firms 
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as a whole profited nearly US$ 51.9 million in the same period of 2007. Aqua’s view was that 
these four firms’ costs increased due to a fall in prices, an increase in fish feed inputs (fishmeal, 
vegetable meal, fish oil and other vegetable ingredients) and raw materials, and worsening 
health conditions due to the effects of a higher incidence of diseases that affected high 
conversion factors and increased mortality (Aqua.cl, 2008a). In the third quarter of 2008 
Multiexport reported losses of US$ 40 million, AquaChile of US$ 10 million, and Invermar of 
US$ 9.4 million (Aqua.cl, 2008c). The following table shows the figures. 
Table 3.2: Figures of economic effects 
Firm Loss first half of 2008 (US$ million) 
Profit first half of 
2007 (US$ million) 
Reduction in 
operating profit (%) 
Increased 
costs (%) 
AquaChile 11.4 24.4 4.9 14.4 
Multiexport 11.4 19.1 14.8 16.5 
Invermar 2.7 3.5 n/i n/i 
Yadrán 4.9 4.9 n/i n/i 
n/i: no information 
Source: Own elaboration base on Aqua (2008a). 
Since Chile is the second largest producer and exporter of salmon in the world, the sanitary 
crisis in Chile affected the global salmon market. Aqua reported that the decrease in Chilean 
salmon production gave the opportunity to other global salmon producers to cover the 
worldwide salmon deficit. According to that media, the Norwegian salmon industry benefited 
the most, taking advantage to expand its sales in the United States that is a key market for the 
Chilean industry. It was said that Marine Harvest (i.e. the Norwegian and largest firm of farmed 
salmon in the world) experienced both sides of the crisis. On the one hand, Marine Harvest 
Chile (i.e. the Chilean subsidiary) was unable to supply its worldwide customers. On the other 
hand, Marine Harvest ASA (i.e. the headquarters located in Norway) grew fastest in the United 
States market (Aqua.cl, 2009c). 
The Executive Director of the Association of Salmon in British Columbia, quoted by Aqua in 
2009, said that the Canadian industry in British Columbia also benefited from the sanitary crisis 
in Chile, but unlike Norway, it lost the opportunity to expand into the United States market 
due to local restrictions imposed on the salmon farming industry. According to him, Canada 
could not take advantage of the deficit of Chilean salmon in the United Sates because in British 
Columbia there are groups against the industry whose campaigns hampered the possibilities 
for expansion (Executive Director of the Association of Salmon in British Columbia quoted in 
Aqua, 10 September 2009). However, the Canadian Agriculture Division reports an increase of 
US$ 2,853 thousands in Canadian Atlantic salmon exports shipped to the United States 
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between 2007 and 2008, and a decrease of US$ 3,866 thousands for the same product 
between 2008 and 2009. 
 
3.4.2. Jobs 
The industry has been an important source of economic activity in the region where the 
production takes place (Los Lagos and Aysén), but also in employment generation and labour 
mobility. Of the 1,200 firms involved in the industry, some 150 are key suppliers of capital 
goods and productive inputs, and 350 companies are in the area of services (Escobar, 2009).  
In terms of the labour market, the industry added 53,400 employees in 2004, corresponding to 
38,400 direct employees and 15,000 indirect employees (Infante, 2008). Figure 3.15 shows the 
employment evolution of the industry between 1992 and 2004. 
 
Figure 3.15: Employment between 1992-2004 
Source: SalmonChile (2006). 
In 2006, before the sanitary crisis, direct employees were around 30,000 (El Mercurio.com, 
2010). The lay-offs in the industry began in December 2007. The first workers dismissed were 
from the firm Marine Harvest (the first firm experiencing the virus and reporting it to the 
authorities) (Bórquez, 2009; OLACH, 2013). The spread of the virus resulted in massive lay-offs, 
together with the closure of some farming centres and processing plants (Aqua.cl, 2008d). This 
situation triggered a series of demonstrations by workers against the firms, claiming 
mismanagement of the situation. It even led to the shutting down of some production facilities 
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by workers (Aqua.cl, 2008i; Aqua.cl, 2008g). In December 2008 the industry had already lost 
about 10,000 jobs (Bórquez, 2009). 
In 2010, after the sanitary crisis, the industry had 18,000-19,000 direct employees, which 
represents around 40% less in comparison with the figures for the labour force at the pre-crisis 
stage (El Mercurio.com, 2010). 
 
3.4.3. Financial effects for the industry 
The significant drop in salmon production led to the industry defaulting with its creditors (i.e. 
the banking sector) and suppliers. This situation sparked off negotiations between the industry 
and banking sector, which were part of the consequences of the policy response to the crisis. 
The industry default was given because a drop in production was translated into a drop in sales 
and exports. In simple terms, producer firms could not generate sufficient money to pay back 
money that they borrowed from the banking sector or to pay to their suppliers. Also, and as a 
consequence of this, the banking sector was unwilling to lend more money to the industry. 
This aggravated the financial situation for the industry. 
For many years salmon producers had good access to financing from banks, with a risky, but 
accepted by creditors, collateral that was the biomass (i.e. the fish in the water). However, this 
situation changed radically with the emergence of ISAv that caused high mortality in fish farms 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d). Banks realised that the biomass was no longer 
reliable collateral. At the same time the ISAv demonstrated to the banking sector that the 
salmon industry was exposed to a great number of risks, of which viruses and diseases are just 
one. Environmental factors and natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic 
eruptions, storms and algal blooms to name a few, as well as risk factors from the aquaculture 
activity itself, such as attacks from South American sea lions (Otaria flavescens) on salmon 
cages, salmon escapes and salmon theft are part of those risks. All these risks may affect either 
the biomass or the profitability of the salmon production (Claro y Asociados, 2009). It was clear 
that ISAv, diseases and sanitary problems were never taken into account for risk assessment 
from the banking sector about the salmon industry. The sanitary issues were underestimated 
and this had to change to find a long term solution that allowed the survival of the industry. 
The General Manger of the Association of Banks (ABIF for its Spanish acronym) pointed out 
that the salmon crisis revealed that a sustainable approach was needed with a greater focus on 
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biosecurity. At the same time, there was a need to modify some legal aspects to have 
collateral in accordance with the diverse industry risks. In May 2009, 12 creditor banks were 
involved with aquaculture firms (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d).  
In 2009 the Association of Banks employed an external consultancy firm, Claro y Asociados, to 
study the state of salmon industry in financial, sanitary, commercial and legislative terms 
(Claro y Asociados, 2009). In May 2009 it was pointed out that the direct debt from the 
industry to the banking sector was approximately US$ 1,600 million, whilst the indirect debt 
(from suppliers) was approximately US$ 400 million (Chilean National Congress Library, 
2010d). However, the report from the external consultant specified that in June 2009 the 
direct debt was between US$ 2,200-2,400 million, whilst the indirect debt (from suppliers) was 
approximately US$ 1,000million (Aqua.cl, 2009a). 
 
3.4.4. Effects in supplier firms 
Some interviewed supplier services mentioned that during the sanitary crisis a great deal of 
attention was paid to the effects of the crisis in terms of the salmon producers and workers 
(unemployment). They argue that the problems the producers were facing (sanitary and 
financial) were prioritised, and much less attention was paid to the effects of the crisis on the 
supplier firms and the problems they were also facing. 
Supplier firms for the salmon industry are composed of both service and product suppliers. As 
mentioned in the previous section, as of June 2009, supplier firms had taken loans of between 
US$ 400 million and US$ 1,000 million from the banking sector. 
Interviewed service suppliers reported during fieldwork that since supplier firms are directly 
dependent on producer firms, a lack of production due to fish mortality and their resulting 
financial difficulties had major repercussions for supplier firms. The clearest repercussion was 
the default of the producers with their suppliers. Mentioned by interviewees, but also pointed 
out by Vera (2010), the Chilean salmon industry is one based on outsourcing. According to 
Vera (2010) the high specialisation, development and innovation that the industry takes pride 
in comes from the supplier firms. However, there is a lack of trust, alliances, collaboration and 
incentives between producers and suppliers that have been strongly criticised by supplier firms 
(Vera, 2010). According to an interviewed service supplier, the incentive for suppliers is to 
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offer sub-standard products and services due to salmon producers’ continuous attempts to 
reduce costs, which leads to choosing cheaper suppliers. 
Suppliers interviewed during fieldwork explained that there is also a long term problem that 
suppliers must deal with, and that was exacerbated during the sanitary crisis;–this was the 
excessive delays in payment to suppliers from producers. An interviewed service supplier 
explained that supplier firms paid a high cost with this sanitary crisis. He said that for every 
employee that lost his job in a producer firm or process plant, three employees lost their jobs, 
or were negatively affected, in supplier firms in economic terms. He continued, arguing that 
suppliers resisted the sanitary crisis and acted, in part, as banks for the producer firms, and 
that delays in payments for them were for four, five, six or seven months, and sometimes one 
year. He finished saying that the delay in payments on accounts receivable for suppliers were 
much longer than for the producers, the recovery for suppliers was longer than for producers 
(probably two or three years more than for the producers), and that there were, and always 
have been, delays in payments to suppliers from producers, but the requirements for suppliers 
are day-by-day.  
 
3.4.5. Industry and country images 
For politicians and industry representatives the salmon industry has always been portrayed as 
an example of success and a reason for pride to be shown abroad highlighting the Chilean 
natural resource advantages. In their Presidential messages the country’s Presidents have 
pointed out the salmon industry as one of the productive engines to contribute to the Chilean 
growth (Lagos, 2002), and as one that should be principally promoted for the country 
(Bachelet, 2008). Explaining the contribution of the salmon cluster to the country’s 
competitiveness, the General Manager of the Association of Salmon Industry stated with some 
pride that one out of four salmon consumed in the world is Chilean salmon (Infante, 2008). 
The ISA crisis affected not just the economic performance of the Chilean industry and country 
but also their international image. On 27 March 2008 The New York Times published an article 
about how ISAv indicts the aquaculture methods in Chile and the practices that led the 
industry to the emergence of ISAv in Chile. The article points out several issues on industry 
practices, emphasising the abuse in the use of antibiotics, lack of sanitary controls, 
contamination of the water, and overcrowding of fish pens, among other issues.  
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It was reported by the press that this article influenced Safeway (a larger retail in the United 
States) to restrict its sales of Chilean salmon coming from the firm Marine Harvest in Chile 
(Chile Potencia Alimentaria, 2013). Although not all Chilean salmon firms sell their products 
through this large retail chain, it was a very negative signal to national and international 
markets. According to the press, Safeway explained that they restricted the purchase of 
Chilean salmon from areas affected with ISAv because it was affecting the quality and size of 
the product. The press also reported that there was a significant drop in local shares linked to 
the salmon industry28 that was attributed to the decision of Safeway in the United States, and 
the questionable sanitary controls that the Chilean salmon firms would have posted in The 
New York Time article (El Mercurio.com, 2008b; Diario Financiero.cl, 2008). 
Some Chilean newspapers of the period, such as El Mostrador, Diario Financiero and La 
Nación, reported that the Chilean salmon industry and Chilean government reacted quickly to 
the accusations posted by The New York Times to reduce the impact on Chilean salmon sales in 
the United States, since this situation could influence consumer perception of Chilean salmon 
and other Chilean products. These local newspapers also reported that the industry contacted 
the Treasury, Ministry of Economy, Foreign Office and Home Office to promote a contingency 
plan. Also that salmon representatives announced in an informative publication in the key 
newspapers in countries where Chilean salmon was sent to clarify the information posted by 
The New York Times that they considered as false. These newspapers pointed out that the 
President of the Association of Salmon Industry (SalmonChile) mentioned that another 
measure that could be taken would be to take legal action against the researcher who was 
interviewed for The New York Times. The researcher mentioned to the media that the high 
overcrowding of fish would increase sanitary risks for the industry. The industry also perceived 
the situation as part of a long term campaign against the industry from environmentalists and 
NGOs.  
On the other hand, these newspaper articles mentioned that the President of Chile assigned 
the Coordinator of Country Image to coordinate the measures to be used to defend the image 
of Chilean exports with the industry. The government also delegated the issue to the Ministry 
of Economy who contacted the industry to elaborate on a national and international plan to 
face the situation. According to the newspapers, the Chancellor was also involved from the 
government and the Undersecretary of Fishing (Subpesca by its Spanish acronym) and General 
Directorate of International Economic Relations (for its Spanish acronym Direcon) prepared a 
                                                             
28 In particular, the shares of Invermar fell 4.9% and Multifoods 3.9% (El Mercurio.com, 2008b). 
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public declaration on behalf of the government. The government also asked salmon producers 
to clarify every point of what The New York Times article had stated.  
The ambassador of Chile in the United States sent a letter to The New York Times saying how it 
damaged this successful industry and that some accusations against the Chilean industry were 
false (El Mostrador.cl, 2008; Diario Financiero.cl, 2008; La Nación.cl, 2008). 
Reported by La Tercera, on 20 April 2008, less than a month after The New York Times article 
was published, personnel from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) visited Chile to 
examine the production systems in the Chilean salmon industry. This visit was very welcomed 
by both the Chilean industry and the government in their aim to reduce the distrust that 
clients and consumers might have about the Chilean salmon industry and Chilean products (La 
Tercera.com, 2008). 
As noted by Barton and Fløysand (2010), The New York Times article showed the globalisation 
of sustainable development issues. The new challenges on sustainability are not country 
localised but involve diverse groups of globalised actors in the debate. The impact of the ISA 
crisis on the image of the Chilean salmon industry and the country at national and 
international levels, showed the boundaries of the industry and the boundaries of sanitary, 
environmental and sustainability debates through the mobilisation of a diverse group of actors 
(press, industry, government, ambassador, researchers and environmentalists). 
 
3.5. Synthesis of the chapter 
Chile is the second largest producer and exporter of farmed salmon in the world after Norway, 
an achievement that was made possible by an intensive production model based on the 
exploitation of the natural common-pool resource water. The country mainly produces and 
exports three different types of salmon species: Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow 
trout. In 2007 the Chilean industry was affected by the infectious salmon anaemia, a viral 
disease of marine-farmed Atlantic salmon caused by the ISAv. The country was the last of the 
global salmon producers to experience ISAv. At the time Chile got the virus it has been 
reported over a long period, the first time being in Norway in 1984. 
Although ISA does affect Atlantic salmon, Rainbow trout and Coho salmon can act as reservoirs 
of the virus. It has been demonstrated that the sea lice caligus acts as a vector. Like ISAv, the 
caligus affects the Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and trout in different ways. The susceptible 
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species for caligus are Atlantic salmon and rainbow trout. Certainly the presence of caligus in 
the industry helped to disseminate the ISAv, which once introduced into the country rapidly 
spread across the industry.  
Before the emergence of ISAv, a decrease in the productivity of the industry was observed. 
This suggests, on the one hand, that the sanitary crisis was partially a man-made event 
because the decrease in productivity was inadequately managed to some extent by an 
increase in fish density, which led the industry to exploit more intensively the natural resource 
water. On the other hand, it suggests that, although the first outbreak of ISAv suddenly 
appeared in 2007, the conditions to reproduce the virus had developed progressively over a 
long period. In this way the decrease in productivity and the emergence of ISAv can be 
considered as implications of a production-intensive model. 
When ISAv was confirmed in Chile, outbreaks became a priority issue in the government 
decision-making agenda, and it was understood that additional specific measures were needed 
to respond to the virus. Vaccines were not available in the country, nor did the sanitary, 
environmental or other regulations include specific measures to deal with ISAv. The 
development and implementation of responses were delayed, partially due to the virus being 
dismissed as a serious sanitary industry problem at the beginning, there was some ignorance in 
diagnosing the disease, and it took time to get international confirmation of the disease. 
The sanitary crisis impacted negatively on the Chilean industry. The participation of the local 
industry at a global level decreased due to the dramatic drop of Atlantic salmon production. 
However, since ISA does not affect Coho salmon and rainbow trout, there were increases in 
the number of these species, which have less commercial value than Atlantic salmon. The 
significant lower production of salmon resulted in massive lay-offs, together with the closure 
of some farming centres and processing plants. Since the industry has been an important 
source of economic activity, employment generation and labour mobility in the southern 
regions where the production takes place, the sanitary crisis also caused a social crisis. 
Moreover, the ISA crisis affected the international image of the local industry and the country. 
This exemplary, successful industry was severely questioned internationally for its practices. 
Senior government officials and industry representatives were actively involved in several 
image campaigns. 
The significant drop in salmon production that affected exports led to the industry defaulting 
with the banking sector and suppliers. Producer firms could not generate sufficient money to 
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pay back money that they borrowed from the banking sector nor pay their suppliers. With the 
industry sanitary crisis the banking sector realised that the biomass (fish in the water) was no 
longer reliable collateral for them, and at the same time it demonstrated that the industry is 
exposed to a great number of risks of which viruses and diseases are just one. It was clear to 
the banking sector that sanitary issues were underestimated and this had to change to find a 
long term solution that allowed the survival of the industry. It was pointed out that the salmon 
crisis revealed that a sustainable approach was needed with a greater focus on biosecurity and 
a need to modify some legal aspects to have collateral in accordance with the diverse industry 
risks. These issues were part of the policy responses to the crisis. 
There are three main differences between the Chilean sanitary crisis and the sanitary crises of 
other global salmon producers. Firstly, at the time of the sanitary crisis in Chile, the Chilean 
industry was considerably larger in size compared with other global salmon producers when 
they experienced the crisis. Because of this, the economic loss to the Chilean industry was 
greater than the other global producers. Secondly, the management of the epizootic by the 
state, and the government response in Chile, were less effective than other countries. Finally, 
since other global salmon producers also have wild salmon species, the appearance of ISA led 
the attention of government officials and other actors (such as wild salmon fishermen) to 
other potential salmon populations that could be affected by ISA and the wild carriers of the 
disease. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
“One can often generalize on the basis of a single case...” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006 p.228) 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology employed in this study. The first 
part of the chapter discusses the case study as the chosen research method. The second 
section explains the selection of the sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon farming industry as 
the case study, and how the research context was organised. Section 3 discusses the reliability 
and validity of qualitative research, and Section 4 the generalisability from a single case study. 
The research strategy, operationalisation of the research questions and key concepts are 
explained in Section 5, whilst Sections 6 and 7 present the sources of data and information, 
and data and information collection, respectively. At the end of the chapter, Section 8 
discusses the data and information analysis. 
 
4.1. Case study as a research method 
In the literature of research methods there is no common and agreed definition of case study. 
Gerring (2004) refers to some definitions29 and concludes that what researchers have defined 
as case studies are actually characteristics of types of case studies rather than what a case 
study is itself. Similarly, Ragin (1992) recognises different conceptions and understandings 
about what a case study is and proposes a conceptual map to conceptualise and understand 
case studies. In this conceptual map there are two conceptions and two understandings about 
what is a case study. In the conception dimension a case study can be specific (i.e. it emerges 
through the research) or general (i.e. it exists prior to the research). In the understanding 
dimension a case study can be understood as an empirical unit (i.e. it is ‘out there’) or a 
theoretical construct (i.e. it is constructed from the theory). Although the authors propose this 
classification they recognise it is not absolute and might overlap with other conceptions and 
understandings about what a case study is. At the same time, in an attempt to define case 
studies according to their functionality, Stake (1995) classifies them into intrinsic (i.e. it is given 
                                                             
29 Such as qualitative method, small sample, participation in the field (Yin, 1994); research characterised by process-
tracing (George and Bennett, 2004); research investigates a process of a single case (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; 
Eckstein, 1975); research investigates a single phenomenon, instance or example. 
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or there is a need or curiosity to learn about a particular case) and instrumental (i.e. it is used 
as an instrument to understand other cases)30.  
The research method literature points out traditional prejudices against case study as a 
research method (Yin, 2009) or misunderstandings about it (Flyvbjerg, 2006). One of these 
prejudices or misunderstandings is to believe that case studies are more useful as a 
preliminary research method in a research process. This is, case studies are better for 
generating hypotheses or in an exploratory phase of the research, whilst other methods are 
more useful for testing and building theory. Therefore they are applied in later phases of the 
research such as the descriptive or explanatory phases (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009). Flyvbjerg 
(2006) explains that this misunderstanding comes from the belief that it is not possible to 
generalise from individual cases or, as Yin (2009) notes, there is a common concern about the 
limits to scientific generalisation in case studies. In order to correct this idea Flyvbjerg (2006), 
Yin (2009) and Kennedy (1979) clarify the manner and conditions under which generalisation 
from case studies can be made (see Section 4.4 where this point is treated in detail). Yin (2009) 
concludes that each research method can be used in all the phases of a research process: 
exploration, description and explanation. 
This research aims to explain how the policy response to the sanitary crisis in the Chilean 
salmon farming industry evolved through processes of learning linked to institutional change, 
and with this to extend the policy learning and policy change literature. To do so, it used the 
case study as the research method. This study adopted the approach proposed by Yin (2009) 
as the rationale to select the case study as the research method because it illuminates what a 
case study is; at the same time it gives insights into what a case study does (i.e. functional role 
of a case study) and what a case study is good for (i.e. the pertinence of its use). 
In Yin’s approach a first step to identify the most relevant research method is to reflect on how 
the research questions have been formulated according to the research topic and the 
phenomenon to be studied. When research questions are formulated into ‘who’, ‘what’, 
‘where’, ‘how many’ and ‘how much’ frames, sometimes they are being used in an exploratory 
or descriptive way. In that case, the questions are likely to be answered using a survey or 
archival analysis. However, when research questions are formulated into ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
frames they are more suitable to be answered with a case study, history or experiment 
research method because the questions are suggesting a more explanatory approach to study 
                                                             
30 Ragin’s conceptual map and Stake’s classification use the same foundation to understand case studies.  
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the phenomenon. This research posed ‘how’ questions (see Section 2.8) to be answered and 
therefore case studies, histories or experiments are suitable to answer them. 
The second step in Yin’s approach refers to reflecting on the degree of control the researcher 
has over the phenomenon, that is, whether the research can control the conditions and 
environment in which events occur. When it is possible to control conditions and 
environments, experiments are more suitable as a research method than histories or case 
studies in which the control of the event is not possible. Since, in this research, the researcher 
could not control the conditions or environment in which the phenomenon occurred, histories 
and case studies are more suitable as research methods. 
Finally, the third step refers to the time focus of the phenomenon. That is, whether the 
phenomenon is linked to a contemporary or historical event in terms of a researcher’s access 
to the events. When the phenomenon is contemporary, case studies are more suitable as the 
research method since the researcher has access to the events by direct observation31, and/or 
by access to participants who were involved in the events. Since this research studied a 
contemporary phenomenon and the researcher had direct access to it via participants involved 
in that phenomenon, case study was the most suitable research method to conduct the 
research. 
According to Yin (2009), a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p.18). The aim of this research is to explain 
in depth the contemporary real-life phenomenon of how actors responded to the sanitary 
crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry through processes of learning and institutional 
change in which context conditions are crucial to understand the phenomenon. 
According to Flyvbjerg (2006) the real life sense and context-dependent knowledge provided 
by case studies are valuable characteristics to conduct good research. As they allow proximity 
to the reality and connection with concrete situations, they help to develop relevant skills and 
experience to achieve a more general or theoretical knowledge (context independent 
knowledge). As part of the case study as a research method Yin (2009) mentions two 
additional characteristics that case study research has: i) case studies rely on multiple data 
sources and data contents converge via triangulation (see Section 4.6), and ii) data collection 
and data analysis are guided from theoretical propositions (see Sections 4.7 and 4.8). The use 
                                                             
31 Histories cannot use this method since the events occurred in the past where the researcher has no direct access 
by taking an active role in developing the material by directly interrogating the participants. 
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of multiple sources of evidence and triangulation as a way of achieving data convergence is 
crucial in establishing research validity and verification. This is an important issue in case study 
research since another traditional prejudice is to believe that case studies have a tendency to 
confirm researchers’ preconceived ideas. However, as Flyvbjerg (2006) explains all research 
methods may have bias toward verification of a researcher’s preconceived ideas, and case 
studies do not intrinsically have greater bias than other methods. Case studies may contain 
greater bias toward falsification of researchers’ preconceived ideas than toward verification 
(see Section 4.4). 
 
4.2. Case study selection and organisation of the research context 
A criterion for selecting cases is to choose them to confirm, challenge or extend the theory 
(Yin, 2009). On this basis cases are selected by theoretical purposes (Eisenhardt, 1989) using an 
information-oriented selection strategy, with which it is intended to achieve the greatest 
possible amount of information in order to gain a deep understanding of the studied 
phenomenon (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Following this strategy the policy response to the sanitary crisis 
in the Chilean salmon farming industry was identified as a suitable case to analyse and test the 
framework on policy learning and policy change stimulated by catastrophic events developed 
in Chapter 2. However, the study of this case also contributes empirically to the literature on 
the Chilean Salmon Industry in which it is important (i.e. for economic, social and 
environmental development reasons) to address issues of industry sustainability, which are 
even more important since the sanitary crisis.  
Therefore, the selection of the case study was a combination of an intrinsic and instrumental 
choice (Stake, 1995). On the one hand, there was an interest to learn and contribute 
empirically to a deep understanding of the sanitary crisis and the policy response to it in the 
Chilean salmon farming industry. At the time this research began, few studies on the sanitary 
crisis of the Chilean industry had been conducted (e.g. Barton and Fløysand, 2010; Iizuka and 
Katz, 2010), and no studies or policy analysis of the policy responses to the crisis and their 
consequences could be identified by the researcher.  
The following statements are the main rationales for selecting the policy response to the 
sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon industry as a single country case study (Yin, 2009): 
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1. The policy response to the sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon industry is a critical case for 
analysing policy learning and policy change processes. The features of the industry and the 
phenomenon studied allow the testing of specific propositions and the conditions under 
which they are valid or believed to be true. Specific features, such as the global boundary 
of the industry, its fragmentation and heterogeneity, as well as the contested issues and 
interests among actors with science and technology content (the resolution of which must 
be appropriate to provide solutions for this industry after its crisis), exist in other 
industries. Therefore the generalisability of this case can be increased. Also, although the 
phenomenon studied represents a localised problem, some processes are likely to be 
reproduced in other contexts and times. Thus, this research is a significant contribution to 
lessons to be learned in policy terms and on the value in anticipating catastrophic events 
like crises. 
2. The policy response to the sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon industry is a longitudinal 
case. The study organises the empirical context in three phases (see below) in order to 
observe and analyse how policy learning and policy change took place. 
3. The intensification of natural (common-pool) resource use represents a tendency of 
modern development, where the intensive exploitation of a biological system to support 
efficiency and profitability affects the environment, thus threatening the sustainability 
resource use and the long-term development of industries. The Chilean salmon industry is 
an emblematic case of an intensive natural (common-pool) resource model. However, this 
case is not exclusive for the salmon industry. As the salmon industry is embedded in the 
aquaculture sector, and the aquaculture sector is embedded in agribusiness, this case may 
apply to other industries in agribusiness in which an environmentally sustainable resource 
use is needed. Also since the Chilean salmon industry is a global one, it is a good example 
of how development has occurred (intensification of the use of a natural, common-pool, 
resource). These elements increase the range of generalisation from this research. 
4. The selected research case involves more than one unit of analysis and therefore it 
corresponds to an embedded single case study (Yin, 2009). The higher level of analysis is 
the industry as a global unit; however, the analysis also involves disagreements and 
conflict among different actors over policy issues. Although this research considered a 
single country case study, comparisons between the crisis and legislative process of the 
Chilean context and others (e.g. Norwegian and Scottish process) were background or 
context type of comparison. 
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The context to analyse the policy learning and policy change processes stimulated by the 
sanitary crisis of the industry was organised into three phases, which are explained in section 
4.5. The following figure demonstrates the organisation of the context. 
 
Figure 4.1: Organisation of the empirical context 
Source: Own elaboration based on Rose (1991), May (1992), Hall (1993), Matland (1995), Faulkner (2001) and 
Kingdon (2003). 
The starting point in analysing the empirical context is at the onset of the sanitary crisis in 2007 
until the time after the crisis when the policy responses were put into practice and some 
consequences of those responses could be observed, 2013. Earlier periods that cover the 
history of the industry, the implementation of the First General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture 
(Law N°18892), and the socio political and economic context of the country are considered as 
background information.  
The publication of the initial law (Law N°18892) in 1989 is an important milestone for the 
industry. This law is the basis of the organisation of the responsibilities and regulations related 
to the sustainability of the aquaculture sector in Chile, and the most relevant law on which the 
Chilean salmon industry built its export-oriented trajectory. This period of time has been 
chosen because it covers the period of the industry crisis (2007-2010) completely, and informs 
about the export-oriented developments of the industry. Also, as Sabatier (1993) and Sanz 
(1995) point out, policy learning and policy change need time to be studied. At least ten years 
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should be considered to study the success or failure of a policy, i.e., once a cycle of formation, 
implementation and reformation has been completed. 
In 2007 the infectious salmon anaemia virus was introduced in the Chilean salmon farming 
industry causing the worst sanitary crisis in the history of this industry. The crisis demonstrated 
that the way in which the industry was operating was no longer viable, and that urgent 
measures were needed to address the crisis itself, the problems revealed by it, and its effects. 
The crisis gave evidence of policy failure because it demonstrated that the established policy 
could not protect the industry from a virus (which was not new in the world), nor was it 
effective in dealing with or controlling the virus once introduced. In the short-term, policy 
responded dramatically directly to the crisis and these short term measures were followed by 
further measures. The theory reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that the short term measures 
were more likely to be radical and the longer term measures were more likely to be 
incremental in nature. However, whether this is true in the case being studied is an empirical 
question. Similarly, it is a question as to whether policy responses to the crisis had different 
consequences for industry actors in the short and long terms. 
 
4.3. Reliability and validity in qualitative research 
Reliability is generally related to the replicability of the research findings. This is whether or 
not the research findings would be repeated if another study was conducted using the same or 
similar methods (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003; Silverman, 2006).  
This research employed the two ways suggested by Moisander and Valtonen (cited in 
Silverman 2006, p.282) to satisfy reliability in qualitative research. These are: 
1. Research process transparency by explaining the research strategy and data analysis in 
detail (see Sections 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8). 
2. Theoretical transparency by making the theoretical lens employed to interpret the data 
and findings explicit, and explaining how the chosen theoretical lens allows those 
interpretations excluding others (it has been applied in the construction of the theoretical 
and conceptual framework).  
The research design was also constructed with aim of validity. Validity in qualitative research is 
concerned with ‘correctness’ or ‘precision’ and quality of the research in its data-sources and 
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methods of collection (construct validity), claims, statements and data analysis (internal 
validity), and in the extent to which the findings are applicable to other contexts or settings 
(external validity) (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003; Yin, 2009). 
This research used the three tests pointed out by Yin (2009) that can be applied to ensure 
validity in qualitative research: construct validity, internal validity and external validity. 
Construct validity refers to the identification of operational measures to the phenomenon 
under study. Thus, the policy response to the sanitary crisis (phenomenon under study) has 
been defined in terms of specific concepts, such as policy learning and policy change, which 
are related to the objectives of the research. Changes in policy goals, policy instruments, or the 
settings of policy instruments, have been defined as measures that operationalise those 
specific concepts (see Section 4.5).  
Internal validity corresponds to the establishment of causal relationships in the data. Analytical 
tactics, such as constant comparative methods and deviant case analysis, have been used in 
the data analysis (see Section 4.8) to achieve internal validity. External validity is concerned 
with the generalisation of the findings. This was achieved through the theories employed and 
demonstrated in the literature review chapter (Chapter 2). Since this research used a single 
case study as its research method and there may be some concerns about the generalisability 
of this study, external validity or generalisation is treated in more detail in Section 4.4. 
In addition validity requires a careful consideration of the robustness of evidence used to draw 
conclusions. Triangulation is a general tool to build validity in qualitative research. It refers to 
the use of multiple sources of evidence, which helps to develop what Yin (2009) calls 
‘converging lines of inquiry’. His argument is that “findings or conclusions are more likely to be 
more convincing and accurate if they are based on several different sources of information, 
following a corroboratory mode” (Yin, 2009 p.116). Mabry (2008) points out different methods 
of triangulation for data collection and data analysis32. Based on this guidance, this research 
employed triangulation by data source and triangulation by method of collection in the 
assembly of evidence, whilst in the data analysis it used theoretical triangulation. 
  
                                                             
32 Those methods are triangulation by: data source, method, time, observer and theory (Mabry, 2008). 
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4.4. Generalisability in qualitative research and from a single case study 
In qualitative research generalisation concerns the potential for drawing inferences or 
extending the application of findings from the immediate case study to wider populations, 
contexts or theories (Lewes and Ritchie, 2003). Lewes and Ritchie (2003) define two types of 
generalisations. The first is a context dependent type of generalisation called ‘empirical or 
inferential’ generalisation. This refers to the application of findings from specific cases or 
studies to populations or settings beyond the particular sample of the study. The second is a 
‘context-free’ type of generalisation called ‘theoretical’ generalisation. This refers to the 
generation of theoretical concepts or positions with wider or universal applications. 
Single case studies have been a matter of concern in qualitative research in terms of their 
potential value for generalisation and contribution to scientific knowledge. However, Flyvbjerg 
(2006) points out that it is incorrect to conclude that it is not possible to generalise from an 
individual case, or to conclude that a single case study cannot contribute to scientific 
development. He argues that single cases can be crucial in revealing ‘falsification’, that is, in 
revealing that something is false when actually it is generally considered true or valid. He says 
“case study is well suited for identifying ‘black swans’ because of its in-depth approach: what 
appears to be ‘white’ often turns out on closer examination to be ‘black’” (Flyvbjerg, 2006 
p.228). Similarly, Kennedy (1979) points out that, more important than the number of cases 
studied is the range of attributes that a case has and the range of conditions under which 
observations occur in that case. Then, more generalisation is not necessarily achieved by 
increasing the number of cases studied. Thus, criteria for generalising from single cases are 
related to the attributes of those cases. 
Kennedy (1979) states that a key criterion for generalisation from case attributes is the 
relevance of these attributes. In the case study, this relevance is driven by the research 
questions or hypothesis of the study. The range of generalisation is set by defining the 
attributes of the case in order to compare them with the attributes of other cases. Those other 
cases that have the most similar attributes (i.e. those cases that are most analogous) are more 
suitable to be generalised from the case. In this way, the validity of the generalisation rests on 
the extent to which the attributes compared among cases are relevant. 
However, this claim is grounded in the premise that the case chosen is not an outlier or 
idiosyncratic case of a general phenomenon: in the case of this research, the general 
phenomenon of resource intensive industry development. A qualification of the research 
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presented in this thesis is that the under-development of the literature on policy making in 
response to crisis makes it difficult to claim that the case of the policy response to the sanitary 
crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry is free of idiosyncratic features that might limit its 
generalisation. This means that the scope for comparison is limited. Thus, the conclusions 
drawn from this thesis offer a potential opportunity for further research, and in this sense 
contribute to the advance of knowledge. 
 
4.5. Research strategy and operationalisation of research questions and key concepts 
The research strategy to operationalise the theoretical framework and answer the research 
questions posed in Section 2.5 involves three phases. In the first phase, using an adaptation of 
the system failure approach (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005) and causal stories 
(Stone, 1989), a characterisation and diagnosis of the Chilean salmon industry was conducted 
to understand the nature of the crisis and its relationship with the structural characteristics of 
the industry at the time of the crisis. In the second phase, the policy responses to the crisis 
were analysed using a policy learning and policy change approach (Hall, 1993; May, 1992; 
Kingdon, 2003) in order to explain how a policy learning process in the industry was 
precipitated by the crisis. Finally, in the third phase the consequences of the policy responses 
to the crisis were analysed from a ‘conflict and ambiguity’ perspective. In this perspective, the 
conflict emerges from inconsistent views that actors have when more than one actor sees a 
policy as directly relevant to his interests, whilst ambiguity occurs when there is 
misunderstanding of policy goals or roles of bureaucrats, as well as uncertainty in the 
resources to perform the activities to implement the policy (Matland, 1995). 
In those phases, policy learning in a context of industry crisis was the dependent variable, and 
how policies changed (i.e. changes in policy goals, policy instruments or settings of policy 
instruments) was used as the explanatory variable to understand the institutional change after 
the sanitary crisis in the Chilean industry. 
As explained in Chapter 2, there is no a single definition about policy learning and policy 
change. There are also different ways in which those concepts have been defined and 
conceptualised (e.g. rational process, bounded rational process) in the literature. This research 
employs an adapted definition of Hall’s policy learning to explicitly indicate that, in the case of 
the Chilean salmon industry, the policy responded directly to the crisis and indirectly to past 
experience and new information. Policy learning to this research means ‘a deliberate attempt 
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to adjust the goals or techniques or instruments, or to establish new goals and create new 
techniques of policy in direct response to external dramatic events such as crises and indirectly 
to past experience and new information’. 
Following Hall´s conceptualisation of policy learning, this research observes policy change as 
the changes in policy goal, policy instruments, or the settings of policy instruments. Changes in 
policy goals or alterations in the hierarchy of policy goals behind policy are understood as 
radical policy change or paradigm shift, whilst changes in policy instruments and changes in 
the settings of policy instruments are understood as incremental policy change. The co-
evolution of the changes in policies with the sanitary crisis was made following the 
evolutionary stages of the crisis: stabilisation, normalisation, improvement, adjustment and 
resolution. 
It is an empirical question whether policy learning at any of the crises stages can be associated 
with radical or incremental change, and whether this occurs in fact in the case of policy 
response to the sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon farming industry. For the reasons given in 
Chapter 2, it might be expected that the short-term policy responses, and the policy learning 
associated with these short-term responses, give rise to a greater likelihood of radical policy 
change. Similarly, it might be expected that the long-term policy responses, and the policy 
learning associated with these responses, give greater opportunity of incremental policy 
change.
 
Figure 4.2: Operationalisation of research questions and key concepts 
Source: Own elaboration based on May (1992), Hall (1993) and Faulkner (2001).  
Policy
learning
Policy
change
Radical policy 
change
(paradigm shift)
Incremental 
policy change
- Changes in 
policy goals
- Alterations in 
the hierarchy of 
policy goals 
behind policy
- Changes in 
policy 
instruments
- Changes in the 
settings of 
policy 
instruments
Stabilisation
Normalisation
Improvement
Adjustment
Resolution
Crisis stages Time
131 
 
 
 
4.6. Sources of data and information  
This research employed primary and secondary sources of data and information. The primary 
source data was gathered from a complete set of actors interviewed from April to July 2011. 
Actors to be interviewed were selected through a purposive sample that was driven by the 
aims and research questions of the study, as well as the theoretical framework that identified 
the key concepts to be covered and the characteristics of the processes under study (Ritchie, 
Lewes and Elam, 2003). The sample was focused on the actors that strongly represented the 
phenomenon to be studied in the research. These actors were those who were participating in 
the processes of diagnosing the industry crisis, policy responses to the crisis, including the 
modification of the initial Fishing and Aquaculture Law (Law N°18892), and the consequences 
of those policy responses. Critical actors to be interviewed were those who demonstrated a 
pivotal role in framing the policy problems, choices and outcomes of the policy response, as 
well as dissident positions to reach consensus over policy issues. 
Given the heterogeneity of the industry and the diversity of participants involved in the 
phenomenon, the sample size considered 10 groups of actors. These actors were: i) 
Bureaucrats, ii) Public Agencies, Programmes, Institutes, Councils and Services, iii) Private 
Institutes, Foundations and Consortia, iv) Interest Groups subdivided into NGOs, Associations 
and Trades Unions, v) Government decision makers, in this case senators and deputies, vi) 
Producers Firms, vii) Supplier Services subdivided into Consultants, Lawyers, Laboratories and 
Veterinarians, Transport and Product Process, viii) Media, ix) Universities, and x) Banking 
Sector and Financial Advisors. 
The groups Trades Unions, Lawyers, Laboratories and Veterinarians, and Transport and 
Product Process, were not considered at the beginning of the research design but were added 
during fieldwork. During fieldwork some themes such as the disagreements of industry 
workers on policy responses, the development of specific industry regulation, industry 
practices, such as the use of vaccines to control ISA, and industry logistics emerged. These 
themes were crucial in the design and delivery of policy responses after the crisis, and 
suggested that the opinion of these participants was relevant. 
The way in which the sample was framed ensured the required diversity of actors to optimise 
the identification of factors and characteristics of the phenomenon, as well as the relationships 
and interdependency among the key concepts to be covered. The diversity of participants 
helped to achieve a range of responses on the interview questions and to avoid biased 
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answers. There were no major challenges in the identification of key interviewees because 
they were all well known. However, the public document ‘history of the Law N°20434’, which 
records the process of modification Law N°18892 (as part of the process under study) at 
parliamentary level, the public access directory of the industry ‘Aqua’, and the snowballing 
technique33 were used to complete the list of interviewees, which is included in Appendix A at 
the end of this thesis. The following table shows the number of interviews conducted by group 
of actor. 
Table 4.1: Number of interviews conducted by group of actor 
Actor Number of interviews 
Bureaucrats 6 
Public Agencies, Programmes, Institutes, Councils and Services 11 
Private Institutes, Foundations and Consortia 5 
Interest Groups 
subdivided into 
NGOs 4 
Associations 7 
Trades Unions 2 
Government decision makers in this case senators and deputies 6 
Producers Firms 9 
Supplier Services 
subdivided into 
Consultants 7 
Lawyers 3 
Laboratories and Veterinarians 4 
Transport and Product Process 4 
Media 2 
Universities 8 
Banking Sector and Financial Advisors 4 
Total of interviews 82 
Source: Own elaboration based on fieldwork. 
Among the interviewees were, for example, the person who reported the virus in 2007, the 
firm that reported the virus and was accused of introducing the virus in the country, the 
person who wrote the project law to modify the initial Fishing and Aquaculture Law (Law 
N°18892) that was discussed at Congress, the political head of the process of modification of 
the Law N°18892, the head of the Fishing Commission in the Chamber of Deputies at the 
Congress, the head of the Fishing Commission in the Senate at the Congress, dissidents of the 
process of design and implementation of policy responses to the crisis, presidents of 
                                                             
33 The ‘snowballing technique’ refers to asking people who have already been interviewed to identify other people 
they know who fit the selection criteria in order for them to be interviewed (Ritchie, Lewes and Elam, 2003). 
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associations, chief executives of firms, and several authorities such as the Undersecretary of 
Fishing and Aquaculture. At the time the interviews were conducted some people were 
working in the consultancy sector, but when the crisis arose in the industry they were 
authorities or relevant people at that time; these people were interviewed as well. 
The strategy to reach interviewees was standardised. It involved sending a letter explaining the 
scope and purpose of the research, the reason why the Chilean salmon industry was chosen 
for the research, what information was required from the interview, and why the interviewee 
was chosen. The letter was sent in a file attached to an email that had a summary of the letter 
in the email itself. This strategy was complemented by telephone contact. 
The secondary sources that complement the primary information included qualitative and 
quantitative documents (Eisenhardt, 1989) of the Chilean salmon industry and the sanitary 
crisis at micro and macro levels (Jupp, 1996). The following table displays these types of 
documents and their sources. 
Table 4.2: Sources of data and information 
Documents Qualitative Quantitative 
Macro level (government, 
bureaucrats and public 
institutions) 
- Enacted laws (e.g. Law 
N°18892 and Law N°20434) 
- Sectoral regulations (e.g. 
sanitary and environmental) 
- Records of parliamentary 
processes 
- Annual Reports 
- Other reports 
- Statistics (e.g. production, 
exports, salmon price, 
employees, salmon eggs 
import, use of antibiotics, 
foreign direct investment, 
research and development, 
industry share) 
Micro level (firms, associations, 
NGOs, private institutes, 
universities, media) 
- Annual Reports 
- Other Reports 
- Articles of the industry 
- Newspapers 
- Statistics (e.g. production, 
exports, salmon price, 
employees, research and 
development, firm share) 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eisenhardt (1989) and Jupp (1996). 
In particular, the content of the enacted laws (e.g. Law N°18892 and Law N°20434) and records 
of hearings of parliamentary proceedings with regard to passage of these laws were important 
sources of information. Also, the histories of those laws34 (Law N°18892 and Law N°20434) 
provided valuable data for analysing what was defined as problematic, explanations of policy 
problems, and alternatives to solve them. They were also useful for examining the negotiation 
process and points of view following the actors and the discussions at parliamentary level. 
 
                                                             
34 The history of the Law N° 20434 records the process of modification Law N° 18892 at parliamentary level. Laws 
and their histories are public documents which can be accessed from the Chilean Congress Library website 
www.bcn.cl. 
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4.7. Data and information collection 
This research collected primary and secondary data and information. The aims of the study, in 
addition to the research questions and theoretical framework, guided the data collection. The 
primary data was collected in a single episode of fieldwork from April to July 2011, using a 
standardised method in order to gather information that could be compared across the sample 
(Wilson, 1996). This method involved a standardised open ended interview and a standardised 
interview schedule. 
The standardised open ended interview was chosen as the gathering instrument because it 
gave the required flexibility to obtain more considered responses on the phenomenon, and it 
therefore provided better access to the opinions, views, interpretations, understandings and 
experiences of interviewees. Also it was the best way to explore the voices and experiences of 
key actors, for example, those actors who were misrepresented in the process of modification 
of law as part of the policy responses to the crisis (Byrne, 2004 cited in Silverman 1996, p.114). 
As the interviewees were key actors, and they also experienced the events discussed in the 
interview, their responses were more reliable. 
The standardised interview included 20 open ended questions. All the questions were about 
real rather than hypothetical events. Of those 20 questions, 15 were in the foreground of the 
research and 5 questions were in the background of the research. Also, 13 out of those 20 
questions were retrospective questions that referred to the causes of the sanitary crisis in the 
industry and the process of policy response, whilst the other 8 were focused on the, at that 
time, ongoing process of the early stages of the delivery of policy responses and their 
consequences.  
The purpose of the interview was to gather information about: 
1. Failures in the industry, causes of the crisis, and the context and sector in which the 
industry is embedded were developed (e.g. why previous regulations could not solve the 
disaster and how the process of policy response began). 
2. The process of policy responses to the crisis (e.g. what were the signals that put the crisis 
in evidence, how the crisis became a policy problem, what were the models that inspired 
the policy responses, and whether scientific advice was used). 
3. Early stage of the delivery of policy responses and their consequences (e.g. what were the 
difficulties of implementing or complying with the policy responses, whether policy 
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responses were facilitating actors’ activities, whether actors had sufficient resources to 
comply with the policy responses, and whether there was compatibility between actors’ 
interests and the goals of the policy responses). 
Of the 82 interviews conducted, 81 were recorded and later fully transcribed. To ensure the 
reliability of the transcriptions they were done without any editing. The length of the 
interviews was between 30 minutes and two and a half hours, with an average of one hour. 
The geographical distribution of interviews was: 31 were in Santiago (capital city), 38 were in 
Puerto Montt (637 miles from Santiago), 11 were in Valparaíso (73 miles from Santiago), 1 was 
in Puerto Varas (14 miles from Puerto Montt), and 1 was in Castro, Chiloé Island (108 miles 
from Puerto Montt). 
 
Figure 4.3: Map of Chile indicating the distribution of interviews (number of interviews in 
brackets) 
 
The standardised interview schedule included (Wilson, 1996): 
· All the interviews were conducted in person by the researcher. 
Santiago: 
- Bureaucrats (1) 
- Public Agencies, Programmes, Institutes, Councilsand Services (5) 
- Private Institutes, Foundations and Consortia (3) 
- NGOs (4) 
- Producers Firms (3) 
- Consultants (3) 
- Lawyers (2) 
- Media (1) 
- Universities (5) 
- Banking Sector and Financial Advisors (4) 
 
Valparaíso: 
- Bureaucrats (3) 
- Associations (1) 
- Government decision makers (6) 
- Consultants (1) 
 
Puerto Montt: 
- Bureaucrats (2) 
- Public Agencies, Programmes, Institutes, Councilsand Services (6) 
- Private Institutes, Foundations and Consortia (2) 
- Associations (5) 
- Trade Unions (2) 
- Producers Firms (6) 
- Consultants (2) 
- Lawyers (1) 
- Laboratories and Veterinarians (4) 
- Transport and Product Process (4) 
- Media (1) 
- Universities (3) 
1.  
Puerto Varas: 
- Consultants (1) 
 
Chiloé Island (in Spanish ‘Isla de Chiloé’): 
- Associations (1) 
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· The same way of introducing the research and same format of approaching the 
interviewees was used. 
· The same questions were asked of every respondent using the same wording: this 
helped to reduce ambiguity in the understanding of questions by interviewees. For the 
reliability of the interview and validity of the research it was important that every 
interviewee understood the questions in the same way as it was intended because this 
ensured obtaining responses on the topics to be investigated, and increased the 
certainty of coding the responses later and analysing the data. 
· Notes were taken during the interviews. 
The reliability of the interview schedule included a pre-testing from which the interview 
schedule and the version of the interview applied in the fieldwork were amended (Silverman, 
2006). 
The secondary data was collected longitudinally (more than one episode of data collection) 
from public access websites of different governmental and private organisations (see Table 4.2 
for details of secondary sources). Also, several documents were collected by the researcher 
from some organisations during the fieldwork. 
To ensure validity in the data collection, triangulation by data source and triangulation by 
method of collection were used (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mabry, 2008). Primary data was collected 
from different interviewees and complemented with secondary sources. Also, secondary data 
was collected from different organisations. Finally, data collected by first and second sources 
were cross-checked. In primary data the content of the interviews among different actors were 
checked in order to confirm, elaborate or disconfirm information from other sources and 
perspectives among actors. This helped to increase the level of accuracy in the data. 
 
4.8. Data and information analysis 
The research used a preliminary analytic strategy that led to two general strategies to analyse 
the data and information. Once those general strategies were applied, four complementary 
analytical techniques were employed to support the findings and draw conclusions. 
The preliminary analytical strategy involved the construction of some categories and sub-
categories where data and information were placed. Also data and information were put in a 
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chronological order (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The constructed categories, sub-categories 
and the defined temporal scheme followed the three phases of the methodology. Thus, data 
and information were placed into the categories of: i) causes of the crisis, ii) policy response to 
the crisis, and iii) consequences of policy response to the crisis. Sub-categories for each 
category were defined to organise the data in order to distinguish and simplify background and 
foreground information. For example, into the category of ‘causes of the crisis’, a sub-category 
called ‘institutional failure’ was constructed. Data and information related to the factors 
located in the initial regulatory framework that contributed to the conditions that stimulated 
the crisis in the industry (e.g. regulations prior to the crisis did not specify and therefore 
enforce a maximum fish density per cage) were placed in this sub-category. The defined 
temporal scheme helped to clarify causal relations among the key concepts to be 
operationalised in the research (i.e. policy learning, changes in policy goals, changes in policy 
instruments, changes in the settings of policy instruments). 
The two general strategies that were guided by the preliminary strategy were, i) to position 
the data and information analysis on theoretical propositions, and ii) to examine rival 
explanations (Yin, 2009). Data analysis followed the theoretical propositions that drove the 
research questions and defined rival hypotheses. Also rival theories were considered to explain 
the data and information in order to prevent bias. 
The four complementary analytical techniques used to support the findings and draw 
conclusions were, i) explanation building (Yin, 2009), ii) time-series analysis, particularly the 
construction of a chronology (Yin, 2009), iii) constant comparative method (Lewes and Ritchie, 
2003; Silverman, 2006), and iv) deviant case analysis (Lewes and Ritchie, 2003; Silverman, 
2006). 
Explanation building was used since the aim of the research is to explain the phenomenon of 
policy response to the sanitary crisis faced by the Chilean salmon industry between 2007 and 
2010. Therefore causal links between policy responses and the sanitary crisis were made. Also, 
the Chilean salmon industry is considered as a successful industry, which, in a short period, 
became the second largest producer and exporter of farmed salmon at the global level. The 
industry was affected by a virus whose existence was known about by the Chilean industry 
since other salmon producers and exporters at the global level experienced this crisis before 
Chile (e.g. Norway in 1984, Canada in 1996, Scotland in 1998, Faroe Islands in 1999, and the 
United States in 2000). This situation deserves an explanation that may include what lessons 
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the Chilean industry failed to learn from its competitors, but, more importantly, what is the 
importance of anticipating crisis at the industry level. 
The chronology was used as an analytical technique since the research is a longitudinal study 
and examines concepts such as policy learning and policy change over time. Also because 
some events occurred before others, the ordering of those events over time enlightens the 
construction of causal relationships among them. The time that the empirical context covered 
was since 2007, which is the year of the onset of the sanitary crisis in the industry, up to 2013, 
which is four years after the publication of the new Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Law 
N°20434), and allows the observation of consequences of the policy responses to the crisis. 
The constant comparative method and deviant case analysis were used as techniques to 
analyse the data but also to reach internal validity. The former was a way of checking ‘accuracy 
of fit’ by developing hypotheses in one part of the data and testing them in other parts of the 
data, comparing, for example, the responses among actors (e.g. Atlantic salmon producers 
versus Coho salmon producers, producers versus NGOs, bureaucrats versus producers). The 
latter was a way of including all the cases, especially the outliers in the analysis without 
ignoring or forcing them into the categories. For example, it was crucial in this research to 
analyse why and when Coho salmon producers started to draw apart from the Association of 
Chilean Salmon Industry (since at the beginning of the design of policy responses they agreed 
with the Association about the need to modify the General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture), 
what are the characteristics of Coho salmon producers, whether there are differences 
between Coho salmon producers and other types of producers, and whether these differences 
influenced their policy options. 
Since the research used a platform of opinions, interpretations and understandings by 
interviewees as evidence to answer the research questions, triangulation by data sources and 
contents and triangulation by method of data collection were used to verify and support those 
opinions, interpretations and understandings. Also theoretical triangulation was used to 
explain and analyse the data (Mabry, 2008). 
 
4.9. Synthesis of the chapter 
This research employed the policy response to the sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon farming 
industry as the case study. This case study was identified as a suitable case to analyse and test 
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the framework on policy learning and policy change stimulated by catastrophic events. The 
selection of the case study was a combination of an interest to learn and contribute empirically 
to a deep understanding of policy responses to the sanitary crisis of the Chilean industry, and 
an interest to extend the policy learning and policy change literature in the context of crisis. 
The case study was used as the research method because it was found to be a more 
explanatory approach to the study; the researcher could not control the conditions of the 
study, and the study was a contemporary phenomenon to which the researcher had direct 
access through participants involved in the crisis. 
The research strategy to operationalise the theoretical framework and answer the research 
questions involved three phases. The first phase conducted a characterisation and diagnosis of 
the Chilean salmon industry using an adaptation of the system failure approach and causal 
stories. The second phase analysed the policy responses to the crisis using a policy learning 
and policy change approach. The third phase analysed the consequences of the policy 
responses to the crisis from a conflict and ambiguity perspective. In those phases policy 
learning in a context of industry crisis was the dependent variable, and how policies changed 
over time were used as the explanatory variables to understand the institutional change in the 
Chilean industry. 
The research employed primary and secondary sources of data and information. The primary 
source data was gathered from a complete set of industry actors in a single episode of 
fieldwork using a standardised open ended interview and a standardised interview schedule. 
The actors interviewed were selected through a purposive sample driven by the research 
questions and the theoretical framework. The secondary sources included qualitative and 
quantitative documents and were collected longitudinally from public access websites of 
different organisations and by the researcher during fieldwork. To ensure validity in the data 
collection, triangulation by data source, contents and triangulation by method of collection 
were used. 
To analyse the data and information, the research used several analytical strategies. A 
preliminary strategy was to construct categories and sub-categories where data and 
information were put in chronological order. Then the data was analysed following the 
theoretical propositions and considering rival theories. Furthermore, explanation building was 
used to enlighten the policy response in the industry, and causal links between policy 
responses and the sanitary crisis were made. A chronology was used because the research is a 
longitudinal study. The ordering of events over time enlightened the construction of causal 
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relationships among them, and concepts such as policy learning and policy change were 
examined over time.  
The constant comparative method and deviant case analysis were used not only as analytical 
techniques but also to reach internal validity. The former was a way of checking ‘accuracy of 
fit’ by developing hypotheses in one part of the data and testing them in other parts of the 
data. The latter was a way of including all the cases, especially the outliers in the analysis 
without ignoring or forcing them into the categories. Theoretical triangulation was used to 
explain and analyse the data. 
To satisfy reliability, this research explained the research strategy and data analysis and made 
the theoretical lens employed to interpret the data and findings explicit. Moreover, it 
explained how the chosen theoretical lens allowed those interpretations. To ensure validity, 
the research was constructed by measuring the policy response to the sanitary crisis through a 
policy learning and policy change lens in terms of changes in policy goals, policy instruments 
and the settings of policy instruments. Internal validity was achieved through causal 
relationships in the data and the analytical tactics explained in the above paragraphs. External 
validity was achieved by explaining the generalisation of the findings. In that regard, this 
chapter pointed out that it is incorrect to conclude that it is not possible to generalise from an 
individual case, or to conclude that a single case study cannot contribute to scientific 
development. The generalisation from this research is possible but limited because the policy 
response to the sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry is not free from 
idiosyncratic features. However, the conclusions drawn from this thesis offer a potential 
opportunity for further research and in this sense contributes to the advance of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CAUSES OF THE SANITARY CRISIS IN THE CHILEAN SALMON FARMING 
INDUSTRY 
“[The sanitary crisis] actually was a chronicle of a death foretold” 
(An interviewed Service Supplier) 
This chapter analyses the nature of the sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry 
that occurred in 2007, and how it helped to inform and defined industry policy problems due 
to ISA. It also examines how the sanitary crisis became the policy window for radical policy 
change, particularly in reforming the industry regulatory framework, and precipitated the 
industry policy learning and policy change. 
This research considers the period of the sanitary crisis between June 2007 (index case) and 
December 2010, when there was a dramatic drop in the virulent ISAv cases. It is arguable that 
the conditions that stimulated the sanitary crisis provoked a system failure in the industry, and 
therefore the explanations about causes of the crisis are organised and analysed using a 
system failure approach. Particular emphasis is put on the hard institutional failure 
experienced by the industry, since it can be demonstrated that the initial industrial regulatory 
framework prior to the crisis was not designed to protect the industry from the crisis. In 
addition, it was not adequately implemented, even when the industry and government were 
aware about ISA sanitary crises in other global salmon producer countries such as Norway. 
 
5.1. Causes of the sanitary crisis in the Chilean industry as the basis for policy responses 
Following Kingdon’s (2003) concept of indicators, and Deutsch’s (1966) concept of feedback to 
government, long before the sanitary crisis occurred in the Chilean salmon industry, different 
actors were providing indicators and feedback about the critical sanitary and environmental 
situation of the industry to government officials including policy makers. Critiques made in the 
forms of studies, reports, research and news from environmental and labour NGOs (e.g. 
Environmental and Labour Monitoring of Chiloé, OCEANA, Terram, ECOCEANOS), artisanal 
fisherman (e.g. CONAPACH), universities (e.g. Universidad de Los Lagos and its institute i-mar, 
Universidad Arturo Prat, Universidad Austral), public and private institutes (e.g. National 
Centre for Alternative Development Studies, Libertad y Desarrollo), the national media (e.g. 
Technopress with its electronic bulletin aqua.cl; local newspapers such as La Tercera, El 
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Mercurio, El Mostrador, Diario Estrategia) and international media (e.g. New York Times) to 
name a few, were well known and publicly accessible. These indicators and feedback provided 
information in the areas of fish disease, intensive production model of the industry, use of 
antibiotics, environmental impacts from salmon production, water pollution, salmon escapes, 
salmon feed, and other topics. NGOs were also alerting the state about the lack of regulation 
in the sector and industry, and the serious consequences it could have for the environment. 
In July 2006 (a year before of the onset of the sanitary crisis) an Inquiry Commission, 
established by the Committee on Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Interests of the Congress, 
investigated the labour and environmental impacts of the salmon industry. Its published report 
provided crucial evidence regarding the unsustainability of the industry model at that point in 
time, and included information on sectoral regulations and industry practices (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 2006c). An interviewed policy maker who participated in this Inquiry 
Commission pointed out that issues such as concession densities, the non-establishment of 
health management areas, non-fallowing and overproduction were for them, at that moment, 
a clear indication that an epidemic was likely. 
More directly, even the salmon and the sea lice caligus were providing feedback that was 
observable in the industry. An interviewed Consultant explained that since smolt with 
compromised immunological quality started to be placed into the water, harvesting times 
were longer, fish growth rates were lower, and morbidity and feed conversion rates35were 
higher.  
As noted earlier in Section 3.2 (Chapter 3), the productivity of the industry, particularly since 
2004, was declining. At the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007, the observed caligus 
population increased five times over earlier levels, which clearly indicated that the fish were 
less healthy in general and therefore most likely also had impaired immune systems (An 
Interviewed Consultant). This information constituted signals of how poorly the industry was 
performing in sanitary and environmental terms, and even more it was an early warning of a 
coming sanitary catastrophe. However, all this feedback was not seen as a signal of a coming 
crisis requiring urgent transformation of the critical sanitary and environmental situation of 
the industry involving its intensive production model, or as a problem to be faced by policy 
makers and government officials (in Kingdon’s term, a policy problem). 
                                                             
35 The Feed Conversion Ratio (FCR) corresponds to the total feed given divided by the total weight gain (Tacon, 
2005). 
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When the ISAv was introduced into the country, it caused massive salmon morbidity. The 
magnitude of salmon fatalities and the infestation of farms across the industry was feedback 
that could not be ignored by the sanitary authority, Sernapesca, and other government 
officials. It did not take long before the crisis was defined as a policy problem and given high 
priority in the governmental agenda. Kingdon (2003) conceptualised these types of events as 
‘focusing events’. They are short shocks that attract the attention of individuals in and around 
the government, and government officials decide to do something. The sanitary crisis in the 
Chilean industry was a focusing event. 
In this way the sanitary crisis itself, that is, to stop the epizootic infestation and reduce the fish 
mortality due to ISAv and control the spread of the virus and the disease, became the first 
defined policy problem (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d). The policy subsystem 
(Sabatier, 1988) involved in the definition of the sanitary crisis as a policy problem was the 
producer firms, the Association of Salmon Industry (SalmonChile), the government by its 
sanitary authority (Sernapesca), and international laboratories, which confirmed that the 
pathogen was actually the ISAv. The measures for this, however, remained to be determined. 
Since the response to the crisis depended upon an understanding of its causes, it is important 
to examine the variety of explanations available as policymakers began to consider a response. 
Primary data gathered in extensive fieldwork reveals that the sanitary crisis in the Chilean 
salmon farming industry could not be assigned to just one direct cause. Instead, there were 
many interdependent failures that, in retrospect, can be seen as having led the industry to the 
crisis.  
Following the ecological system failure framework formulated in Chapter 2, a list and brief 
explanation of each failure reported by the complete set of industry actors interviewed during 
fieldwork is given below. Since the fieldwork occurred well after the onset of the crisis these 
reported failures have the benefit of hindsight – they are, to some extent, retrospective views 
even though respondents were asked to recall what explanations were offered at the time of 
the crisis. They are categorised in institutional (hard and soft), infrastructural, interaction 
(weak and strong), capabilities and unexpected failures. As discussed in Chapter 2 the 
unexpected failures category was added because this is critical for natural resource based 
industries such as salmon farming.  
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Table 5.1: System failure and narratives 
NARRATIVE 
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FAILURES  
Institutional 
Hard 
Lack of and lag in 
regulation  X       X  
Profligate granting of 
concessions      X   X  
Ineffective 
enforcement system         X  
Lack of risk assessment    X     X  
Soft 
Free production 
approach – framework 
of the regulation 
       X X  
Scope of the role of the 
state       X X X  
Short term vision X    X    X  
Concealment of 
information X          
Overconfidence/arroga
nce of the industry      X     
Ambition     X X  X   
Reactive approach and 
behaviour  X   X    X  
Infrastructural 
Lack of capacity of the 
sanitary authority        X X  
High concentration of 
farming centres– 
intensive production 
model 
 X         
Interaction Weak 
Lack of scientific 
knowledge to make 
production decisions 
   X X      
Individualistic approach 
to perform 
aquaculture/salmon 
activities 
  X      X  
Strong Collusion      X     
Capabilities 
High concentration of 
fish per cage (high 
density) – intensive 
production model 
X X X   X     
Lack of fallow– 
intensive production 
model 
  X        
Heavy use of medical 
inputs – intensive 
production model 
X    X    X  
Smolt with 
compromised 
immunological system 
X     X     
Presence of other 
pathogens X X  X       
Ignorance    X X      
Capability of the 
sanitary authority 
(including lack of 
resources) 
       X X X 
Unexpected Attempt          X Natural conditions  X  X       
Source: Own elaboration based on analysis and ecological system failure approach. 
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The above table illustrates how the diversity of industry failures created divergent narratives 
which explain the causes of the sanitary crisis, as explained below. 
 
Institutional Failures: 
Applying Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing’s (2005) concept of institutional failures to the 
Chilean salmon industry, they refer to the ‘rules of the game’ in which the industry operates 
regulating actors’ behaviour and their interaction. These rules of the game are part of the 
industry regulatory framework. 
Following the definition of hard institutional failures posed by Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and 
Gilsing (2005), in the Chilean industry they refer to the formal mechanisms in the industry 
regulatory framework such as laws and regulations. 
· F1: Lack of and lag in regulation. This refers to the late development of an 
environmental and sanitary regulatory framework for the industry. The regulatory 
framework of the aquaculture sector, and therefore of the industry, formally began in 
the late 1980s with the 1989 General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Law N°18892) 
(see Appendix B for a history of the industry’s regulatory framework). However, the 
environmental and sanitary regulations came in the 2000s with the 2001 Decree 
N°320, which set the Environmental Regulation RAMA (for its Spanish acronym), and 
2002 Decree N°319 which set the Sanitary Regulation RESA (for its Spanish acronym). 
· F2: Profligate granting of concessions. The scheme for allocation of concession 
resulted in an excessive delivery of them36. 
· F3: Ineffective enforcement system. The system was unable to persuade and induce 
compliance with environmental and sanitary conditions required by regulations. 
· F4: Lack of risk assessment to protect the industry from exotic diseases such as ISA, 
reduce the negative externalities to the environment, reduce the risks related to the 
operation of the industry, and ensure a sustainable production. 
                                                             
36 An aquaculture concession is the administrative act by which the National Ministry of Defence gives a person the 
rights of use on certain domestic goods and the person should perform aquaculture activities (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 1989). 
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In the Chilean salmon industry there are implicit rules of the game in which the industry 
operates, such as beliefs and values that shape policy and policy environments. This is what 
Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005) refer to as soft institutional failures. 
· F5: Free production approach – framework of the regulation. Concessions were 
granted without reference to the level of production they allowed or when they might 
be terminated. Implicitly this allowed unlimited production for an unlimited time. 
· F6: Scope of the role of the state. The state allowed inadequate practices in the 
industry despite evidence of environmental harm from these practices. 
· F7: Short term vision. Although there has been a National Aquaculture Policy since 
2003, there was no strategic plan for the industry. There was no process for defining a 
sustainable policy to develop the aquaculture sector or salmon industry, and no plan 
for preventing or protecting the aquaculture sector and the salmon industry from 
diseases. 
· F8: Concealment of information to hide the poor performance of the industry. 
· F9: Overconfidence/arrogance of the industry given the golden period the industry was 
enjoying when the crisis came due to its economic profits, excellent technological 
development, and the social development the industry gave to the southern regions in 
the country. 
· F10: Ambition to reach one million tonnes of salmon species, to catch up with the 
Norwegian production and achieve higher levels of profit. 
· F11: Reactive approach and behaviour. This refers to the reactive rather than 
preventive approach of the regulatory framework. Regulations and modifications to 
regulations came after the industry experienced difficulties or crises such as the ISA 
crisis, after which the 1989 General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Law N°18892) was 
modified creating the 2010 General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Law N°20434). 
 
Infrastructural Failures: 
Although Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005) refer to innovation, their concept of 
infrastructural failure discussed can be applied to the Chilean salmon industry. In that case, 
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they refer to the physical systems that are necessary for the operation and development of the 
industry. 
· F12: Lack of capacity of the sanitary authority to control the industry. 
· F13: High concentration of farming centres – intensive production model. 
Concentration of farming centres into concessions, and high concentration of 
concessions in areas. 
 
Interaction Failures: 
Following Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005) discussion on weak and strong interaction 
failures, we say that, in the context of the salmon industry in Chile, interaction failures may be 
defined as the interactions among actors of the industry and the sector in which the industry is 
embedded. Weak interaction failure corresponds to a poor connectivity among actors that 
prevents synergies and learning, whilst strong interaction failure corresponds to dominance 
dependence among actors who may be locked into ‘inadequate’ practices. 
Weak interaction failures: 
· F14: Lack of scientific knowledge to make production decisions given the disconnection 
between the industry and the knowledge providers (e.g. universities, research 
centres). 
· F15: Individualistic approach to perform aquaculture/salmon activities that do not take 
into account collaboration and coordination among producers to look after and 
manage the common-pool resource water and the industry as a whole. 
Strong interaction failures: 
· F16: Collusion between the producers and providers of the Environmental Reports 
(INFAs by its acronym in Spanish) that are the point of reference to report 
environmental impacts from the production of salmon. Prior to the crisis producers 
were responsible for the production of these reports and hired a third party to 
perform the studies. When the outcomes of these reports were too negative and there 
was a danger of the continuity of production being disrupted, the producers asked that 
the results of the studies were changed in order to show positive impacts. 
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Capabilities Failures: 
Lack of competencies, capacities and resources is what  Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing 
(2005) conceptualised as capabilities failures. Capabilities failures in the salmon industry may 
refer to the lack of competencies, capacities and resources toward an unsustainable 
development. 
· F17: High concentration of fish per cage (high density) – intensive production model. 
This is the overcrowding of fish in farming cages. 
· F18: Lack of fallow– intensive production model that ensures continuous production 
without renewal of the common-pool resource water to preserve its quality. 
· F19: Heavy use of medical inputs – intensive production model such as antibiotics, 
fungicides and vaccines to deal with lower productivity and maintain competitiveness.  
· F20: Smolt with compromised immunological system that makes the fish weak and 
more susceptible to pathogens and diseases. 
· F21: Presence of other pathogens that act as carriers, vectors or reservoirs of ISAv, 
such as the sea louse caligus. 
· F22: Ignorance about basic variables of the system such as salmon biology and the 
direction of ocean currents. 
· F23: Capability of the sanitary authority (including lack of resources) in detecting and 
recognising ISA. Prior to the crisis no system was developed and ready for this 
particular purpose. It includes lack of personnel to monitor and control environmental 
and sanitary industry practices by the National Fishing Service. 
 
Unexpected Failures: 
The aquaculture sector, in general, and salmon industry in particular, face and deal with 
significant uncertainties. These uncertainties come from nature (i.e. unexpected factors such 
as natural conditions and natural disasters) and from the activities themselves (i.e. inherent 
uncertainties). These uncertainties can lead to unexpected failures, either because of their 
appearance or because of the decisions that are made to deal with them. 
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Even when natural conditions or circumstances and inherent uncertainties are not taken into 
account in the strategy and operations of an innovation system, the failure framework, 
including unexpected failures as discussed in Chapter 2, is pertinent for two reasons. The first 
is that, since the industry is embedded in an ecological system and works with a biological 
‘delicate’ resource (i.e. salmon), it is always relevant to include the inherent uncertainties 
related to fish responses in the way in which the resource is treated. For example, fish 
response to antibiotics or other disease treatments, change in diet, vaccines, and vaccination 
methods to name a few, and natural conditions (expected and unexpected) such as water with 
less oxygen, water with more nutrients, and higher or lower temperatures.  
This research recognises that these uncertainties, as well as natural conditions or 
circumstances and natural disasters, may play a role in sanitary crises such as the ISA crisis. 
Other inherent uncertainties related to salmon production are the long production cycle37, 
attacks of salmon cages from South American sea lions (Otaria flavescens) that produce 
salmon mortalities, salmon escape and increase in fish stress, and salmon theft. 
The second reason is that natural conditions or circumstances can be considered as acts of 
God38, such as those discussed by Sidmon (1923) and Bozeman (1952), and it can be believed 
that sanitary crises like that of ISA may be such an event. However, as Wijkman and 
Timberlake (1984) argue, humans may play a key role in making their environment more prone 
to certain crises.  
This research demonstrates that the sanitary crisis faced by the Chilean industry was not an act 
of God but an act of man. At the same time it recognises the natural conditions the industry 
faced at the time of the crisis and that those conditions, to a lesser extent, also played a role. 
Among these natural conditions are the geography of Chile, which played a role in spreading 
the virus, and the weather at the time of the crisis. 
One of the natural disasters that affected the industry during the first year of the ISA crisis was 
the eruption of Chaitén Volcano (X Region), which started on 2 May 2008. As a consequence of 
this, eight farming centres infected with ISAv were isolated. To avoid an ecological disaster 
from fish mortalities, Sernapesca authorised the move of those centres to another area in the 
                                                             
37 This is different for Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and trout. The longest production cycle is for Atlantic salmon, 
which is between 27 and 33 months.  
38 ‘Any accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of 
foresight, pains, or care, reasonable to be expected, could have been prevented’ (Bozeman, 1952, p.422). 
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region –Quellón. This action resulted in the spread of the virus and the infestation of other 
farming centres (La Tercera. com, 2009, Sernapesca, 2008a). 
The eruption of Chaitén Volcano and its consequences is just one example of natural disasters 
that have affected the Chilean salmon industry. Other more recent disasters that have affected 
the industry are: earthquake in Aysén Fjord (April 2007), earthquake in the Bío-Bío Region and 
subsequent tsunami (February 2010), tsunami warning for earthquake in Japan (March 2011), 
and Cordón Caulle eruption (June 2011) (Mundo Acuícola, 2013). 
Other environmental factors that may affect the industry are storms and algal blooms39. For 
example, in March 2009 a harmful algal bloom40 of Alexandrium catenella was observed in the 
Aysén Region. Reported by Aqua, it produced significant mortalities in Atlantic salmon 
(Aqua.cl, 2009b) and, according to Diario Financiero, an economic loss of more than US$10 
million to salmon producers (Diario Financiero.cl, 2009). 
· F24: Attempt to reduce the comparative advantage of the Chilean industry and its 
position at the global level (i.e. competitiveness of the industry). 
· F25: Natural conditions that allowed the reproduction of ISAv such as dry year, higher 
temperatures, more salinity of the sea and the geography of Chile. 
The interdependence of these 25 failures, and interaction among different actors and 
institutions, are demonstrated through the following 10 causal stories that explain why the 
Chilean industry had a sanitary crisis. These stories were composed from the failures and story 
lines reported by the interviewed actors, and organised in the causal stories framework 
developed by Stone (1989). 
 
Inadvertent cause: 
Following Stone’s framework on causal stories in policy making (Stone, 1989), we argue that 
some of the explanations given by the interviewees about why the Chilean industry had a 
sanitary crisis may be interpreted as inadvertent causes. The explanation of these causal 
                                                             
39 ‘The rapid excessive growth of algae, generally caused by high nutrient levels and favourable conditions. Can 
result in deoxygenation of the water mass when the algae die, leading to the death of aquatic flora and fauna’ 
(http://www.greenfacts.org/glossary/abc/algal-bloom.htm Last accessed: 22 January 2013). 
40 ‘Algal bloom events involving toxic or otherwise harmful phytoplankton. Such blooms often take on a red or 
brown hue and are known colloquially as red tides’ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algal_bloom Last accessed: 22 
January 2013). 
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theories refer to purposeful actions of the industry that had unexpected negative 
consequences. 
Narrative 1: Ignorance of the industry 
The industry did not know that the manner in which the salmon was being cultivated was 
causing, or could cause, negative externalities to the environment and other actors (lack of 
knowledge). According to an interviewed producer firm, the cultivation focused on growing 
and producing salmon, and not on knowing how the biological resource salmon and the 
environment in which the salmon was growing up operated (short vision). He explained that 
there were basic things that the industry did not know, such as the characteristics of the 
salmon and the environment in which the salmon was being cultivated (e.g. direction of the 
currents, operation of circuit nutrients, levels of oxygen). This point was noted by the 
interviewee when he said ‘…I perfectly remember saying to an oceanographer… …we have 
cages in the sea, in different points, at different depths and we really had no idea how the 
currents worked in the sea, if we had oxygen or not, how that condition affected the fish…that 
means that there was a profound ignorance of many things that were critical, today we know 
they are critical, but at that moment we did not know that…’. 
For this reason the industry addressed the consequences of problems rather than their causes 
(reactive behaviour). For example, if the salmon was sick the industry used medicines to make 
the salmon better rather than try to understand the reasons for the salmons’ illness. If there 
was an algal bloom the industry put oxygen in the water rather than try to understand the 
reasons for that algal bloom and know whether the salmon was being located in a right place 
for maturation. Regarding this, the interviewee observed ‘…probably we attacked the 
consequences...nowadays there is a study of a matrix of risks and impacts analysis. Nowadays I 
locate a centre to fifteen feet deep or thirty and I know I am surrounded by this or that thing, 
that the currents come here, etc., that is, there is a much deeper analysis…’. 
Another issue, he continued, was that the lack of knowledge in biological and environmental 
resources was due to a disconnection between the industry and the knowledge providers such 
as universities and research centres. This lack of knowledge was also due to a deficiency of 
professionals connected with marine sciences. There was a lack of information and knowledge 
in critical aspects (such as the introduction of pathogens via the import of eggs) and from the 
field (i.e. what was going on with the fish). A representative of an Association described by in 
the following way, ‘…the industry started to be fed with professionals, perhaps...there were 
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marine biologists, fishery engineers, veterinarians, but the veterinarian somehow, was 
educated to creatures that live on land, not in the water, then, there was a sort of 
metamorphosis that never worked and the result was a shortage of professionals. On the 
other hand, the entrance of industrial civil engineers began, commercial engineers, they put 
pressure on the productive part, they saw no more than costs, the biological part, the part of 
the salmon, the animal welfare and a lot of factors that are seen on the field itself…no, that 
was not an issue for them because that was not their responsibility, and from there the 
productive chain of the industry began to weaken…’. 
Probably the ambition of the industry in maximising profits was part of this ignorance. 
Shareholders and managers of firms were focused only on maximising production and 
minimising costs. Regarding this, a representative from an Association noted ‘it was sought to 
maximize the production but without knowing if that was feasible in reality or if that was 
known it was ignored or it wanted to believe that what happened was not going to happen, 
which in our opinion was a foretold chronic’. In the same line, an interviewee linked to the 
industry from the service sector said that the role of the veterinarian was ignored and the role 
of managers was privileged; because of this, the salmon production was based only on 
profitability without taking into account the environment and animal welfare, and this led the 
industry to unsustainable practices in production.  
 
Narrative 2: Negligence of the industry in fattening up salmon  
Opinion was shared across the interviewees that the industry was operating with a great 
biomass per cage (i.e. high concentration of fish per cage), and that the industry had an 
inclination to use immunologically weak smolt to produce salmon. Smolts such as these are 
very susceptible to die and/or get pathogens and diseases. Regarding this, an interviewed 
Consultant said ‘…if you do not respect the production of an animal…with enough space, with 
a good immune system, it will get diseases. If you do not respect that it is likely that disease 
will come and also if this is an exotic disease in a place where you have many farming centres, 
this is, there is a more or less intense production and also you do not have certain biosanitary 
measures…’. Another interviewed consultant pointed out that this practice constitutes a 
sanitary risk known to the industry. He explained that immunologically weak smolts were 
being forced to finish their production cycle in order to meet the requirements of the market, 
and in order to accomplish this objective the industry was using high levels of medical inputs 
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such as antibiotics and fungicides. This point was described by the Consultant when he said 
‘such was the growth in the industry and such was the demand of an end product to different 
markets that the firms discriminated little about the quality of their smolts that had to be 
placed in the sea, because they needed more smolts placed in the water…then dramatic things 
began to happen; the harvest times were longer, growth rates were obviously lower, morbidity 
rates were higher, feed conversions were increasingly high, and therefore more food was 
demanded per produced kilo. All this made from the point of view of productivity that the 
situation went from bad to worse, but the goal was to meet with clients who demanded a 
certain amount of products in those years’. An interviewed NGO said that the number of 
mortalities and the quantity of medical inputs was not public information. The interviewee 
observed ‘…we knew that the industry was abusing antibiotics, although the government 
never released the information on the use of antibiotics until we requested it in 2009. We 
knew that, for example, in 2007 the salmon industry in Chile used 385 tons of antibiotics. That 
year Norway used 600 kilos, and that is the point, Norway used 600 times less antibiotics than 
Chile, with a higher production…’. There was agreement among the interviewees that, at the 
time of the sanitary crisis, the industry was operating with its highest level of caligus, a vector 
for ISAv. As narrative 8 explains. 
 
Narrative 3: Negligence of the industry in contaminating the water 
The industry was operating with a great biomass (i.e. fish in the water) and without fallow 
periods. An interviewed researcher from a University explained that the more fish there were 
in the water, the more pollution to the water from the uncaptured feed and faeces; this 
implies an accumulation of contaminating material on the seabed, and negative impacts on the 
biodiversity and other water users. Poor quality of water due to the accumulation of 
contaminating material constitutes a stress for the salmon making it immunologically weaker. 
Since the water is a common-pool resource and farming centres are close to each other, the 
contamination in one farming centre may affect other farming centres. Regarding this, an 
interviewed producer firm observed ‘…unlike the production in other environments, as might 
be in land, in the sea the externalities are huge, that is, it is not enough that I do well, I have to 
do it well and you have to do it well and the neighbour has to do it well, otherwise, due to the 
currents in Chile, all of us end badly’. The lack of fallow does not allow the renewal of the 
water and its improvement in terms of quality (e.g. oxygen). Several individuals often 
mentioned this. For example, a representative from an Association described this in the 
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following way, ‘…there are farming centres that took responsibility for fallowing…there are 
farming centres that never fallow in the 20 years’. 
To clarify the claim posed above, we use the explanations made by Buschmann (2006) and 
Pizarro and Zolezzi (2003). According to these authors water pollution from salmon farming 
production comes mainly from uneaten feed, fish faeces and chemical treatments for salmon. 
Organic salmon wastes (feed and faeces) contribute with about 75% of phosphor, nitrogen and 
carbon to the aquatic environment. Just 25% of these elements are actually recouped when 
salmon is harvested (Buschmann, 2006). This is because about 25% of the given feed is eaten 
by the salmon and between 75-80% remains in the environment. Part of this 75-80% goes to 
the seabed and the other part remains in the water column. It has been estimated that more 
than 60% of the phosphor and 80% of the nitrogen from the organic salmon wastes remain in 
the water column. The increase in these nutrients (i.e. phosphor and nitrogen) in the water 
provokes a process called ‘eutrophication’ that decreases the level of oxygen and therefore 
reduces the biodiversity (Pizarro and Zolezzi, 2003). Phosphor is accumulated under the cages 
and is used as an indicator of water pollution (Buschmann, 2006). 
 
Narrative 4: Exacerbated desire to maximise profits 
Pointed out by some interviewed producer firms, although the industry was started through 
the initiative of the state (entrepreneurial state), the private sector played a crucial role in 
developing the industry and making it the second largest producer and exporter of salmon at 
the global level. An interviewed deputy stated that this made the industry feel an 
overwhelming success, which translated   an arrogant and resistant attitude to be questioned 
and controlled by regulation. It was agreed across the interviewees that the industry was 
developed on the principle of self-regulation and with the belief that the state was 
unnecessary. This point can be exemplified by the words of an interviewed NGO who said 
‘…they are [the private sector] who feel that they are the parents of the project of this 
industry. They indicate that this was a private initiative that emerged from their effort when 
they were small, when they were visionaries…and they believed this and therefore that was 
the main argument for the state to not regulate because they knew what the activity was…’. 
An interviewed producer firm explained that since the production of salmon was a very 
attractive business, the industry started to ask increasingly for more concessions; a situation 
permitted by the legislation. The producer firm described this in the following way, ‘…this thing 
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started badly because when many years ago this thing about concessions appeared, I could ask 
half of the Chilean Sea and nobody stopped me...and this at the end resulted in many people 
with vision became millionaires at the expense of demanding rights which were free and at 
expense of demanding rights by a map. Here there was not a process in which authorities said 
we are going to study this region and we will determine the 200 best places and we will visit 
them...no, here it was, look, here is the table, the law is the law, who grabs, grabs, and then 
they grabbed the maps and started asking for concessions with a map and with not serious 
studies that any individual could support…’. The industry was overambitious and engaged in 
relentless increases in production and profits, which ended in an unsustainable production 
model. A representative from the banking sector opined that the disproportionate ambition of 
the industry was translated into an abuse of natural resources. An interviewed researcher 
working in a University said that the ambition led the industry to use smolt of bad quality, 
increase the fish densities, buy salmon eggs from any supplier, and, finally, relax the complete 
process of producing salmon. There was a desire for rapidly growing the industry and 
everything was focussed on this avarice. In the same line and regarding this, an interviewed 
deputy said ‘…the arrogance of the managers and their greed for having returns that do not 
exist anywhere else in the world plus a timorous attitude of our past and current government 
officials especially in the labour and environmental fields in the previous government, 
obviously, that leads us to this kind of problems…’. 
It was argued by an interviewee from a public agency that the ambition of the industry and its 
desire to maximise profits via continuous production, also pushed the industry to perform 
inadequate practices such as collusion between producers and environmental report providers 
to report positive impacts from the salmon activities, even when this was not and could not be 
the case. An interviewed researcher from a University argued that one of the consequences of 
wealthier salmon businesses was their physical distance from the places of production (since 
they went back to the capital city Santiago), and therefore emotional distance from the 
employees, communities and the environment. He observed ‘...not only their ego skyrocketed 
but they began to tell themselves stories of heroes, to follow each other and also to make an 
apology of the salmon cluster…’. 
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Narrative 5: Blinded by economic success 
The salmon industry is an example of success to the Chilean politicians. They proudly present 
the industry abroad as an exemplary model of development and modernity that combines 
foreign investment, natural resources, workforce generation and export orientation; an 
industry that grew rapidly and became part of the global economy. A representative from an 
NGO said ‘President Lagos said, leaving, because here all say when they leave... said, I leave 
and one of every three salmon consumed in the world comes from Chile, that is my cover 
letter that my management was successful because I was able to combine natural resources, 
international capital, technology, large companies and Chilean workforce’. Some NGOs pointed 
out that since the industry had a huge social and economic impact in the regions where the 
production takes place i.e., the generation of approximately 50,000 jobs in moribund regions 
and the development of supplier industries, the state became part of the objectives of the 
industry, ignoring the negative environmental and sanitary impacts that the industry was 
causing and privileging its economic success over other considerations. Another interviewed 
NGO said that the state gave the political support that the industry needed for unbounded 
growth. He said ‘…there was no interest from the Chilean government and the state in general 
to restrict and regulate properly this industry. The excessive growth of the industry was 
encouraged without taking measures for preventing this situation, the economic aspect was 
privileged and the environment was forgotten, the welfare of the population, of the local 
communities and the economic activities that already exist in Patagonia, and that was a 
deliberate strategy by the Chilean government’. 
 
Narrative 6: Self-regulation 
An interviewed bureaucrat from Subpesca explained that the self-regulation model in which 
the industry was developed played a key role in the fast growth of the industry. Probably 
without self-regulation the industry would not be what it is today. He continued, saying that 
the state did not have the capacity and capabilities to regulate the industry, and that, 
apparently, the industry had sufficient capabilities to self-regulate and take care of the 
business and the environment in which the business was operating. In his words, ‘I personally 
was one who always defended the self-regulation because I thought that it is an industry that 
did not exist, it was a region that did not exist, that was nothing in 1985, 1986. From there it 
became the second largest producer and exporter, billions of dollars, it created thousands of 
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jobs. It seemed to me that there was sufficient grey matter, business capacity to take care of 
that, but in the same way the industrialists were wrong, I was wrong too as an advocate of the 
industry, without having anything to do with them. The role of the state in regulation is 
critical…it is necessary to implement rules to these guys because if rules are not implemented 
the enthusiasm can end up killing…’. However, an interviewee from the banking sector pointed 
out that self-regulation did not work because it was translated into a disproportionate liberty, 
which favoured investments and profit maximisation over environmental and sanitary 
standards. A representative from a producer firm referred to the unworkable aspect of the 
self-regulation from a cultural point of view in the following way, ‘…our way of functioning and 
due to the culture we have, we do not have a concept of self-regulation. We necessarily 
depend on a regulatory framework to tell us at least in broad terms what are our limits. Our 
culture is not self-impose limits…’. 
Self-regulation was a well-intended model in which the state believed, but it was 
demonstrated that it had unintended negative consequences; this was said by an interviewed 
producer firm. He pointed out that in self-regulation models the existence of free riders who 
create negative externalities was likely, and the Chilean salmon industry was not an exception. 
In open common-pool systems like the sea, the externalities are greater than in closed systems 
(e.g. land) where their effects are more evident and it may be easier to control them. It is clear 
that the role of the state is fundamental in providing control and rules of the game for natural 
resource based industries. In the same line, this point was also mentioned by an interviewed 
lawyer when he said ‘the free riding meant a lack of control regarding sanitary management, a 
lot of high densities of fish, greater chance of infection, many movements of fish, the fish were 
more likely to become stressed and lower their immune system…what the crisis demonstrated 
is that the entire industry shares the same aqueous environment, and what happens in a part 
of the aqueous environment will have effects on the rest. Then, we must prevent that the free 
riding, in all types of environmental and sanitary behaviours, affect the rest…’. 
The six narratives posed above argue that the development of the conditions that led the 
industry to the crisis were not intentional. Although there was a persistent pursuit of salmon 
output growth and profit, this was understood as a natural behaviour of investors who wanted 
to make the most from a good business opportunity. The co-facilitating state regulation and 
self-regulation were well intentioned actions to rapidly develop an industry that was seen as 
having great potential to take advantage of the natural resources of the country. 
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Accidental cause: 
Some explanations given by the interviewees may also be interpreted as accidental cause, in 
which the explanations of the causal theories refer to unguided actions and consequences 
(Stone, 1989).  
Narrative 7: Permissive regulation 
Several interviewees, for example, bureaucrats and producer firms, pointed out that, prior to 
the crisis, there were regulations for the salmon industry: the General Law of Fishing and 
Aquaculture (GLFA), the Environmental Regulation (RAMA), the Sanitary Regulation (RESA) and 
the Regulation on Hydrobiological Plagues (REPLA). NGOs opined that these regulations were 
not extensive, very generic, and weak, and did not accord with scale of development of the 
industry. Moreover, they were deficient in protecting the environment and the sanitary assets 
of the country, in this case an ISA-free country. A representative from the banking sector 
mentioned ‘…the state managed badly the regulation, because there was very little regulation, 
because gave few resources to target regulation, Sernapesca was a shame, as an institute it 
was a shame…’. 
All interviewees agreed that the industry grew faster than the development of regulation. This 
point was mentioned by a representative interviewed from a Public Agency when he said 
‘…the state with public policies has always been lag behind than the progress of the private 
sector, in all sectors, obviously, the business issue goes much quicker, much faster than the 
state's response…’. The GLFA was created in 1989, and the Environmental, Sanitary and 
Hydrobiological Plagues Regulations were created in the 2000s; this means that the industry 
operated without environmental and sanitary regulation in its main expansion period, as was 
explained by an interviewed NGO. A representative from an association opined that those 
regulations had a short term vision and were an approach aimed at addressing the 
consequences of the problems rather than their causes and with no attention to the impacts of 
problem in the long term. This point was exemplified by a bureaucrat when she said ‘…for the 
escape of salmon there was a measure that was rather a mitigation measure and not a 
prevention of salmon escape. It was never assumed in the escape that it was necessary to take 
care about the safety of the structure to prevent escapes. It was always thought, well, if there 
are escapes you have the obligation to recapture. That was the perspective of the regulation, 
precisely a more mitigation approach rather than a preventive approach…’. An interviewed 
consultant opined that the regulatory process did not incorporate a risk analysis that identified 
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the critical points to be controlled. ‘Prior to the crisis even the word biosecurity was not used’, 
said an interviewed bureaucrat.  
‘The state did not take responsibility for the importance of the industry’, an interviewed 
consultant said; ‘sanitary issues were not visualised and what could happen in sanitary terms 
was not in the agenda of the state’, it was recognised by a representative from Subpesca. The 
resources intended for regulation were few and not according with the importance of the 
salmon industry and aquaculture sector for the country. The state did not understand the 
aquaculture and its potential well, and earmarked few resources for administrative regulation 
for the industry. As a consequence of this the sanitary authority (Sernapesca) did not have 
sufficient infrastructural resources to control and monitor all the farming centres in the 
industry. An interviewed consultant described this in the following way, ‘…an authority that 
had few resources to monitor by itself...it is imperative to do so because firms generally may 
have not made a sufficient check, not even recognised clinical signs of diseases that were 
different from those which were attacking us, not only because they did not want to do that 
but because they ignored it, they did not report dangerous diseases. Then, in my view, the role 
of the state in sanitary surveillance was insufficient, it was little proactive’. 
According to bureaucrats, Sernapesca had few capabilities and power to control the industry 
(producers and providers). In 2006, there were 637 grow out centres in operation: with scarce 
and non-suitable personnel, the authority could not control them all. For example, it was 
Sernapesca’s practice to ask the firm it was going to inspect for a boat to make the inspection. 
Some centres were supervised once a year and others once every two years. A bureaucrat said 
‘…I think the system overall was slightly oiled like a little oiled machine. While the 
environmental regulation is from 2001, I would say, the last four years Sernapesca actually 
starts a far more systematic control to farming centres. Before that, in fact, Sernapesca was 
focused more on fishing than on aquaculture. Just four years ago, is where it really starts to 
look the aquaculture. Mainly the aquaculture for Sernapesca, which is the watchdog, is 
oriented to certification for export rather than to take charge of compliance with 
environmental, sanitary issues. Especially the control in the early years was focused on 
administrative inspections, if I have the papers that I should have to have, that kind of stuff, 
but the control was not very substantial…’. A consultant and a representative from a public 
agency agreed in their opinion, pointing out that there were controls in the processing plants 
because large buyers insisted on quality and sanitary standards in these facilities, however, no 
one was taking care of the sanitary conditions in the production of salmon. 
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A bureaucrat from Subpesca explained that there were crucial biosecurity activities performed 
by service suppliers that, due to a lack of capabilities, were not being supervised (e.g. the 
transport of live fish and monitoring of mortality) and that the control of all these activities 
was a responsibility of the private sector. ‘Sernapesca did not have legal support to act 
effectively when the crisis started, for example ordering fish depopulation or unannounced 
visits to production installations’, was said by a representative from a producer firm. Several 
interviewees pointed out that Sernapesca did not have access to crucial industry data, nor did 
it have the resources for surveillance or for discovering outbreaks of pathogens and diseases. 
Sernapesca was dependent upon firms for these activities and, although there were 
laboratories, their principal clients were the firms. Regarding this, a representative from the 
media noted, ‘Sernapesca did not have the resources to control. That was not an issue; I think 
that was not an issue. It was an issue in the sense that we have officials who control but the 
farming centre could do all its production process and the officials never came to take a 
sample. In Canada you have the inspectors who go every month to take their samples, but 
apart from the inspector you have an independent entity that is elsewhere and then these 
samples are put together, this is, there is an independent body, more than one laboratory, 
both oversee every month the production randomly, of course; after this they compare these 
samples... always there is a risk that humans collude and that the businessman gives money...it 
is human. So to avoid that, they have two separate entities, the government, but they at the 
same time have this private laboratory’. 
The industry was in the process of getting the highest production (by weight) at any cost, 
which implied a focus on the end of the production cycle rather than on the farming process, 
an interviewed bureaucrat explained. Thus, there was a great deal of pressure for the fish to 
finish its production cycle and this was usually achieved through a high use of medicines. Some 
NGOs point out that regulation on the use of medicines was not strict and the state was not 
supervising industry practices, for example, there was no control on the use of antibiotics. In 
the words of a bureaucrat from Subpesca ‘…regarding the issue of antibiotics there was a lot of 
misinformation…there was a strong suspicion that a lot of antibiotics were used, but there was 
no concrete evidence of what was used, then there were no concrete measures on that…’. An 
interviewed producer firm said that, at the time the sanitary crisis started, there were no 
specific programmes to control the sea lice caligus and prevent the industry from ISA, even 
when authorities knew that these parasites were implicated in the virus problems in other 
salmon industries, for example, in Norway. There were no procedures for identifying outbreaks 
of ISA or protecting the industry from ISAv because, in the RESA, ISA was listed in list 2 rather 
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than list 1, and it was therefore assumed by regulations that the disease was already present in 
the country, an interviewed lawyer said. He mentioned, ‘according to me, they were wrong in 
copying…it is not a joke, in fact when the ISA crisis began, they stated to implement a policy 
that was issued only to the list 1, then after that they had to dictate a modification, and said, 
these rules can also be applied to the list 2, because ISA was listed in the list 2 and not in the 
list 1, and why was ISA on the list 2?, because when they made the lists they copied them from 
a paper or from some Norwegian or Scottish regulation, and ISA was listed in list 2 because 
Norway had ISA long ago, ISA in Norway is endemic, then as they had it on list 2, they copied 
list 1 and list 2, and ISA was listed in list 2 and in Chile we never have had ISA, it must have 
been in list 1 but it was in list 2’. A producer firm said that several months from the onset of 
the sanitary crisis the sanitary authority Sernapesca created the ISA contingency programme, 
however, this programme and the measures were again too late. In his words, ‘...we had to 
make an ISA regulation, this is, we spent a couple of months to originate a regulation that 
would allow you to have a legal ground to start working, and in a matter of viral diseases like 
these ones a week is too much. If we really wanted to have a contingency plan, that 
contingency plan should have been ready, like the avian influenza, everything is there, the 
plan, the regulatory framework is here, ready, then the outbreak came and we apply this. But 
we, the outbreak appeared and we said let’s begin to generate this and to have the legal 
ground to apply it...’. 
An interviewed individual from an association explained that regulation on the import of eggs 
was also lax, with any sanitary measures concerning these being voluntary rather than any 
compulsory checks or certifications, and there was no adequate or accurate way of evaluating 
the sanitary status of the eggs. Some interviewees pointed out that one of the most prominent 
hypotheses about how the virus reached the country was via the import of eggs. This point 
was mentioned by a representative from the banking sector when he said ‘…I am totally 
convinced that the ISA came to Chile by overseas salmon eggs. This is a hypothesis, it is not 
proven, but for me this is the most probable hypothesis…’. And also mentioned by a consultant 
when he said ‘…there were firms that thought that we should be very drastic [with the eggs] 
because that was the origin [of the virus] and there were other firms that did not thought [that 
that was the origin of the virus]...’. In the same line, a deputy pointed out ‘…it is said that there 
was an intention from outside [the country], contaminated eggs,…that allowed to realise that 
the generation and control of the eggs was a not less important issue to solve…’. The 
enforcement system was ineffective in its structure and enforcement. An interviewee from a 
laboratory and two representatives from public agencies opined that the penalties were very 
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low compared with the economic benefits of contamination (perverse incentive), and the 
capacity of enforcement was very low given a lack of resources to control the industry. 
Regarding the penalty, a bureaucrat said ‘...there are sanctions which are not sufficiently 
persuasive because it is more convenient to infringe the regulation than to pay the penalty...’, 
and a representative from a public agency observed that ‘... the state considered a penalty, 
very small fines...the cost from the point of view of production per kilo salmon was maybe five 
Chilean pesos per kilo, that was practically zero…’. 
An interviewed NGO pointed out that the scope of the role of the state was framed in the 
ideology of non-intervention. ‘The state did not have much interest in regulating the industry 
because the industry was producing excellent economic results and regulation and control 
were seen as disincentives’, he said. Instead, the state clearly supported an intensive 
production model via a free production approach and a concession scheme that promoted, 
depending on interpretation, a naïve reliance self-regulation or an excess of liberty for the 
private sector, opined a representative from a producer firm. There was no regulation to limit 
the biomass and capacities of concessions and farming centres; this was at the discretion of 
the private sector. An interviewed lawyer pointed out that ‘the amount of fish was decided by 
you with your technical project. The state did not tell you how much you could produce, as it is 
in Europe where the state tells you how much you can produce’. The representative from the 
producer firm continues explaining that at the beginning of the 1980s, when the industry was 
small, the private sector asked for concessions closer to the coast where the infrastructural, 
logistics and social facilities were. He said ‘the concessions were given indefinitely…the 
individual interests of concession holders were unlimited, and the State had little to say about 
their renewal or revocation…the State did not consider the possibility of a change in the size of 
the industry and continued granting concessions and the State did not have the legal resources 
to modify this concession regime’. 
 
Narrative 8: Caligus 
Across interviewees the opinion was shared that, at the time of the crisis, the industry was 
dealing with the highest level of caligus. For example, an interviewed Association said ‘…we 
had a very high caligus condition…we had more sea lice than fish’. Caligus is a sea louse 
parasite that produces injuries on the salmon that are entrances for viruses such as ISA. It has 
been demonstrated that caligus acts a vector for ISA. A representative from an association 
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pointed out that the caligus was present in the Chilean industry before the sanitary crisis 
began in 2007. However, in 2007 it found more susceptible hosts to attack (i.e. 
immunologically weak fish living at high densities per cage and high concentration of farming 
centres), and more suitable natural conditions for proliferation, for example, weather 
conditions at the time of the crisis led to higher sea temperatures (see next narrative). 
Regarding this, an interviewed consultant noted ‘…the rates were declining since 2004 or so, 
all the production indicators were going down…and they stepped up when in late 2006 and 
early 2007 the caligus, increased five times its levels in fish and that has to do, I think, with a 
poorer immune status and protection of fish and with the high concentration of farming 
centres and with a large amount of biomass that was placed in the water. Then, the caligus 
was always there; but when it found fish that were easier for its action, it multiplied and grew, 
also associated with environmental changes that occurred in that period, which were declining 
rainfall and therefore higher salinity that favours caligus. That made the attack of caligus to 
fish causing injuries that obviously increase the risk that the fish is attacked by 
pathogens…then, in general, the disease rates increased and an opportunistic pathogen as ISA 
could be, which was latent, saw its major opportunity and then caused the problem’. 
In an interview conducted by Ecoceanos in 2007, the researcher Sandra Bravo explained that, 
at that time, the industry was using the medication emamectin to deal with caligus. However, 
it was not effective since the salmon had already developed resistance to it. The industry 
needed to change the medicine but it was not possible because emamectin was the only 
product approved by the Agriculture and Livestock Service (SAG) to control caligus in fish. Also, 
Sernapesca did not have a contingency plan to deal with caligus because it was not considered 
a ‘high risk disease’. There was no prevention in the control of caligus. A rotation in treatments 
would have helped to control it with emamectin, which is an effective and easy product to deal 
with this sea louse as the medication is supplied orally via the food (Ecoceanos, 2007). 
 
Narrative 9: Natural conditions 
Nature has a fundamental role in aquaculture activities. There are natural conditions that are 
not well known by both the industry and the state. As a representative from a producer firm 
explained, the sea has cycles and these cycles allow worse or better conditions for the 
development of pathogens. He described this in the following way, ‘I think that there are a lot 
of factors at the level of nature that are not well known and I think that in the sea there are 
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also cycles, cycles in which the conditions of the sea are better or worse for certain 
developments, and, I mean, the role I attribute to nature or to the environmental parameters, 
not well known in those years, they play an important role’. He also said that ‘there was some 
information that the virus was introduced into Chile around 1997, but it did not become 
endemic at that time because the conditions of the sea were not suitable’. 
Another interviewed producer firm explained that in the region where the salmon production 
takes place, the last summers, prior to the emergence of the crisis, were hotter than usual. The 
higher sea temperatures contributed to the proliferation of the sea lice caligus, which makes 
salmon susceptible to diseases such as ISA. In the words of the interviewee ‘…this area had 
three summers that were quite hot...it was like we were in a more mild than cold area as it is 
usually. I remember having stayed for two or three summers going to the beach until March 
and that is not common here. The temperatures of the waters increased and that is 
undoubtedly a factor that triggered the crisis…’. Also, unlike in Norway, the geography of Chile 
and ocean currents do not provide natural barriers to the dissemination of diseases. As the 
interviewee said ‘…Canada and Norway are geographically very different from Chile. Norway 
are fjords like fingers which are independent of each other and that they go to the Atlantic. 
Here is the Atlantic and each fjord is different from this one…but our country is different, we 
are all in an inland sea, where the waters are common…’. The Norwegian geography forms 
natural barriers between fjords where the production of salmon is performed. In Chile, there is 
a high density of farms in areas without natural barriers. 
 
Intentional cause: 
There is one explanation about why the Chilean industry had a sanitary crisis in which the 
realisation of a purposeful action had the wanted consequence. Stone (1989) refers to this as 
an intentional cause. 
Narrative 10: Industrial sabotage 
A representative from a public agency opined that one hypothesis about why and how the 
virus appeared in the country was that the Chilean industry was deliberately infected with ISAv 
to reduce its competitiveness. The virus suddenly appeared at the central point where the 
production takes place, from where it rapidly and easily spread, and no-one knows how it got 
to that strategic place. The capabilities of the sanitary authority failed in detecting this 
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situation. The industry took advantage of this sabotage to reduce the highest industry cost at 
that time, the workforce cost. Since the virus led to decreasing production, the industry had 
the perfect excuse to dismiss the surplus of employees. In his words, ‘…this impacted heavily 
on the regional economy, then, the possibility to improve the cost structure of the industry 
was seen, from that point of view…this is science fiction, since this is aquaculture, it is 
aquaculture science fiction, well…where do I put the bomb to be exploded?, in the central 
point, in the node. It appeared unexpectedly, no one knows how it appeared specifically there. 
If you see the distribution that was prior to the event, prior 2007, that was the focal point, 
plants, laboratories, flow of trucks, everything converged there, and from there, it radiated to 
the centre, everything is concentrated there. There, it was the 80% of salmon production in 
Chiloé, 80%. You placed your child with a cold…the whole kindergarten was infected’. This 
narrative is, of course, a type of conspiracy theory. 
The composed narratives posed above suggest different social constructions that explain the 
reasons for the sanitary crisis in the Chilean industry. Each of these social constructions has an 
argument that interconnects different industry failures to explain why the Chilean industry had 
a sanitary crisis. The argument of each narrative is linked to distinct forms of thoughts or forms 
of understandings that this research refers to as cognitive frames (Stone, 1989; Surel, 2000). 
These cognitive frames have premises that form the basis for the arguments. The cognitive 
frames are not necessarily exclusive to an actor or group of actors in the industry. Individuals 
within different categories of actors can explain the causes of the crisis through the same 
cognitive frame; however, sometimes it is more evident to associate the cognitive frame of 
some individuals to their role or profession within the industry. There were five cognitive 
frames apparent in the narratives that emerge from the interviews: 
1. The biological-sanitary cognitive frame is based on the premise that the salmon is more 
susceptible to diseases when it is weak and stressed. Black and Pickering (1998) mention 
some stressors41 as: the water quality, the handling and confinement of salmon, salmon 
nutrition and high rearing densities. The key impacts of stress on performance are 
mortality rates, behaviour, poor growth and food conversion, reproduction and product 
quality (Black and Pickering, 1998; Hedrick, 1998). 
In this cognitive frame the sanitary crisis in the industry is explained by the susceptibility of 
the salmon to diseases. The disease ISA occurred because of the interaction of a 
                                                             
41 ‘A stimulus or event that provokes a stress response in an organism’ (http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/stressor Last accessed: 1 February 2013). 
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susceptible host (salmon), appropriate pathogen (ISAv) and suitable environmental 
conditions. The ISAv was the appropriate pathogen due to the high levels of caligus, a 
vector of ISAv and negative biological externality, faced by the industry in 2007. The most 
prominent environmental condition supporting the development of the disease was the 
high densities of salmon, which increased its stress and compromised its immunological 
system, making it more susceptible to diseases.  
This cognitive frame is more related, but not exclusively, to fish health scientists, fisheries 
biologists and fish epidemiologists. The second narrative, negligence of the industry in 
fattening up salmon, and the eighth narrative, caligus, belong to this cognitive frame. 
2. The biological-environmental cognitive frame is based on the premise that the 
environment, such as unusual weather conditions and poor water quality, stresses the 
salmon thus deteriorating its immunological system. Also, these conditions encouraged 
the development and spread of pathogens. Poor water quality is due to an intensive use of 
the common-pool resource water (high density of salmon), aquaculture activities and 
human impact (Black and Pickering, 1998; Hedrick, 1998). Black and Pickering (1998) point 
out that the respiratory activity of the fish decreases the dissolved oxygen and increases 
the levels of ammonia, carbon dioxide and suspended solids. It is known that low dissolved 
oxygen levels trigger stress responses. Buschmann (2006) refers to the occurrence of 
harmful algal bloom from the nitrogen given to the environment by salmonid farms. Algal 
blooms cause stress responses in salmon (Black and Pickering, 1998). Antibiotic and feed 
residuals are also contaminants to the marine environment that reduce the levels of 
dissolved oxygen (Pizarro and Zolezzi, 2003). 
In this cognitive frame the sanitary crisis in the industry is explained by an unsuitable 
environment that allowed the development of ISAv. This cognitive frame is more related, 
but not exclusive, to environmentalists, ecologists and oceanographers. The third 
narrative, negligence of the industry in contaminating the water, and the ninth narrative, 
natural conditions, belong to this cognitive frame. 
3. The shareholder primacy cognitive frame is based on the premise that the needs of the 
shareholders are before any other needs. It is assumed that the primacy of shareholders is 
to increase their profit and therefore there is a primacy of profit (Stout, 2002; Robins, 
2006). 
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The Chilean salmon industry took to an extreme the primacy of the maxim ‘maximising 
shareholder value’ and thereby the primacy of profit. It was operating on a short-term 
production-intensive model that under-emphasised the environment and the sanitary 
conditions necessary for re-production of salmon. Of course, this also meant that 
shareholder value was defined as a short term objective without regard to longer term 
value.  
In this cognitive frame the sanitary crisis in the industry is explained by the ambition of the 
industry to maximise profits over and above environmental constraints. The first narrative, 
ignorance of the industry, and the fourth narrative, exacerbated desire to maximise 
profits, belong to this cognitive frame. 
4. The captured state cognitive frame is based on the premise that the state was captured by 
the industry in the formation of the industry regulatory framework. Levine and Forrence 
(1990) and Laffont and Tirole (1991) refer to the regulatory capture. This can be applied to 
the salmon industry saying that the industry controlled the state and its public agencies to 
benefit itself through a suitable design and implementation of industry regulation.  
In this cognitive frame the sanitary crisis in the industry is explained by a lax and 
ineffective regulation to benefit the industry interests. The fifth narrative, blinded by 
economic success, the sixth narrative, self-regulation, and the seventh narrative, 
permissive regulation, belong to this cognitive frame. 
5. The failure of imagination cognitive frame is based on the premise that no one imagined 
that the Chilean industry could be attacked through introducing a virus. The National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) refers to the failure of 
imagination in the September 11 attacks, indicating that, in that case, although an attack 
could have been predicted, it was not planned. This refection can be used in the case of 
the salmon industry saying that this cognitive frame explains the sanitary crisis in the 
industry by the lack of imagination regarding undesirable situations against the industry. 
The tenth narrative, industrial sabotage, belongs to this cognitive frame. 
The premises of the cognitive frames are built on paradigms (Hall, 1993). These paradigms 
represent ‘world views’ that establish how the world operates based on certain 
understandings, interests and beliefs. The premises of the biological-sanitary and biological 
environmental cognitive frames are closer to each other and connected through an ‘ecological’ 
view of the world, whilst the premises of shareholder primacy and captured state cognitive 
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frames are closer to each other and connected through a ‘neoliberal’ view of the world. This 
suggests the existence of two paradigms: an ecological and a neoliberal. Since the failure of 
imagination cognitive frame is based on a lack of imagination to predict events, this cognitive 
frame may belong to either or both paradigms. 
1. Ecological paradigm: 
The biological-sanitary cognitive frame and the biological-environmental cognitive frame 
belong to this paradigm. These cognitive frames deal with the ecology; this is the interaction 
between the salmon as a biological being with other organisms and the environment (Biology 
online, 2009). In this interaction other organisms may be other types of marine entities such as 
fish, molluscs, humans, virus, bacteria and parasites, whilst the environment corresponds to 
the external conditions and stimuli with which the salmon and other organisms interact 
(Biology online, 2008). In the ecological paradigm it is understood, and interpreted, that the 
appearance of a disease is due to the breakdown of the ‘ecological triad’: the ecological triad is 
the relationship of the host, pathogen and environment (Hedrik, 1998). In this case it refers to 
the relationship of the host salmon, the pathogen ISAv and the culture environment (e.g. 
quality of water, human interaction, fish threats and weather). The disease is a process 
characterised by “any impairment that interferes with or modifies the performance of normal 
functions, including responses to environmental factors such as toxicants and climate, 
nutrition, infectious agents; inherent or congenital defects, or any combination of these 
factors” (Wobeser, 1981, quoted in Hedrick, 1998, p.108). Figure 5.1 shows the causation for 
diseases from an ecological triad view.  
The ecological paradigm pays attention to the relationship between environmental stresses 
and biological responses; that is, on the impacts of stress on salmon performance. 
Environmental stresses consider both the aquacultural stresses (Black and Pickering, 1998) and 
stresses produced in the aquaculture environment by natural circumstances and human and 
industrial action (e.g. increase in water temperature by a hotter season or volcano eruption 
and human water pollution). Aquacultural stresses are those related to aquaculture activities 
such as water quality, physical salmon disturbance, environmental temperature, salmon social 
interaction, nutrition and treatments (Black and Pickering, 1998). In the sanitary crisis the key 
impact was on mortality rates. Redclift (1992) states that the meaning of sustainable 
development of a perspective based on ecological parameters is the natural resource base. In 
the ecological paradigm of the salmon industry the object of sustainability was the natural 
resources. 
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Figure 5.1: A web of causation for diseases. 
Source: Hedrick (1998). 
 
2. Neoliberal paradigm: 
The shareholder primacy cognitive frame and captured state cognitive frame belong to this 
paradigm. These cognitive frames deal with a core aspect of the neoliberalism: minimal state 
intervention. Deregulation, private sector power, elites oriented to business and finance, 
market and export orientation, and short-term vision are some elements that characterise a 
neoliberal paradigm (Mudge, 2008). The environmental consequences of neoliberalism (e.g. 
short-term vision on natural resource exploitation and privileges to foreign investments), has 
certainly been negative. Chile is one of the countries with clear examples of this, for example, 
the overexploitation of the sea bass and forestry (Harvey, 2005). The focus on short-term 
returns and the problem of opportunistic free riders that may disadvantage firms that take a 
longer term view are also part of a neoliberal paradigm. Following Redclift’s (1992) discussion 
on sustainable development in the neoliberal paradigm of the salmon industry, which was 
based on economic parameters to maximise benefits of economic development, the 
understanding of sustainable development was related to the level of production and 
consumption. 
The following figure shows the paradigms and cognitive frames linked to narratives. 
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Figure 5.2: Paradigms and cognitive frames 
N: Narrative; F: Failure 
Source: Own elaboration based on Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005), Stone (1989), Surel (2000), Hall (1993) 
and data analysis. 
 
The ten narratives posed above, and the premises of the five cognitive frames, claim that the 
industry, including its initial industry regulatory framework (design and implementation), was 
framed in a neoliberal paradigm that neglected ecological parameters, which are at the core of 
an ecological paradigm. Since the neoliberal paradigm was the dominant paradigm in which 
the industry was developed, from the beginning of the industry the locus of authority, and 
therefore the allocation of power, has been in the neoliberal paradigm in imposing the 
premises, forms of action and instruments of this paradigm in policies. 
The sanitary crisis faced by the industry with environmental results was a clear consequence of 
this neoliberal paradigm frame that partially stimulated the failures in the industry. The way in 
which the neoliberal paradigm understands sustainable development is in unison with the 
export-oriented model, which has characterised the Chilean economic orientation since 1975 
(Barton, 1997). It is also in unison with the construction of competitive factors for non-
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traditional sectors such as aquaculture, which includes a favourable concession scheme to 
attract private capital and little regulation to the sector.  
Although the industry was developed within the neoliberal paradigm it does not mean that the 
neoliberal frame or view of the world was an exclusive one. The entry of diverse actors into 
the industry (Barton and Fløysand, 2010) pressuring an ecological view of the world (e.g. 
environmental NGOs, researchers, marine biologists) to be considered in policies reveals the 
presence of an ecological paradigm. As will be seen in the next chapter, the sanitary crisis 
explicitly initiated a competition between the neoliberal and ecological paradigms for 
reframing the industry policy. The crisis challenged the dominant neoliberal paradigm and gave 
the opportunity of a paradigm shift from a neoliberal paradigm to an ecological one. 
Considering the construction of identity function states by Surel (2000), and Sabatier’s 
definition of advocacy coalition (1988), that also includes the interests of actors as a unifying 
element, we may say that the neoliberal and ecological paradigms constructed two distinct 
coalitions: the neoliberal coalition and the ecological coalition. The most prominent actors 
representing the neoliberal and ecological coalitions were the producer firms and the NGOs, 
respectively. 
The understanding, interests and beliefs of bureaucrats and government decision makers, as 
institutional actors that face institutional constrains and incentives (Layzer, 2006), are shaped 
by the strategies and techniques used by the coalitions in translating the coalition’s 
understanding, interests and beliefs into policies. 
The remaining actors, such as public agencies, private institutes, associations, trade unions, 
supplier services, media, universities and the banking sector, may also join the coalitions 
according to their own understandings, interests and beliefs, and/or be biased and influenced 
by the most prominent actors representing the neoliberal and ecological coalitions. 
The industry sanitary crisis pushed sudden and unexpected changes in policies that served as 
the basis of the deliberations for updating the industry regulatory framework, including the 
modifications of the GLFA, RESA and RAMA, and was a starting point of policy learning in the 
industry. At the time of the onset of the crisis, the sanitary, environmental or other regulations 
did not include specific measures to deal with ISAv (outbreaks and spread), nor did they have a 
wider frame in which to measure and deal with the virus, such as coordinated productive 
actions, strict disinfection and fallowing that could be implemented and enforced. This meant 
that there was no policy ready to deal with ISA, nor a legal framework on which it could quickly 
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build specific control measures such as, for example, in the Scottish case in which regulations 
could be adapted to deal with ISAv. The Chilean industry and the sanitary authority Sernapesca 
were unable to anticipate sanitary problems due to ISAv. As an interviewee from a programme 
linked to the industry explained, part of the explanation is that ISA was listed in list 2 (i.e. a 
disease that is distributed at length in the national territory) in the RESA and therefore the 
warning systems were not looking for this disease. The industry systems (regulatory and non-
regulatory (e.g. practices)) were not protecting the country and industry from ISAv. This 
became a call to modernise the warning, control and mitigation systems of the industry. 
 
5.2. Sanitary crisis as a policy window and precipitator of policy learning and policy change 
The sanitary crisis hit the industry with the rapid dissemination of ISAv in farming centres 
belonging to different firms and spreading to Region XI. At that point, it was urgent to stop the 
epizootic infestation, reduce fish mortality and control the spread of the virus and the disease. 
As said in the previous section, this concern was defined as the first policy problem. Since this 
sanitary problem faced by the industry was qualitatively and quantitatively different from 
routine emergencies, new and specific measures were needed to deal with the virus. The 
urgency of the situation meant that government and industry actors quickly mobilised to 
develop and implement immediate measures. The policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1988) involved 
in finding the solution for the first policy problem was composed by the government through 
Sernapesca, Subpesca and Salmon Roundtable, by the industry through Intesal, SalmonChile, 
and other industry Associations and by national and international experts. 
When ISAv was reported to Sernapesca by Marine Harvest, through the sanitary authority 
(Sernapesca) the government took immediate actions to deal with the virus. Sernapesca 
formed a committee composed of experts in pathology and virology from Universidad Austral, 
Universidad de Chile, Intesal42 and representatives of salmon industry. The aim of this 
committee was to elaborate a contingency plan for ISA. This plan was decreed on 6 August 
                                                             
42 Intesal (acronym for its Spanish name Instituto Tecnológico del Salmón) is the technological platform of the 
Association of Salmon Industry (SalmonChile). Created in 1995, it coordinates research programmes and monitors 
and tracks salmon activities. It has worldwide linkages with universities and key research centres. It monitors the 
needs and technological developments in the industry to promote and implement standards and conduct of its 
members, recommendations to internal and external entities to obtain the highest levels of information, 
competitiveness, sustainability and in order to anticipate the trends of clients and stakeholders 
(http://www.salmonchile.cl/frontend/intesal.asp?secid=23 Last Accessed: 2 January 2011). 
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2007 (two months after the index case) by Sernapesca, and mandatory actions43 were codified 
in Resolution N°1670 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2007a) to prevent the propagation of 
the disease. These were the first measures taken to address the incidence of ISA in Chile. 
The measures of the Contingency Plan were adopted in coordination with the Chilean Army, 
Port Works Direction, National Environmental Commission, Port Firms in Puerto Montt (Region 
X), Superintendence of Health Services, Transport Maritime Firms and the salmon industry. 
These responses were inspired by control programmes and technical information from the 
international experiences of other countries who had dealt with the virus (see section 3.2), and 
from recommendations of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) (Subpesca and 
SalmonChile, 2008).  
The international experiences showed that useful measures in the control of the virus were the 
elimination of the infected salmon and periods of fallowing of the farming centres. Chile 
adopted the same actions that other countries such as Norway and Canada had employed, 
which involved the elimination or early harvest allowances of affected cages after an ISA alert, 
the report of changes in the disease by diagnosis laboratories and producer firms, and the 
establishment of quarantine and vigilance areas with control of the movement of food, nets, 
mortality, equipment and personnel (Subpesca and SalmonChile, 2008).  
The non-existence of a contingency plan for ISA in the country prior to the sanitary crisis was 
due to ISA not being considered in the list of monitored diseases that represent a hazard to the 
country (list 1). According to the sanitary regulation, RESA, there are two lists of diseases. List 1 
corresponds to high risk diseases (dangerous diseases) that are not present in Chile; the 
sanitary authority demands tests to be run and has surveillance programmes over those 
diseases in order to protect the country from them. In list 2 there are diseases that are 
assumed to be present in Chile and therefore the regime for dealing with those diseases is 
different from those used to deal with diseases in list 1. As a representative from a Programme 
said, warning systems were not looking for ISA in order to protect the country.  
According to some interviewees there are two possible explanations why ISA was listed in list 
2. A Lawyer interviewed during fieldwork said that this could have been a mistake in the 
                                                             
43 They were: i) Elimination or harvest of cages with fish infected with ISA, ii) Definition of quarantine and 
surveillance areas, iii) Restriction of movements from the affected areas, iv) Strict biosafety measures, v) Special 
harvest and processing conditions for centres located in areas under quarantine and vigilance, vi) Smolt and breeder 
fish check, vii) Water disinfection systems in process plants, viii) Permanent monitoring and vigilance of the centres 
in affected areas and other areas related to outbreaks, and ix) Weekly report of mortalities in farming centres as an 
early alert. 
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elaboration of the lists. Chile copied the lists from other countries such as Norway or Scotland 
were ISA has been listed in list 2 for a long time because those countries have had ISA since the 
1980s and 1990s (i.e. ISA was listed in list 2 due to a legislative drafting error). A representative 
from a Programme said that, because the disease was detected in Coho salmon in the 1990s, 
the disease was listed in list 2. If the second explanation is true, it was a reasonable decision to 
put ISA on list 2. However, it was not a reasonable policy to ignore the risks of diseases on list 
2. Whilst there was a means for dealing with exotic diseases, those for dealing with diseases in 
list 2 were not very effective. 
An interviewed bureaucrat from Sernapesca said that the non-existence of a contingency plan 
for ISA was a mistake in normative terms, a lack of institutions. At the same time the 
bureaucrat thought that the response from Sernapesca was very quick compared to Norway. 
However, the opinion of a representative of a large producer firm disagreed and strongly 
criticised the focus of the contingency plan. According to the producer firm a contingency plan 
is a plan that should be made in advance within a surveillance programme. Thus, when an 
outbreak appears the contingency plan is applied and it allows the containment and 
elimination of the outbreak. In this way, the Chilean Contingency Plan was a delayed plan since 
it was developed after the virus had already spread across the industry. The firm 
representative opined that, at that point, the plan was a control plan and not a contingency 
plan and explained that the authority spent two months in developing a regulation as a legal 
ground to start working and dealing with ISA. In viral diseases like ISA even a week is too much 
time to react. In the words of a producer firm representative, ’if Chile really wanted to have a 
contingency plan it should have already been developed and ready to be implemented at the 
time of the first ISA outbreak’. 
The measures enforced in the Contingency Plan were complemented with voluntary measures 
adopted by the industry. In August 2007 the Association of Salmon Industry, SalmonChile, 
developed additional biosecurity measures in order to prevent the dissemination of ISAv 
(Subpesca and SalmonChile, 2008). Three months after the index case, Intesal, firms and other 
organisations organised an international workshop to provide the government and the Chilean 
industry with guidance on the detection of the virus, surveillance and control measures and 
regulatory tools on ISA. This workshop helped to design specific control measures for ISA 
(Alvial et al., 2012).  
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Table 5.2: Immediate responses 
Instruments Taxonomy 
Authority-based 
policy instruments 
Command-and-control-regulation Contingency measures (Resolution N°1670) 
Self-regulation Voluntary measures of the industry 
Advisory committees 
Expert Virology Committee 
International advice 
Source: Own elaboration based on analysis, Hall (1993) and Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) as theoretical base. 
The development and implementation of new and specific measures to deal with ISA 
demonstrated that the sanitary crisis in the salmon industry abruptly opened a policy window, 
‘an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to 
their special problems’ (Kingdon, 2003 p.165), to reform the regulatory framework of the 
industry. As will be analysed in the next chapter, this policy reform was a turning point and, in 
the words of Keeler (1993), a ‘policy innovation [for the industry] that may manifest an 
unusually substantial redirection or reinforcement of previous public policy’ (p.434). This policy 
window gave the opportunity for major changes (Kingdon, 2003) that consisted of a shift in the 
policy paradigm of the industry (Hall, 1993) from a neoliberal to an ecological paradigm (this 
will be discussed in the next chapter). 
As the policy window was opened due to the urgent need to solve the crisis and its effects, 
relevant actors looked for alternatives to solve the first policy problem. No direct previous 
Chilean experience with ISA implied a lack of knowledge in the industry and sanitary authority 
to detect and identify the virus, but it also meant that the required knowledge and solutions to 
deal with the virus and solve the crisis was not in Chile but in other salmon industries as those 
described in section 3.2. The immediate responses mentioned above reflect this. Both 
available solutions abroad and local political support to address the first policy problem kept 
the policy window open for the Chilean industry. 
This policy window was an unpredictable opportunity to push the attention on special 
problems and radical proposals (Kingdon, 2003). However, the sanitary crisis itself was partially 
predictable by environmental and labour NGOs, artisanal fisherman, universities, public and 
private institutes, and the national and international media. Their environmental and sanitary 
critics have always been part of the salmon industry development. They argued that under the 
conditions in which the industry was operating the occurrence of an environmental and/or 
sanitary crisis was easily predictable. Nevertheless what could not be predicted was exactly 
when this crisis would occur. 
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Some interest group and supplier services interviewees literarily referred to the sanitary crisis 
as a ‘chronicle of a death foretold’, making the analogy with the novella of the same title 
written in the 1980s by Gabriel García Márquez44. As a representative from an association 
pointed out, ‘it was sought to maximise the production but without knowing if that was 
actually feasible or if it was known it was ignored or it was decided to believe that what 
happened was not going to happen. In our opinion this was an announced chronic’. ‘Since 
2000 we are monitoring the industry. If you see our website, you can go day by day seeing 
what happened. Everything that happened was announced in advance. ’A representative from 
an NGO quoted García [Gabriel García Márquez] as saying, ‘this was the chronicle of a salmon 
crisis announced’. 
The analogy between the novella with the salmon crisis is interesting, not only in a broad sense 
in which those interviewees relate the title of the novella to their belief of ‘this crisis was 
predictable and expected’, but also in a narrower sense where, in the novella, although the 
anticipated murder of a man was publicly known, nobody did enough to prevent it. This was 
either because some of them did not believe the murder would actually happen or because 
those who believed it were too excited and distracted with the arrival of the Bishop to the 
town. In the novella there is also a woman who is ignored when she tries to convince the 
Mayor of the town about the murder. The Mayor paid little attention to the woman and 
although he confiscated the knives of the future killers he let them go. Later on the killers 
committed the crime. 
According to fieldwork there was a common and public knowledge among actors (e.g. the 
salmon industry, bureaucrats, interest groups, policy makers, researchers and media) about 
the real possibility of a sanitary and/or environmental crisis since the conditions in which the 
industry was operating were unsustainable. ‘Everyone knew that a crisis was coming but 
nobody knew how or when’, a researcher from a University pointed out. Sooner or later a crisis 
would happen and this crisis could be triggered by any pathogen or environmental factor. 
However, no one did enough to prevent it. Producers were too busy and satisfied (‘excited and 
distracted’) in maximising their profits, meeting the quantities required by the markets and 
believing that if nothing ‘bad’ has happened up to now, there is no reason to be concerned 
that something bad would happen. Bureaucrats were relaxed and tolerant on the industry self-
regulation discourse and without sufficient resources to enforce regulation. The government 
                                                             
44 Original Spanish title: Crónica de una Muerte Anunciada, published in 1981. Gabriel García Márquez was a 
Colombian novelist, short-story writer, screenwriter and journalist. Considered one of the most significant authors 
of the 20th century; he received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1982. 
177 
 
 
 
was satisfied (‘excited and distracted’) with the results of the industry and therefore more 
regulation or enforcement was seen as a disincentive. The banking sector was tranquil and 
confident about the results of the industry. Groups such as NGOs, artisanal fisherman and 
universities were ignored. 
In the suspense novel view of the world a murder is deliberately planned, i.e. premeditated. 
The author of this research does not think the sanitary crisis was premeditated, even though 
this possibility was mentioned during fieldwork with the issues of motive and opportunity 
addressed by the potential for economic gain and the pre-existence and availability of 
contaminated salmon eggs from Norway. However, like most conspiracy theories (an 
intentional cause in Deborah Stone’s (1989) framework), the actor or actors responsible 
remain in the shadows. It is clearly beyond the scope and interest of this research to pursue 
this investigation. 
The immediate responses to the crisis were recognised as being insufficient because the 
contingency plan and voluntary measures of the industry partially addressed the problems 
revealed by the crisis and represented by the industry failures, as discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter. After some experience and evidence had accumulated, subsequent 
short-term responses were developed and applied. In May 2008 a working group was formed 
at governmental level with the public institutions related to the aquaculture to analyse the 
situation due to ISAv and to propose short-term measures for the salmon industry, including 
the improvement of industry production and sanitary conditions (Aqua.cl, 2008f; Aqua.cl, 
2008e; Aqua.cl, 2008h). This group was called the Salmon Roundtable (Mesa del Salmón in 
Spanish) and comprised representatives from:  
· Ministry of Economy leading the group 
· Undersecretary of Fishing (Subpesca) 
· Marine Undersecretary 
· Fisheries Service (Sernapesca) 
· National Environmental Commission 
· Agency for Economic Development 
· Marine Resources Area of Fundación Chile 
· A Scientist, and  
· An Executive Secretary 
Sources: Sernapesca, 2009 and Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d. 
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Although Fundación Chile is a private non-profit organisation, it was invited to participate in 
the Roundtable due to its crucial role in the development of the salmon industry. Felipe 
Sandoval, a former Undersecretary of Fishing, was appointed as the Executive Secretary of the 
Roundtable, and acted as policy broker (Sabatier, 1988) between the government, the industry 
and other related actors. A task that the Salmon Roundtable urgently addressed was the 
review of aquaculture regulations as well as their implementation and effectiveness to face 
and address events such as ISAv. The analysis of the location of farming centres and the way 
they operated, including their related activities mainly services, was used as feedback for the 
Roundtable to conclude the need for change in the aquaculture regulation’s approach. Thus, 
the second defined policy problem was to update the industry regulatory framework including 
the development and implementation of new policies and the modification of existing policy 
instruments. The subsystem (Sabatier, 1988) involved in defining the second policy problem 
was the Salmon Roundtable. 
The Roundtable had the freedom to meet, negotiate and reach agreement with actors. 
However, it was within its remit to make decisions to develop and propose formal actions to 
be presented to the government and decision makers. Since accepted solutions need to be 
built upon and to reach consensus among a variety of actors who have different 
understandings, interests and beliefs, the process of reaching consensus takes time. However, 
the industry was in crisis and therefore it was imperative to decide rapidly on what to do. An 
interviewee member of the Roundtable opined that the rationale of the government in 
forming the Roundtable with just public actors and Fundación Chile was to reduce the level of 
conflict among actors and to reach agreement in the proposals rapidly. However, this was not 
the case and the proposals made by the Roundtable created a high level of conflict and 
ambiguity among actors. The diversity of industry failures created divergent and incoherent 
narratives (as was demonstrated by the ten narratives posed in the previous section) about the 
causes of the crisis. This represented a major problem in the design and implementation of the 
short-term measures because the actions that were guided by those narratives were also 
divergent. This point will be treated in detail in the next chapter. 
Since the sectoral regulatory framework prior to the sanitary crisis could not solve the crisis 
itself (there was a need to enact strict sanitary measures to control the virus), and the relief 
approach of the aquaculture regulations was shown to be ineffective to prevent the industry 
from events such as ISA, the problems caused by the crisis opened the policy window to 
reform the regulatory framework of the industry (Kingdon, 2003). In this way, the ISA crisis 
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focused the attention on the industry regulatory framework and from there to address some 
industry practices.  
As May (1992) and Hall (1993) discuss, the changes in policy precipitated a social and 
instrumental policy learning process. As in the case of economic policymaking in Britain 
analysed by Hall (1993), the policy learning process of the Chilean industry was conscious and 
intentional; however, unlike what Hall (1993) points out, it responded directly to the crisis and 
indirectly to past experience and new information. In the Chilean salmon industry it was ‘a 
deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques or instruments or establish new goals and 
create new techniques of industry policy in direct response to the ISA sanitary crisis and 
indirectly to past experience and new information’. In this case, the sanitary crisis (an outside 
factor for the state) played the primary role in accelerating the process of developing policy for 
the salmon industry.  
Industry participants played a crucial role in the policy learning and policy change processes of 
the industry. As was repeatedly said by interviewees during fieldwork, these processes were 
initiated by industry (private) initiatives and not from the public (government) sector. As will 
be seen in the following chapters, the autonomy of the state in making policy was limited by 
the pressures of the addressees and other actors such as NGOs and artisanal fishermen. The 
conflict among them and with the government was an important driver in the policy learning 
and policy change processes of the industry. 
As said before, a long time before the sanitary crisis there was a set of indicators and feedback 
that supported an ecological view of the industry problems. However, these indicators and 
feedback were ignored and looked over as positive indicators of production, exports and 
employment. When production indicators declined because huge numbers of salmon started 
to be killed by ISAv, they were related to ecological indicators such as the dissemination of 
diseases and from there connected with feedback about the location of farming centres and 
the conditions in which the industry operated. Thus, the two defined policy problems indirectly 
involved ecological elements. 
The policy problems defined by the sanitary crisis were framed within the neoliberal paradigm, 
even when some indicators and feedback were showing that the conditions that led the 
industry to the crisis were ecological ones. More precisely for framing the industry and its 
development within a neoliberal paradigm that neglected ecological issues critical for an 
industry that works with the ecology and natural and biological resources. This was because 
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the subsystems defining the policy problems had a neoliberal view of the industry. They were 
worried about the decrease in salmon production rather than the sanitary and environmental 
problems of the industry, and as will be seen in Chapter 6, the regulatory changes they 
proposed were in unison with a neoliberal view related to maintaining the levels of salmon 
production. The policy problems were translated to the development of specific regulations to 
the industry to ensure the survival of salmonculture and a continuous growth in production. 
The sanitary crisis in the industry reinforced the pre-existing perceptions of sanitary and 
environmental failures, and in this way it renewed the conflict between the ecological and 
neoliberal coalitions and the tension between the ecological and neoliberal views on 
sustainability and the way to achieve sustainable development. The ecological and neoliberal 
coalitions understood the root cause of the sanitary crisis in the industry differently. Within 
the ecological paradigm it was understood that the problems of the sanitary crisis were those 
related to the abuse of natural resources and the breakdown of the ecological triad. For the 
ecological coalition, the root cause of the crisis was the transgression of ecological limits 
although it recognised that the regulatory framework prior to the crisis played a crucial role in 
this.  
In defining the policy problems of the industry, the ecological coalition was active in providing 
strong evidence on the relationship between the sanitary crisis and the abuse of the 
environment. Implicitly the goals of an ecological paradigm were well established indicating 
that the salmon production needed a (more) sustainable approach as the only way to survive 
over time. An interviewed NGO belonging to the ecological coalition clearly indicated that ‘the 
production of salmon is not and will never be a sustainable activity; however, it might be done 
with better sanitary and environmental standards’. 
By contrast, within the neoliberal paradigm it was understood that the problems of the 
sanitary crisis were those related to the deregulation of the sector. For the neoliberal coalition 
the root cause of the crisis was a lack of regulation for the industry and the sector in which the 
industry is immersed. The ecological and neoliberal coalitions agreed that prior to the crisis 
there were important regulations and programmes to protect the industry from hygienic and 
environmental problems: these included the environmental regulation RAMA and the sanitary 
regulation RESA. However, there was a policy failure of the regulatory framework in protecting 
the industry from ISAv and in playing a crucial role in developing the conditions that led the 
industry to the crisis. It was also agreed, but mainly by the ecological coalition, that the 
inadequate practices of the producers also contributed to the crisis. There was no agreement 
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by interviewees on whether the regulatory framework prior to the crisis was just wrongly 
designed, rightly designed and inadequately implemented, or both wrongly designed and 
inadequately implemented as well. 
 
5.3. Synthesis of the chapter 
Long before the sanitary crisis occurred in the Chilean salmon farming industry, different 
actors were providing indicators and feedback about the critical sanitary and environmental 
situation of the industry to government officials. Moreover, a decline in the industry 
productivity particularly since 2004 was observable. This feedback was ignored and not seen as 
a signal of a coming crisis requiring urgent transformation of the critical situation of the 
industry involving its intensive production model, or as a problem to be faced by policy makers 
and government officials. However, when ISAv was introduced into the country and started to 
kill salmon, the magnitude of salmon fatalities and the infestation of farms across the industry 
could not be ignored. It did not take long before the crisis was defined as the first policy 
problem with a high priority in the governmental agenda. Thus, the sanitary crisis in the 
industry was a focusing event, that is, a situation that attracted the attention of individuals in 
and around the government, and government officials decided to do something. 
Policy responses were based on the causes of the crisis. According to fieldwork there was a 
variety of explanations about the causes of this crisis and the existence of many 
interdependent failures that can be seen as having led the industry to the crisis were shown. 
The diversity of industry failures created divergent narratives linked to different cognitive 
frames that identified the existence of two paradigms – the neoliberal and ecological 
paradigms. Since the response to the crisis depended upon an understanding of its causes, the 
divergent narratives created divergent policy responses. 
At the time of the onset of the crisis there was no policy ready to deal with ISA nor a legal 
framework on which it could quickly build specific control measures. Since the sanitary 
problem faced by the industry was qualitatively and quantitatively different from routine 
emergencies, new and specific measures were needed to deal with the virus. The urgency of 
the situation meant that government and industry actors quickly mobilised to develop and 
implement immediate measures. The first immediate action was the elaboration and 
implementation of a Contingency Plan that contained the first measures taken to address the 
182 
 
 
 
incidence of ISA in Chile. The measures enforced in the Contingency Plan were complemented 
with voluntary measures adopted by the industry. 
However, the immediate responses to the crisis were recognised as being insufficient because 
they only partially addressed the problems revealed by the crisis and represented by the 
diversity of industry failures. After some experience and evidence had accumulated, 
subsequent short-term responses were developed and applied. These short-term measures, 
including the improvement of industry production and sanitary conditions, were proposed by 
the governmental working group Salmon Roundtable. A task that this Roundtable urgently 
addressed was the review of aquaculture regulations as well as their implementation and 
effectiveness to face and address events such as ISAv. The Roundtable concluded the need for 
change in the aquaculture regulation’s approach.  
The update of the industry regulatory framework, including the development and 
implementation of new policies and the modification of existing policy instruments, was 
defined as the second policy problem. Both policy problems were framed within the existing 
neoliberal paradigm because the subsystems defining the policy problems had a neoliberal 
view of the industry. The policy problems were translated in the development of specific 
regulations to the industry to ensure the survival of salmonculture and a continuous growth in 
production. 
The sanitary crisis in the salmon industry abruptly opened a policy window to reform the 
sectoral regulatory framework because the industry regulatory framework prior to the crisis 
could not solve the crisis itself (there was a need to enact strict sanitary measures to control 
the virus), and the relief approach of the aquaculture regulations were shown to be ineffective 
in protecting the industry from events such as ISA. Thus, the crisis pushed sudden and 
unexpected changes in policies precipitating a policy learning process. The policy learning 
process of the Chilean industry was a conscious and intentional process; however, unlike what 
Hall (1993) points out, it responded directly to the crisis and indirectly to past experience and 
new information. 
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CHAPTER 6 
POLICY RESPONSE TO THE SANITARY CRISIS IN THE CHILEAN SALMON 
FARMING INDUSTRY 
“We never plan our regulations, we have never done a priori 
regulatory modifications in order to avoid undesirable 
situations. We always react, always…” 
(An interviewed Lawyer) 
This chapter analyses how policy responded, in the short and long terms, to the sanitary crisis 
in the Chilean salmon industry. The industry policy learning and policy change is analysed 
following the evolutionary stages of the sanitary crisis. It is argued that potentially radical 
measures are expected to occur in early stages of the crisis. Whether those measures actually 
produce a radical policy change in later stages of the crisis remain as a question. To analyse 
this, a bridge between policy learning literature and literature on disasters and crises 
management is made posing the main theoretical contribution of this research. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the policy learning and policy change processes of the 
salmon industry after the sanitary crisis. Then, the second part makes an analysis of the short-
term industry policy learning and policy change, which involves the development and 
implementation of new measures to deal with the virus and the participation of the neoliberal 
and ecological coalitions in those measures. The third part of the chapter analyses the long-
term policy responses and how the short-term measures affected those responses.  
The primary conclusion will be that, following the immediate policy response described in the 
previous chapter, the ISA sanitary crisis was not sufficient to produce a policy paradigm shift in 
the industry, but it did provoke a fundamental change in the industry’s production model as 
the processes of policy learning proceeded. This fundamental change in the industry’s 
production model introduced, through discussion and consideration of new ideas, changes in 
policies that progress in the direction of a more ecological paradigm. The studies of Hall’s 
(1993) policy paradigm shift, May’s (1992) instrumental and social learning, and Sabatier’s 
(1988) coalition formation are used as a theoretical base. The relationship between a policy 
paradigm shift and the fundamental change in the industry production model is made by an 
analysis of the stages of a policy regime change as proposed by Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 
(2009). 
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6.1. Policy learning and policy change from the sanitary crisis 
Chapter 2 points out that, in order to provide a more comprehensive and systematic analysis 
of how policy responds to catastrophic events, it is necessary to connect the evolutionary 
phases of those events with policy learning and policy change processes. This section takes 
forward that idea and analyses how the policy responded to the sanitary crisis in the Chilean 
salmon industry, how the processes of industry policy learning and policy change progressed 
according to the evolution of the crisis, and whether the changes in policies were incremental 
or radical. 
The sanitary crisis was a dramatic event that disrupted the governance processes of the 
Chilean salmon industry including its regulatory framework. The crisis progressed from a 
critical period of urgency in 2007 to a new improved state of industry operation in 2010. The 
policy responses to the crisis were developed and delivered in different phases, and the 
changes in policies were outcomes that accompanied the industry’s policy learning process. 
Once the crisis and the update of the industry regulatory framework became policy problems, 
the relevant actors began to look for proposals and alternatives to solve those defined policy 
problems. Since no policy was preventively developed to deal with ISA in a pre-event stage of 
the crisis (i.e. there was no pre-event stage), proposals to solve the policy problems were 
developed in the stabilisation stage (reaction phase). The Chilean industry and government 
neither prevented the emergency of ISAv nor protected the industry from it, even when the 
industry was aware of the existence of this virus, which was not new to the world and had 
been affecting the global salmon farming industry since 1984.  
Multinational companies located in Chile, such as Marine Harvest Chile S.A. (a subsidiary firm 
of Marine Harvest ASA) and Mainstream (a subsidiary firm of Cermaq ASA), are from those 
countries that experienced ISA crises before Chile; however, they did not take measures 
against it. This means that the industry did not experience a proactive policy leaning process 
but industry policy responded reactively to the sanitary crisis and in this way there was a 
reactive policy learning process. 
In the precursor stage of the crisis, industry, government and other actors interpreted the 
signals that warned about the coming crisis differently. For the NGOs, it was apparent that an 
environmental or sanitary crisis would come soon due to the poor environmental and sanitary 
conditions in which the industry was operating. However, for the producers and government, 
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the decrease in the production indicators was seen as a normal consequence of the 
intensification of the salmon biological resource. 
After the ISA crisis occurred there were immediate or urgent policy responses, short-term and 
long-term responses. The immediate responses were developed and applied during the 
stabilisation stage of the crisis (during the first three months after the index case: June-
September 2007), short-term policy responses were developed and applied during the 
normalisation stage (from the fourth month to the first year and half after the index case: 
October 2007-January 2009), and long-term responses were developed and applied during the 
improvement, adjustment and restoration stages (after the first year and half from the index 
case: January 2009-onwards).  
The following sections show how, during the early stages of the sanitary crisis, measures 
considered as potentially radical were introduced into the industry. It was in these stages that 
non-routine responses were required to address the unusual problems the industry was 
experiencing because of the crisis. Also, the effect of those measures on the long-term policy 
learning and policy change of the industry are analysed. 
As seen in Section 5.2, the policy problems linked to the sanitary crisis were framed within the 
neoliberal paradigm. This framing shaped the policy alternatives to solve those problems. The 
policy making process in developing and delivering the policy responses to the crisis was 
characterised by high levels of conflict and ambiguity among different actors and over distinct 
policy issues. The Executive Secretary of the Salmon Roundtable and policy makers played an 
important broker role in limiting this conflict to obtain a politically acceptable response to the 
policy problems posed by the industry; however, this did not entirely resolve the problems at 
any stage. 
 
6.2. Short-term policy response 
The short-term policy responses were developed and applied during the normalisation stage, a 
period where the short-term needs of the salmon producers (the affected community) were to 
stop salmon deaths and restore the levels of production prior to crisis as soon as possible. 
Since no policy was ready to deal with ISA, during the first stages of the crisis the short-term 
responses were mainly a new set of policies oriented to the detection and control of the virus. 
In April 2008 specific measures to control ISA were decreed by Sernapesca in the Resolution 
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N°776 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2008e). These new measures complemented those 
established in the Contingency Plan and were aimed at reducing the incidence of ISA and 
isolate it geographically. They strengthened the control on farming centres, embarking and 
disembarking ports, roads and movements of fish. Early harvest or depopulation of cages and 
mortality treatments were stipulated.  
It was also decreed that a resolution on solid and waste measures should be issued within 10 
working days from the publication of Resolution N°776, i.e., during the second half of April 
2008. In July 2008, measures to manage solid and liquid waste in slaughterhouses on land, and 
process plants receiving salmon species from farms in quarantine areas due to ISAv, were set 
and decreed by Resolution N°1882. These specific measures were for solid organic waste to be 
sent to fishmeal and fish oil plants, solid organic waste for final disposal, cleaning and 
disinfection proceedings, and methods of disinfection for liquid waste. In the specific case of 
solid organic waste for disposal, a silage process for organic waste was required that employed 
closed containers to which formic or acetic acid was added. 
In July 2008 alternative and additional measures, provisionally for protecting and controlling 
the introduction of high risk diseases through salmon eggs, were set via Resolution N°1803 by 
Sernapesca. This resolution decreed that for the import of salmon eggs from countries in 
which ISA is present, the eggs should be verified as being free of the agent causing ISA through 
screening of broodstock of those eggs. Broodstock showing positive for ISA, eggs from that 
broodstock, and eggs sharing an incubator with eggs from positive ISA broodstock, were 
prohibited from entering Chile. This resolution on salmon eggs specified that the techniques to 
perform screening should be RT-PCR or PCR in Real Time using heart and gills as samples. 
In October 2008 the first Specific Sanitary Programme for ISA was established by Resolution 
N°2638 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010i). This Programme added new regulatory 
requirements related to health and fish disease. Although it did not mention Coho salmon and 
rainbow trout as vectors or carriers of ISA, it mentioned, but did not specify, other susceptible 
hydrobiological species. The programme proposed the definition of authorised laboratories by 
Sernapesca to diagnose ISAv and the methods to isolate and identify the virus. It also 
established a notification system that included holders of farming centres and laboratories, 
creating an explicit obligation to report to Sernapesca ISA outbreaks and the presence of the 
virus. This information should be supported by a Veterinary Report or The Positive Result from 
an authorised laboratory. It was also a requirement to submit an epidemiological survey 
provided by Sernapesca. An important component of the programme was that it established 
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the categorisation of zones and farming centres. For surveillance zones a minimum of 10 km 
radius from an infected area or suspected centre was defined. 
The Sanitary Programme clearly established that regulations for cleaning, disinfection and 
biosecurity should be followed. All these regulations are from 2003, for example Resolution 
N°72 on General Sanitary Programme of Cleaning (Chilean National Congress Library, 2003c) 
and Resolution N°65 on General Sanitary Programme for Disinfection of Salmon Eggs (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2003b). Farming centres should have written protocols for cleaning, 
disinfection and biosecurity to be applied, for example, to harvesting, massive cull and 
mortality. These protocols were to be approved by Sernapesca and all the personnel in the 
farm should be aware of them. Another specification of the programme was the a priori 
authorisation by Sernapesca of the movement related to aquaculture activities among farms 
such as live fish, mortalities, harvest and cull. Sernapesca was to issue a sanitary certificate for 
movement. In 2008 Sernapesca established an additional measure to restrict the movement of 
cages related to the broodstock detected with ISAv in Llanquihue Lake (Region X) (Sernapesca, 
2008b). 
In 2007 Sernapesca incorporated the sea lice caligus as a high risk disease in List 2 because 
caligus was considered to be an important disease present in Chile and was also a vector of 
ISA. The Specific Control Sanitary Programme for Caligus enacted by Resolution N°1883 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2007c), and the Specific Surveillance Sanitary Programme 
for Caligus enacted by Resolution N°1789 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2007b), were 
created in 2007, and in 2008 part of the Specific Control Sanitary Programme for caligus was 
replaced by Resolution N°448 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2008d). 
Together with the development and implementation of new regulations, through its website 
Sernapesca started a public information campaign to permanently identify infected farms 
showing the centres that were at risk of spreading the virus. This was in order to provide the 
producers with crucial information about the virus and its incidence, and encourage other 
farming centres to adopt preventive measures (Sernapesca, 2008b). All these measures 
represented a substantial increase in Sernapesca’s responsibilities.  
The range of responsibilities undertaken by Sernapesca was considerably wider than that prior 
to the crisis. It was recognised during fieldwork by a member of Sernapesca that the resources 
available to perform these responsibilities were quite limited, and by several interviewees that 
Sernapesca did not have the capabilities to effectively perform the new tasks. An interviewed 
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lawyer explained that Sernapesca was not a high level technical body, that most of the 
professionals in the regions were newly graduated veterinarians without experience, and that 
the organisation did not have enough resources to perform the new activities. 
To support the short-term measures the government through CORFO provided a loan 
guarantee to producer firms. This government financial aid consisted of a guarantee to get 
bank credits to fund investments in sanitary areas, and in this way it was an incentive for the 
firms to invest in the new measures to control ISA. The state guaranteed up to 60% of the 
credits with a limit of US$8 million per firm. According to El Mercurio, in total the state 
guaranteed US$120 million for the industry (El Mercurio.com, 2008a). 
Chile was interested in developing knowledge exchange mechanisms and transfer knowledge 
between the Chilean industry and those industries that had experienced ISA crises before (e.g. 
Norwegian, Canadian as it was described in section 3.2) to know how to deal with ISAv and 
solve its sanitary effects. For example, a study to investigate the virus origins in Chile was made 
by the Canadian University Prince Edward Island (La Tercera.com, 2009), and the report on risk 
factors relating to the spread of the virus was made by the Norwegian Scientific Committee for 
Food Safety (Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety, 2007). Although this sanitary 
crisis in the Chilean industry represented a country specific problem, experiences from other 
places and times were employed to look at alternatives to solve this problem in the Chilean 
context.  
As was pointed out in Section 3.1, since the virus was not new in the world, the knowledge to 
solve this specific problem was located in those countries where the virus had existed and 
been considered as a disease for the salmon industry such as Norway and Canada. In this way, 
using international expert advice and experiences from other places Chile experienced a policy 
transfer process such as those discussed by Rose (1991). 
The urgency and new responses to control the virus in order to stop the salmon mortalities, 
and the fast mobilisation of actors meant that the short-term responses were potentially 
radical to cause a policy paradigm shift in the industry. Whether these policies caused a shift in 
the industry policy paradigm or not would be observed after their implementation and when 
some experience and evidence was accumulated. Within this new set of policies, the most 
potentially radical change in the industry came in 2008 with the development and 
implementation of the new industry production model, called the Health Management Area 
Model (HMAs), codified in Resolution N°450 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2009f), 
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Resolution N°1449 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010g) and resolution N°93 (Chilean 
National Congress Library). This model was a fundamental change in the production of salmon 
in Chile. It was inspired by the Canadian Bay Management Area Model discussed by McGeachy 
and Moore (2003), as it was described in section 3.2, and shares the similarity that the 
territory had been organised to have coordinated management of salmon production. 
However, one difference between the Canadian and the Chilean models was the number of 
involved firms, which in the end had an effect on the model’s operation. According to Aqua, in 
Chile there were 28 firms involved, while in Canada there were just 4, which facilitated 
industry coordination (Aqua.cl, 2010a). With this new production model all the measures 
already developed as immediate and short-term responses would be more effective, since the 
model would organise the farming centres to control the virus and ensure production in a 
more effective way.  
The HMAs were the only alternative proposed as a new form of industry organisation. The 
model was proposed by the neoliberal coalition, represented most prominently by the 
producer firms, and promoted by the Salmon Roundtable. According to international 
experience, coordinated management of farms was a crucial measure to control the virus in 
those countries that implemented the model, such as Canada and Norway. It was believed that 
the new model would help to recover the salmon production and ensure a continuous growing 
production. However, if it was a crucial measure to control the virus in Chile, this would be 
demonstrated by its effectiveness in the Chilean context.  
The ecological coalition, represented most prominently by NGOs, did not propose an 
alternative model to the HMAs and its participation was mainly focused in contesting the 
model proposed by the neoliberal coalition. Perhaps it was not in the interest of the ecological 
coalition to propose an alternative model because the members of the coalition were most 
likely to oppose the farmed salmon production, and because the coalition also constituted a 
loosely linked group without formal existence. 
The adopted solutions were framed within the neoliberal paradigm of restoring levels of 
salmon production. As will be seen in the next chapter, features of the new industry 
production model, such as fallow periods and coordinated production, led to restrictions in 
salmon production, a consequence that created discontent in some producers, and contested 
the extent to which the actual policy response continued to be solely aligned with the 
neoliberal paradigm. 
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In summary, drawing lessons from other salmon industries, the key instruments developed to 
deal with the first policy problem (i.e. the sanitary crisis itself) were the Contingency Plan 
codified in Resolution N°1670 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2007a), the Measures to 
Control ISA codified in Resolution N°776 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2008e), the 
Specific Programme for ISA codified in Resolution N°2638 (Chilean National Congress Library, 
2008c), and the Health Management Area Model codified in Resolution N°450 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2009f), Resolution N°1449 (Chilean National Congress Library, 
2010g) and Resolution N°93 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010j). International advice in 
the form of workshops and studies were mechanisms of knowledge transfer used by Chile to 
produce information about the virus and its spread in the national territory.  
To introduce fundamental changes in the industry Chile adopted the same measures to control 
ISA that other salmon-export countries such as Norway, Canada and United States, aimed at 
detecting the disease and new outbreaks at the earliest opportunity, control of fish cages, 
restrictions in the movement of fish, the creation of zones, depopulation of farms and 
elimination of fish when required, fallowing, and more control from the sanitary authority 
Sernapesca. 
Thus, to solve the first policy problem, the industry adopted a positivist ‘best practice’ model 
of policy learning (Freeman, 2006), in which experiences from other places and times were 
transferred and adapted to the Chilean context, introducing fundamental changes in the 
production model of the industry. The purpose of a positivist ‘best practice’ model was to find 
the most cost-effective solutions. These solutions were ones that could inform effectiveness 
and feasibility. However, effectiveness and feasibility are related to the similarities of 
institutional context between systems of comparison. As we will see in the next chapter, the 
implementation of this model led the industry to conflicts and ambiguities and a new phase of 
policy learning. 
Table 6.1 presents the short-term policy responses to the sanitary crisis. The majority of policy 
instruments developed to face the sanitary crisis were in the form of Command-and-Control-
Regulation. It suggests that some difficulties in implementing them may be in the compliance 
of the standards set by the regulations, the risk of regulatory capture, overregulation, and the 
lack of resources (capacity) and capabilities for effective enforcement of the policy 
instruments, as will be seen in Chapter 7. 
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Table 6.1:Short-term responses 
Instruments Taxonomy 
Nodality or information-
based instruments Public information campaigns 
Dissemination of infected farms 
through Sernapesca website 
Authority-based policy 
instruments 
Command-and-control-
regulation 
Control measures (Resolution N°776) 
Solid and liquid waste measures 
(Resolution N°1882) 
Eggs measures (Resolution N°1803) 
Sanitary Programme ISA (Resolution 
N°2638) 
HMAs regulations (Resolutions N°450, 
N°1449 and N°93) 
Specific Control Sanitary Programme 
Caligus (Resolutions N°1883 and N°448) 
Specific Surveillance Sanitary 
Programme Caligus (Resolution 
N°1789) 
Advisory committees Salmon Roundtable 
Treasure-based policy 
instruments Guarantee for loans State guarantee fund CORFO 
Source: Own elaboration based on analysis, Hall (1993) and Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) as theoretical base. 
 
6.3. Long-term policy responses 
Long-term policy responses were developed and applied during the recovery phase of the 
industry’s sanitary crisis. The recovery phase of the crisis began a year and half after the index 
case, after the worst part of the crisis was over. The long-term responses mainly addressed the 
second policy problem, not only to update the industry’s regulatory framework including the 
development and implementation of new policies and the modification of existing 
instruments, but also aiming to continue with the control and spread of ISA (i.e. first policy 
problem). 
The policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1988) involved finding the most appropriate institutional 
solution to solve the second policy problem was developed by the government employing 
Subpesca, Sernapesca, Salmon Roundtable, public agencies and policy makers; the industry 
itself through producer firms and its different associations (associations of producers – 
SalmonChile and Acotruch45, associations of service suppliers such as Association of Maritime 
Shipowners, Association of Divers and Association of Nets); environmental and labour NGOs, 
                                                             
45 Association of Coho Salmon and Rainbow Trout Producers.  
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other associations such as the National Corporation of Fishermen, banks through its 
association ABIF, trades unions and Universities. 
The recovery phase of the crisis included the improvement, adjustment and resolution stages. 
As said in Chapter 2, in evolutionary models of policy learning we can find some loops in the 
development of policies. In the case of the Chilean salmon industry, since new policies were 
being developed and implemented, they were tested and adjusted in the light of experience 
and new information. Then, the improvement stage overlapped with the adjustment stage. 
The resolution stage had not yet occurred; this was because the salmon industry had not 
completely restored its industry governance processes because the industry regulatory 
framework had not been completely routinised. 
The potentially radical policy responses developed as immediate and short-term measures to 
deal with ISA proved to be ineffective in containing the virus in the original area (Region X), in 
providing a model that ensured the continuous production of all the Chilean salmon species, or 
in controlling some industry practices adequately. This called for further reforms that occurred 
during the recovery phase of the crisis and, in this way, continued the industry’s policy 
learning. The changes in policy during the recovery phase were the creation, changes and 
adjustments in policy instruments and their settings. Changes in policy instruments were 
outcomes that gradually continued accompanying the policy learning process of the industry. 
The improvement and adjustment of policy instruments was made by incremental policy 
changes that were revealing an increasing degree of the ecological paradigm. The long term 
response was a participatory process in which the authorities were willing to receive 
observations and comments on the policy instruments from the addressees (i.e. producers and 
suppliers). The experience in implementing the instruments allowed the actors to obtain 
information and give feedback to the authorities. The amendment of instruments was a 
bottom-up process in which producers and suppliers influenced the adjustments of the 
measures based on their understanding, interests and beliefs in an active way. Their strategy 
was to report the infeasibilities of the instruments and attempt to influence instrument 
adjustments in favour of their interests. 
The incremental policy change in the industry had a constructivist approach of policy learning, 
and the adjustments of policy instruments emerged as a collective process of knowledge 
accumulation from the interaction and participation of the different actors (Sabatier, 1993; 
Sanz, 1995). In the words of Freeman (2006) this model ‘treats policy as emergent. Policy does 
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not exist somewhere else in finished form, ready to be looked at and learned from, but is 
finished or produced in the act of looking and learning’ (Freeman, 2006, p.379). 
The main regulatory change in the industry came with the process of reform of the 1989 GLFA, 
with the aim of incorporating a preventive problem-solving approach and institutionalise the 
new production model of the industry. As said in Chapter 5, the regulatory framework for the 
industry prior to the crisis had received strong criticism about its reactive rather than 
preventive approach to support industry development. Both the ecological and the neoliberal 
coalitions agreed that the regulatory framework prior to the crisis contributed to the 
development of the conditions that stimulated the failures in the industry, and subsequently 
the sanitary crisis. Changes introduced in the GLFA allowed for a more effective 
implementation of the new production model assurance to the banking sector on the financial 
possibilities of producer firms. 
The review of the aquaculture regulation including the GLFA was conducted by the Salmon 
Roundtable. The proposals made by the Roundtable were presented to policy makers in the 
Law Project to modify the GLFA N°18892. According to the History of the Law N°20434, the 
project was submitted to the Congress for legislative process by Presidential message with 
high priority on 8 January 2009. It was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies as the chamber 
of origin, and therefore the reviewer chamber was the Senate. The modifications were made 
in four areas: alterations in the farming centres model, alterations in the mechanisms to 
facilitate aquaculture concessions as mortgages, strengthening the power of Sernapesca and 
increase the payment of aquaculture fees. The topics contained in the project were: 
1. The introduction of a new production model based on the creation of Health Management 
Areas (HMAs). The HMAs have been a crucial recommended international measure to face 
and reduce the impacts of sanitary events such as ISA. These areas refer to the 
coordination of the operation of farming centres that are located in an area that, given its 
features (e.g. by group of hydrobiological species), should be managed independently from 
others. The areas consider high biosafety measures and fallow periods. They contain a 
group of concessions and at the same time are grouped and contained in bigger areas 
called macro zones. These areas allow the creation of firewalls to contain outbreaks of 
diseases and isolate contaminated farming centres. The following figure shows the levels 
of action in biosecurity measures. 
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Figure 6.1: Levels of action in biosecurity measures 
Source: Subpesca. 
Given the situation of ISA, the creation of HMAs in Regions X, XI and XII was urgently 
required. The areas were aimed at controlling the virus in Los Lagos and Aysén Regions, and 
to avoid the implementation of an intensive production model in Magallanes that led the 
industry to the crisis. In order to organise the regional fish aquaculture, the indefinite 
suspension of the procedure of applications and granting of fish aquaculture concessions 
was proposed in the Los Lagos Region, and the suspension for one year in Aysén Region. 
With the creation of HMAs the relocation of concessions was also proposed as part of their 
implementation. Since the coordination of the operations of farming centres was required, 
the holders of farming centres would occasionally need to relocate to areas where 
coordination with other farming centres was easier, or to areas more suitable to operate 
fish aquaculture (e.g. deeper areas). The relocation of concessions would require 
renouncing the concession that would be relocated, and the acquisition of a new 
concession in a new area under different requirements, such as 25 renewable years. 
The relocation of farming centres would also be done (apart from the relocation of 
concessions) by transferring the concession holder to another area where a new farming 
centre was acquired. In order to speed up the procedure of transfer of farming centres, a 
concession record to implement concession transfers and cession of rights was created. 
The possibility that these areas may be declared by group of hydrobiological species that 
will facilitate the creation of the HMAs in the future was also incorporated in the 
declaration of areas suitable for aquaculture (AAA for its Spanish acronym). 
2. The possibility of giving concessions as real collateral. To solve firms’ financial problems 
and ensure a scale development of the industry, it was realised that the regulatory 
framework should be upgraded to facilitate the concessions as real collateral. Although it 
Farming 
Centre 
Health Management Area 
Macrozone 
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was always possible to give a concession as collateral46, in practice there were practical 
problems that made its implementation difficult. 
3. The performance of Environmental Reports INFAs and certification by suitable third 
parties. With this change the authority took the possibility of collusion due to the strong 
connection between clients and providers of INFAs seriously. To do this, Sernapesca had a 
record where suitable professionals would be registered to elaborate the instruments of 
environmental and sanitary evaluation to which the GLFA and its regulations refer. 
4. To include the regulation of aquaculture related activities in the sanitary regulation. Since 
activities related to aquaculture (e.g. aquaculture suppliers) play a key role in maintaining 
good sanitary conditions in farming centres, they should meet sanitary requirements in 
order to avoid being carriers of pathogens. This expressly includes establishing the facility 
to stipulate the elimination of species in order to control high risk diseases. The sanitary 
programmes would be in charge of the implementation of the measures to do that. 
Strengthen the control faculties of Sernapesca. That is, to give more power to the sanitary 
authority to inspect activities that, in the past, were not explicitly mentioned. These 
activities include, for example, collection centres, slaughter centres and feed plants, which 
at the moment of the project law may be just controlled by SAG. Also the time to control 
activities (i.e. control activities could be done out of working hours) was extended. An 
Automatic Positioning System (POSAT for its Spanish acronym) in ships transporting 
materials among farming centres would be required. 
5. To improve the enforcement system in order to make it effective. To address 
environmental and sanitary infractions, the application of administrative sanctions (i.e. 
they may be applied by resolution of Subpesca) would be incorporated. Also a more 
preventive approach in environmental regulations was implemented. This was done by 
reducing the time required for remediation of anaerobic water conditions by suspending 
the farming centre’s operations until suitable environmental conditions are proven to have 
operated for at least one production cycle. Environmental information would be approved 
by Sernapesca and meet farming conditions such as density, cultivation, harvest and 
fallow. 
6. The increase of the cost of the aquaculture fees. 
                                                             
46 According to the Law N°20091 from 2006. 
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Since the chamber of deputies and the Senate had disagreements on the Law Project and its 
amendments, a Joint Commission was formed to propose a way of solving those 
disagreements. After fifteen months in legislative process, the new law (Law N° 20434), as an 
outcome of the modification process of the 1989 GLFA, was promulgated, published and 
implemented. The formation process of the Law N°20434 is summarised in the following table. 
Table 6.2: Formation process of the Law N°20434 
Phase Steps Stage Period of Time 
Initiative Initiative through Presidential Message 
First Constitutional 
Stage 
8 January 2009 – 
20 May 2009 
(133 days) 
Discussion of 
the Project 
Law 
Project Law is presented to Chamber of Origin 
(Deputies) 
Project Law is approved by the Chamber of 
Origin (Deputies) 
Approved Project (from Chamber of Origin – 
Deputies) passes to the Reviewer Chamber 
(Senate) Second 
Constitutional 
Stage 
8 July 2009 – 20 
January 2010 
(197 days) Reviewer Chamber (Senate) amends the approved Project by the Chamber of Origin 
(Deputies) 
Revised (i.e. amended) Project by the 
Reviewer Chamber (Senate) back to the 
Chamber of Origin (Deputies) Third 
Constitutional 
Stage 
20 January 2010 
– 20 January 
2010 
(1 day) 
Chamber of Origin (Deputies) rejects the 
amendments from Reviewer Chamber 
(Senate) 
Formation of Joint Commission (equal 
number of deputies and senators) to propose 
the way to solve the disagreements 
Joint Commission 
Stage 
10 March 2010 – 
10 March 2010 
(1 day) 
Joint Commission reaches an agreement 
Project from Joint Commission passes to the 
Chamber of Origin (Deputies) 
Chamber of Origin (Deputies) approves the 
Project from the Joint Commission 
Project from Joint Commission passes to the 
Reviewer Chamber 
Reviewer Chamber approves the Project from 
the Joint Commission 
Sanction of 
the Project 
Approved Project by both Chambers Deputies 
and Senate is approved by the President 
Stage of 
Completion 
16 March 2010 
(1 day) 
Promulgation President announces the Decree for Promulgation Promulgation 
5 April 2010 
(1 day) 
Publication 
of the Law in 
the Official 
Newspaper 
Text of the Law is published in the Official 
Newspaper Publication 
8 April 2010 
(1 day) 
Source: Own Elaboration based on the “History of the Law N° 20434” (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d) 
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The legislative process of modification of the 1989 GLFA was, in general, a participative one. 
According to an interviewed NGO, the process in the Senate was more participative than in the 
Chamber of Deputies. The role of the President of the Senate, Senator Antonio Horvath, as 
policy broker (concept discussed by Sabatier, 1988) was crucial in opening up the discussion of 
the Law Project to the diversity of involved actors. Senator Horvath, as an environmentalist (he 
is known as ‘the Eco Senator‘) and a native of Aysén, one of the regions affected by ISAv and 
the salmon industry, opened room for negotiations in which the actors were allowed to 
present their views on the Law Project. An interviewed policymaker and a representative from 
the NGOs explained that, apart from the discussions in the Congress, Senator Horvath 
collected information from the regions, and it is fair to say that he conducted all the necessary 
sessions so that no one was left unheard. As an interviewed NGO pointed out, ‘there was not 
any actor who asked to speak at the sessions and has not been heard’.  
With the discussions made at the Senate and the information collected from the regions, it 
was clear that the sanitary crisis was a more complex situation than what was presented in the 
Law Project. This was also recognised by a bureaucrat interviewee from Subpesca saying that, 
at the beginning (i.e. when the project was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies through 
presidential message), the Law Project was very weak and did not take into account labour and 
environmental issues in depth, as was required in later parliamentary discussions mainly in the 
Senate 
During the legislative process there was criticism about the neoliberal approach of the Law 
Project and they provoked conflict among political parties. Some members of Congress, 
belonging to centre-left coalitions (the coalition in power at the time of the submission of the 
project), strongly criticised the treatment given to concessions, their time limit and possibility 
to give them mortgages, during the modification of the law. Those members argued that the 
project obeyed economic rather than biological criteria, and that economic parameters were 
privileged over ecosystem considerations47 
 
                                                             
47 According to Dávila and Soto (2011), the economic paradigm is the predominant one in the approach of public 
policies in Chile. In public issues, the logic is focused on the analysis of resources and based on cost-benefit, 
efficiency and effectiveness criteria over other approaches. The expert knowledge of public policy usually comes 
from outside the government, and is located in think tanks that are linked to political parties. Moreover, Lahera 
(2004) notes that the modernisation of the government’s action is given by the convergence of politics and public 
policy. This improvement requires, among other things, changes whereby political parties, social groups and citizens 
internalise the analysis and proposals made by pro-government and opposition policy institutes. On the role of 
citizenship, Dávila and Soto (2011) raise the question of what is the role of citizens and their organisations in the 
debate on the importance of expertise in public decisions in contemporary democracies. 
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. They pointed out that there were environmental and sanitary issues ignored in the Law 
Project, and that there was no difference between the approaches and positions of the 
Opposition (i.e. centre-right) and the Government, even when the Law Project was coming 
from a centre-left government (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d). 
The neoliberal position of the government was criticised for preferring economic priorities 
over biological ones, and a regulatory capture of the government from powerful groups was 
suggested. In the words of a congress member ‘…apparently behind the project there were 
powerful groups which seduced the government and the government instead of take care of 
the assets of all the Chileans went in the defence of the interests of the industry…’ (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2010d, p.768). It was said by some members of Congress that the 
project threatened the sovereignty of Chileans and favoured the privatisation of the sea, and 
that the time limit of concession did not obey biological issues (Chilean National Congress 
Library, 2010d). Those congress members agreed with the development of the industry but not 
with the neoliberal approach of the industry taken by the government. 
Evidence collected through interviews indicates that, although the policy reformation process 
was in general a participatory one, some actors such as Coho salmon and trout producers, 
environmental NGOs and suppliers, were dismissed. Disagreements about the proposed 
measures and favouritism to some actors (e.g. Atlantic salmon producers) destabilised the 
consensus that the industry had before the crisis. 
The modification of the GLFA took place during the presidential electoral year of 2009-2010. 
This electoral environment implied a political sense of urgency from the centre-left coalition, 
the coalition in power at that moment, to solve this sanitary crisis and its effects. This political 
sense of urgency reflected the political salience of a powerful political sector (i.e. needing 
results on important issues), and at the same time to get support for the coming elections 
from a broader cross-section of voters. The sense of urgency to approve the new law (outcome 
of the modification process) was translated in a feeling of something that in Chile is colloquially 
understood as a ‘marmicoc legislation’48. A marmicoc legislation is understood as a rushed 
legislation with fast legislative process (the term is based on the analogy of something that 
needs to be cooked quickly).  
                                                             
48 Marmicoc is the colloquial Chilean name and brand of the pressure cooker introduced into the country in the 
1950s. In Chilean colloquial language something that is rapidly done is associated with marmicoc 
(http://www.marmicoc.cl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=2 Last accessed: 1July, 
2013). 
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In order to conduct the process as fast as possible dissident views were not considered. A 
congressman pointed out in a Congress session that, during the modification of the law, there 
was a lot of pressure on the members of Congress and pressure from the Executive to approve 
the Law project submitted for modification (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d). 
Interviewees agreed that lobbying was the most common mechanism during the legislative 
process used to influence the process of law modification. This observation is consistent with 
the study of Kingdon (2003) on policy change in the American context. The result of the 
presidential elections in 2010 (in a two round system) swung the government from a centre-
left coalition to a centre-right coalition. The modification of the GLFA was one of the last 
projects undertaken by the centre-left coalition. The Joint Commission approved the project in 
Congress on 10 March 2010, a day before the handover of power. The new law (Law N°20434) 
was promulgated and published under the new coalition in government in April 2010. 
The banking sector played a key role in the sector’s learning process and during the 
modification of the GLFA. At the time of the crisis there was a high involvement of the banking 
sector in the industry. An industry bankruptcy (for not being able to face its financial 
commitments and not having operational money) would lead the banking sector to face 
massive financial problems. Thus, the negative financial effects of the industry were also a 
problem for the banking sector. The banking sector, represented by the Association of Banks 
(ABIF), soon realised that what it considered as collateral from the industry was not effective 
(an interviewee from the banking sector and financial advisors). Up to the sanitary crisis banks 
considered biomass as collateral, however, the sanitary crisis demonstrated that without 
biomass (in this case due to fish mortality because of ISAv) they did not actually have anything 
valuable that they could get from the industry if they were not able to pay back loans. This 
problem was translated as no real collateral for the banking sector.  
The consideration of aquaculture concessions as real collateral would have solved this 
problem, but in the regulation of the period there were practical difficulties in allowing this. 
Given fallow restrictions, this collateral may also have been compromised from a risk 
management viewpoint. The approval of the new law untangled and accelerated the 
negotiations between the producers and the banking sector. As Claro y Asociados (2009) 
points out, with the approval of the law the banks had more guarantees to give credits to the 
industry, and the firms were in a better position and with more solvency to obtain new 
investments and attract new funding and commercial partners. 
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The Salmon Roundtable also worked on modifications of the sanitary (RESA) and 
environmental (RAMA) regulations. However, it was said that a change in the approach of 
these regulations would not be complete without the specific modifications in the General Law 
of Fishing and Aquaculture (Law N°18892) mentioned above in order to consider, reinforce and 
effectively enforce these amended instruments. 
RAMA’s first modification was published in April 2009 by Decree N°397 (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 2009a), a year before the publication of the new LGPA (Law N°20434). The 
key issues in RAMA’s modification involved the adoption of measures for the disposal of solid 
and liquid waste coming from the production of salmon, the availability of an action plan for 
contingencies (similar to those established in Norway) in the case of producing negative 
sanitary and environmental externalities, actions to be taken for salmon escapes (including the 
recapture of the fish), and a secure disposal of waste and the elimination of dead fish. 
Sernapesca and the Marine Authority should be informed of these contingencies. Sernapesca 
and Maritime Authority should also be informed about fish escapes within 24 hours of the 
incident. The modifications also referred to net washing and specified that the removed nets 
to be washed could not be kept in the farming centres and nearby places.  
There were some specifications for the INFAs and the time during which it was allowed to put 
fish into the water, according to INFAs. An important specification was that, from now, the 
INFAs should be performed by suitable qualified personnel with specialisation or experience in 
marine or environmental issues; laboratories performing INFAs should be accredited. In its 
inspection function, Sernapesca would perform the INFAs for farming centres as determined 
annually, acting as intermediaries between INFA’s suppliers and clients. In this way the 
authority took the issue of the collusion between clients and providers of INFAs seriously, as 
they were seen as a strong network industry failure. 
The first modification of the RESA was published in April 2009 by Decree N°416 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2009b), together with the modification to the RAMA, a year before 
the publication of the new law (Law N°20434). The modification of the RESA involved the 
specification of biosecurity measures such as disinfection of farming centres, net washing, 
removal of mortalities and silage, brood stock, eggs, farming centres on land, some practices 
such as all-in-all-out, sanitary certificates49 for fish movements. There was a specific section to 
                                                             
49 The policy learning process and the new operation of the industry increased the bureaucracy in the firms and in 
the industry. For example, there was a considerable increase in paperwork with the issue of sanitary certificates and 
a set of records that must be undertaken as required by the authority (e.g. a record of process of disinfection in 
slaughter centres and process plants), an interviewee from a laboratory pointed out. 
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the HMAs where a coordinated sanitary management was required, among other things the 
distance between farming centres was specified (1.5 nautical miles), and from farming centres 
and their areas (3 nautical miles). 
Subsequent modifications of RESA and RAMA were enabled by Decree N°349 (published in 
May 2010) and N°350 (published in June 2010) respectively (Chilean National Congress Library, 
2010b, 2010c). These modifications were made with the aim of improving some of the 
measures contained in the sanitary and environmental regulations. For sanitary regulations 
some concepts such as silage, incineration and recirculation of the fish pool were specified and 
from now any person with justified information about outbreaks may inform Sernapesca. 
Other adjustments referred to the farming centres located in land and their systems of 
mortality treatment, as well as issues about disinfection of places and aquaculture materials. 
For the environmental regulation the main adjustments were made on cleaning and washing 
of aquaculture materials such as nets.  
Alterations to the GLFA and to the sanitary (RESA) and environmental (RAMA) regulations 
were made in light of the new knowledge gained from the control of the virus and the 
elements needed to effectively manage it. Also some adjustments in the settings of the HMA 
model were needed in order to modify the calendar months of the zones’ fallow periods. This 
was made by Resolution N°2273 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2009e). 
The majority of the adjustments were for regulations (policy instruments) related to the 
fundamental change in the industry’s production model (HMA model), and this suggests the 
influence of the ecological paradigm in the policies that were adopted. There were several 
aspects to the adjustments: 
• To incorporate the fallowing of collection centres. This was made by Resolution 
N°1897 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010g); 
• To update the calendar period of three months fallowing for the group of concessions 
in Region X, this was made by Resolution N°1898 (Chilean National Congress Library, 
2010h) and Resolution N°1381 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011h); Region XI, 
this was made by Resolution N°1897 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010g), 
Resolution N°1898 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010h), Resolution N°1381 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2011h) and Resolution N°2534 (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 2011r) and Region XII, this was made by Resolution N°2082 (Chilean 
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National Congress Library, 2011l) and Resolution N°2302 (Chilean National Congress 
Library, 2011p); 
• To modify suitable areas for the Aquaculture in the Region XII. This was made by 
Resolution N°1215 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011g); 
• In Region XII, to adjust the macrozones by Resolution N°2003 (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 2011k) and group of concessions by Resolution N°2435 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2012g); 
• To include new zones affected with ISA by Resolution N°756 (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 2011u) according to the ISA Sanitary Programme (enacted by 
Resolution N°2638) and the zonification (enacted by Resolution N°450), and exclude 
areas where new outbreaks have not been present and then to reclassify those zones 
as surveillance zones; 
• To include affected zones in Region XI by Resolution N°2256 (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 2011o) and set complementary sanitary measures by Resolution 
N°1739 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010f); 
• To adjust the group of concessions in Region X and XI by Resolution N°2253 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2011n), Resolution N°2891 (Chilean National Congress 
Library, 2011s) and Resolution N°3104 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011t). 
The new law (Law N°20434) mandated the modification of the 1993 regulation on concessions 
and authorisations of aquaculture decreed by Decree N°202 (Chilean National Congress 
Library, 2011c), and that an Automatic Positioning System should be enforced on the vessels 
that provided services to the farming centres50 (aquaculture service providers) in cases of 
conditions of sanitary risks among zones or groups of aquaculture concessions, this was 
decreed by Decree N°198 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010a). 
The creation of the group of concessions by the Law N°20434 required another update of the 
Sanitary Regulation, this was made by Resolution N°275 (Chilean National Congress Library, 
2011d) and Decree N°56 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011e) and the Environmental 
Regulation that was made by Decree N°168 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011b). The 
new update in the Sanitary Regulation was to incorporate the concept of ‘group of 
concessions’ and to establish the 1.5 nautical miles distance among farming centres belonging 
to a group of concessions. It made clear that the exception to this distance would be made for 
                                                             
50 These are vessels providing services to farming centres such as a transport service for live fish, dead fish and their 
products, food, personnel, nets and other elements for the containment of farmed species as well as fasten, 
flotation and protection elements (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010a). 
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concessions being relocated. It also set the distance requirements for the relocation of 
concessions and the conditions of operation for these concessions.  
The update of the Environmental Regulation was to include that the farming centres should 
have an engineering study to specify the conditions of farming including methodologies to 
gather and process information. It pointed out that information about where the farming 
centre would be located should be specified, such as geographical, meteorological and 
oceanographic features, as well as procedures for installation, operation and maintenance. 
Also, there was a need to extend the start-up period of the operating conditions of sanitary 
management that should meet the biosecurity points of embarking and disembarking used in 
the activities of salmon farming. This sanitary management was enforced from 1 March 2013 
by Resolution N°302 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2012h). 
In 2009 the Specific Surveillance Sanitary Programme for Caligus and the Specific Control 
Sanitary Programme for Caligus were modified and integrated creating the Specific Sanitary 
Surveillance and Control Programme for Caligus codified by Resolution N°2117 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2009d). This was modified in May 2012 by Resolution N°1141 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2012c). 
Regarding the creation of policy instruments, new regulations were developed to complement 
the set of regulations already issued in the reaction phase. Additional instruments were 
created, especially in the area of the HMA model by Resolution N°1896 (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 2011j), Resolution N°2238 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011m), 
Resolution N°1548 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2012e) and Resolution N°1549 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2012f). These instruments were aimed at the operationalisation of 
new concepts introduced by the new law (Law N°20434) such as ‘group of concessions’ and 
‘macrozones’. According to an interviewed bureaucrat from Subpesca, when the health 
management areas were created the concept itself (i.e. health management areas), and the 
maps made to define the areas, gave the impression to some actors, such as tourism providers 
and artisanal fisherman, that everything inside those areas belonged to the salmon industry, 
not just the aquaculture concessions to produce salmon.  
Later, it was understood that the authority was adding the space among the concessions to the 
aquaculture concessions and that no one could operate there (e.g. fisherman or a tourist firm 
transporting tourists). This created conflict among different actors and it was, therefore, 
necessary to clarify that what the model actually did was to group aquaculture concessions 
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producing salmon for coordinated operation. The macrozones are bigger areas containing 
groups of concessions with the aim of promoting the contention of sanitary emergencies. 
Thus, although in the language of the industry actors still talk about ‘health management 
areas’ or ‘barrios’ in a colloquial language, the new instruments created during the 
improvement stage set the number of groups of concessions of salmon aquaculture for the Los 
Lagos Region (24 groups of concessions), Aysén Region (37 groups of concessions) and 
Magallanes Region (27 groups of concessions), and the macrozones for Los Lagos Region (5 
macrozones) and Aysén Region (3 macro-zones). 
In 2011 a new and more complete version of the ISA Sanitary Programme was issued by 
Resolution N°1577 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011i). The aim of the programme was 
the early detection of the virus and the opportune control of ISA. The previous programme 
codified in Resolution N°2638 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2008c) and its modification 
codified in Resolution N°2216 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010i) were replaced in 
order to incorporate new procedures to improve the mechanisms of detection and control of 
ISA. According to an interviewee from Subpesca, the Chilean ISA Programme was a pioneer 
since it incorporated ISA control in fresh water and proposed the screening in broodstock.  
Due to these measures, in 2010 Chile detected cases of HPR051. From this detection the 
possibility of a risk effect was realised. Although HPR0 does not develop the disease it may 
mutate into the pathology that causes the disease. The elimination of broodstocks showing 
HPR0 and the eggs from these broodstocks was proposed. With this measures Chile was the 
first country to incorporate measures to control HPR0. In May 2013, at the request of Chile, 
the OIE agreed to consider ISAv infection for both virulent variables and the cause of 
subclinical disease (i.e. HPR0), and made changes to the Aquatic Code. These changes involved 
the consideration of HPR0 in the surveillance programmes of countries producing salmon, and 
the notification of the presence of HPR0 to the OIE (Aqua.cl, 2013c). 
This demonstrates how policy learning at the local level may influence the policy learning of 
the industry at the global level. The knowledge and experience applied to the 2011 ISA 
Sanitary Programme, and the new information gathered about the virus such as the existence 
and recognition of HPR0, created the need to modify this Programme in 2013, which mainly 
incorporated the concept of ‘compartment’52, and to eliminate the harvesting restrictions to 
                                                             
51 A virulent strain of ISAv that does not cause the clinical disease. 
52  This is one or more hatcheries with the same biosecurity management system containing a population of fish 
with a particular status of ISAv and ISA which are subjected to surveillance and control measures and meet the basic 
biosecurity conditions (Chilean National Congress Library, 2013). 
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the farming centres classified as confirmed HPR0. The update in the Programme also added 
information about the HPR0. This was codified in Resolution N°228 (Chilean National Congress 
Library, 2013). 
In March 2013 the Density Regulation was established, which was designed by the authority 
but under consultation with the private sector and SalmonChile. The regulation was enforced 
from 1 January 2014, and regulates the quantity of fish firms can place into the sea according 
to the sanitary behaviour of the area in which the firms are located. There is a maximum limit 
of density per specie (17 Kg/m3 for Atlantic salmon and 12 Kg/m3 for Coho salmon and trout). 
Prior to the sanitary crisis the fish density reached 30 Kg/m3 (La Tercera.com, 2013).  
According to Aqua, to elaborate this regulation Subpesca used technical information and the 
collaboration of Universidad de Chile to set a density for each group of concessions. The idea 
was to avoid the overload of some farming areas (Aqua.cl, 2012c). The regulation also included 
an individual penalty for an excess of mortality that would be enforced six months after of the 
publication of the regulation (La Tercera.com, 2013). The authority estimated a reduction in 
the production of salmon (Aqua.cl, 2013h). The implementation of this regulation prevented 
the industry from growing.  
The announcement of this regulation produced controversy in the industry, for example, 
SalmonChile asked the authority what would happen with those firms that harvested at a 
greater density since they had lower mortality, or whether an exception would be made. The 
authority replied that the regulation indicated that the density is a number of fish, therefore, 
what it was monitoring was the number of fish at the beginning and at the end. Therefore it 
never would be possible to have more fish at the end than those that were placed into the sea 
(Aqua.cl, 2012a). 
In terms of suitable personnel to elaborate certificates, environmental and sanitary 
instruments, a regulation was issued pointing out that Sernapesca was the organisation 
empowered to keep records of suitable personnel, the requisites of those personnel, and that 
Sernapesca would entrust the elaboration of the certificates, environmental and sanitary 
instruments to the personnel listed in the register through a previous tender. This regulation 
was codified in Decree N°15 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011a). 
The certification and sanitary requirements for the import of hydrobiological species was 
regulated to prevent the entry of diseases and causal agents via importing aquatic species, 
eggs or gametes, especially those that were not present in the national territory or diseases 
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that had a specific surveillance or eradication programme in the country. It established a risk 
analysis of the hydrobiological species, eggs or gametes to be exported to Chile. Based on this 
analysis Sernapesca would issue a list of the countries from where hydrobiological species, 
eggs or gametes can be imported to Chile. The import of hydrobiological species, eggs and 
gametes requires sanitary certificates issued by the competent authority of the origin country 
that meet the requirements set in this regulation. This regulation also refers to the procedure 
to import hydrobiological species and is codified in Decree N°72 (Chilean National Congress 
Library, 2012a). 
In 2012 the Sanitary Programme on Mortality Management was created by Resolution N°1468 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2012d) with the aim of establishing procedures to prevent 
the dissemination of pathogen agents, and reinforce vigilance for the early detection of high 
risk diseases during the mortality management produced in the farming centres. The 
programme established the classification and reporting of mortalities to the authority, the 
procedures to extract and manage the mortalities including the disinfection, denaturation and 
removal of mortality. The programme issued regulations for embarking and disembarking 
points (ports) for the farming of salmon species, setting the health management conditions for 
the points intended for the loading and unloading of fish and materials used in the cultivation 
of salmon activities. This was codified in Resolution N°2323 (Chilean National Congress Library, 
2011q). 
Complementing the measures proposed by Sernapesca, in 2009-2010 SalmonChile developed 
44 voluntary specific sanitary measures. Out of these 44 measures, 20 were not norms 
dictated by Sernapesca, however, the Association considered they were crucial for adequate 
sanitary management. Among these measures were restrictions on the movement of 
broodstock in the sea, the prohibition of spawning in marine sites, the complete cycle of eggs 
on land and vaccination before placement in lakes (Barros, 2010). 
During the recovery stage, the bureaucrats of Subpesca and Sernapesca continued to provide 
permanent information about the set of regulations developed due to ISA. This included the 
publication of maps of macrozones and groups of concessions, information about caligus in the 
macrozones, and the future publication of the score of sanitary risk. This information was 
provided via their websites, workshops and meeting with the addressees and other relevant 
stakeholders. 
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In the development of the measures to deal with ISA, the neoliberal coalition had a very active 
participation meeting and lobbied the Salmon Roundtable and authorities. By contrast, the 
ecological coalition was less active in proposing measures, and its participation was more 
focused on discussing and contesting the measures developed by the neoliberal coalition. 
To support the recovery phase, involving the development of further regulation and 
adjustment of existing instruments, the government formed two advisory groups: an Expert 
Panel and a second Salmon Roundtable. The Expert Panel was an advisory group for 
aquaculture formed in the first trimester of 2011 with the aim of complementing the technical-
sanitary view of the authority with opinions on economic and social effects of sanitary and 
productive measures. The Panel was asked to give expert advice on three issues. The first was 
the measures concerning the smoltification of Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and trout in 
rivers, lakes and estuaries. Since it was proposed, this had been a conflicting issue dividing the 
industry. The basic question was whether it was possible to produce smolts in rivers, lakes and 
estuaries. This measure had sanitary and operating cost impacts.  
The second issue was the controversial instrument of macrozones in Los Lagos, Aysén and 
Magallanes Regions and the features of corridors between these macrozones.  
The last issue was regarding a methodology and/or mechanism to evaluate and classify the risk 
of farming centres and group of concessions via a ‘risk score’. The idea was to establish a 
methodology, variables, criteria and scales to establish scores of sanitary risk. This score would 
be public through the Sernapesca website in order to ‘discipline’ the firms in sanitary terms. 
This score could be also useful to make decisions such as financing and sanitary control from 
Sernapesca (Estrategia.cl, 2011; Subpesca and Fundación Chile, 2011). 
The formation of this Panel received some criticism as was exemplified by an interviewed 
researcher who was sceptical about the capabilities of the ‘experts’ in making decisions. The 
researcher explained that, in the composition of the Panel, three economists and one 
veterinary (or as the researcher pointed out ‘a cow epidemiologist’), there was no one who 
knew about salmon but they would be responsible for making decisions about salmon. 
In August 2011, as reported by Aqua, the government, through the Ministry of Economy, 
reinstated the Salmon Roundtable to provide support to the aquaculture sector, analyse 
relevant issues, propose solutions and support the salmon industry in its recovery. This 
Roundtable had a different organisation and dynamic from the first Roundtable formed in 
2008. It was organised in five working groups (institutions, territorial organisation, production 
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model, infrastructure and science and research) composed of salmon producer firms and 
coordinated by a bureaucrat from Subpesca, Sernapesca or Ministry of Economy. Each group 
met independently and frequently and could decide whether other relevant actors should be 
invited to participate in the group. The five groups also met together frequently. 
Among the themes to be considered by the Roundtable were the institutions of the sector, the 
growth and development of the industry, how to produce and the relocation of concessions. 
The results of the Salmon Roundtable’s work were expected to be delivered by December 
2011 (Aqua.cl, 2011a; Aqua.cl, 2011f; Aqua.cl, 2011e). 
In an interview with Aqua, the President of Acotruch (Association of Coho Salmon and 
Rainbow Trout Producers) said that the Association valued the invitation and opportunity to 
participate in this second Roundtable. He said that in the first Roundtable most of the 
producers and many firms were excluded and their opinions were not heard. Also he pointed 
out that, unfortunately, they did not participate nor were not heard by the first Roundtable, 
but now they had the opportunity to actively work in the discussions of relevant issues for the 
future of the industry (Aqua.cl, 2011a; Aqua.cl, 2011f; Aqua.cl, 2011e). 
Thus, there was a belief that the second Salmon Roundtable was more inclusive. In an 
interview with Aqua, the Undersecretary of Fisheries explained that this Roundtable would 
work with all the relevant public stakeholders and six representatives of the private sector in 
each of the five formed working groups. In the first stage of the Roundtable only producers of 
sea salmon and sea trout were considered, however, it was intended to expand the 
participation and to include all those who were able to participate (Aqua.cl, 2011e). 
As reported by Aqua, the strategy of Acotruch was to ask the authority if one or two 
representatives of the Association could participate in each group, and in this way to ensure an 
active participation and voice in all the working groups. Acotruch also pointed out to the 
authority the need to consider the voice of various actors involved in the salmon activity in the 
enactment of regulations before these are passed. According to the Association, in this way it 
was ensured that the regulations affecting the industry had greater stability over time, and in 
this way avoid constant changes that create uncertainty for investors (Aqua.cl, 2011e). 
In August 2012 the Aquaculture National Commission was created by Law N°20597 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2012b) to advise the Chilean President through the Ministry of 
Economy, Development and Tourism on the implementation of the National Aquaculture 
Policy, and in September 2013 the Aquaculture Scientific-Technical Committees were 
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implemented. The proposal was to have three Scientific-Technical Committees: one for 
environmental issues, another for sanitary issues, and the third for the territories. These 
committees would be consulted about scientific topics relevant for the administration of 
aquaculture. Also they could be consulted on the methodology for classifying farms and groups 
of concessions, proposals for the establishment of macrozones, and the evaluation of sanitary 
programmes. The members would be selected through a public competition held by the 
Ministry of Economy according to Decree N°77 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2011f) 
(Aqua.cl, 2013k). 
In terms of government reorganisation there was a structural organisational change in the 
Undersecretary of Fisheries (Subpesca) and in the Fisheries Service (Sernapesca). In August 
2012 both organisations changed their names to the Undersecretary of Fisheries and 
Aquiculture, and Fisheries and Aquaculture Services respectively. Also the Undersecretary of 
Fisheries and Aquiculture created the Aquiculture Division to reinforce the importance of the 
aquaculture sector, and give explicitly the same hierarchy for aquaculture and fisheries. 
Among its responsibilities, this new division had the organisation of the territory for 
aquaculture and the proposal of sanitary measures. In the same line the Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Services created the Aquiculture Unit. All this was made by Law N°20597 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 2012b) (Aqua, 6 August 2012; Aqua, 13 August 2012). 
The following table summarises the long-term policy responses to the sanitary crisis analysed 
in this section. 
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Table 6.3: Long-term responses 
Instruments Taxonomy 
Nodality or 
information-
based 
instruments 
Public 
information 
campaigns 
- Workshops and meetings from Subpesca and Sernapesca 
- Score of sanitary risk through Sernapesca website 
- Publication of maps of macrozones, maps of group of 
concessions, caligus and set of regulations through Subpesca and 
Sernapesca websites 
- ISA outbreaks and state of farming centres and zones (e.g. 
surveillance, quarantine)  
Authority-
based policy 
instruments 
Command-and-
control-
regulation 
- HMAs regulations (Resolutions N°1896, N°2238, N°1548 and 
N°1549) 
- Sanitary Programme ISA (Resolution N°1577) 
- Specific surveillance and control sanitary programme (Resolution 
N°1141) 
- Regulation on fish density (Sernapesca, 2012) 
- Record of personnel to make environmental and sanitary 
instruments (Decree N°15) 
- Certification and sanitary requirements for import of 
hydrobiological species (Decree N°72) 
- Sanitary programme on mortality management (Resolution 
N°1468) 
- Sanitary conditions in biosecurity embarking and disembarking 
ports (Resolution N°2323) 
- Modification of GLFA (Law N°18892) 
- Modifications of RESA (Decrees N°416 and N°349) 
- Modifications of RAMA (Decrees N°397 and N°350) 
- HMAs regulation adjustments (Resolution N°2273) 
- HMAs regulation adjustments (Resolutions N°1739, N°1897, 
N°1898, N°2256, N°756, N°1215, N°1381, N°2253, N°2082, 
N°2891, N°2302, N°3104, N°2534, N°2003 and N°2435) 
- Modification of concessions (Decree N°202) 
- Modification of automatic positioning of ships regulation (Decree 
N°198) 
- Modifications of RESA (Resolution N°275 and Decree N°56) 
- Modifications of RAMA (Decree N°168) 
- Modification of ISA Sanitary Programme (Resolution N°228) 
- Modification of regulation on sanitary conditions in biosecurity 
embarking and disembarking ports (Resolution N°302) 
- Specific Sanitary Surveillance and Control Programme Caligus 
(Resolution N°2117) 
- Modification of the Specific Sanitary Surveillance and Control 
Programme Caligus (Resolution N°1141) 
Self-regulation 44 measures of SalmonChile 
Advisory 
committees 
- Expert Panel 
- Salmon Roundtable (second one) with five working groups 
- Aquaculture National Commission (Law N°20597) 
- Scientific-Technical Committees on Aquaculture with three 
working groups (Decree N°77) 
Organisation-
based policy 
instruments 
Government 
(re)organisations 
- Adjustment of Sernapesca and Subpesca organisational names to 
include Aquaculture 
- Creation of Aquiculture Division in Subpesca 
- Creation of Aquiculture Unit in Sernapesca 
Source: Own elaboration based on analysis, Hall (1993) and Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009).as theoretical base. 
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In summary, the initial crisis had not produced a paradigm shift in either government or 
industry from a neoliberal to an ecological one. However, it was a sufficient condition to 
produce a fundamental change in the production model of the industry, changing the goal of 
the production model from uncoordinated production to coordinated production. The HMA 
model in the Chilean context was taken as the best practice to control the virus: it was 
proposed under the premises of a neoliberal paradigm. However, although it was not thought 
or explicitly recognised at the beginning as a motive and after some experience and evidence 
had accumulated, the model revealed elements of an ecological paradigm. These elements 
were observed in practice after the implementation of the model and stated to be crucial to 
deal with the virus. 
The fundamental change in the industry’s production model, and the unchanged paradigm, is 
explained below using the characteristics of a policy regime change proposed by Howlett, 
Ramesh and Perl (2009) and summarised in Table 6.4: 
1. Regime stability: the firm neoliberal policy paradigm and a convenient uncoordinated 
production model 
The neoliberal policy paradigm was institutionalised in Chile in the 1970s by the military coup 
and the group of economists called pejoratively the ‘Chicago Boys’, which advised in favour of 
a radical change toward neoliberal fiscal and monetary policies. Within its achievements are 
the development of an export-oriented model and natural resource based industries such as 
the salmon farming industry. A key characteristic of the paradigm was the deregulation of 
sectors that wanted to be developed.  
The regulatory framework of the salmon industry prior the crisis, framed in the neoliberal 
paradigm, allowed the fast growth and rapid insertion of the industry into the global economy. 
This regulatory framework was characterised by an aquaculture concession scheme that 
stimulated an intensive model of production and a free production approach with unrestricted 
density of fish per cages, farms and concessions from the state to the private sector. 
Adjustments to the industry’s regulatory framework were made in the 2000s (development of 
RESA and RAMA) by members who shared the principles of the neoliberal paradigm. 
The common-pool resource water was individually managed by each firm without coordination 
with others. Thus, the placement of smolts into the seawater, sanitary fish treatments and all 
salmon activities were freely made according to the needs of each firm. The uncoordinated 
method of industry production was something that implicitly facilitated the rapid success of 
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this young industry. Without coordination costs, the industry easily achieved a continuous 
growing production, which led the industry to rank as the second global salmon producer and 
exporter of salmon species after Norway. 
2. Accumulation of real world anomalies: the ISA sanitary crisis as the anomaly for the 
neoliberal policy paradigm and the uncoordinated production model 
The sanitary crisis was a serious anomaly for both the neoliberal policy paradigm and the 
uncoordinated production model. The deregulation dictated by the paradigm, and its 
conceptualisation of rapid development as requiring un-regulated or self-regulated control, 
meant that the regulatory framework prior to the crisis did not include specific regulation to 
deal with ISA (even when both the industry and authorities were aware of this virus and its 
negative effects in other salmon-producer countries). The paradigm relied on the self-interest 
of producers to prevent such a crisis. The paradigm was focused on economic criteria, but the 
sanitary crisis was an ecological problem for the industry with economic and social 
consequences. Short term opportunism prevailed over rational self-interest defeating self-
regulation that, in other contexts, might be effective because of the more direct evidence of 
responsibility and more direct measures for control. Because of this, and since ISA was a 
different problem from what the regulatory framework was familiar with, the regulatory 
framework prior to the crisis could not solve the sanitary crisis and its effects itself. 
Expert advice and the international experience of those countries that already dealt with ISA 
(see section 3.2) showed that coordinated management of sanitary treatments and biosecurity 
measures are crucial measures to deal with and control the virus. The transportation of smolts 
from different suppliers, and contact with contaminated equipment or equipment by people 
handling infected fish from farm to farm, have been suggested as mechanisms of transmission. 
All these activities need to be coordinated over the whole industry to stop the spread of the 
virus and control it. However, the uncoordinated way in which the industry was operating 
could not offer adequate solutions to deal with the virus. 
3. Experimentation: incapacity of stretching the neoliberal policy paradigm and the 
uncoordinated production model 
The existing policies of the regulatory framework prior to the crisis could not be adjusted to 
deal with ISA since the measures suggested by international experience were very specific and 
were not included in existing Chilean regulations. Since there was no legal ground to deal with 
ISA there was no experimentation in regulatory terms. Instead of experimentation there was a 
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process of regulatory development that included a set of regulations and programmes to 
control the virus. The only way in which the existing regulatory framework could be stretched 
was in that the authority explicitly enforced the existing regulations about cleaning and 
disinfection. 
The uncoordinated production model could not help in dealing with and controlling the virus 
since international experience showed that, actually, a coordinated management of farms was 
needed. There was no experimentation with the production model and the efforts were 
focused on developing a new production model with the coordination of measures and farm 
management that later on became the HMA model. 
4. Fragmentation of authority: the stable policy subsystem and the discredited individualistic 
approach of the production model 
Interest groups such as environmental and labour NGOs, associations of service suppliers, 
artisanal fishermen and researchers, challenged the existing subsystem in terms of their 
approach in developing the aquaculture sector and the salmon industry. The existing 
subsystem, including the government and the aquaculture authorities Sernapesca and 
Subpesca, were discredited and strongly criticised by the scope of their role. However, this 
criticism did not result in fragmentation of authority and the existing subsystem kept its power 
and positions in decision making. Experts and officials in power worked on the solutions to 
solve the crisis, and other actors such as NGOs were only marginally included through the 
expression of their points of view, but excluded from the decision making process. 
Using international expert advice, the existing subsystem developed the set of regulations and 
programmes needed to control the virus and actively worked on the modification of the GLFA. 
On the other hand, the individualistic approach of the production model had already been 
shown to be ineffective, and that the industry model needed a profound change and 
adjustment in its goal.  
5. Contestation: the debates on the neoliberal policy paradigm and the uncoordinated 
production model 
Contestation between the neoliberal and the ecological coalitions were made in the form of 
criticisms, denunciations, participation in meetings with the Salmon Roundtable, campaigns 
and strikes. The efforts of some actors of the ecological coalition were focused on criticising 
the proposed measures and the modifications in the GLFA made by the neoliberal coalition in 
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order to include some elements of the ecological paradigm. Inside the neoliberal coalition 
actors were contesting the settings of the HMA model (e.g. period of fallow), however, they 
agreed with the content of the proposal and the modification of the law. There was no contest 
regarding the uncoordinated production model since, at this point, it was already understood 
that the industry model should significantly change. 
6. Institutionalisation of a new regime: the reaffirmation of the neoliberal paradigm and the 
institutionalisation of coordinated production 
Advocates of the ecological paradigm did not secure positions of authority, and therefore 
there was no alteration of the decision making process in order to institutionalise an ecological 
paradigm. Members of the existing paradigm reaffirmed their positions and with this there 
was a reaffirmation of the neoliberal paradigm. However, the reaffirmed neoliberal paradigm 
exhibited some incipient elements of an ecological paradigm. Some of these elements were 
embedded in the industry’s new production model, such as the awareness of biosecurity 
measures and more protection for the environment through fallow periods, and some of them 
were embedded in the content of subsequent measures. These ecological elements were 
incorporated with the aim of ensuring a continuous growing production and being able to 
compete at the global level. The rhetoric of the paradigm remained the same but the content 
of the measures (e.g. HMA model and the measures that followed this model) reflected an 
increasing influence of the ecological paradigm; ecological issues are seen as a means to retain 
the neoliberal paradigm. 
The industry discourse about the importance of the industry for the country and the southern 
regions in terms of economic development and jobs, and the extension of the industry to 
Magallanes, was presented as a new opportunity for the industry to develop another southern 
region and provide jobs, but now ‘in the right way’ with a new production model (i.e. HMA 
model). This could be interpreted again as the regulatory capture of the government from the 
industry. 
Regarding the industry policy paradigm shift from the neoliberal to the ecological, we conclude 
that the ISA crisis was a sufficient anomaly to disrupt the existing industry regulatory 
framework. This disruption opened a window of opportunity to provoke a process of policy 
paradigm change, however, this change in the policy paradigm did not occur. Although there 
was contestation from the ecological coalition, the goal of the ecological paradigm was well 
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established, and the impossibility of stretching the existing neoliberal policy paradigm was 
sufficient evidence of the need for change.  
Neither the public regulators nor the private sector actors of the Chilean salmon industry 
experienced a policy paradigm change from neoliberalism to environmentalism. A primary 
reason for this, consistent with Hall’s discussion on paradigm shift, was that there was no 
fragmentation of authority in the policy subsystem based on the neoliberal paradigm that 
would have occurred had members of the ecological coalition secured positions with the aim 
of altering the existing decision making. 
On the other hand, two pieces of evidence allowed for the fundamental change in the 
industry’s production model from uncoordinated production to coordinated production. First, 
there was enough evidence showing the ineffectiveness of uncoordinated production in the 
Chilean industry. International experience from other countries that already had ISA effectively 
showed that coordinated management was crucial to solve events such as ISA. Since those 
countries had already proved the model, there was assurance for the Chilean industry that 
what worked in other industry would work for the Chilean one. 
In these other contexts, there was fragmented authority and representatives of the ecological 
paradigm were present. As a result, the policies imported from these areas embedded ideas 
drawn from the ecological paradigm. However, they were conceived by the importers (Chilean 
policymakers) as being consistent with international competitiveness, which allowed these 
policymakers to ignore the origins or process of these policies’ creation. 
Second, the industry’s new production model, based on the HMA model, was strongly 
defended by, although fragmented, an articulated formal coalition. Even more, the 
fragmentation of the Association of Salmon Industry and the formation of a new Association of 
Coho Salmon and Rainbow Trout Producers (Acotruch by its Spanish acronym), in the end 
strengthened the neoliberal paradigm. This was because two different associations of 
producers were defending a change in the production model and it was reaffirmed that the 
proposed model was the right one, although some adjustments in the settings of the model 
were needed (Chapter 7 will analyse this issue). In this way, the fundamental change in the 
industry’s production model supported the reaffirmation of the reigning neoliberal paradigm. 
The implication of this is that even when industries experience great shocks such as crises in 
their policy environment, this may not be sufficient condition to produce a policy paradigm 
shift (Sabatier, 1988). However, crises such as ISA may trigger processes of policy learning and 
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give the opportunity for great policy change or paradigm shift driven by the features of the 
crisis’ stages and the conflict among actors. A policy paradigm shift requires the existence of an 
articulated framework including formal and non-fragmented coalitions to compete and break 
the existing dominant paradigm. 
If there is no policy paradigm shift, changes in policies provoked by great shocks may exhibit 
notions of the alternative paradigm (i.e. a paradigm challenging the dominant one), when 
contesting coalitions succeed in including elements of the alternative paradigm in the policies. 
In the case of the salmon industry, the reaffirmed neoliberal policy paradigm of the industry 
exhibits incipient elements of an ecological paradigm since the ecological coalition could 
include some elements in the new policies. This suggests that the ecological paradigm will have 
another opportunity for great policy change when the policy window is open again with the 
next ecological crisis, or when members of the ecological coalition secure positions in decision 
making processes. 
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Table 6.4: Regime change in policy paradigm versus production model 
Characteristics of policy regime 
change 
No shift in the policy paradigm 
(from neoliberalism to 
environmentalism) 
Fundamental change in the 
production model 
(from uncoordinated 
production to coordinated 
production) 
Regime stability: the firm 
neoliberal policy paradigm and a 
convenient uncoordinated 
production model 
Neoliberalism was 
institutionalised in the 1970s. 
Deregulation of the industry 
allowed for fast growth and 
rapid insertion into the global 
economy. 
Uncoordinated production 
model of the industry facilitated 
rapid success and development 
of the industry. 
Accumulation of real world 
anomalies: the ISA sanitary crisis 
as the anomaly for the 
neoliberal policy paradigm and 
the uncoordinated production 
model 
ISA as a serious anomaly for the 
neoliberal policy paradigm. 
Ecological problem for a 
neoliberal paradigm. 
ISA as serious anomaly for the 
uncoordinated production 
model. 
 
Experimentation: incapacity of 
stretching the neoliberal policy 
paradigm and the uncoordinated 
production model 
No experimentation in policies 
but the development of specific 
regulation for ISA. 
International experience showed 
that coordinated management is 
needed. 
Fragmentation of authority: the 
stable policy subsystem and the 
discredited individualistic 
approach of the production 
model 
Existing subsystem challenged 
by interest groups but no 
fragmentation of authority 
occurred. 
Individualistic approach of the 
production model discredited 
and the need for a profound 
change of it. 
Contestation: the debates on the 
neoliberal policy paradigm and 
the uncoordinated production 
model 
Contestation from ecological 
coalition to the neoliberal 
paradigm, but no alternative 
proposed to the solutions 
proposed by the neoliberal 
coalition. 
No contestation regarding the 
uncoordinated production 
model. 
 
Institutionalisation of a new 
regime: the reaffirmation of the 
neoliberal paradigm and the 
institutionalisation of 
coordinated production 
Reaffirmation of the neoliberal 
regime. It is reaffirmed that the 
industry is a key sector for Chile, 
especially the southern regions. 
There is an opportunity to bring 
development to Magallanes 
(Region XII). The extension of 
the industry is seen as an 
opportunity for development for 
a southern region. 
Institutionalisation of the HMA 
model through its effectiveness 
in other salmon industries, 
defence of the model from an 
articulated coalition and political 
support from the government. 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on analysis and using Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) as theoretical base. 
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6.4. Synthesis of the chapter 
In the Chilean salmon farming industry the policy responded to the sanitary crisis following its 
evolutionary stages. No policy was preventively developed to deal with ISA in a pre-event stage 
of the crisis, and the responses were developed and delivered in three different phases. The 
immediate responses were developed and applied during the stabilisation stage of the crisis, 
as discussed in Chapter 5. The short-term policy responses were developed and applied during 
the normalisation stage, and long-term responses were developed and applied during the 
improvement, adjustment and restoration stages of the crisis. 
During the first stages of the crisis the short-term responses were mainly a new set of policies 
oriented to the detection and control of the virus in order to stop the salmon mortalities (i.e. 
to address the first policy problem). The urgency, non-routine responses required to address 
the unusual problems the industry was experiencing, and the rapid mobilisation of actors, 
meant that these responses were potentially radical in causing a policy paradigm shift in the 
industry that could be observed after their implementation and when some experience and 
evidence was accumulated.  
Since it was the first time that ISAv was present in Chile in its clinical presentation in Atlantic 
salmon, the country did not have the knowledge or experience to know how to deal with the 
virus and solve its sanitary effects. Knowledge and experience from countries that experienced 
ISA crises before Chile, such as Norway and Canada, were then used to design the responses to 
the crisis in the local context. Within this new set of policies, the most potentially radical 
change in the industry came in 2008 with the development and implementation of the Health 
Management Area Model. This model was the only alternative proposed as a new form of 
industry organisation and constituted a fundamental change in the production of salmon in 
Chile. Proposed by the neoliberal coalition, and following a policy transfer process, the model 
was inspired by the Canadian Bay Management Area Model, experience that showed that 
coordinated management of farms was a crucial measure to control the virus. With this new 
production model all the measures already developed would be more effective because the 
model would organise the farming centres in a more effective way to ensure production.  
The adopted solutions to the crisis were framed within the neoliberal paradigm of restoring 
levels of salmon production. During the later stages of the crisis the long-term responses 
mainly addressed the second policy problem (i.e. to update the industry regulatory framework 
including the development and implementation of new policies and the modification of 
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existing instruments), but also they were aimed at continuing with the control and spread of 
ISA (i.e. first policy problem). The improvement and adjustment of policy instruments was 
made by incremental policy changes that revealed an increasing degree of the ecological 
paradigm in the new production model of the industry.  
The main regulatory change in the industry came with the process of reform of the 1989 GLFA, 
with the aim of incorporating a preventive problem-solving approach and institutionalise the 
new production model of the industry. This policy reform process was, in general, a 
participatory one but, as reported by interviewees, some actors such as Coho salmon and trout 
producers, environmental NGOs and suppliers, were dismissed, and disagreements on the 
proposed measures and favouritism to some actors (e.g. Atlantic salmon producers) 
destabilised the consensus that the industry had before the crisis. This implied that conflict 
and ambiguity over the industry policy learning were present, as will be seen in the next 
chapter. 
The ISA crisis was a sufficient anomaly to disrupt the existing industry regulatory framework 
and this disruption opened a window of opportunity to provoke a process of policy paradigm 
shift from the neoliberal paradigm to an ecological one; however, this paradigm shift did not 
occur. A primary reason for this is that there was no fragmentation of authority in the policy 
subsystem making decisions, and members of the ecological coalition did not secure positions 
with the aim of altering the existing decision making. Instead, the ISA crisis provoked a 
fundamental change in the industry’s production model, changing the goal of the production 
model from uncoordinated production to coordinated production.  
This fundamental change was possible because there was enough international experience and 
evidence showing the ineffectiveness of the uncoordinated production in controlling the virus, 
and because the HMA model was strongly defended by, although fragmented, an articulated 
formal neoliberal coalition. The fragmentation of the neoliberal coalition strengthened the 
neoliberal paradigm since different actors were defending a change in the production model. 
The fundamental change in the industry’s production model supported the reaffirmation of 
the reigning neoliberal paradigm. However, although it was not thought or explicitly 
recognised at the beginning as a motive and after some experience and evidence had 
accumulated, the model revealed elements of an ecological paradigm. These elements were 
observed in practice after its implementation and stated to be crucial to deal with the virus. 
Thus, the reaffirmed neoliberal policy paradigm in the Chilean salmon industry exhibits 
incipient elements of an ecological paradigm.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY RESPONSE TO THE SANITARY CRISIS IN THE 
CHILEAN SALMON FARMING INDUSTRY 
“[In the modifications of the law and sanitary regulation] there were many 
 things that were left out and other things that were misplaced. They 
 are not easy to implement and often not practicable for both the 
authority [bureaucrat] and the producers [addressees]” 
(An interviewed Bureaucrat) 
This chapter analyses the consequences of the policy responses to the sanitary crisis in the 
Chilean salmon farming industry. The analysis is made from a conflict and ambiguity policy 
perspective, adapted from Matland (1995) and Slembeck (1997), which combines political and 
technical elements allowing a further analysis of policy learning. This perspective is relevant 
since policy learning is not a neutral process based solely on the role of ideas and knowledge in 
policy but one strongly influenced by the power relationships among actors. In this perspective 
both conflict and ambiguity in policy have diverse sources and, depending on their intensity 
(low or high), lead to different types of consequences (consequences with low conflict and low 
ambiguity, consequences with high conflict and low ambiguity, consequences with low conflict 
and high ambiguity, and consequences with high conflict and high ambiguity).  
The analysis is made highlighting three themes: i) the increasing influence of the ecological 
paradigm on the industry policy learning and policy change, ii) the reconfiguration of actor 
interests and the influence of Acotruch over policy issues regarding production, and iii) the 
consequences of the policy responses and new regulations on the structure of the industry. 
The chapter begins with the role that conflict and ambiguity played in the policy learning of the 
Chilean salmon industry. Then, taking forward this idea, it turns to the second section about 
the short-term consequences from the policy response to the sanitary crisis in the industry. 
The short-term consequences involve the conflict and ambiguity in the design of the policy 
responses, and the conflict and ambiguity in putting the policy responses into practice. The 
third section discusses the long-term consequences from the policy response with the 
adjustments made on the policy instruments towards reducing their conflict and ambiguity. 
The fourth section refers to the evidence of policy learning and policy change from the ISA 
crisis. The chapter ends with the closing of the policy window, and information about the 
recovery of the Chilean industry that has the status of a country with endemic ISA, like the 
other global salmon producers. 
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7.1. The role of conflict and ambiguity in the industry policy learning and policy change of 
the Chilean salmon industry 
In the Chilean salmon farming industry conflict over policy issues emerged due to the 
incompatibility of policy goals, interests, values and activities among actors, as well as their 
disagreements over policy means and policy outcomes. The restriction on the behaviour of the 
industry actors also led to conflict with the government and bureaucrats. Ambiguity in the 
industry emerged due to misunderstandings or uncertainty about policy goals, policy 
instruments and the settings of the policy instruments that the different actors had over policy 
issues. Also when the actors interpreted the goals or instruments of policy differently, there 
were misunderstandings or uncertainties in their role, uncertainties in their capability or 
capacity and resources to reach policy goals or implement policy instruments, or when there 
was ambiguity in the language of policy. These observations are consistent with the studies of 
Matland (1995) and Slembeck (1997) who discuss the role of conflict and ambiguity in policy 
implementation. 
In the Chilean industry it was clearly observable that there was conflict and ambiguity not only 
between the ecological and neoliberal coalitions but also within the neoliberal coalition, as will 
be seen in the next sections. Both the conflict and the ambiguity concerning policy issues in 
the industry had different sources and they evolved over time over the phases of the sanitary 
crisis. This evolution was due to the change in the knowledge, interests and values of actors 
regarding policy problems, alternatives and outcomes. We employ the conflict and ambiguity 
matrix developed in Chapter 2, which arrays consequences in a 2x2 matrix with conflict and 
ambiguity as axis and high and low levels. This conflict and ambiguity approach allows the 
identification of four distinct types of policy consequences that evolved over time, as discussed 
in the next sections. 
 
7.2. Short-term consequences of policy response to the sanitary crisis 
The short-term consequences of the policy responses are those related to the immediate and 
short-term policy responses that occurred during the stabilisation and normalisation stages of 
the crisis (i.e. reaction phase). There were two consequences from the short-term policy 
response adopted by the industry: the conflict and ambiguity caused in the process of the 
design of the immediate and short-term policy responses, and the conflict and ambiguity in 
putting those policy responses into practice. 
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7.2.1. Conflict and ambiguity in the design of the policy responses 
The virus and the problems caused by it were new for the Chilean industry and, as said 
previously, rapid and new measures were developed to face those problems and control the 
virus. In general, during the design of the immediate and short-term measures in the industry, 
the conflict and ambiguity over policy issues were present with different intensities. The most 
controversial response was the proposal of a new industry production model based on the 
HMAs. This model constituted a fundamental change for the industry, and its potential to be a 
radical measure meant that conflict and ambiguity occurred with respect to different aspects 
of the model. Both the conflict and ambiguity had different intensities, as is explained below. 
 
High conflict and low ambiguity: 
One of the most controversial aspects of the HMA model, that started to show the influence of 
Acotruch over policy issues related to production, was the fixed three month fallow period 
measure for all salmon species. Coho salmon and Trout Producers strongly opposed this 
measure arguing that this fallow period did not represent their interests because it was 
detrimental to the production of species other than Atlantic salmon, such as trout and Coho 
salmon, species that have a production cycle distinct from Atlantic salmon and are not affected 
by ISA virus. In their opinion there was favouritism to Atlantic salmon since the majority of the 
regulation related to the HMAs was just in favour of the production of that specie and 
prejudicial to the production of Coho salmon and trout (Aqua.cl, 2009d). 
The banking sector also explicitly expressed their interests requiring assurance in the 
concessions as collateral. As a Claro y Asociados (2009) points out, banks were concerned that 
these assets may disappear over time for reasons for which they were not responsible, for 
example, the concession holder failing to take on required labour or other reasons for lack of 
operation of the concession, as well as possible negative results of the INFAs or non-payment 
of concession fees. 
Interest groups, such as artisanal fishermen and some environmental NGOs, strongly disagreed 
with the possibility of the private sector being allowed to offer concessions as collateral to the 
banking sector in order to renegotiate its debts and get money. This revitalised the ideological 
discussion about the ‘privatisation of the sea’. As a Congressman explained, although the 
aquaculture concessions existed from long ago, this new law’s provision that they would be 
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used as collateral gave a judicial status to the firms. They would be able to get credits in order 
to perform the productive and sanitary innovations that the industry was not able to do in the 
boom of its development (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d). However, the majority of 
interviewees agreed that the so-called ‘privatisation of the sea’ had already occurred with the 
initial law prior to crisis (Law N° 18892). 
Two aspects of the model that had low ambiguity but high conflict and affected the structure 
of the industry, were the belief that the creation of the HMAs privileged larger firms over 
smaller ones and the changes made in the concession scheme. A representative of a producer 
firm explained that there was some favouritism to larger firms since HMAs would fallow at a 
certain point in time; larger and diversified firms, firms with concessions in different HMAs or 
with the possibility of renting concessions, might be able to ensure a continuous production. 
When some of their concessions were fallowing, they could use other concessions in other 
HMAs that were still in operation. Smaller firms with few concessions, or with all of their 
concessions in just one HMA, could not produce when that area was fallowing.  
This situation is incompatible with the production possibilities of smaller firms and threatens 
their survival. In the words of the interviewed representative, the HMAs system, in the end, 
allowed for the survival of diversified firms (firms in different HMAs) and not those with few 
concessions. Therefore there were advantages for large firms. On the other hand, the change 
of the period to operate the concessions, from an indefinite period to 25 renewable years, was 
strongly criticised mainly by the interviewed producer firms who thought that this change in 
the rules of the game created disincentives for new investments and the production business. 
 
Low conflict and high ambiguity: 
The increasing influence of the ecological paradigm in the design of the HMA model (proposal 
framed in a neoliberal view) introduced high ambiguity over several aspects of the model. An 
issue that was highly questioned was the scientific base of the model. It was argued by the 
majority of interviewees that there was a lack of scientific knowledge to explain the design of 
the HMAs. This created uncertainty over the scientific rationale of how the HMAs were 
formed, their number and the distance between concessions inside the areas and the areas 
among the macro zones. Argued by interviewees, oceanographic studies (e.g. direction of the 
currents and its effects on farming centres according to their location) and studies on load 
capacity of the ecosystems were not taken into account. This knowledge is crucial to the 
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design of an effective model. As an interviewed consultant explained, it is fiction to think that 
the HMAs somehow represent an homogenous environmental reality and that they are areas 
distinguishable from each other. There are many HMAs but their limits have a lack of scientific 
information to support the fact that one area is different from another. If differentiated 
managements are made in areas that actually are not different it is possible to make severe 
mistakes. 
Related to the above issue, the environmental and sanitary effectiveness of the HMAs was also 
highly questioned by some NGOs. They argued that it was not clear whether the HMAs were 
adequate to address environmental and sanitary problems or externalities caused by salmon 
activities to the ecosystem. For example, as an interviewed NGO explained, the main principle 
of the model was the coordinated operation of farming centres, and therefore, when the 
farming centres applied coordinated sanitary treatments, they would do it at the same time 
and all the effects of the medicaments would be released into the environment. 
Some interviewees questioned some practices to be adopted, for example, the management of 
broodstock on land rather than at sea, compulsory vaccination, and effluent treatment in 
aquaculture systems. They argued that these measures implied great investments without 
assurance of their effectiveness, and that these types of drastic measures needed a period of 
learning before being enforced. An interviewed researcher explained that since virus mutate 
and vaccines are made using biological material from previous years, the effectiveness of those 
vaccines may be lower than expected. On the other hand, a representative from a producer 
firm pointed out that they sent letters to Sernapesca and Subpesca expressing their discontent 
on avoiding broodstocks at sea, saying that ‘any transition from one system to another 
requires a learning process...one can generate significant restrictions but it is very risky to 
make drastic changes without a validation process which guarantees that you will not have 
problems because you may cause a non-sanitary crisis’. 
 
High conflict and high ambiguity:  
During the design of the new model for the industry, two issues with high conflict and 
ambiguity that affected the structure of the industry were the production in lakes, estuaries 
and rivers, and the relocation of concessions. Disallowing the production of smolts in lakes, 
estuaries and rivers proposed a change in the reproduction of fish from fresh water to other 
facilities such as in land facilities. However, it also showed how the interests of Acotruch were 
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affected. According to interviewed Coho salmon and trout producers, the measures to disallow 
the production of smolt in lakes, estuaries and rivers as a sanitary measure to avoid ISA during 
the fresh water phase were unsatisfactory, especially for Coho salmon and trout producers 
who thought that the government was revoking the opportunity to produce at a lower cost. 
Since trout and Coho salmon do not develop ISA they argued that these species can be 
produced in lakes, estuaries and rivers without problems. According to them, lakes, rivers and 
estuaries are an important part of the competitive advantages of Chile in salmon production. 
However, since trout and Coho salmon may act as reservoirs of ISA, it was not clear to the 
authorities if the smolt production of these species in lakes, estuaries and rivers would 
maintain ISA in the fresh water phase. 
The relocation of concessions meant that concessions might be found in unsuitable places 
according to the HMA model, and they should be moved to other more suitable places. This 
implied a geographical change in the production of salmon. It was not clear how the relocation 
of concessions could be done in practice in order to create corridors that would act as firewalls 
among HMAs and macrozones. Concessions located in these corridors were subject to be 
relocated. As a consultant said ‘to my knowledge, I do not know if anyone has calculated a 
study of winds, currents and tides and what are the corridors that are required. A corridor is 
not just distance, we need information on currents’. Again, there is uncertainty and lack of 
information on studies of tides and winds to design the model.  
On the other hand, NGOs disagreed to the possibility to relocate concessions in other regions 
and in this way to extend the industry to the south. Reported by the media, decisions about 
the corridors would require more time since there was no available oceanographic 
information, which is crucial in the design of maps of macrozones. Producers pointed out that 
more conclusive studies were needed in order to define the maps of the macrozones and that 
the first available map would not be definitive (Aqua.cl, 2011b). 
A very important consequence of the conflict and ambiguity regarding the design of the HMA 
model was a crisis inside the Association of Salmon Industry (SalmonChile), with the 
consequence of two important breakdowns that ended in AquaChile (the largest Chilean 
capital firm) leaving the SalmonChile Association and its board (Víctor Hugo Puchi who is the 
president of AquaChile resigned as the vice-chairman of SalmonChile). Some trout and Coho 
salmon producers also left; they created a new association to defend their interests, the Coho 
salmon and Rainbow Trout Producers Association (Acotruch). 
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The interests, decisions and measures adopted by the Association of Chilean Salmon Industry 
(SalmonChile) did not represent the interests of AquaChile and those trout and Coho salmon 
producers. According to reports from Aqua, inside SalmonChile there was consensus on the 
modification of the GLFA and some industry practices to improve the sanitary standards of the 
industry. However, there were opposite views about how to face those modifications. The 
strongest disagreement was on the minimum distance between concessions. For Víctor Hugo 
Puchi this distance should be 3.2Km, but for other firms it should be no more than 2Km. So, 
the firm disagreed in the distance of farming centres proposed by the Association. The more 
distance between centres the fewer concessions could be granted.  
This fact opened polemics about whether the actual concern defining a minimum distance 
between centres was to reduce the likelihood for fish disease spreading or to increase the 
value of concessions and then restrict activities for those firms with fewer concessions. 
AquaChile is the largest Chilean firm with the majority of concessions in the industry (about 
150). Smaller firms (firms with fewer concessions) inevitably need more concessions for 
growth. When the Board of the Salmon Industry Association voted for the minimum distance, 
the votes were divided but the 2Km proposal won. The 2Km was the distance that Subpesca 
took into account to include in the HMA model. The smaller firms (the majority in the 
Association) voted in favour of 2 Km. At that time on the board of the Association one firm 
represented one vote independent of the firm size (Aqua.cl, 2010e; Aqua.cl, 2010d). The 
subject to vote of scientific facts is more evidence of the neoliberal view on the HMA model. 
The other disagreement was that AquaChile (Víctor Hugo Puchi) thought the Association was 
demanding measures for the industry that were too soft. People from the sector opined that 
Puchi’s view was a technical one in the long-term but the Association’s view was a short-term 
view (Aqua.cl, 2010d). Puchi’s long-term view can be interpreted as attempting to be closer to 
the ecological paradigm in which a scientific perspective based on more distance among 
farming centres and strict fallow period may ensure suitable sanitary and environmental 
production conditions in the long-term. 
In the case of trout and Coho salmon producers, their dissatisfaction was based on the view 
that their interests were not represented in the adopted solutions, and that those solutions 
were detrimental to developing the production of trout and Coho salmon (the adopted 
measures were meant to solve problems of Atlantic salmon production). There was discontent 
about the priority given to the protection of the production of Atlantic salmon over other 
species such as trout and Coho salmon, which are also part of the salmon industry. As a result 
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a new association (and a new industry policy subsystem) was created. This new association 
was called Acotruch and formed by five firms53 that together represented about 10%of the 
national salmon production in 2008 (Aqua.cl, 2009d). 
The Association began in February 2009, a month later the project law to modify the GLFA was 
submitted to the Congress for legislative work, but it was legally formalised in July 2009 with 
the aim of representing small and medium firms and in this way present to the authorities and 
the industry their reality (Acotruch, 2013). 
According to the President of Acotruch, between the firms that left SalmonChile and formed 
Acotruch and SalmonChile there was agreement in the modification of the GLFA but not in the 
measures to be adopted nor in the sanitary programmes. Although everybody agreed with the 
concept of fallowing, the conflict was over the period of fallowing. Salmon species have 
different production cycles and this was not taken into account by the authority. The President 
of Acotruch explained to Aqua that the farming of Coho salmon requires 11 months for the 
grow-out phase and 1 month of fallowing, whilst the farming of Atlantic salmon is 21 months 
and the farm should fallow for 3 months. If the fallow period for Atlantic salmon (three 
months) is applied to Coho salmon, Coho salmon producers would be losing revenues for 
about two years, which would increase the production costs and lead some firms to 
bankruptcy. In this way, the placement of smolts into the sea, the periods of grow-out, harvest 
and fallow of farming centres should be set considering the physiology of the different salmon 
species, and not just favouring the Atlantic salmon (Aqua.cl, 2009d). It is understood that the 
most damaging scenario for Coho salmon producers would be to fix the fallow periods of 
Atlantic salmon (three months) after every production cycle because this implies that Coho 
salmon producers would need 28 months to produce two cycles of salmon that prior to the 
measure took 22 months (each cycle is 11 months)54. 
Finally, another proposed measure with high conflict and ambiguity was the discussion on the 
import of salmon eggs. Some actors, such as salmon egg producers, argued that the import of 
eggs implied the import of diseases and therefore the import of eggs should be disallowed. 
Others, opposing this view, argued that the problem was the control of diseases of imported 
eggs rather than the import itself. Also, it was unclear if disallowing the import of eggs could 
be seen as a trade restriction. As a representative from a producer firm said, ‘Chile is defined 
                                                             
53 Salmones Aysén S.A.; Salmones Caleta Bay S.A.; Salmones Ice Val Ltda.; Comercial Mirasol S.A. and Salmo Pacific 
(Aqua.cl, 2009d). 
54 Eleven months on growing + 3 months fallowing + 11 months on growing + 3 months fallowing = 28 months in 
two production cycles. 
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as a highly open country to the foreign trade with free trade agreements, and to put 
restrictions on trade goes against the DNA of all economic policymakers...any restriction on 
trade is an invasion to the [economic] system’. The government defended the position of Chile 
as open-trade country. 
The following table summarises the conflict and ambiguity over some issues of the design of 
policy responses. 
Table 7.1: Conflict and ambiguity from the design of policy responses 
 Conflict: 
- Incompatibility of policy goals, interests, values, 
activities 
- Disagreement over means 
- Restriction of the behaviour of the addressees 
Low High 
Ambiguity: 
- Misunderstanding and/or 
uncertainties in policy goals, 
instruments, instrument 
settings 
- Different interpretations of 
policy goals, scope and/or 
instruments 
- Misunderstanding and/or 
uncertainties in the role of 
actors 
- Uncertainty in capability 
and/or capacity and 
resources to reach policy 
goals and/or implement 
policy instruments 
- Ambiguity in policy language 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
- Favouritism to Atlantic 
salmon 
- Favouritism to larger 
firms 
- Concession scheme 
High 
- Scientific base of the 
HMAs 
- Environmental and 
sanitary effectiveness of 
the HMS 
- Some practices to be 
adopted 
- Production in lakes, 
estuaries and rivers 
- Relocation of concessions 
- Import of salmon eggs 
Source: Own elaboration based on analysis and using Matland (1995) and Slembeck (1997) as theoretical base 
 
7.2.2. Conflict and ambiguity to reduce the policy responses into practice  
Policy responses in the stabilisation stage were developed and delivered without delay due to 
the urgency in controlling the virus. Since the responses were urgent, new and potentially 
radical, during the early stage of their implementation there were difficulties in bringing them 
into practice and implementing them in the way that was intended. As noted by Slembeck 
(1997, 2003) and Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) a reason that explains the difficulties in 
putting the policy into practice was due to the principal agent problems among actors. Kingdon 
(2003) pointed out that this may also occur due to the technical and political infeasibility over 
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policies. In the Chilean salmon industry principal agent problems55 between the legislative (the 
state) and bureaucrats (Subpesca and Sernapesca), and between the bureaucrats and 
addressees (producers and suppliers) were observed. Moreover, some responses were 
technically and politically infeasible. In the same way, Matland (1995) and Slembeck (1997) 
point out that conflict and ambiguity play a key role in implementing policies.  
In the Chilean industry, both the principal agent problems, and the infeasibility of some 
responses, revealed that the conflict among actors due to their incompatibility of policy goals, 
activities, interests and values, and the restriction of the behaviour of the addressees as well 
as the ambiguity of policies and measures, played a key role in putting the policy responses to 
the crisis into practice. This is analysed below. 
Some difficulties in translating the policy responses into practice are the consequences of 
conflict and ambiguity during their design. For example, for points in which actors did not 
reach agreement, the conflict was passed to the implementation stage. Other difficulties in the 
first stage of implementing the policies were inherent due to their novelty, the increasing 
influence of the ecological paradigm over policy issues, and the discontent with the short-term 
measures from some actors. Since the industry experienced fundamental changes, it had to 
operate in a different way compared to prior to the crisis. For this, a new system had to be 
developed that required new understandings, priorities, beliefs and agreements. The 
establishment of this new system created a contested process involving new discussions and 
efforts to negotiate the implementation of and adjustments to the policy responses. 
The first part of the table below shows some issues that were not solved during the design of 
the policy responses and whose conflict and ambiguity passed to the implementation stage, 
and its corresponding difficulty in the early stage of policy implementation. The second part 
shows the inherent difficulties of the first stage implementing the policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
55 The state depends on the bureaucrats who at the same time depend on the addressees to effectively implement 
policy. 
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Table 7.2: Difficulties in reducing the policy responses into practice  
Conflict and ambiguity during the design of the 
policy responses 
Difficulty in putting the new regulatory 
framework into practice 
Scientific base (HMA model) Environmental coalition does not share the goals 
of the law and contested the implementation of 
policy responses 
Environmental and sanitary effectiveness (HMA 
model) 
Favouritism to Atlantic salmon (HMA model) 
Fallow period fixed at three months for all species 
is detrimental for the production of Coho salmon 
and rainbow trout 
Production in lakes, estuaries and rivers (HMA 
model) 
Avoiding smoltification in lakes, rivers and 
estuaries is detrimental for the production of Coho 
salmon and rainbow trout 
Inherent difficulties of the early stage in implementing the radical measures 
Implementation of ISA and Caligus Programmes 
Self-governance of HMA 
Logistics of the HMA model such as transport and ports 
Fallowing of collection centres as part of the HMA model 
Fallowing of centres with different species as part of the HMA model 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Low conflict and low ambiguity: 
When both conflict and ambiguity are low in the implementation of policy responses, policy 
goals are clear, understood and shared by the actors as well as the means to achieve those 
goals, although there are some uncertainties in the resources to implement some responses 
(Matland, 1995). 
In the early stage of the implementation of the new policies, the overarching goal of the policy 
was clear: to control the virus and to improve the sanitary and environmental conditions of the 
industry in order for it to recover from the crisis and ensure a continuous growth in 
production. This goal was understood and shared by the legislature, the bureaucrats (i.e. 
Subpesca and Sernapesca) and those addressed (i.e. producers and suppliers). 
The role of the bureaucrats was clear: Sernapesca specified the ISA and Caligus Programmes. 
Bureaucrats and addressees cooperated to reach the objectives of the policy and the 
implementation process was a purely bureaucratic procedure (a term used by Slembeck, 
1997). During the implementation of the ISA and Caligus Programmes there were no principal-
agent problems, and it was technically and politically feasible to implement the policy 
instruments, although there were some uncertainties in the implementation of some 
measures as they were intended due to the increased costs for the firms to implement them. 
In their new roles, the bureaucrats (especially Sernapesca) began many new activities, some of 
which were fairly demanding. It was shared across interviewees that they did not have 
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sufficient resources, and there was no agreement across interviewed actors whether 
Sernapesca had the capabilities to implement the new policies. The ecological coalition did not 
participate in the implementation of these measures, whilst the neoliberal coalition 
cooperated in implementing the policy instruments. 
 
Low conflict and high ambiguity: 
When the intensity of the conflict is low and the intensity of the ambiguity is high the 
outcomes of the implementation of policy responses are hard to predict and they largely 
depend on the actors and their resources (Matland, 2005). 
In the early stage of the implementation of the HMA model there was uncertainty in how the 
self-governance of the HMAs would be, for example, according to Aqua one issue was the way 
of reaching agreements in the logistic operation (e.g. movement of personnel and ships in the 
areas), and how consensus would be achieved (e.g. definition of the period of the year in 
which the zone is fallowing). The self-governance of the HMAs was highly influenced by the 
ecological paradigm since production and commercial decisions per area were now affected 
by, for example, the physiology of species in the areas and disinfection procedures in the 
farming centres of the area. Aqua reported that some industry participants disagreed with a 
majority system in decision making, preferring a consensus system or a unanimous vote. 
Whatever rules were adopted, there was a need to develop a set of rules for the operation of 
this new model (Aqua.cl, 2010a). 
With the implementation of the HMAs the logistics of the industry became more complex than 
prior to the crisis for several reasons: for example, restrictions were made on the movement of 
fish and the use of ports. The establishment of ‘dirty’ and ‘clean’ ports was proposed. Dirty 
ports would receive materials from the farming centres whilst clean ports would send 
materials to the farms. According to interviewees, this proposal was technically unfeasible and 
could not be implemented given the size and the infrastructure of the ports. The influence of 
the ecological paradigm on this issue was also clear because disinfection and cleaning 
procedures of ports, as well as the movement of potentially contaminated fish, were 
important requirements for the success of the new production model. The logistics of the HMA 
model also affected the structure of the industry because new arrangements and agreements 
among actors on the use of common facilities and tracking of fish and material for production 
were needed to continue and improve the production of the industry. 
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Since, with this category of consequences, i.e. the conflict was low, principal-agent problems 
were not expected. Principals (e.g. producers and bureaucrats) and agents (e.g. suppliers and 
producers) cooperated to put the policy responses into practice and sometimes reduce the 
ambiguity of them. The ecological coalition did not participate in implementing these 
measures, and the neoliberal coalition cooperated in implementing the policy responses while 
informing the authority concerning the technical infeasibility of policy instruments. 
 
Low ambiguity and high conflict: 
When the intensity of the ambiguity is low and the intensity of the conflict is high, although 
policy goals are clear and understood by the actors they do not share them. This results in the 
implementation of policy responses being decided by power and the implementation process 
is open to influence from the actors (Matland, 1995). 
In the early stage of the implementation of the new policies there was conflict between the 
environmental coalition and the neoliberal coalition. The environmental coalition did not share 
the goals of the law and contested the implementation of policy responses. NGOs claimed that 
the policy responses did not solve the fundamental problems produced by the salmon 
industry, which were of an ecological nature. Reported by Aqua, they argued that the 
responses did not include substantial measures to guard the ecosystems in which the salmon 
industry is based (Aqua.cl, 2009f). The ecological coalition continued with its information 
strategy and denunciations, mainly via media campaigns, trying to influence the 
implementation of the policy responses. Information was delivered in the form of blogs, 
opinion columns and publications. This was public information that could be accessed from the 
websites of NGOs such as Fundación Terram (www.terram.cl), Ecoceanos (www.ecoceanos.cl) 
and Oceana (www.oceana.org). 
During the implementation of policy responses, the conflict between Acotruch (the new 
industry subsystem and part of the neoliberal coalition) and the government about the non-
differentiation of fallow periods between Atlantic salmon and the other species, Coho salmon 
and rainbow trout, was intensified. As they argued and expressed during the design of the 
HMA model, but they were ignored, they believed that the fallow period fixed at three months 
for all species was detrimental for the production of Coho salmon and rainbow trout, and 
favoured the production of Atlantic salmon and that this specie was prioritised and protected 
over Coho salmon and trout (La Segunda, 2010). With this fallowing measure the production of 
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Coho salmon and trout was seriously affected since the production cycle for these species is 
different from Atlantic salmon and it would result in fewer fish being produced over the years. 
According to fieldwork, Acotruch started to negotiate this measure directly with the 
government, providing feedback on it. Since Coho salmon and trout producers were ignored 
on this topic during the policy reform process, the state was unable to anticipate detrimental 
consequences for the production of Coho salmon and trout. Although all the involved actors 
were listened to in the deliberation process, only some feedback was taken into account. 
Acotruch, which is part of the neoliberal coalition, strongly resisted the proposed equal 
treatment of all the species, ignoring the fact that the species cultivated in Chile have different 
production cycles. Specifically, Acotruch disagreed with the settings of the HMA model and 
proposed that the practices of placement of smolts in the sea, grow out periods, harvest 
periods and fallow periods should consider the physiology of the distinct species and not 
favour just one specie –the Atlantic salmon (Aqua.cl, 2009d). 
 
High conflict and high ambiguity: 
When both conflict and ambiguity are high the goals of the policy are abstract or referential, 
and there are coalitions competing for interpreting and implementing the policy responses 
according to their interests (Matland, 1995). 
According to interviewees, at the beginning of the implementation of the HMA model there 
was high ambiguity regarding how the fallowing of farms producing different species would be 
carried out. Different species have distinct production cycles and it is not technically feasible to 
achieve the same marketable fish as before for all the species when they are forced to adapt 
their production cycle, or the production of some species would be reduced over time. At the 
beginning, the regulation indicated that the entire HMA should fallow at a certain date. Also 
there was no consideration about how consensus on this topic would be achieved (e.g. would 
the authority provide the actual information or would there be a quorum among the firms to 
agree the timing of the production period). This unclear information generated difficulties in 
the business planning of the firms (Subpesca, 2010). 
An interviewed lawyer explained during fieldwork that another unclear point of the responses 
was the situation faced by the collection centres. He said that, at the beginning, it was not 
clear whether the collection centres actually had fallow periods or not, and if they had fallow 
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periods when they occurred. Collection centres are centres inside the HMAs that are meant to 
collect and keep live fish waiting to be processed. When an HMA in which these centres are 
located is in fallowing, the centres cannot be in fallowing without ceasing their function. 
Collection centres receive live fish from multiple HMAs and if they are in fallowing this means 
there will not be a place to keep live fish before they are processed, which reduces capacity 
and generates problems in the production chain. Thus, the fallowing of collection centres is 
technically infeasible. 
Both the fallowing of collection centres and the fallowing of farms with different species affect 
the structure of the industry. When the collection centres cease their functions this reduces 
the capacity of the system and the live fish to be kept should be send to other collection 
centres or directly to the process plants. New logistics should be developed for that. On the 
other hand, the fallowing of farming centres with different species could imply a reduction of 
production of some species over time or smaller fish, which implies a reduction in their exports 
or revenues from their sales. 
As a policy response, the avoiding of smoltification in lakes, rivers and estuaries was also 
discussed. This practice was evaluated as a high risk practice for ISAv. During the 
implementation of policy responses, the conflict on this measure was also intensified. This was 
because it affected the costs and structure of salmon production as part of the production 
would be moved to facilities other than lakes, rivers and estuaries. According to Acotruch’s 
representatives, smoltification in lakes, rivers and estuaries has been an important 
comparative advantage for the Chilean industry. The most affected producers would be the 
Coho salmon and trout producers, which are for the most part smaller firms. Since ISAv does 
not affect Coho salmon and trout, Acotruch strongly disagreed with the proposed cessation of 
smolt production in rivers, lakes and estuaries and continued contesting this measure. 
The ecological coalition did not participate in the implementation of these policy responses, 
and the neoliberal coalition interpreted the unclear points of the policy in their favour, for 
example, explaining to the authority the technical infeasibility of the fallowing of collection 
centres, and the problems in considering the same fallowing period for centres producing 
different species. 
Despite the development of policy responses to stop the epizootic and control the virus, a 
short-term consequence was that in 2008 the virus had already spread to Aysén (Region XI), 
and in November 2010 the first outbreak of ISA was found by Sernapesca in Magallanes, 
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Region XII (Sernapesca, 2010a). With this, the virus was already present in all of the three 
regions where the salmon production takes place and therefore endemic to the entire Chilean 
industry. 
The participation of the banking sector during the early period of implementation was crucial 
to push the industry to comply with the sanitary requirements of the new regulatory 
framework. As was pointed out in Chapter 5, the sanitary crisis helped the banking sector to 
recognise the high risk of the industry. Reported by Aqua, at the beginning of 2013 industry 
debts reached US$1,700 million, and the banking sector was closely monitoring the regulation 
of the industry and the sanitary behaviour of firms. Banks were interested in knowing about 
the sanitary situation of firms and the industry, and they requested meetings with the 
Undersecretary for Fisheries to discuss the regulatory changes for the aquaculture business.  
In one of those meetings the banking sector pointed out the need for more accurate, 
transparent and timely information for the industry in order to evaluate the firms’ risks better 
(e.g. number of fish into the water, mortality levels, the presence of caligus per HMA, harvest 
weight). The Undersecretary facilitated this process by offering meetings between the 
technical team of Subpesca and the banks, and by expressing interest in collaborating with the 
banking sector to help the firms solve their financial difficulties (La Tercera.com, 2013; Aqua.cl, 
2013d). 
The following table summarises the conflict and ambiguity in putting the policy responses into 
practice. 
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Table 7.3: Conflict and ambiguity to reduce the policy responses into practice 
 Conflict: 
-  Incompatibility of policy goals, interests, values, 
activities 
- Disagreement over means 
- Restriction of the behaviour of the addressees 
Low High 
Ambiguity: 
- Misunderstanding and/or 
uncertainties in policy goals, 
instruments, instrument 
settings 
- Different interpretations of 
policy goals, scope and/or 
instruments 
- Misunderstanding and/or 
uncertainties in the role of 
actors 
- Uncertainty in capability 
and/or capacity and 
resources to reach policy 
goals and/or implement 
policy instruments 
- Ambiguity in policy language 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
- Implementation of ISA 
and Caligus Programmes 
 
- Environmental coalition 
did not share the goals of 
the law and contested 
the implementation of 
policy responses 
- Fallow period fixed at 
three months for all 
species is detrimental for 
the production of Coho 
salmon and rainbow trout 
- Avoiding smoltification in 
lakes, rivers and estuaries 
is detrimental for the 
production of Coho 
salmon and rainbow trout 
High 
- Self-governance of HMA 
- Logistics of the HMA 
model such as transport 
and ports 
- Fallowing of collection 
centres as part of the 
HMA model 
- Fallowing of centres with 
different species as part 
of the HMA model 
- Avoiding smoltification in 
lakes, rivers and estuaries 
was detrimental for the 
production of Coho 
salmon and rainbow trout 
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical analysis and Matland (1995) and Slembeck (1997) as theoretical base. 
 
7.3. Long-term consequences of policy response to the sanitary crisis 
The long-term consequences of the policy responses are those related to the long-term policy 
responses that occurred during the improvement, adjustment and restoration stages of the 
crisis (i.e. recovery phase). The policy responses were incrementally adjusted, mainly during 
the recovery phase of the sanitary crisis, towards reducing their conflict and ambiguity. For 
some responses it was possible to reduce the conflict, but not the ambiguity, whilst for others, 
it was possible to reduce the ambiguity, but not the conflict. In some cases both the conflict 
and the ambiguity were reduced. However, there were some measures in which it was not 
possible to reduce either the conflict or the ambiguity. The adjustment of policy responses also 
produced new consequences, which are shown in Table 7.4. 
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From the conflict and ambiguity perspective, what is involved is addressing the issues with high 
conflict and high ambiguity through changes and adjustments of the policy instruments and 
their settings. The adjustments of policy instruments and instrument settings through the 
evolution of conflict and ambiguity is understood as the movement of the policy issues from 
one quadrant to another in the conflict-ambiguity matrix, as explained below. 
In the process of reducing the conflict and ambiguity of policy instruments, the policy system 
involved was 1) the government ,i.e. Sernapesca and Subpesca, 2) the industry as represented 
through their associations, SalmonChile and Acotruch, and 3) the providers represented by 
their associations, including Arasemar, Armasur and Atared to name but a few. 
 
Low conflict and low ambiguity: 
According to fieldwork and secondary data, for five policy responses or policy issues it was 
possible to reduce their conflict and ambiguity through adjustments. These are:  
· self-governance of HMAs;  
· logistics of the new production model, such as transport and ports;  
· fallowing of collection centres;  
· fixed fallow periods for all species; and  
· avoiding smoltification in lakes, rivers and estuaries.  
In the conflict and ambiguity matrix they now appear in the low conflict and low ambiguity 
quadrant. 
To reduce the ambiguity of the self-governance of HMAs, the authority gave some latitude for 
action (a term used by Slembeck, 1997) to the firms operating within the HMA model to 
organise themselves and facilitate the self-governance of the areas. Subpesca (2011) reported 
that the government enabled this latitude for action by announcing that concession holders 
may adopt measures additional to those set by regulations in terms of management plans for 
productive, logistic or sanitary measures, with the aim of improving the sanitary and/or 
environmental behaviour of the group of concessions in the area. These actions, as well as the 
responses to directives, should be incorporated in a management plan presented to 
Sernapesca for approval and monitoring. The issues that were agreed were: the cultivation of 
just one specie, fallowing of border concessions within less than three nautical miles at pre-
determined times, ports to be used, and navigation tracks segregated by risk, modification of 
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the cultivation location according to oceanographic conditions, monitoring programme for 
algal bloom, contingency plans and fallowing programmes for all or just one part of the group 
of concessions.  
According to Subpesca (2011) the adoption of agreements in the HMA required absolute 
majority of the concessions belonging to the group of concessions. In this majority, at least 
80% of the concessions should be holders declaring an intention to operate in the next 
productive cycle. The quorum for agreements should be unanimous in the case of the 
cultivation of just one species, the fallowing of border concessions and fallowing programme 
for all or just one part of the group of concessions. The quorum for agreements always refers 
to the total of existing concessions in the group of concessions and not to the concession 
holders. 
Regarding the logistics of the new production model such as transport and ports the ambiguity 
was reduced enacting more regulations. In November 2011 the regulation for embarking and 
disembarking points (ports) of farmed salmon species was issued by Resolution N°2323 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2011q). The regulation set the health management 
conditions for the points intended for loading and unloading of hydrobiological resources (live 
or dead), products, food and nets used in the salmon activities. The points may be exclusively 
for loading, or exclusively for unloading, but there is also the possibility they may be for both 
loading and unloading. The regulation specified that the points of loading and/or unloading 
must have their own equipment and materials for the cleaning and disinfection of facilities, 
structures, materials and equipment. The person or entity providing the cleaning service and 
disinfection procedure must be included in the list of service providers to which the Sanitary 
Regulation refers. Also, it was pointed out that the procedures for cleaning and disinfection 
should meet the General Sanitary Cleaning Programme. 
Based on this regulation, on 17 July 2013 the list of biosafe ports for the three regions where 
salmon production takes place (Los Lagos, Aysén and Magallanes) was published. Reported by 
Aqua, the three regions have embarking and disembarking points. In Los Lagos there are 17 
points available, whilst in Aysén there are 5 and in Magallanes 6 (Aqua.cl, 2013n). 
In 2010 the conflict and ambiguity of the fallowing of collection centres was reduced by 
modifying the sanitary management measures by area. One of these modifications was aimed 
at incorporating a fallow period of collection centres. This was made by Resolution N°1897 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2010g). The 2010 modification stated that collection 
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centres should fallow in the last month of the three month fallowing period of the area to 
which the collection centre belongs. This amendment reduced the ambiguity in the policy 
regarding whether the collection centres have periods of fallowing and when they should 
fallow.  
In 2012 the media reported another modification in the measures for collection centres. In this 
case the modification was aimed at eliminating the condition enforced by the regulation 
regarding the assurance of ‘no water exchange on arrival’. Since it is not possible to comply 
with this condition, the modification made possible what is actually feasible. Also the 
adjustment of the operation time of collection centres whose concessions have expired or will 
expire soon was proposed (Aqua.cl, 2012g). 
In relation to the fixed fallow periods for all species, after the new law was passed (Law 
N°20434) and given its discontent, Acotruch started to negotiate directly with and lobby the 
authorities in order to make its feedback known on the HMA model, especially on the three 
months fixed fallow period, which corresponds to the setting of this instrument. Aqua 
reported that Acotruch informed the authority several times of the need to reduce the 
coordinated fallow period from three to two months for Coho salmon production centres. 
Acotruch also specified that the fallow regulations created problems with infrastructure and 
services (e.g. trucks, process plants and refrigerators) during periods when harvests are 
concentrated. This made the situation even more complex for small and medium producers of 
this species that have fewer aquaculture concessions (Aqua.cl, 2013f; Aqua.cl, 2013b). 
In May 2013, Acotruch again met the Ministry of Economy and the Undersecretary of Fisheries 
to reiterate their requests regarding to the fallowing period for Coho salmon and the threat to 
small and medium firms. In that meeting, the Undersecretary of Fisheries expressed the 
intention of including in the next amendment of the Sanitary Regulation (RESA) the request 
that reduced the fallowing period of Coho salmon for farms which place into the sea up to 
600,000 fish from three to two months (Aqua.cl, 2013b). Thus, in July 2013 the 
Undersecretariat of Fisheries (Subpesca) drafted legislation for Coho salmon in order to reduce 
the fallowing period of farms producing Coho salmon from three to two months. According to 
the Undersecretary of Fisheries, since smaller and medium firms have complicated continuous 
production cycles due to having fewer concessions, this initiative would generate a positive 
effect from the point of view of giving continuity to these firms. The reduction of the fallowing 
period for Coho salmon did not have sanitary effects for ISA since this specie does not develop 
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the disease (Aqua.cl, 2013l); however, this specie could be a vector for the disease as pointed 
out earlier. 
Given lobbying and pressures from Acotruch, measures about fallowing in farming centres 
have taken a different course than that proposed earlier. The authority considered the 
proposal of one month fallowing for Coho salmon farms once this specie had completed 11 
months of productive cycle. In practice this means having two separate fallowing periods in 
two years for the production of Coho salmon. The adjustment of the settings of the HMA 
model due to the influence of Acotruch demonstrates the power of a minority group of the 
industry over sectoral regulation. 
Coho salmon and trout producers are mainly smaller and medium firms producing species 
(Coho salmon and rainbow trout) that are not the most profitable specie for the industry, 
unlike Atlantic salmon; it also has a lower production than Atlantic salmon. This also 
demonstrates that the formation of Acotruch was, from these producers’ viewpoint, a success. 
What was lost in dividing the industry voice by creating this new Acotruch subsystem was 
compensated by succeeding in influencing industry policy. 
To reduce the conflict and ambiguity regarding the smoltification in lakes, rivers and estuaries, 
the media report that the Expert Panel formed by the government recommended that the 
smoltification of Coho salmon, rainbow trout and Chinook salmon was allowed, with a specific 
sanitary programme, in zones that Sernapesca has declared free of diseases from List 2. 
Smoltifications were also allowed for a period of three years in zones declared as surveillance 
zones by Sernapesca for List 2 diseases with a control programme. After these three years the 
measure would be re-evaluated based on the relevant updated sanitary and environmental 
information. According to Subpesca, since there is no conclusive evidence that Coho salmon, 
rainbow trout and Chinook salmon are vectors of ISA, the smoltification in surveillance zones 
should carry a low risk of ISA (Subpesca and Fundación Chile, 2011).  
In a meeting held in October 2011, Acotruch expressed its concerns to Sernapesca regarding 
this measure saying that, after the three years, it created uncertainty with effects on 
investments (Aqua.cl, 2011g). In its recommendations the Expert Panel recognised the 
comparative advantages of the Chilean waters in developing aquaculture, and it estimated that 
it was not adequate to disallow the future possibility to use all available water bodies, in 
particular the estuaries (Subpesca and Fundación Chile, 2011). On the other hand, the Expert 
Panel recommended the restriction of the smoltification of Atlantic salmon in zones declared 
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free of diseases listed in List 2 by Sernapesca, with a specific sanitary programme. The 
smoltification of Atlantic salmon should be carried out just in hatcheries, but the possibility of 
producing smolts in rivers, lakes and estuaries in zones declared as free zones of diseases listed 
in List 2 in the future was preserved.  
Rivers, lakes and estuaries present a much higher probability of contagion than hatcheries. At 
the time of the Expert Panel report it was pointed out that the majority of smolt producers of 
Atlantic salmon were migrating to freshwater, especially hatcheries. This measure sought to 
reduce ISA in Atlantic salmon by curtailing production of this specie in lakes, rivers and 
estuaries. It is claimed that this measure did not have a great economic impact (Subpesca and 
Fundación Chile, 2011). 
The development and delivery of new policies and their adjustments brought a new language 
to the policy makers, authorities and the industry that sometimes resulted in norms with 
complex language. Also smaller firms had lack of resources to comply with the new policies. On 
the issue of norms with complex language, a report of a workshop about the implementation 
of the new law (Law N°20434) reported that there were a large number of norms with 
technical language, and that the norms were difficult to understand and interpret. For 
instance, there was no definition of important concepts such as ‘healthy fish’ and some terms 
such as ‘slaughter’ should be specified (Subpesca, 2010). New words such as biosecurity, 
surveillance zones, group of concessions, closed, semi-closed and open wellboat, biosafe port, 
embarking, disembarking and mixed point, sanitary certificate, to name a few, emerged as part 
of the industry policy learning and policy change. 
In order to reduce the ambiguity of the language and gain a common understanding of the 
new policy instruments including the policy goals, the bureaucrats (from Subpesca and 
Sernapesca) started an information diffusion campaign to create reference information and to 
disseminate this information via workshops, meetings and their websites (www.subpesca.cl; 
www.sernapesca.cl). Industry actors through their associations (e.g. SalmonChile, Acotruch, 
Arasemar, Armasur) also had their own information campaigns via regular meetings, 
workshops and information through their websites. 
On the issue of lack of resources for smaller firms, although the goals of the regulations and 
programmes were understood and shared by the regulated firms, it was said that the new 
sanitary and environmental requirements would increase production costs by approximately 
30%. Since the industry is heterogeneous in size and conditions (e.g. infrastructure and 
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geographic distribution of farms) the increase in costs is not the same for all the firms and it 
was estimated to vary between 20% and 30% or more. Smaller firms might not have sufficient 
resources to comply with the new requirements (Aqua.cl, 2011c). 
Reported by Fish Information and Services, in 2010 when the new law (Law N°20434) was 
approved, the banking sector calculated that the industry would have to invest more than US$ 
1,000 million between 2011 and 2014 to meet the new sanitary and environmental 
requirements. From these US$ 1,000 million, about US$ 400 million should be for the 
development of new infrastructure to increase and improve the biosecurity levels and the 
controls to avoid contamination (Fis.com, 2010). Aqua points out that, according to 
information from the industry, the major costs facing the firms with the regulatory 
modifications were the fallowing, which implies approximately 30% less production, the 
smoltification on land, which is 30%-50% more expensive than smoltification in lakes, the 
restriction on imports of eggs, which increased their costs by 40% (the cost of domestic eggs 
has been higher than the cost of imported eggs), investments in the management and control 
of mortality using silage, the application of vaccines, the transport of fish using wellboats with 
closed recirculation systems, disinfection of water and ultraviolet equipment (Aqua.cl, 2010c; 
Aqua.cl, 2011c). 
As seen in the previous chapter, the modification of the GLFA was in part aimed at reducing 
the industry’s financial risks. According to an interviewee from the banking sector, to achieve 
this aim there was a change in the funding of the industry. The treatment of concessions as 
collateral facilitated negotiations between the banking sector and the producers; it allowed 
the refinancing of debts. However, in the financial structure of the industry, post sanitary 
crisis, the banking sector had less participation, which implied a reduction in the debt-equity 
ratio56 of firms and therefore of the industry. In this new scenario larger firms adopted the 
strategy of obtaining financial resources from the stock exchange. However, this was not a 
strategy that could be adopted by smaller firms, said another representative from the banking 
sector.  
As reported by Aqua, in general the money raised from the stock exchange was used to cover 
operations and pay back part of the debts to the banking sector (a negotiation that took place 
during the modification of the law). Aqua reported that in the attempt of raising money from 
                                                             
56 ‘A measure of a company's financial leverage calculated by dividing its total liabilities by stockholders' equity. It 
indicates what proportion of equity and debt the company is using to finance its assets’. 
(http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/debtequityratio.asp Last accessed: 17 October 2013). 
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the stock exchange, the largest Chilean capital firm, AquaChile, was the most successful 
offering in the stock market with a capitalisation of US$ 373 million. Approximately 40% of the 
raised money was allocated to paying debts with the banking sector due to the sanitary crisis, 
and the rest of the money was intended to finance the business plan over the next five years 
and for future investments (Aqua.cl, 2011d). 
In June 2011 the Santiago Stock Exchange created the salmon sectoral index confirming that 
salmon was an economic sector with high presence in the Chilean stock market. In 2011, there 
were already eight firms (six national and two multinationals) participating in the stock market 
(Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago de Chile, 2012; Grupo Editorial Editec, 2013b). 
There was complete agreement across the interviewees that the financial effects of the crisis 
on firms, together with the increase in costs due to the new regulations, would lead to a 
consolidation of the industry with fewer producer firms and greater vertical integration. The 
common opinion in the industry was that the process of consolidation would result in the 
creation of five or six larger competitors. Aqua reports that in the SalmonChile Association 
alone there were 25 producer firms (Aqua.cl, 2012e). According to interviewees a consequence 
of the consolidation would be an easier management of sanitary conditions in the industry, 
since it is easier to reach consensus among fewer firms.  
Aqua points out that different actors in the industry agree with the consolidation model as the 
most efficient form to recover the production levels of the industry and accelerate its 
recovery, which was not expected to be before 2015 (Aqua.cl, 2009c). Also reported by the 
media, speculations about mergers and acquisitions started in 2009 during the modification of 
the law and negotiations between the producers and banking sector. Since in Los Lagos and 
Aysén Regions, it was not possible to grow via the acquisition of new concessions due to a halt 
in the creation of concessions, firms started looking to Mergers and Acquisitions as the 
possibility for growth57. According to some analysts interviewed by Aqua, by 2014 the number 
of producer firms would be reduced by half (Aqua.cl, 2012b). However, there are no signs that 
this is happening so far. 
The perception of the industry from the regional communities was also an issue mentioned by 
interviewees regarding the consequences of policy responses to the sanitary crisis. Although 
the industry has brought economic benefits to the southern regions where production takes 
place, mainly Region X, it was reported by some interviewed NGOs and researchers that there 
                                                             
57 Some M&A were El Golfo-Itata, Cultivos Yadrán-Andritz, Friosur-Landes and Vestisqueros-Congelados Pacífico 
(Aqua.cl, 2011f; 2013m; 2013o). 
244 
 
 
 
is resistance to the industry from some groups such as environmentalists and pro-labour 
groups. According to them, the feeling of these groups is that the industry abuses the 
environment and local communities, and that this abuse comes mainly from large 
multinational firms that came to Chile to contaminate the environment because they cannot 
contaminate their own home countries (e.g. Norway). This abuse has also been extended to 
other sectors that are located in those regions such as artisanal fisheries, tourism, and mussel 
and algae sectors.  
The sanitary crisis deepened the sense that the recipients of the industry’s negative 
externalities and the consequences of the crisis were for these sectors. An interviewed NGO 
opined that the support from the state to the industry, in response to the sanitary crisis, such 
as the financial support via the state guarantee fund CORFO, the modification of the GLFA to 
renegotiate the industry’s debs with the banking sector, and the extension of the industry to 
southern regions of the country via the granting of aquaculture concessions in Magallanes, 
were perceived as a scandalous rescue of an industry that had given more negative than 
positive externalities, which privatised the sea, an asset that belongs to all Chileans, and 
provoked one of the most serious sanitary crisis in the history of Chilean natural resources. 
 
High conflict and low ambiguity: 
On the issue of the relocation of concessions it was possible to reduce the ambiguity but not 
the conflict. The ambiguity was reduced by suspending the granting of concessions in Region X 
and XI; however, this encouraged the extension of the industry to the southern Region of 
Magallanes and maintained the conflict at a high level. The new law (Law N°20434) established 
the suspension of the granting concessions in Region X for five years and in Region XI for two 
years. After five years it would only be possible to get a concession in Region X if it became 
available from previous concessions that were renounced or had expired. The aim of this point 
was to stop the delivery of places for the production of salmon since, according to the 
government, there were no more suitable places for production in Region X. 
At the beginning of the implementation of the HMA model, concessions were permitted to be 
relocated in the same region, and just in Regions X and XI. However, there was then the 
possibility of relocating concessions in Region XII (Magallanes), due to the suspension of the 
granting of concessions in Region X and XI, giving preference to those concessions located into 
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the corridors or macro-zones considered as places incompatible for aquaculture use (Aqua.cl, 
2012h). 
In June 2012 the government announced the establishment of eight macrozones (five in Los 
Lagos and three in Aysén). Based on oceanographic and logistics information, it was decided 
that the corridors to separate the macrozones would have a width of at least five nautical 
miles. In this scheme firms would have to relocate 72 concessions58 that were in these 
corridors, although not all of them were active. The firms were not forced to move their 
concessions because the government did not have the power to expropriate those licenses. 
However, Subpesca explained that firms relocating concessions until 2015 would have 
preference in the process. From April 2015 the farming centres located in the corridors will 
have to follow stricter sanitary requirements, non-fulfilment of which jeopardises continuation 
of the concession (Aqua.cl, 2012f). 
According to the NGO, Ecoceanos, with the relocation of concessions in Magallanes, and the 
granting of concessions in this region, the state facilitated and favoured the extension of the 
industry in this region. Ecoceanos saw this negatively and explained that Magallanes is a 
remote area that was outside of the industry plans. However, since Regions X and XI were 
already contaminated with the virus and in fallowing, there have been petitions for 
concessions in Magallanes. By April 2011 there had been 1,600 concession applications for this 
region. This conflicted with other activities in the region, mainly with tourism. Ecoceanos said 
that Magallanes is a region that lives mainly from tourism, and the salmon industry was 
competing for space with the tourism industry (El Mostrador.tv, 2011). However, the media 
reported that the delivery of new concessions in Magallanes was seen positively. It would 
increase the economic activity of the region providing employment, while at the same time 
reducing the sanitary risks of the industry distributing its production over a larger area (El 
Mercurio.com,2013). 
Reported by the media, the development of the industry in Magallanes has been different 
from Los Lagos and Aysén Regions. When ISA started in 2007 in Los Lagos, Magallanes had a 
low salmon activity and the authorities focused on the development of a sustainable model 
that was in harmony with other activities, thus avoiding the mistakes of the model installed in 
Los Lagos. For this reason the Law N°20434 (outcome of the reformation process) suspended 
                                                             
58 AquaChile is the firm with the majority of concessions and it must relocate eight farming centres in Aysén. 
According to SalmonChile the investment needed to relocate a farming centre is US$ 500,000-US$ 800,000 (Aqua.cl, 
2012f). 
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the granting of concessions during the time the zonification of the regional coastline and the 
redefinition of areas suitable for the aquaculture were being elaborated. As a result of this 
process, the areas suitable for aquaculture in the region were reduced, eliminating 60% of the 
sites available to develop the salmon activity, and that were established for the state in 1994: 
2% of the maritime area of internal waters was left available (El Mercurio.com,2013; Aqua.cl, 
2013e). 
According to the president of the Association of Salmon and Trout in Magallanes interviewed 
by Aqua, the regional process of defining the use of the coastline was a participative process 
that lasted two years. This process involved workshops, consultation and meetings, and all the 
public and private entities related to the coastline. Zones for the distinct economic activities 
were defined in this process, and many zones were excluded for salmon activity (Aqua.cl, 
2013g). Apart from the conflicts with NGOs such as Ecoceanos, Oceana and Terram, indicated 
previously, the salmon industry faced conflicts with the National Forest Corporation (Conaf for 
its Spanish acronym) and indigenous communities.  
Out of the more than 1,000 aquaculture concessions in the south of Chile, 300 are located 
inside zones considered as National Parks. Conaf and indigenous communities strongly 
opposed the granting of those concessions for the development of salmon activities (El 
Mercurio.com, 2013; Aqua.cl, 2013g). After noting this opposition, the General Accounting 
Office later decided that salmon activities could not be performed inside National Parks 
(Aqua.cl, 2013a). 
According to the Undersecretary of Fisheries and the industry, both interviewed by the media, 
Magallanes presents an auspicious growth scenario because this region does not have the high 
concentration of concessions, like Los Lagos. This was a strategy to reduce the operational risks 
of new disease outbreaks, because if there are outbreaks in one region the firms may use 
concessions that are not contaminated in another region, which reduced their losses (Aqua.cl, 
2012d). Also, the region is free from piscirrickettsiosis (SRS) and caligus, diseases with which 
the industry is greatly affected (Aqua.cl, 2013e). 
In the case of caligus this is due to the low sea temperature in the region, which does not 
favour the development of this sea louse. On the other hand, due to the low temperature a 
longer period is needed for the salmon productive cycle compared to other regions (Aqua.cl, 
2013g). Until March 2012 there were 18 concessions granted in Magallanes, however, there 
were another 44 additional requests. Out of those 44 concessions, 12 would be for the 
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production of salmon (Aqua.cl, 2012d). During 2012 Sernapesca received 516 applications, and 
at June 2013 there were 61 concessions granted. According to Sernapesca, the granting of 
approximately 100 new aquaculture concessions were expected at the end of 2013 or 
beginning of 2014 (Aqua.cl, 2013e). 
The Undersecretary of Fisheries pointed out that in 2012 the production of salmon in 
Magallanes was approximately 33,000 tonnes, with approximately 1,200 direct jobs. For 2016 
more than 100,000 tonnes of production are expected with 4,000 direct jobs and 1,000 
indirect jobs (Aqua.cl, 2012f). Also there are projects for US$250 million to be developed in the 
next five years. 
The relocation of concessions was based on the idea that it is neither possible to increase the 
number of concessions nor to increase the area given for concessions. The new law allowed 
the splitting and merging of concessions. Relocated concessions lost the right to be indefinite 
and were given just for 25 renewable years. Those concessions located in incompatible areas 
for aquaculture use according to the new production model, and for Coho salmon and trout 
producers were preferred for relocation. Acotruch reported to Aqua that this favouritism for 
Coho salmon and trout producers was perceived for them as an ‘apparent favouritism’, since 
according to Acotruch this measure did not take into account its real demands, which were 
related to the favouritism of the production of Atlantic salmon.  
The relocation of a concession implied investments that small and medium firms, such as Coho 
salmon and trout producers, could not assume, and relocated concessions lost their indefinite 
life. If a small or medium firm did not have a considerable number of concessions (the usual 
case), the relocation of concessions was not useful (Aqua.cl, 2009d). Also concession holders 
who were relocating their concessions had preference over other concession applicants asking 
for the same concession. The Law N°20434 points out that the possibility of relocation of 
concessions opened a competition for spaces (Chilean National Congress Library, 2010d). 
In 2012 there were some modifications to the concession scheme. In Aysén these 
modifications were aimed at denying all requests on aquaculture concessions that were not 
aimed at relocation, and limited the preference for the cultivation of salmon and rainbow trout 
to applications presented before 8 April 2011. These modifications were also aimed at 
improving the sanitary standards and territorial organisation of those aquaculture concessions 
(Aqua.cl, 2012g; Aqua.cl, 2012h). 
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Low conflict and high ambiguity: 
A consequence of the development of new regulations that had low conflict but high 
ambiguity was the lack of resources and capabilities of the sanitary authority, Sernapesca, to 
control sanitary and environmental activities. In the early stage of the implementation of the 
policy responses, the goals of the policy were clear and shared by the actors (legislator, 
bureaucrats and industry). However, as it was repeatedly mentioned by all the interviewees, 
Sernapesca, a bureaucracy, does not have sufficient resources to comply with the new 
requirements of its role. The modification of the law gave more power to the sanitary 
authority, which meant that the industry would have more control.  
Reported by a bureaucrat, during the time of the crisis the resources of Sernapesca were 
increased, but after the crisis the resources decreased because they needed to be reassigned 
to other Sernapesca’s activities such as fisheries. A bureaucrat from Sernapesca explained that 
the state was sensitive to the ISA crisis and gave more resources to Sernapesca, but after the 
worse part of the crisis passed Sernapesca no longer had sufficient resources to, for example, 
rigorously implement the surveillance programme. With the resources Sernapesca had, it 
might have implemented less than half of the proposed surveillance programme.  
Thus, on the one hand, the latitude for action by Sernapesca was enlarged via the modification 
of the law (more power), but on the other hand their latitude of action was narrowed. 
Therefore the implementation of new policies was less effective and they could not be 
implemented in the same way as they were intended. There was no agreement across 
interviewed actors whether Sernapesca had the capabilities (i.e. qualified staff) to perform its 
role as a controller. The participation of large amount of veterinarians in the organisation was 
mention; however, it is questionable whether they had the knowledge to deal with fish 
diseases when they were veterinaries of mammals, for example cows. 
 
High conflict and high ambiguity: 
During the long term policy response, the modification of GLFA was a controversial process 
with high conflict and high ambiguity. The Law project was submitted for legislative process at 
the beginning of January 2009, and it was thought that the new law would be approved in a 
couple of months. However, the difficulties in reaching consensus and processes of negotiation 
delayed the approval of the new law until April 2010. In general, actors agreed that a change in 
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the GLFA was needed in order to solve the sanitary crisis itself, its effects, and to update the 
industry’s regulatory framework, including a more preventive approach. However, there were 
strong criticisms of the government’s position and the way in which the modification process 
was conducted. The conflicts were focussed on the policy instruments – especially the 
proposed new production model for the industry and the negotiation process between salmon 
producers and the banking sector. 
The government was strongly criticised by environmental NGOs and some legislators for taking 
a neoliberal position and using economic criteria to solve a situation that was understood by 
these actors as an ecological problem. The changes in the concession scheme (e.g. concessions 
as collateral and relocation of concessions) proposed in the law project led to the belief that 
the government was functioning as promoter as well as regulator, with clear favouritism 
towards the industry. Even more, some interviewed actors strongly believed that the actual 
goal in modifying the GLFA was to facilitate the procedure to give concessions as collateral, 
and in this way give guarantees to the banking sector, ensuring future loans for the industry 
and solving the financial problems of the producers, rather than being determined by 
environmental and sanitary considerations. This belief was based on the argument that the 
main reason to modify the law was to allow concessions as mortgages.  
The Salmon Roundtable was strongly criticised by NGOs in devising the modification law to 
focus only on the salmon industry, despite the existence of different actors sharing the 
common natural resource water. It was also criticised by the NGOs for ignoring the salmon 
workers in the discussions from the beginning, since they were deeply affected by the sanitary 
crisis. A representative from an NGO said that the excuse given for this from the Roundtable 
was that their aim was to preserve objectivity by not involving workers or businessman in the 
discussions. However, according to the interviewed NGO, the Roundtable was working with 
SalmonChile and there was a continuous lobby from the Association to the Roundtable.  
Another interviewed NGO opined that the formation of the Salmon Roundtable could have 
been useful in organising the territory in Region X in a better way by considering the 
participation of all the actors that share this territory and the common-pool resource water. 
Later on, Felipe Sandoval (Executive Secretary of the Salmon Roundtable) received personal 
criticism for taking a job with AquaChile after the modification of the law. This was another 
argument for believing that the Salmon Roundtable was in favour of the interests of larger 
producers. 
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As was seen in Section 3.4.3 (Chapter 3), the sanitary crisis had negative financial effects for 
the industry, which led to the default of the industry with the banking sector. According to 
news, in April 2009 industry debts were US$ 4,000 million approximately, representing about 
30.4% of the patrimony of the banking sector at that moment, which was US$ 13,170 million 
(Estrategia.cl, 2009). The negotiations between the banking sector (ABIF) and the salmon 
producers were based on the job and report(s) of Claro y Asociados (a consultancy firm hired 
by ABIF). The points of contention between the producers and the banks were in the petitions 
made by the both sectors: after six months of negotiations there was agreement between the 
two groups. Bórquez (2009) reported the requests of producers and banks. On the one hand 
the producers requested for more comprehension and flexibility from the banks, arguing the 
importance of the industry for the country and the economy of the southern regions. Given 
the high mortality of fish and decrease in production, producers pointed out the difficulties in 
paying back the money to the banks, a situation that could be aggravated if there is inflexibility 
from the banks in considering their requests. There were three main requests from the 
producers: 
· Exemption from industry debts: producers appealed the same consideration 
that the banking sector had during the military government in 198259 when the 
industry was considered a key sector of the economy. 
· The flexibility for the sector in delaying payments: producers requested for a 
reasonable time to give the money back to the banks, as well as grace years 
according to the characteristics of the sector. 
· Concessions as collaterals: the possibility of giving the aquaculture concessions 
as mortgages. This point was already considered in the modification of the GLFA. 
On the other hand, since it was demonstrated that the salmon itself (i.e. biomass) was not a 
real collateral, the banks requested real collateral and assurance from the industry to prove 
that it was able to pay back its debts and credits. There were also three requests from the 
banking sector: 
· Give shares as securities: at the beginning of the negotiations this point was the 
most inflexible one from the producers, however, in the end the industry 
agreed. 
                                                             
59 In 1982 the major economic crisis was suffered in Chile. 
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· Banking sector as inspector: the request to have a presence in the firms in order 
to guarantee the adequate use of the credits. Producers had no major 
objections. 
· Renegotiation conditions: the banking sector agreed a time between seven and 
ten years to the payment of debts, and grace periods of between two and five 
years. 
Although the debts of the industry to the banking sector involved important sums of money, 
Bórquez (2009) explained that the government did not participate in the negotiations between 
the producers and the banking sector. However, it provided support actions such as the 
development of a new regulatory framework, including the modification of the GLFA and the 
updates of RESA and RAMA, the state guarantee fund CORFO, and the defence of country 
image. These actions were aimed at activating the industry, which is considered as a key sector 
for the country. 
In terms of the coalitions both the neoliberal and the ecological coalitions requested 
improvements in the industry’s regulatory framework. The ecological coalition contested the 
modifications to the GLFA proposed by the Salmon Roundtable, and proposed issues that 
should be taken into account in the modification of the law. These issues included an updated 
concession scheme with the redefinition of suitable areas for the aquaculture and the location 
of the concessions according to this redefinition. Also included was the granting of concessions 
in natural places of hydrobiological resources, the end of aquaculture in rivers and lakes, an 
environmental damage insurance, the setting of maximum limits of harvest, the use of 
antibiotics and the extension of the industry to Magallanes (FundaciónTerram, 2009). The 
issues were proposed by different agents of the coalition such as Fundación Terram, 
Ecoceanos and Oceana. The efforts of the coalition were focussed on revealing the limitations 
and perils of the policy responses and the neoliberal approach. However, there were no 
counter proposals for the HMA model, and the HMA became the only new model for the 
organisation of the industry. 
The ecological coalition was fragmented in defending the issues of the ecological paradigm. 
That is, some actors of the coalition proposed specific issues to be included in the modification 
of the law but they were not united in a specific campaign. For example, Fundación Terram 
mainly defended a more holistic approach of the aquaculture policies and the use and 
management of the coastline; Ecoceanos mainly defended the extension of the industry to 
Magallanes; Oceana mainly defended issues related to salmon escapes and the use of 
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antibiotics. Ecological and marine biologist researchers defended the development of diseases 
in fish and aquaculture environment and animal welfare. 
In the neoliberal coalition, although there was an important fragmentation reflected by the 
organisational fission of the Association of Salmon Industry (SalmonChile). With the departure 
of the Coho salmon and trout producers and the subsequent formation of their own 
Association Acotruch and the departure of AquaChile, the fragmented neoliberal coalition 
could still defend the core of the neoliberal policy paradigm (i.e. ensuring a continuous 
growing production of salmon). This was because the fragmentation of the neoliberal coalition 
was not a result of disagreements about the core of the policy they were defending, but, using 
Sabatier’s (1988) wording, as a result of discontent in the secondary aspects of the policy, 
which suggested that the policy paradigm remained unchanged. 
While the neoliberal coalition’s main goal was to regain the production levels prevailing prior 
to the crisis as soon as possible, the ecological coalition requested better sanitary and 
environmental conditions. For the neoliberal coalition the sanitary and environmental 
conditions of the industry were means to achieve a continuous growing production; however, 
for the environmental coalition they were ends in themselves. 
During the modification of the industry regulatory framework, an issue that was left with a 
high level of ambiguity was the revocation of the concessions due to three breaches of 
agreements in labour issues from the firm in a period of 18 months. According to an 
interviewed Trade Union, this measure was too difficult to implement because, first, there was 
to be a two year period of an experimental run of the new regulatory framework in which this 
issue would not be implemented, and second, the revocation of concessions related to the 
unfulfilment of the labour-law was not a serious proposal. This was because employees should 
tolerate at least three unfulfilments with the labour-law by the firm in 18 months and just then 
the concession is revoked. 
During the recovery stage the neoliberal coalition, mainly Acotruch, was more effective than 
the ecological coalition in influencing the adjustments of policy instruments. The settings of 
the HMA model were adjusted as the result of the lobbying and pressure by Acotruch. On the 
other hand, the ecological coalition, although it was opposed, could not stop the extension of 
the industry to Magallanes. In particular, the NGO Ecoceanos was an active coalition actor in 
opposing the relocation of concessions in Magallanes. According to Aqua, Ecoceanos 
questioned the legal grounds of the proposal and explicitly pointed out once more the 
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regulatory capture of the government by the salmon industry. However, the government 
pushed forward the relocation of concessions in Magallanes, arguing that the proposal was 
made considering the protection of sanitary and environmental aspects, and that the proposal 
was positively valued for the Aquaculture National Commission, a consultative body, created in 
2012, in issues such as regulation affecting the salmon industry (Aqua.cl, 2013i). 
The large set of regulations developed and implemented since the outbreak of ISAv in 2007, 
led some individuals to conclude that, after the ISA crisis, some aspects of the salmon 
production could become overregulated. A lawyer interviewed by Aqua explained that the 
regulations developed post-ISA crisis were excessive, and that the salmon activity passed from 
having a rather general regulation to an activity that was highly regulated. He pointed out that 
some of what was regarded as excessive regulation in the industry was likely to be the 
consequence of policy ambiguity. As a consequence, there were delays in implementing the 
policy instruments and procedures the new law (Law N°20434) mandated (Grupo Editorial 
Editec, 2012). 
The following table summarises the conflict and ambiguity for the long-term policy responses. 
Table 7.4: Conflict and ambiguity from long-term policy responses 
 Conflict: 
- Incompatibility of policy goals, interests, values, activities 
- Disagreement over means 
- Restriction of the behaviour of the addressees 
Low High 
Ambiguity: 
- Misunderstanding and/or 
uncertainties in policy goals, 
instruments, instrument settings 
- Different interpretations of 
policy goals, scope and/or 
instruments 
- Misunderstanding and/or 
uncertainties in the role of 
actors 
- Uncertainty in capability and/or 
capacity and resources to reach 
policy goals and/or implement 
policy instruments 
- Ambiguity in policy language 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
- Self-governance of HMAs 
- Logistics of the new 
production model such as 
transport and ports 
- Fallowing of collection 
centres as part of the HMA 
model 
- Fixed fallow periods for all 
the species 
- Avoiding smoltification in 
lakes, rivers and estuaries 
- Norms with complex 
language 
- Lack of resources for smaller 
firms 
- Perception of the industry 
from other communities 
- Relocation of concessions 
and the extension of the 
industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
- Lack of resources and 
capabilities of the sanitary 
authority Sernapesca to 
control sanitary and 
environmental activities 
 
 
- Modification of the LGPA 
- Revocation of concessions 
Source: Own elaboration based on analysis, and Matland (1995) and Slembeck (1997) as theoretical base. 
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7.4. Evidence of industry policy learning and policy change 
The most tangible evidence of a far-reaching policy change corresponds to the fundamental 
change in the industry production model, which involved a significant change from 
uncoordinated production to coordinated production. Moreover, tangible evidence of policy 
change in the industry to attain the new industry production model includes the new GLFA 
(Law N°20434), the updated sanitary and environmental regulations (RESA and RAMA 
respectively), the set of regulations and programmes (e.g. ISA Programme) enacted by 
Subpesca and Sernapesca that decree the measures to deal with ISA jointly with the voluntary 
measures of the industry, and the 44 measures applied by SalmonChile. 
This evidence of sectoral policy change opens the discussion about whether this policy change 
actually enabled policy learning in the industry or not, and what the supporting evidence is for 
that answer. As said in Chapter 2, according to Birkland (2006), prima facie evidence of 
learning constitutes changes in policy, ‘in a way that is reasonably likely to mitigate the 
problem revealed by the focusing event’ (p.22); in this case changes in policy that reasonably 
alleviate the problem revealed by the sanitary crisis as the focusing event that illuminated the 
failures in the industry. In this way, the identification of learning seems to be a more or less 
straightforward task. However, it becomes a complicated one when there are strong 
disagreements on what the problem actually was as revealed by the focusing event, and then 
whether the changes made in policy mitigated it. 
As was discussed in Section 5.2 the problems revealed by the sanitary crisis in the industry 
were understood differently by the two coalitions. For the neoliberal coalition the sanitary 
crisis revealed the deregulation of the industry that allowed the development of a fragile 
production model, which stopped a continuous growth in salmon production with financial 
consequences for producer firms. On the other hand, for the ecological coalition the sanitary 
crisis revealed the transgression of the limits of the ecology in which the salmon industry is 
immersed, expressed by permanent negative externalities produced by the industry. 
Since the changes in policy entailed the development, delivery and adjustments of policy 
instruments, the creation of a stronger production model and the possibility to give 
concessions as real collateral that facilitate the financial relationship between the industry and 
the banking sector, it is fair to conclude that policy learning took place in the industry 
according to the arguments made by the neoliberal coalition. This interpretation is not 
supported by the ecological coalition, which argued that the changes made in policy did not 
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address the ecological problems caused by the industry, and therefore it was not possible to 
conclude that learning took place. Instead, what the industry had was superstitious learning (a 
concept developed by May, 1992) via interventions of policy instruments with the belief that 
these new instruments actually solve the ecological problems. There was also mimicking 
behaviour (also used by May, 1992) through the creation of the Health Management Area 
Model with the belief that this new production model may solve the negative externalities 
(e.g. contamination) caused by the industry.  
As an interviewed NGO said, the new model did not solve sanitary problems in the industry; it 
may have prevented some of them but, under this new HMA model, if there was, for example, 
a sanitary problem in which medications should be applied, all the firms in that specific area 
would apply the treatments together, which would result in a major contamination to the 
water. 
However, the two coalitions agreed that one of the systemic failures of the industry was a 
policy failure translated as a hard institutional failure. As said previously, Birkland (2006) stated 
that learning has taken place when ‘the proximate causes of the policy failure revealed by the 
event are subsequently addressed by changes in policy’ (p.166). But again, the two coalitions 
understood the proximate causes of the policy failure differently. For the neoliberal coalition 
the proximate causes were understood as a lack of regulation to ensure production, whilst for 
the ecological coalition they were a lack of regulation to look after of the ecology, which 
includes the environment and the biological resource salmon.  
Therefore, from the neoliberal view it is fair to say that learning actually took place since the 
changes in policy addressed the lack of regulation via much more regulation that targeted 
coordinated production. However, from the ecological view learning did not occur since the 
changes in policy tangentially addressed the care for the ecology in which the industry is 
immersed. Again, for the ecological coalition, it is seen as superstitious learning since the 
changes were made with little or no reflection on the continuous industry contamination and 
the way in which the salmon is produced, even when some considerations, such as the use of 
antibiotics and animal welfare, were included in regulations. 
Although radical policy change did not occur because there was not a shift in the policy 
paradigm of the industry from a neoliberal paradigm to an ecological paradigm, and the 
learning in policies was not sufficient to balance the neoliberal and ecological paradigms of the 
industry, the industry regulatory framework is gradually progressing in an ecological direction. 
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For now, this ecological direction taken by the industry is more a means than an end to still 
support the neoliberal paradigm. However, as some interviewees reported, it is likely that 
another sanitary crisis should be expected soon, which may be caused by pathogens other 
than the ISA virus (e.g. Salmon Rickettsial Syndrome -SRS). This new sanitary crisis will serve as 
a new opportunity to position the ecological view in policies. 
The following table shows evidence of learning during the process of design and delivery of 
policy responses and regarding the consequences caused by those policy responses. 
Table7.5: Typical evidence of learning in the policy process of the Chilean salmon industry 
Actor 
Evidence of Learning 
During the design and delivery of policy 
responses 
Regarding the consequences of policy 
responses 
Media 
- Daily news and considerable coverage 
in national media newspapers such as 
Estrategia, El Mercurio, La Tercera and 
La Segunda, and especially from the 
specialised aquaculture media, Aqua 
(Technopress) 
- International media coverage from, for 
example, New York Times and FIS 
- News about the effects of the updated 
industry regulatory framework, 
especially the HMA model for 
producers and suppliers, the 
negotiations between the industry and 
the banking sector, and the recovery 
of the industry 
Interests 
groups 
- Different actors (e.g. NGOs, producers, 
banking sector) going to the Congress 
to negotiate policy responses 
- Researchers interviewed during the 
policy reform 
- Development of the voluntary and 44 
measures applied by SalmonChile 
- Briefs and information on the websites 
of NGOs, SalmonChile and Acotruch 
- Interests groups such as Acotruch and 
supplier associations negotiating the 
implementation and adjustment of 
policy responses with the government 
Policy makers 
- Senators and Deputies working a year 
and half in modifying the GLFA 
N°18892 
- Debates on the problems in 
implementing the policy responses 
Regulatory and 
implementing 
agencies 
- Sernapesca and Subpesca working on 
the modification of the GLFA, sanitary 
and environmental regulations, and 
developing new measures to deal with 
ISA (e.g. ISA Programme) 
- Other actors related to the 
aquaculture sector such as the 
Ministry of Economy, Marine 
Undersecretary, National 
Environmental Commission, Agency 
for Economic Development and 
Fundación Chile participating in the 
development of policy responses 
- Bureaucrats (i.e. Sernapesca and 
Subpesca) implementing the policy 
responses 
Source: Own elaboration adapted from Birkland (2006) and based on data. 
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7.5. The closing of the policy window and the ‘recovery’ of the industry with an endemic ISA 
The closing of the policy window in the industry occurred with the approval of the new GLFA 
(Law N°20434) in April 2010. At that moment the HMA model was, although partially, already 
implemented, and adjustments through incremental upgrading were occurring to make the 
model more technically and politically feasible. Moreover, the worst part of the crisis had 
passed and the virus was already under control; ISA outbreaks and salmon mortality (i.e. the 
problem that opened the policy window) were no longer as relevant as before. ISA outbreaks 
had been mainly due to the virulent strain of ISAv (i.e. HPR0), which does not cause the clinical 
disease. One case of HPR260 was detected in Aysén (Sernapesca, 2013). 
The development and delivery of the new industry regulatory framework to deal with ISA was 
made, and the government believed that they had addressed the sanitary crisis through the 
upgrading of industry regulations. This belief was supported by the gradual increase in the 
Chilean salmon production: this increase was achieved through an increase in the salmon 
biomass. According to Sernapesca (2013), in 2012, the industry reached a biomass level higher 
than 2007 and 2008 (the beginning of the sanitary crisis); however, the distribution was 
different. Aysén Region registered 52.88% of the total biomass, whilst Los Lagos and 
Magallanes Regions registered 43.05% and 4.15% respectively. For Aysén and Magallanes the 
more recent production was historically their maximum levels of biomass.  
This shows the interest of the industry in producing salmon in the southern regions, other than 
from Los Lagos (where the activity started) and the extension of the industry to those places. 
For example, until 2012, there were 198 concessions granted in Aysén, and between June 2011 
and March 2012 there were 148 applications (Aqua.cl, 2012d). 
Between 2011 and 2012 there was an increase of biomass at the national level of 31.92%. 
Aysén and Magallanes Regions registered a higher increase in the biomass compared to Los 
Lagos (13.15%), with 52.39% and 33.48% respectively. In 2012 at the national level, Atlantic 
salmon was the most cultivated specie with 61.35% of the total biomass, followed by rainbow 
trout with 24.49% and Coho salmon with 14.02%. In Los Lagos Region 45.10% of the biomass 
corresponded to Atlantic salmon, 30.94% to rainbow trout and 23.64% to Coho Salmon. In 
Aysén Region 72.68% corresponded to Atlantic salmon, 20.03% corresponded to rainbow trout 
and 7.29% to Coho salmon. In Magallanes, 85.76% corresponded to Atlantic salmon and 
                                                             
60 A more virulent strain than HPR0 of ISAv. 
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14.24% to rainbow trout, whilst in this region there is no cultivation of Coho salmon 
(Sernapesca, 2013). 
In 2011 the harvested biomass of Atlantic salmon and Coho salmon was 264,000 tonnes and 
160,000 tonnes respectively. This was 53.4% and 17.23% more than 2010 (Grupo Editorial 
Editec, 2013b). As a consequence of this there was an increase in the global salmon 
production, which produced a decrease in the international prices and affected the finances of 
the local firms. In 2011 at the global level, there was a decrease in the price of salmon of about 
30%; this was due to the production of Chile that reached a peak of 804 tonnes (Aqua.cl, 
2013h). 
In 2012, an increase in production that was achieved through an increase in the biomass again 
caused a deterioration in the sanitary conditions of the industry, although not at the levels of 
the ISA crisis. However, there was a significant increase in the infestation of farms due to 
caligus, and an increase of mortality due to Salmon Rickettsial Syndrome (SRS) (Grupo Editorial 
Editec, 2013b). 
Comparing 2011 with 2012, there was an increase in the average load of total adult caligus 
from 2.4 to 3.28. Aysén was the region registering the highest increase (from 2.43 to 3.94): Los 
Lagos Region had a smaller increase from 2.31 to 2.45 (Sernapesca, 2013). According to 
Sernapesca (2013), the increase in the biomass of the susceptible species and the density are 
the most strongly associated factors with the increased parasite loads. The susceptible species 
for caligus are the Atlantic salmon and the Rainbow trout, whose biomass was increased by 
38.32% between 2011 and 2012. Aysén has been the most affected region. 
In terms of mortality, the following figure shows the percentage of mortality in 2011 and 2012 
at the national level. It can be appreciated that, excluding the months of July, August and 
October, there was an increase of mortality in 2012. In 2012 the main pathology causing 
mortality for Atlantic salmon, Coho salmon and rainbow trout was piscirickettsiosis (SRS) with 
69.4%, 60.3% and 94.6% respectively (Sernapesca, 2013). 
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Figure 7.1: Percentage of salmon mortality in 2011 and 2012 at national level. 
Source: Sernapesca (2013). 
This deterioration in sanitary conditions increased the costs of the firms, and the local industry 
was again facing an adverse scenario. As the majority of the interviewees reported, the policy 
learning and policy change of the industry helped everyone to realise that the new regulatory 
framework of the industry could not guarantee the avoidance of a future sanitary crisis. 
However, it could reduce the risk of having a future crisis or the magnitude of that crisis. The 
learning processes also reinforced awareness in the actors about how the industry works with 
biological species that are unpredictable, and that a crucial element to avoid a future crisis is 
to have adequate practices in order to take care of the natural resource water and the 
biological resource salmon.  
The continuous improvements and the creation of new policy instruments demonstrates a 
dynamic policy learning in the industry that will be accelerated again with the next crisis that 
can be sanitary, financial or of some other nature. 
 
7.6. Synthesis of the chapter 
In the Chilean salmon industry there were short and long term consequences of the policy 
responses to the sanitary crisis. These consequences were caused by the increasing influence 
of the ecological paradigm on the industry policy learning and policy change, the influence of 
the new industry association, Acotruch, over production policy issues, and the policy responses 
to the structure of the industry. The consequences were analysed from a conflict and 
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ambiguity policy perspective because it combines political and technical elements allowing a 
further analysis of policy learning.  
The consequences of the immediate and short-term policy responses were the conflict and 
ambiguity in the process of the design of those responses, and the conflict and ambiguity in 
reducing those responses into practice. The ecological view needed to solve the policy 
problems that were framed in a neoliberal perspective, and the divergent narratives that 
illuminated the causes of the crisis explained the conflict and ambiguity in the design of the 
responses. The difficulties of putting the policy into practice were the principal agent problems 
between the legislative and bureaucrats, and between the bureaucrats and addressees, and 
the technical and political infeasibility over policies.  
The incremental long-term policy responses led to the attempt to reduce the policy conflict 
and ambiguity through changes and adjustments of the policy instruments and their settings. 
The most controversial policy response in terms of conflict and ambiguity was the proposal of 
the new industry production model, which constituted a fundamental change for the 
production of salmon. Once implemented, the model introduced substantial ambiguity and 
conflict. This is because it created a new industry structure that revealed the need for an 
ecological perspective over policy issues and the success of minority industry actors who were 
able to influence the production organisation. 
In terms of evidence of policy learning and policy change, the most tangible evidence of a far-
reaching policy change corresponded to the fundamental change in the industry’s production 
model, which involved a significant change from uncoordinated production to coordinated 
production. Moreover, tangible evidence of policy change in the industry in attaining the new 
industry production model included the new Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, updated 
regulations, a new set of regulations and programmes to deal with ISA and measures of the 
industry.  
This evidence of sectoral policy change opened discussions about whether this policy change 
actually enabled policy learning in the industry or not. From a neoliberal view, policy learning 
took place because the changes in policy mitigated the problems revealed by the crisis. 
However, from an ecological view, since the changes made in policy did not address the 
ecological problems caused by the industry, it was argued that it was not possible to conclude 
that learning took place. The ecological coalition claimed that what took place was 
superstitious learning via interventions of policy instruments, with the belief that these new 
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instruments actually solved the ecological problems, and mimicking behaviour through the 
creation of the new production model, with the belief that the model may solve the negative 
externalities caused by the industry. 
The development and delivery of the new industry regulatory framework to deal with ISA was 
made, and the government believed that they had addressed the sanitary crisis through the 
upgrading of industry regulations, and, with the approval of the new Law of Fishing and 
Aquaculture in 2010, the industry policy window closed. This belief was supported by the 
gradual increase in Chilean salmon production. This increase was achieved through an increase 
in the biomass, which caused a further deterioration in the sanitary conditions of the industry 
and increased the costs of the firms. 
Although radical policy change did not occur because there was not a shift in the industry 
policy paradigm from a neoliberal paradigm to an ecological paradigm, and the learning in 
policies was not sufficient to balance the neoliberal and ecological paradigms of the industry, 
the new industry regulatory framework is gradually progressing in an ecological direction. The 
majority of the interviewees reported that the policy learning and policy change of the 
industry helped everyone to realise that the new industry regulatory framework could not 
guarantee the avoidance of a future sanitary crisis. However, it could reduce the risk of having 
a future crisis or the magnitude of that crisis. The learning processes also reinforced an 
awareness in the actors about how the industry works with biological species that are 
unpredictable, and that a crucial element to avoid a future crisis is to have adequate practices 
in order to take care of the natural resource water and the biological resource salmon. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
The first section of the concluding chapter revisits the research problem, research questions, 
data, information and methodology. The second section summarises the main findings of the 
study and discusses the substantial contribution to knowledge and generalisation this research 
makes. The last section outlines some limitations of the study and possible future work. 
 
8.1. Revisiting the research 
8.1.1. Research problem 
The research problem of this thesis is concerned with the timing, steps and forms by which 
policy changes and adapts to respond to catastrophic events such as the sanitary crisis of the 
Chilean salmon farming industry. In the process of policy learning and policy change related to 
dramatic events, it is particularly relevant to differentiate radical changes from more 
incremental ones because those changes accompany the features of the phases that 
catastrophic events exhibit. 
The Chilean salmon farming industry is the second largest producer and exporter of farmed 
salmon in the world after Norway. The sanitary crisis due to ISAv (a virus that kills salmon) 
during 2007 and 2010 was not just a localised problem but a global one. In 2006 the Chilean 
industry accounted for 38% of global salmon production, which dropped by 25% in 2010 due 
to the decrease in the Chilean production. The sanitary crisis in the Chilean industry produced 
a turning point in the industry evolution. It paved the way for the update of the sector’s 
regulatory framework, which was demonstrated to be ineffective in protecting the industry 
from diseases such as ISA. 
After the sanitary crisis, industry policy changed and rapidly adopted the best practice models 
of other global salmon producer countries, who experienced the same sanitary crisis long 
before Chile. In the short-term, the policy introduced potentially radical changes, of which the 
development and implementation of the new production model was the most fundamental. In 
the long-term, the policy changed incrementally to adjust to the potentially radical changes. 
The changes in the industry paralleled the phases of the sanitary crisis that evolved over time. 
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The argument is made in the thesis that the potentially radical and incremental policy 
responses to the sanitary crisis in the Chilean industry produced different consequences in the 
short and long terms for industry participants and society (e.g. local environment, jobs). Those 
consequences were influenced by the conflict and ambiguity introduced by the policy 
responses that stimulated further adaptation and update of the industry policy. 
 
8.1.2. Research questions 
Within the context of the sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon farming industry, this thesis 
posed three research questions. 
First research question: 
How do industry natural resource crises precipitate processes of policy learning and policy 
change? 
This research question is formulated to investigate the timing in which changes in policy occur 
stimulated by dramatic events. This involves investigating how the policy changes are 
accelerated by those events and is therefore related to the time in which policy changes in the 
policy making process occur. 
Second research question: 
How are policy responses stimulated by industry natural resource crises developed and 
implemented? 
This second research question aims to understand better the steps and forms that policy 
responses to catastrophic events take, how they are formulated and delivered. To do so, it is 
crucial to link those responses with the evolutionary phases of catastrophic events since each 
phase exhibits particular features that the policy should attend.  
Third research question: 
What are the consequences of policy responses stimulated by industry natural resource crises 
for industry participants and society (e.g. local environment and jobs)? 
The aim of this third research question is to investigate the effects and results that policy 
responses to catastrophic events have on different industry participants and society, such as 
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the local environment and jobs. Policy responses will have different effects due to the diversity 
of industry actors in terms of their distinct interests, understandings, values and positions in 
the industry. 
To answer these research questions, two bodies of literatures were employed: i) policy 
learning and policy change, and ii) crises and disasters management. The combination of these 
two bodies of literature provided the lens through which the data and information could be 
viewed to analyse the research questions. 
 
8.1.3. Data, information and methodology 
The empirical research of this study was mainly based on 82 interviews with producer firms, 
bureaucrats, NGOs, associations and the banking sector to name but a few. Those interviews 
gathered information from a complete set of industry actors on the causes of the sanitary crisis 
in the Chilean salmon farming industry, the policy responses reacting to the crisis, and the 
consequences of those policy responses. Information on these topics allowed for analysis on 
the nature of the sanitary crisis in Chile, how the policies were updated via changes and 
adaptations due to the crisis, and the effects of these policies for industry actors and society. 
In addition, industry and government quantitative and qualitative data were gathered from 
industry, government, firms, NGOs and associations reports. 
To answer the research questions, this thesis employed a qualitative approach. Data and 
information was put in chronological order according to the events that occurred in reality. 
The research questions followed this chronological order. The first research question is related 
with how the sanitary crisis pushed and started a policy learning process. This event was 
followed by the development and delivery of policy responses to respond to the crisis (second 
research question). These responses had consequences for industry participants and society 
that are related to the third research question. The causal relationships between policy 
learning, changes in policy goals, policy instruments, and the settings of those policy 
instruments in the three research questions, were clarified by the chronological scheme since 
it is clear that the sanitary crisis was followed by policy responses that were preceded by 
effects or results of those responses. 
To analyse how a crisis precipitates processes of policy learning and policy change in the 
salmon industry (first research question), narratives of the sources of the crisis were used as 
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an analytical technique. The causal link between the event of the industry sanitary crisis and 
the beginning of the process of policy learning and policy change was made. There is a strong 
link between these two events since the study demonstrates that industry policies changed to 
deal with the crisis and its effects. To answer the second research question, which is related to 
how the policies respond to the industry crisis, the link between the features of the 
evolutionary phases of the crisis and the responses was made to analyse the nature or form of 
the response (i.e. more radical or more incremental responses). Also, it was observed how 
policies changed and evolved over time to satisfy the needs of each phase of the crisis.  
To answer the third research question, which deals with the effects of the policy responses to 
different actors, the link between the policy responses and their effects was made. Also, a 
‘time-series analysis’ was made looking at how the policies were adapted over time to deal 
with the ineffective or unwanted results the responses caused. The ‘constant comparative 
method of comparison’ among the interviewees’ responses, and the ‘deviant case analysis’ to 
include information relevant to the study, such as the departure of the Coho salmon and trout 
producers, were used to answer the three research questions. 
 
8.2. Main findings, contribution to knowledge and generalisation from this research 
This thesis contributes theoretically, methodologically and empirically to knowledge in the 
following ways: 
8.2.1. Theoretical contribution 
This research contributes theoretically to the literature of policy learning and policy change in 
four ways. The first theoretical contribution refers to the discussion of the implications of 
crises to the policy learning and policy change literature. In the literature of policy learning and 
policy change, the characteristics of crises have not been considered and linked to policies 
responding to those events in an institutional learning process. 
The second theoretical contribution considers the causes of crises in defining policy problems. 
Considering the work of Penning-Rowsell, Johnson and Tunstall (2006) on crises as policy 
change accelerators. We argue that crises can also be considered as policy learning 
precipitators. Crises are powerful events that accelerate processes of policy learning.  
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The third theoretical contribution extends the view of the policy learning and policy change 
literature on dramatic events such as crises, considering them as dynamic and persistent 
situations. The literature views these events as stagnant situations. It means that catastrophic 
events such as crises do not evolve over time (i.e. they do not have different stages). This limits 
the analysis on policy responding to dramatic events because the responses may not be linked 
to the phases of crises since the literature does not take these phases into account. It also 
gives a static analysis of policy learning processes and the nature of radical and incremental 
changes in policies may not be known in detail. 
The fourth theoretical contribution regards the role of catastrophic events such as crises in 
creating opportunities for radical policy change. The existing literature on policy learning and 
policy change refers to radical policy change and the potential of catastrophic events as 
accelerators of radical policy change, however, it does not analyse in detail the timing or steps 
by which radical policy change is likely to occur after a dramatic event. The literature refers to 
radical policy change as paradigm shifts. In this view, and as Hall (1993) indicates, overarching 
goals that guide policies in a particular field are altered. Crisis response is an atypical type of 
policy change whose origins are found outside the formalities and routines of the policy-
making process (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl,2009). Catastrophic events challenge the prior 
decisions taken by formal policy-making processes and may require radical policy change. 
However, since the existing literature adopts the limited view of catastrophic events as 
transient situations, it does not analyse their potential as precipitators of radical policy change, 
nor provide a means for considering the timing and processes by which this radical policy 
change may occur. 
Moreover, a theoretical contribution is made to the system failure approach and it is related to 
the link made between all the failures of the system failure approach identified in the study, 
and not the consideration or identification of one type of failure as Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and 
Gilsing (2005) did. Also, adding the ‘unexpected failures’ category to the system failure 
approach in the innovation literature to be taken into account in studies related to ecology and 
natural resources is a contribution. This contributes to the system of innovation literature, 
specifically the system failure approach.  
A policy conclusion arising from the extension of the theoretical framework used in this thesis 
to consider the role of crises in policy-making, is to build a bridge between the policy learning 
and policy change literature and the literature relating to crises and disasters management. 
The principal features of this bridge are, a) an understanding of the roles of the catastrophic 
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events, b) an understanding of how catastrophic events create opportunities for radical 
changes and learning in policies, c) how the dynamic, enduring and persistent features of 
catastrophic events result in policy learning and policy change evolving through different 
stages, paralleling the evolution of the catastrophic events themselves, and d) an 
understanding of the elements or processes that emerge at each stage in the policy-making 
process. By bridging these two literatures it is possible to identify strategies by which policy-
makers may design immediate and short-term responses that simultaneously take into 
account both short and long term consequences. This might be done by anticipating the 
demands that crises may cause, and framing the policy-making process to be more robust to 
demands that are not initially present but can, in outline, be anticipated to emerge in later 
stages of the process. Immediate responses that address these issues might help to reduce the 
magnitude and effects of catastrophic events, and may help to anticipate and prevent future 
dramatic events. This thesis has demonstrated this using the sanitary crisis of the Chilean 
salmon farming industry as a case study. 
 
8.2.2. Methodological contribution 
This thesis makes two methodological contributions. The first methodological contribution is 
the in-depth analysis of a single industry-country case study. It gives the opportunity to 
observe in detail and comprehend the dynamic among industry actors over policy issues that 
cannot be observable using a more general approach, for example, the comparison between 
two industries in different countries such as the comparison between Chile and Norway, the 
two countries competing for first place in producing and exporting farmed salmon at the global 
level. This analysis extends the policy learning and policy change literature adding new 
empirical understandings on the dynamics of the salmon industry. The dynamic is related to 
the heterogeneity of the industry in terms of different actors, with distinct understandings, 
interests and beliefs cultivating a variety of species that have distinctive biological features, 
who should decide over policy issues of the whole industry. 
The second methodological contribution is related to the holistic approach adopted by the 
research in which a complete set of industry actors was considered as opposed to more 
narrow methods that just consider the behaviour of firms, for example. The approach also 
involves the causality of different events and their analysis as a whole, as opposed to isolating 
them. For example, only considering the isolated case of the sanitary crisis of the industry, or 
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considering the isolated case of the policy responding to the sanitary crisis, or considering the 
isolated case of the effects of those policy responses. The holistic approach enriches the 
literature on policy learning and policy change, providing a more complete view of the 
evolution of an industrial regulation policy. 
 
8.2.3. Empirical contribution 
This thesis has contributed to an understanding of how policy learning and policy change takes 
place in the context and aftermath of a self-made natural resource industry crisis. We took the 
Chilean salmon farming industry that suffered a catastrophic crisis as a consequence of the ISA 
virus between 2007 and 2010. The findings are presented following the order of the three 
research questions investigated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
Empirical contribution of the first research question 
The first research question asks how catastrophic industry events accelerate policy learning 
and policy change processes. The main contribution of this research question is to 
demonstrate that, in the case of the salmon industry in Chile, the industry sanitary crisis was 
an exogenous stimulus that disrupted the industry governance processes, including the 
industry’s regulatory framework opening a window for potentially radical institutional change. 
During the first stages of the sanitary crisis, the industry governance processes, including the 
industry’s regulatory framework, were disrupted. The crisis proved that the way in which the 
industry was operating was no longer viable and that something urgent and radical was 
needed to address the causes of the crisis. Therefore the crisis revealed the inherent problems. 
The second finding is that the sanitary crisis in the Chilean industry revealed evidence of policy 
failure in several ways. It was shown that the initial industry regulatory framework was 
inadequate in protecting the industry from a virus that was not new in the world, nor was it 
effective to deal with and control it. ISA virus was unknown (at least in scale) for the Chilean 
industry, and the regulatory framework at the time of the crisis had not adequately 
incorporated in its goals specificities of this virus. Therefore no measures to protect the 
industry from this virus were implemented before the crisis. The solution to solve the 
industry’s sanitary crisis and its effects could not be achieved using the initial regulatory 
framework; therefore updates and modifications in this framework were needed. For example, 
part of the solution to solve the crisis involved an upgrading in the coordination of salmon 
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production in order to attack sanitary (e.g. fish diseases) and environmental (e.g. cleanliness of 
water) problems in a coordinated way. The initial industry regulatory framework was 
adequately designed to protect the industry from other known hygienic problems but it was 
inadequately implemented. This ineffective implementation allowed the development of 
conditions that stimulated the crisis in the Chilean industry. The industry was unable to 
anticipate sanitary problems due to ISAv, and therefore the industry should modernise its 
warning, control and mitigation systems, introducing modifications in the settings of the 
regulatory framework and its instruments in order to make them more adequate and effective 
to the new needs and challenges of the industry. 
The third finding is that when the policy window was opened a variety of understandings, 
interests and beliefs emerged that influenced the development and delivery of policy 
responses to the crisis. There were multiple interpretations about the conditions that 
stimulated the crisis in the industry, and discrepancies in expert opinion about whether the 
initial regulatory framework prior to the crisis was adequately designed to protect the 
industry. These multiple interpretations and discrepancies produced conflicts in the diagnosis 
of the problems revealed by the crisis, including the failures of the initial regulatory framework 
that influenced the ordering and outcome of policy deliberations and the resulting adopted 
measures as policy responses to the crisis. 
A fourth finding is that the sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry renewed the 
historical conflict between the industry and NGOs on the poor sanitary and environmental 
conditions in which the industry was operating, and it also showed the different interests 
among industry actors. The conflict shaped the policy learning and policy change processes of 
the industry. It also enlightened the heterogeneity of the industry and the diversity of interests 
among industry actors that, in normal times, are restrained. Throughout the history of the 
Chilean salmon industry, the number and variety of ideas, interests and beliefs has been 
increased by the entrance of new actors into the industry, for example, NGOs. Ideas, interests 
and beliefs about environmental care and sustainability (proposed mainly by NGOs) added to 
the ideas, interests and beliefs on profit maximisation and levels of exports (proposed mainly 
by producers) more strongly over the last ten years. The level of conflict regarding 
environmental issues was increased by the entrance of NGOs into the industry. 
The fifth finding is that the conditions that stimulated the crisis in the industry were 
interdependent and an industry system failure was observed. Prior to the crisis some actors, 
such as NGOs, researchers, associations, trades unions and veterinarians, were warning that an 
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intensive production model, together with a lack of or an ineffective regulation and a lack of 
scientific knowledge to make decisions sooner rather than later, would produce a catastrophic 
event in the industry. However, those voices were ignored up until the point of the crisis. 
 
Empirical contribution of the second research question 
The main contribution of the second research question is to demonstrate that the sanitary 
crisis in the Chilean industry was neither transient nor episodic, but was enduring, persistent 
and dynamic. This was due to the fact that it was caused by a biological agent that was 
impossible to eradicate, and which, once introduced, made the industry chronically vulnerable. 
This finding is different from those reported by Kingdon (2003) and Birkland (2006), who 
consider catastrophic events such as crises as focusing events that last for a short period of 
time. 
Second, the thesis demonstrated that the sanitary crisis of the Chilean salmon industry did not 
produce a radical policy change. Potentially radical measures were part of a set of policies that 
emerged as initial responses during the first stages of the crisis. They included the 
fundamental change in the industry production model and the development of new 
regulations to control the virus. New ideas that prior to the crisis were ignored were now 
considered, such as the enforcement of a period without salmon in the water to allow it to 
recover after a production cycle (i.e. fallowing) and to impose fish density limits. After the 
potentially radical measures were proposed, and during the later stages of the sanitary crisis, a 
set of more incremental policy responses was developed and applied. The incremental policy 
change was aimed at attending to the non-urgent needs of the industry and reducing the 
conflict and ambiguity caused by the potentially radical policy response. Policy responses were 
guided by the features of crisis stages. 
The third finding is that, in the case of the Chilean salmon industry, the policy responded 
directly to the crisis and less directly to past policy and new information, such as the sanitary 
and environmental conditions of the industry prior to crisis. This contrasts with Hall’s (1993) 
definition of policy learning in which it is indicated that the adjustments of goals or techniques 
in policy respond to past experience and new information. The policy learning process 
triggered by the crisis was demonstrated to be reactive rather than proactive. 
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The fourth finding is that, to solve the sanitary crisis itself (first stages of the crisis), the 
industry adopted a positivist ‘best practice’ model of policy learning (a concept used by 
Freeman, 2006), and therefore experiences from other places and times were transferred and 
adapted to the Chilean context. The industry’s new production model (i.e. health management 
areas model) was inspired by the Canadian experience, and international experts were 
participating in plans and actions developed and adopted by the local industry. To update the 
industry regulatory framework (in the later stages of the crisis) a more constructivist approach 
of policy learning (a concept used by Freeman, 2006) was adopted, and therefore the new 
policies, including the Law N°20434 resulting from the policy response process, emerged as a 
collective process of knowledge accumulation from the interaction and participation of 
different actors. 
From an actor perspective, the fifth finding show that there was agreement among actors 
about the need to modify the industry’s regulatory framework, but strong disagreement about 
what aspects of this regulatory framework should be modified and how these aspects should 
be modified. This situation generated conflict in the industry’s policy learning process. 
Moreover, in the learning process, new actors emerged during the development of policy 
responses, for example, the banking sector and the new Association of Coho Salmon and 
Rainbow Trout Producers. 
 
Empirical contribution of the third research question 
The main finding of the investigation of the third research question is that the policy responses 
to the sanitary crisis destabilised the consensus in the Chilean salmon industry causing conflict. 
The conflict was demonstrated to be an important driver in the policy learning and policy 
change processes of the industry. After the crisis, industry actors could not agree on how to 
solve the crisis and its effects. Although the policy response process was a participatory one 
and was made through consultation, there were disagreements on the proposed responses 
and favouritism to some actors (e.g. Atlantic salmon producers); there was no agreement of all 
the actors. The strong disagreements and the new regulatory framework, which did not 
represent a consensus to the interests of all actors, led to the organisational fission of the 
Association of Salmon Industry; this caused the emergence of a new and parallel Association 
with the dissidents of the Association of Salmon Industry as a new industry actor.  
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Some actors (who are a minority in the industry) were marginalised in the deliberation process 
of policy reform. At the same time, the disruption of the industry governance processes, 
including the initial regulatory framework of the industry, allowed the opportunity to change 
or reorder the interests, priorities and power of involved actors. For example, smaller 
producers of a less significant species pushed the policy change process in a different direction 
than what was decided earlier. 
The second finding is that the state was unable to anticipate detrimental consequences of the 
measures adopted because of this marginalisation or exclusion of these actors. The result was 
an ineffective policy that provoked a call for further reform by lobbying and political pressures 
aimed at taking a different course than the initial measures that were adopted.  
Third, during the first stages of the crisis there was substantial ambiguity about its causes, the 
effectiveness of policy responses and the consequences of these responses. A clear example is 
that there were some difficulties in reducing the new regulatory framework into practice and 
to implement it in the same way as was intended. Reasons for this were the conflicts 
generated by the adopted measures (i.e. some actors disagree with some measures), the 
ambiguity of the means of implementing some measures (e.g. lack of resources for Sernapesca 
to control the industry through sanitary inspections more), and the infeasibility because of 
impractical points of the new law and regulations (e.g. fallowing periods of farming centres 
that do not match with the production of some salmon species). 
A fourth finding is that since the new regulatory framework proposed potentially radical 
changes in the industry, it had to operate in a different way compared with prior to the crisis. 
A new system had to be developed that required new understandings, priorities, beliefs and 
agreements. The establishment of this new system created a contested process involving new 
discussions and efforts to negotiate the implementation of, and adjustments to, the new 
regulatory framework. 
 
In synthesis: 
From the above account we argue that, in the earlier stages of catastrophic events, it is 
expected that more potentially radical than incremental policy change occurs. This is due to 
the fact that in those stages where the governance processes are disrupted, there is more 
fluidity and urgency of action, policy failure is proven, conflict among actors is renewed, 
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consensus among actors is destabilised, ambiguity on policy issues arises, and new actors and 
new ideas emerge. A dynamic is created that interrupts the more common incremental 
process of policy learning. 
The significance of this thesis therefore lies in integrating new understandings and evidence of 
policy learning and policy change processes in the context of catastrophic events into the 
existing policy learning and policy change literature. Above all it argues that the process of 
policy learning and policy change in the context of catastrophic events is very different from 
the processes of policy learning and policy change in normal times. 
We can also conclude that, while the literature does refer to crises as catastrophic events that 
may accelerate catalytic policy change (e.g. Penning-Rowsell, Johnson and Tunstall, 2006), it 
does not refer in detail to the feature of crises as being dynamic, evolving and persistent 
events and the consequences of this feature. On the contrary, the literature treats these 
events as transient and episodic. For example, Kingdon (2003) and Birkland (2006) consider 
catastrophic events as focusing events that last for a short period of time, focalising the 
responses to them to the immediate and short-term periods.  
However, the chronic feature of crises as something that is more persistent and continual, and 
makes it necessary to be constantly updating the knowledge and policy responses to these 
events. This view changes the perspective of the responses and the actors need to think in the 
long-term, taking into account the vulnerability that the crisis created.  
Biological crises caused by biological agents (such as viruses that may mutate) always 
constitute a risk for potential future crises. This feature is aggravated when the resources 
involved correspond to those called common-pool resources. This is due to the spillovers of 
the problems caused by the crisis and because the policy responses to them may expand the 
consequences to a larger range of actors. 
On the other hand, policies responding directly to a crisis and less directly to past policy and 
new information tend to be reactive and solve the particular problems emerging from the 
crisis. This may occur because resources (e.g. time, money, personnel) can be limited or there 
are political pressures (e.g. an electoral year) to show solutions. However, this also shows a 
short-term vision in policy making, where the opportunity to anticipate or reduce the 
magnitude of future crises is limited. 
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The aim of this thesis has been to better understand how policy responds to catastrophic 
events and how policy changes and adapts after a catastrophic event. Thus, this thesis 
critiques the existing literature by linking the policy learning and policy change literature with 
the literature on crises and disasters management to introduce critical questions of stages of 
change to the outcomes of policy change 
This linkage offers novel insights on policy learning, policy change and dramatic events as 
processes that co-evolve. Literature relating to crises and disasters’ management indicates 
that catastrophic events evolve from a critical period of urgency to a period in which normality 
is restored (Faulkner, 2001). Policy learning and policy change literature may benefit from this 
contribution when thinking about catastrophic events as dynamic, enduring and persistent, 
and not just as transient disturbances or episodic. The adoption of this perspective allows 
thinking about policy responses as an evolutionary process in which policies may react 
differently according to the distinct evolutionary stages of catastrophic events, and thus 
respond through more radical or incremental changes according to the particularities of each 
stage. 
 
8.3. Limitation of the research and future topics to explore 
The use of a single industry-country case study can limit our ability to make inferences to other 
contexts. Although it was argued in Section 4.4 that it is incorrect to conclude that it is not 
possible to generalise from an individual case, generalisations from using single cases (such as 
this research) must be made with caution. This caution refers to the ‘correct’ identification of 
the attributes and the relevance of the attributes of the case study. However, it has to be 
understood that this claim is grounded in the premise that the case chosen is not an outlier or 
idiosyncratic case of a general phenomenon. In this thesis, the under-development of the 
literature on policy making in response to crisis makes it difficult to claim that the case of the 
policy response to the sanitary crisis in the Chilean salmon farming industry is free of 
idiosyncratic features that might limit its generalisation. This means that the scope for 
comparison is limited.  
Another limitation of this research is that the interviews were designed to gather information 
about the changes and updates in rules, policies and regulations that followed the sanitary 
crisis in the industry, but did not pursue in depth and gathered little information about 
changes in the actual industry practices. The explanation for this is that the aim of the research 
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was to explain how and why changes in the regulatory framework of the industry were made 
stimulated by the industry sanitary crisis. The fieldwork took place exactly a year after the 
approval and publishing of the modification of the General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture 
(Law N°20434), which framed and drove the changes in rules and regulations responding to 
the crisis. A year of implementation is too early to state how the actual industry practices have 
changed, because during this period the adjustments of the newly implemented law (Law 
N°20434) or policy responses were taking place.  
Even with this qualification or reservation, it is important to point out that assessment in the 
changes of industry practices must be carefully related to what was the actual role of the 
regulation in these changes. This should take into account not just the mechanisms (and their 
limitations) of enforcing and controlling industry practices, but also the interests and 
preferences of the addressees that could be inconsistent with the goals and means of the 
regulation, and the capacity and resources the regulated firms have to comply with the 
regulation. Future research might involve providing further empirical insights into industry 
practices. This thesis can serve as a basis for that future research. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR THIS RESEARCH 
This appendix displays the list of the 82 interviews conducted to gather primary data collection 
during the single episode of fieldwork from April to July 2011. 
The geographical distribution of interviews was: 31 were in Santiago (capital city), 38 were in 
Puerto Montt (637 miles from Santiago), 11 were in Valparaíso (73 miles from Santiago), 1 was 
in Puerto Varas (14 miles from Puerto Montt) and 1 was in Castro, Chiloé Island (108 miles 
from Puerto Montt). 
All interviewees were key people for the Chilean salmon industry, sanitary crisis in the 
industry, policy responses to the crisis and their consequences, at the time of this research. 
Among the interviewees were, for example, the person who reported the virus in 2007, a 
manager of the firm which reported the virus in 2007, the person who wrote the project law 
which was discussed at the Congress, the political head of the process of modification of the 
law, the head of the Fishing Commission in the Chamber of Deputies at the Congress, the head 
of the Fishing Commission in the Senate at the Congress, dissidents of the process of 
modification of the law, presidents of associations, chief executives of firms and several 
authorities such as the Undersecretary of Fishing and Aquaculture. 
At the time of the fieldwork some interviewees were working in the consultancy sector but 
when the crisis arose in the industry they were authorities or relevant people at that moment. 
The interviews were grouped into the following 10 actors: 
Bureaucrats: 6 interviews 
Interviewee Position at the 
time of the 
interview 
Organisation at 
the time of the 
interview 
Date of 
the 
interview 
Place of 
the 
interview 
Alicia Gallardo Head 
Aquaculture 
Unit 
National Fishing 
Sector 
8 June Valparaíso 
Branny 
Montecinos 
Head 
Aquaculture 
Unit 
National Fishing 
Sector (X 
Region) 
26 May Puerto 
Montt 
Jessica Fuentes Legal Adviser Undersecretary 
of Fishing 
5 May Valparaíso 
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José Miguel 
Burgos 
Head 
Aquaculture 
Division 
Undersecretary 
of Fishing 
9 May Santiago 
Pablo Galilea 
and José 
Miguel Burgos 
Undersecretary 
and Head 
Aquaculture 
Division, 
respectively 
Undersecretary 
of Fishing 
26 July Valparaíso 
Verónica 
Guzmán and 
Heriberto 
Ceballo 
Head of Fishery 
Management 
Programme and 
Professional of 
Fishery 
Management 
Programme, 
respectively 
National Fishing 
Sector (X 
Region) 
26 May Puerto 
Montt 
 
Public Agencies, Programmes, Institutes, Councils and Services: 11 interviews 
Interviewee Position at the 
time of the 
interview 
Organisation at 
the time of the 
interview 
Date of 
the 
interview 
Place of 
the 
interview 
Alfredo 
Fröhlich 
Regional Director 
(X Region) 
Agriculture and 
Livestock 
Service 
23 May Puerto 
Montt 
Carlos Vial Representative of 
Trade Unions 
Business Sector 
X-XII Regions 
National 
Fisheries 
Council 
6 June Santiago 
Gonzalo 
Romero 
Former Manager  Salmon Cluster 
(Integrated 
Territorial 
Programme) 
18 May Puerto 
Montt 
Héctor Vera General Manager Serv. Acuicolas 
Paguro EIRL 
EcoverdeLtda 
SalmodiversLtda 
21 May Puerto 
Montt 
Hugo Escobar Development and 
Innovation 
Executive 
Regional 
Direction Chilean 
Agency for 
Economic 
Development Los 
Lagos (X Region) 
Chilean Agency 
for Economic 
Development 
21 May Puerto 
Montt 
Leonardo 
Guzmán 
Head of 
Aquaculture 
Research Division 
Fisheries 
Development 
Institute 
13 May Puerto 
Montt 
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Rafael 
Lorenzini 
Executive 
Director 
National Council 
for Clean 
Production 
21 July Santiago 
Romilio Espejo Academic Staff Institute of 
Nutrition and 
Food 
Technology 
University of 
Chile 
13 April Santiago 
Sandra Silva Regional Director 
(X Region) 
Export 
Promotion 
Bureau 
17 May Puerto 
Montt 
Santiago 
Urcelay 
Dean of the 
Faculty of 
Veterinary and 
Animal Sciences 
Universidad de 
Chile 
22 July Santiago 
Sonia Barría Sectoral Adviser 
of Sectoral and 
international 
programmes 
Division 
Chilean Agency 
for Economic 
Development 
18 April Santiago 
 
Private Institutes, Foundations and Consortia: 5 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Luis Pichott Director of 
Aquaculture 
Innovation 
Centre 
Fundación 
Chile 
6 May Santiago 
Martín Pascual Director National 
Centre for 
Alternative 
Development 
Studies 
30 May Santiago 
Pablo Kangiser 
and Susana 
Jiménez 
Legislative 
Researcher 
and 
Economic 
and Social 
Researcher, 
respectively 
Libertad y 
Desarrollo 
4 May Santiago 
Pablo Mazo Assistant 
Director 
Technological 
Salmon 
Institute 
(INTESAL) 
17 May Puerto 
Montt 
Rodger Miranda General Aquainnovo 20 May Puerto 
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Manager Montt 
 
Interest Groups subdivided into: 
NGOs: 4 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation at 
the time of the 
interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Alejandro Salinas Director Environmental 
and Labour 
Monitoring of 
Chiloé 
(OLACH) 
31 May Santiago 
Alex Muñoz Executive 
Director 
OCEANA 22 June Santiago 
Flavia Liberona Executive 
Director 
Fundación 
Terram 
2 May Santiago 
Juan Carlos 
Cárdenas 
Executive 
Director 
ECOCEANOS 20 June Santiago 
 
Associations: 7 interviews 
Interviewee Position at the 
time of the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Carlos Odebret General 
Manager 
Association of 
Chilean 
Salmon 
Industry 
(SalmonChile) 
12 May Puerto 
Montt 
Esteban 
Chamorro 
President Association of 
Divers 
(ADEB) 
9 July Castro 
(Chiloé) 
Gustavo León President Association of 
Maritime 
Shipowners 
(ARASEMAR 
A.G.) 
8 July Puerto 
Montt 
Julio Traub President Association of 
Trout and 
Coho Salmon 
Producers 
(ACOTRUCH) 
20 May Puerto 
Montt 
Pablo Elvenberg Head of Association of 13 July Puerto 
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Control 
Management, 
Management 
and Projects 
Maritime 
Shipowners 
(ARMASUR 
A.G.) 
Montt 
Soledad Zorzano Technical 
Director 
Association of 
Nets 
(ATARED) 
16 May Puerto 
Montt 
Zoila 
Bustamante and 
Cristian Tapia 
President and 
Lawyer, 
respectively 
National 
Corporation of 
Fishermen 
(CONAPACH) 
8 June Valparaíso 
 
Trade Unions: 2 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Francisco Rain Former 
Union 
Leader 
Trade Union 
FETRASAL 
11 July Puerto 
Montt 
Ricardo Casas Union 
Leader 
Trade Union 
FETRAIMPRES 
11 July Puerto 
Montt 
 
Government decision makers in this case senators and deputies: 6 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Alfonso De 
Urresti (Member 
of Parliament) 
Deputy in the 
Natural 
Resources, 
National 
Assets and 
Environment 
Commission 
National 
Congress 
5 July Valparaíso 
Antonio Horvath 
(Member of 
Parliament) 
Senator and 
President of 
the Maritime 
Interests, 
Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 
Commission 
National 
Congress 
20 July Valparaíso 
Carlos Recondo 
(Member of 
Parliament) 
Deputy and 
President of 
Maritime 
Interests, 
National 
Congress 
21 June Valparaíso 
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Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 
Commission 
Enrique Accorsi 
(Member of 
Parliament) 
Deputy in the 
Natural 
Resources, 
National 
Assets and 
Environment 
Commission 
National 
Congress 
5 May Valparaíso 
Jorge Ulloa 
(Member of 
Parliament) 
Deputy in the 
Maritime 
Interests, 
Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 
Commission 
National 
Congress 
21 June Valparaíso 
PatricioVallespín 
(Member of 
Parliament) 
Deputy in the 
Natural 
Resources, 
National 
Assets and 
Environment 
Commission 
National 
Congress 
7 June Valparaíso 
 
Producers Firms: 9 interviews 
Interviewee Position at the 
time of the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Agustín Adasme Technical 
Assistant 
Manager 
Vetisqueros 
S.A. 
24 May Puerto 
Montt 
Berta Contreras Technical 
Assistant 
Manager 
Marine 
Harvest Chile 
S.A. 
26 May Puerto 
Montt 
Enrique Silva Smoked 
Manager 
DeliFish 
Patagonia 
Salmon 
27 May Puerto 
Montt 
Felipe Sandoval Director of 
Corporate 
Affairs 
AquaChile 30 May Santiago 
Guillermo Brain Environmental 
Manager 
Cultivos 
Yadran S.A. 
24 May Puerto 
Montt 
José Ramón 
Gutiérrez 
Executive 
Director 
Multiexport 
Food S.A. 
17 June Santiago 
Mauro Araneda Technical 
Manager 
Pesquera Los 
Fiordos Ltda. 
25 May Puerto 
Montt 
Pedro Pablo 
Laporte 
Manager of 
Salmon Area 
Salmones 
Itata S.A. 
24 May Puerto 
Montt 
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Víctor Hugo 
Puchi 
President of the 
Board 
Empresas 
AquaChile 
S.A. 
13 June Santiago 
Suppliers Services subdivided into: 
Consultants: 7 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Adolfo Alvial Managing 
Director 
Adolfo Alvial 
Asesorías 
18 May Puerto Varas 
Andrea Zúñiga Auditor and 
Senior 
Consultant 
Go Up 22 May Puerto 
Montt 
Estrella Díaz Researcher in 
the Division of 
Studies 
Work 
Direction 
7 June Santiago 
Francisco Mery Project 
Manager 
POCH 
Ambiental 
13 May Puerto 
Montt 
Jorge Quiroz Consultant Quiroz 
&Asociados 
4 July Santiago 
Ricardo 
Norambuena 
Associate GEQ Chile 
S.A. 
26 April Valparaíso 
Rodrigo Infante Development 
Manager 
Gestión 
Ambiental 
Consultores 
31 May Santiago 
     
Lawyers: 3 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Javier Ovalle Lawyer Ovalle y Cia 15 June Santiago 
Raúl Lecaros Lawyer AVL 
Abogados 
13 June Santiago 
Ronald Schirmer Lawyer Legal Sur S.A. 18 May Puerto 
Montt 
 
Laboratories and Veterinarians: 4 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
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Bernd Wrege General 
Manager 
Pharmaq AS 
Chile Ltda. 
15 July Puerto 
Montt 
Daniel Nieto General 
Manager 
Sustainable 
Salmon 
17 May Puerto 
Montt 
Javier Moya Sales and 
Services 
Manager 
Diagnotec 
S.A. 
7 July Puerto 
Montt 
Patricio Bustos General 
Manager 
ADL 
Diagnostic 
Chile 
19 May Puerto 
Montt 
 
Transport and Product Process: 4 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Andrés Esteban Commercial 
Assistant 
Director 
CPT Empresas 
Marítimas S.A. 
13 July Puerto 
Montt 
Leonardo Bravo Plant 
Manager 
Agroindustrial 
Santa Cruz 
27 May Puerto 
Montt 
Mario Céspedes General 
Manager 
AquaIntegral 
E.I.R.L. 
12 July Puerto 
Montt 
Rodrigo Pérez General 
Manager 
Kuality Harvest 
S.A. 
15 July Puerto 
Montt 
 
Media: 2 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Gonzalo Silva Editor TechnoPress 12 May Puerto 
Montt 
Margarita 
Vergara 
Managing 
Director 
TechnoPress 3 May Santiago 
 
Universities: 8 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Alejandro Researcher Universidad 15 July Puerto 
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Buschmann de Los Lagos Montt 
Carlos Vignolo Researcher Universidad 
de Chile 
18 July Santiago 
Eduardo Bustos Researcher Universidad 
Arturo Prat 
18 May Puerto 
Montt 
Jonathan Barton Researcher Pontificia 
Universidad 
Católica de 
Chile 
28 April Santiago 
Jorge Katz Researcher Universidad 
de Chile 
13 April Santiago 
Juan Pablo 
Zanlungo 
Researcher Universidad 
de Chile 
13 July Puerto 
Montt 
Rodrigo Vidal Researcher Universidad 
de Santiago 
de Chile 
20 April Santiago 
Sandra Bravo Researcher Universidad 
Austral de 
Chile 
6 April Santiago 
 
Banking Sector and Financial Advisors: 4 interviews 
Interviewee Position at 
the time of 
the 
interview 
Organisation 
at the time of 
the interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
Alejandro 
Alarcón 
Academic 
staff 
Universidad 
Gabriela 
Mistral 
29 June Santiago 
Benjamín Vargas Associate Corporate 
Finance 
Group 
17 June Santiago 
Fernando 
Edwards and 
Jorge Ovalle 
Director of 
Corporate 
Finance and 
Corporate 
Finance 
Analyst, 
respectively 
IMTrust 24 June Santiago 
José Mujica Associate Claro y 
Asociados 
10 June Santiago 
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APPENDIX B 
EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE CHILEAN 
SALMON FARMING INDUSTRY 
The evolution of the industry’s regulatory framework has influenced its trajectory. This 
regulatory framework is comprised of organisations and regulations (laws, regulations, 
policies, rules and programmes) that regulate, supervise and control the industry. The 
development of this regulatory framework started formally in the late 1980s with the 
promulgation of the First General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Law N°18892). At that time 
the industry had already been operating for over 10 years and therefore it is possible to 
observe a gap between the regulatory and organisational-technological development of the 
industry. An historical look at the industry’s regulatory framework helps to understand this co-
evolution.  
The regulatory framework of the Chilean salmon industry is immersed in the regulatory 
framework of the aquaculture sector, since the salmon industry belongs to the aquaculture 
sector. The aquaculture sector in Chile was developed under the fishing sector. Since 2000 the 
contribution of the aquaculture to total Chilean fisheries exports (capture plus aquaculture) 
has exceeded the contribution of the capture61 (TechnoPress S.A., year 2000 onward). 
Although aquaculture activities have been performed in the country since the 18th century, it 
only became a commercial activity in the 1960s with oysters and mussels culture. In the 1980s 
the boom of the salmon industry began, which became the major contributor to the 
aquaculture sector up to now (Subpesca, 2009). 
 
1. Up to 1973: 
This period covers the experimentation phase of the industry and is characterised by a lack of a 
specific regulatory framework for the industry. Probably the absence of a specific regulatory 
framework to perform salmon culture is justified by the incipient and experimental activities 
that were carried out at that time. However, the salmon farming activities carried out during 
this period as part of the fishing and aquaculture activities were regulated under the fishing 
regulatory framework. It is, therefore, important to understand the origins of the fishing 
                                                             
61 In 2000 the contribution of aquaculture was 56.1% to the total fisheries exports (Technopress). 
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regulatory framework in order to understand the development of the regulatory framework of 
salmon culture. 
The origins of the regulatory framework of the fishing sector go back to the 1930s when, 
through the law-ranking decree N°34 of 1931 from the Ministry of Agriculture62,the need to 
legislate the fishing sector was recognised. This was because a lack of adequate information 
about the subsectors of the fishing sector made it difficult to make investments and policy 
decisions to develop it. In 1934 the decree N°1584 approved the regulation to apply the law-
ranking decree N°34 of 1931 about the fishing industry and its by-products. In this regulation 
there were some specifications for salmon species such as close seasons, minimum size of the 
species to capture, buy, sell and transport and net specifications. Also, the prohibition of using 
salmon eggs as caviar was specified (Chilean National Congress Library, 1934). 
In the 1920s, the regulation of fishing activities was under the charge of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Industry and Colonisation, which was created in 1924. In 1927 this Ministry 
changed its name to the Ministry of Public Works whose duties were compromised to those 
related to the agricultural sector, which included fishing activities. This Ministry of Public 
Works had a Department of Agriculture, which, in 1930, became the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Ministerio de Agricultura, 2012). Thus, the fishing sector in Chile was developed in the 
agriculture sector and therefore the organisation that was in charge of fishing activities (and 
therefore in charge of aquaculture activities) from the beginning was the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  
In 1964 the Ministry of Agriculture had a Direction of Agriculture and Fisheries that included a 
Fishery Department. In 1967 this Direction of Agriculture and Fisheries became the Agriculture 
and Livestock Service (SAG for its Spanish acronym), independent from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Creating this new organisation it would be possible to strengthen the 
development of agricultural production, forestry and fishing, solving problems arising from the 
productive process related to, for example, plant and animal health, land and water 
conservation, and renewable natural resources. Also, among its tasks were those activities 
relating to oversight and control of compliance with norms that the Ministry of Agriculture had 
under its responsibility.  
Related to aquaculture activities, the Agriculture and Livestock Service at this time had a 
bioaquatic programme to cultivate oysters and mussels, first introductions of pacific salmon 
                                                             
62 In 1983 the law-ranking decree N°5 from the Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction stated the 
revised, coordinated and systematised text of the law-ranking decree N°34 of 1931, which legislates about the 
fishing industry and its by-products (Chilean National Congress Library, 1983). 
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and produce information about the quality of the water in lakes and rivers (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 1967; Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero, 2012). 
Also in 1964 the Chilean Agency for Economic Development (CORFO) created the Fisheries 
Development Institute (IFOP for its Spanish acronym) with the aim of conducting research in 
fishery and aquaculture (Instituto de Fomento Pesquero, 2012). In 1976 the Chilean 
government set up the ‘semi-public entrepreneur cum venture capitalist’ organisation 
Fundación Chile, with the aim of transferring technology from abroad and adapting it to the 
Chilean conditions in order to strengthen or develop new sectors and industries for the 
country (Agosin, Larraín and Grau, 2009). Salmon was one of the industries developed by 
Fundación Chile. 
In terms of regulations, in 1960 the law-ranking decree N°340 about maritime concessions was 
published. Although this did not refer specifically to aquaculture, it was an important decree 
since aquaculture requires concessions to perform its activities. This decree set up the 
exclusive power of the Ministry of National Defence and Maritime Undersecretary to grant the 
specific use of places such as beaches, land of fiscal beaches, seabed, water portions, and 
concessions in rocks, rivers and lakes (Chilean National Congress Library, 1960). 
In 1968 decree N°223 approved the regulation to apply the law-ranking decree N°340about 
maritime concessions (Chilean National Congress Library, 1968). Later, this decree would be 
modified in 1994 by decree N°476 (Chilean National Congress Library, 1995b) and 1998 by 
decree N°161 (Chilean National Congress Library, 1998), and replaced in 2006 by decree N°2 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2006a), in order to update the concession regulations 
according to the requirements and practices in the fishing and aquaculture sectors. 
In September 1973 a military coup occurred and marked the beginning of 17 years of 
dictatorship in Chile and the arrival of new economic reforms based on neoliberal ideas. The 
Junta took the direction of the country and dissolved the National Congress, assuming the 
legislative work that means the facility to make and announce laws. The justification to 
dissolve the National Congress was the need to accelerate the fulfilment of the functions and 
tasks the Junta proposed as pointed out in decree-law N°27 (Diario Oficial de la República de 
Chile, 1973). 
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2. 1974-1989: 
This period covers the learning and the formative, industrial initiation and industrial expansion, 
phases of the industry (Iizuka, 2007).It is characterised by an initial development of the 
regulatory framework for the fishing sector, and therefore also for the aquaculture sector to 
which the salmon industry belongs. 
The fishery sector continued to grow and in the mid-1970s the Chilean government recognised 
it as a substantial potential resource for the country. Arguing that at that time the public 
institutional structure of the sector and regulations of the sector had characteristics that made 
the development of fishery activities for industrial and commercial aims difficult, and that 
organisations related to the fishery sector were dispersed and under several Undersecretaries 
of the State and other departments making the operationalisation of a coherent and rational 
fishery policy difficult, the government acknowledged that it was necessary to improve the 
governance and performance of the fishery sector.  
To do so, in 1976 the Undersecretary of Fishing under the authority of the Ministry of 
Economy, Development and Reconstruction was created. Jointly with the creation of this 
Undersecretary as a new organisation, the position of Undersecretary of Fishing as the person 
in charge of this new organisation was also created. However, no further details of this 
organisation were established in 1976: those specifications would come later (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 1976). 
In the late 1970s the government recognised the need to reorganise the organisations and 
their functions in the fishery sector in order to facilitate and improve its development. Thus, in 
1978 through the decree-law N°2442 from the Ministry of Economy, Development and 
Reconstruction, the government decided that this Ministry would be the organisation through 
which the government would set up policies to address and coordinate the activities related to 
fishery sector, with the aim of improving and developing it and to protect and conserve the 
marine resources. One of the functions set for this Ministry was to take action to protect the 
country’s marine resources from the introduction and propagation of diseases that could 
affect these resources, as well as to combat existing diseases. This Decree-law N°2442 also 
ordered the organisation of the activities performed by the Undersecretary of Fishing, and 
created the Fisheries Service and National Fishery Council.  
The powers of this organisation were under the authority of the Undersecretary of Fishing. In 
addition, it covered the functions of the two departments this Undersecretary had at this time 
(Department of Resources and Department of Studies) and the staff required to perform the 
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activities, around 50 people. The Fisheries Service was also created under the authority of the 
Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction and it was set that this Service would 
implement the national fishery policy and control its fulfilment. The adequate implementation 
of sector regulations were duties also given to this Service.  
It was established that this Service would have one national office plus regional offices. The 
departments of the national and regional offices were established as well as the functions of 
these departments. It was stated that the person in charge of this Service would be the 
Director of Fisheries Service and his tasks were specified. The Fisheries Service was created 
with 191 people. From this moment the duties in terms of the fishery activities, and therefore 
of aquaculture activities, performed by the Ministry of Agriculture and its departments (e.g. 
Agriculture and Livestock Service and Agricultural Development Institute63) were transferred to 
the Fisheries Service, and the departments related to fishery activities in those organisations 
were closed. On the other hand, the National Fishery Council was created as an advisory body 
for the Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction. Its function was to advise on 
the coordination and safeguarding of the country’s maritime interests relating to fishing 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 1978). 
In the 1980s, the regulatory framework for the fishing and aquaculture sector was slowly being 
developed. In 1980, through the decree N°175, fishery activities were regulated. However, at 
the same time the concept of aquaculture activity was defined, and a set of concepts to 
perform it such as farming establishments, collection centres, seed, broodfish and fry (young 
fish). In particular this regulation refers to salmon culture specifying, among other issues, the 
requirements to begin salmon culture (e.g. the submission of an annual production plan per 
specie), the features of the concessions and the size of the species. In environmental and 
hygienic issues it regulates how and when to decontaminate the water, from where eggs, fries 
(young fish) and brood fish should be obtained, and that it is the Undersecretary of Fishing 
who may authorise in advance the import and reproduction of species. In the case of import 
species it was specified that a sanitary certificate was required (Chilean National Congress 
Library, 1980). 
In 1989 the government discussed the regulatory framework of the fishing sector, pointing out 
the existence of a disperse set of regulations. This dispersion of regulations did not allow 
decisions to be made on the sector, and therefore the need to put all these regulations under 
                                                             
63 Created in 1962 by the Law N°15020 (First Agrarian Reform Law) from the Development and Agricultural Research 
Council. This had the aim of helping small and medium farmers within the First Agrarian Reform, which was meant 
to improve the levels of agricultural production through the slow modification of land ownership regime by allowing 
the redistribution of State land among agricultural workers (Chilean National Congress Library, 1962). 
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one main law was recognised. With this aim the first General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture 
was published in December 1989 (Law N°18892 Chilean National Congress Library, 1989), with 
it coming into effect from 1 April 1990. This law marked an important milestone for the 
aquaculture sector because it is this law that created the aquaculture sector as it is from the 
aquaculture activities performed in the country up to that time. In this law a complete section 
refers to aquaculture, referring to the aquaculture concessions and the procedure that these 
concessions should follow. Because this law included the aquaculture sector it was called 
General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture. 
 
3. The 1990s: 
In March 1990 with the return to democracy, the National Congress was reopened in Chile. 
The implementation of the General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Law N°18892) was 
postponed five times64, until August 1991, in order to discuss modifications in the Congress. 
Also the Laws N°19079 (Chilean National Congress Library, 1991c) and N°19080 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 1991d) introduced modifications to the 1989 General Law of Fishing 
and Aquaculture (Law N°18892). Some specifications were related to the requirements to 
obtain aquaculture concessions and authorisations65, the responsibility of concession holders, 
and the powers of authorities (e.g. Fisheries Service, Navy and Police) to supervise the 
fulfilment of the law. In terms of sanitary issues it was specified that a regulation would be 
announced to set measures to protect and control the prevention and introduction of high risk 
diseases, take measures in case of outbreak occurrence, as well as to prevent the spread and 
eradicate those diseases. In the same regulation which the high risk diseases would be was 
also specified. 
However, in 1992 the decree N°430 (Chilean National Congress Library, 1992a) became the 
consolidated version of the 1989 General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, which unified all the 
regulations and amendments in a single document. It promoted growth of aquaculture in the 
context of environmental sustainability and organized all fishing activities (extraction, 
aquaculture, research and sports) that are conducted in the country’s waters. Therefore, from 
                                                             
64 Laws that postponed this implementation were: Law N°18977, Law N°18999, Law N°19009, Law N°19043 and Law 
N°19066 (Chilean National Congress Library, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1991a and 1991b). Also the Laws N°19079 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 1991c). 
65 ‘Aquaculture concession’ refers to the rights granted by the Ministry of National Defence to use specific national 
goods, for an unlimited period of time, to perform aquaculture activities, whilst ‘aquaculture authorisation’ refers to 
the permission granted by Undersecretary of Fishing to perform aquaculture activities for an unlimited time in areas 
that are under the scope of the General Direction of Water (Chilean National Congress Library, 1991c). 
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this moment this document was the main normative body under which the aquaculture sector 
and therefore the salmon industry were developed. After 1992 a set of regulations for the 
aquaculture sector was created to operationalise and complement this 1992 decree N°430. 
Regarding the import of hydrobiological species in 1996, the decree N°730 refers to the legal 
need to regulate the introduction of hydrobiological species into Chile, the studies required for 
this introduction, and the conditions under which imports should be made, among other 
issues(Chilean National Congress Library, 1996a). However, it is actually the 1996 decree 
N°96that specified by regulation the procedure for the introduction of hydrobiological species 
into the country (Chilean National Congress Library, 1996b). This regulation would be replaced 
in 2012 after the ISA crisis by decree N°72 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2012a). 
Regarding the concessions, the 1993 decree N°550 regulated the concession areas and 
aquaculture authorisations in order to secure an adequate use of the water (Chilean National 
Congress Library, 1993b). For salmon culture the maximum limits for farming activities was set. 
The 1993 decree N°290 regulated the aquaculture concessions in terms of their types, 
procedures to obtain them, transfers and rents, holder’s rights and maintenance of the 
ecological equilibrium, among other issues (Chilean National Congress Library, 1993a). On the 
other hand in 1994the National Aquaculture Register was also created by regulations (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 1994a). In 1995the procedure to report to the Fisheries Service the 
fishing and aquaculture activities was laid down (Chilean National Congress Library, 1995a). 
Also, since 1993, different decrees dictated by the Ministry of National Defence have set 
suitable areas for aquaculture to each region in the country. 
In 1992 the Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction modified the structure of 
the Undersecretary of Fishing and the Fisheries Service by the law-ranking decree N°1 (Chilean 
National Congress Library, 1992b). Considering that the Undersecretary of Fishing is the 
organisation that proposes the fishery policy and its application, and coordinates the fisheries 
activities from the government, and that the Fisheries Service is the organisation in charge of 
the implementation of the fishery policy and regulations of the sector as well as the 
supervision of their fulfilment, the aim of the modification of the structure of these two 
organisations was to ensure a more efficient performance of their activities and functions. 
Thus, the Undersecretary of Fishing would have an Aquaculture Department and the Fisheries 
Services would have a Sanitary Fisheries Department. 
Another important milestone of this period was the announcement of the General 
Environmental Law (Law N°19300) in 1994 by the Ministry of General Secretary of the 
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Presidency. It established the institutional national framework to prevent and solve 
environmental problems and sets tools for effective management and protection of the 
environment. One of these tools was the Environmental Impact Assessment System (SEIA for 
its Spanish acronym). Since aquaculture activities could cause environmental impacts this tool 
applies to the aquaculture sector. Therefore the regulation on environmental impact 
assessment applies to the aquaculture as well. This law also specified that the activities that 
could cause environmental impacts, such as aquaculture, required an Environmental Impact 
Study if these activities produce negative environmental externalities such as the negative 
impacts on the renewable natural resources, of which the water is one. 
 
4. The 2000s: 
In the 2000s the regulatory framework for the aquaculture sector, and therefore for the 
salmon industry made important progress in the areas of sanitation, environment and plagues 
(i.e. sanitary and environmental areas). Also during this period (2007-2010), the salmon 
industry faced a sanitary crisis produced by the infectious salmon anaemia (ISA) virus, which 
radically changed the industry’s regulatory framework. 
In broader issues, in 2003the National Aquaculture Policy and the commission in charge to 
implement it was set by decree N°125 (Chilean National Congress Library, 2003a). The setting 
of this policy was based on the need to face the challenges of the aquaculture sector related to 
the possibility that commercial international agreements between Chile and other countries 
offered to develop the sector with traditional and new species, the rational use of public 
goods, and the protection of the country’s sanitary and environmental assets. In this context 
there was a need to orient the actions of the public and private sector through a national 
policy. 
Regarding sanitary regulations in 2002, the decree N°319 set the Sanitary Regulation RESA 
(Chilean National Congress Library, 2002). This is the regulation on preventive, control and 
eradication measures on high risk diseases for hydrobiological species. In this regulation the 
classification of high risk diseases is set out in two lists (list 1 and list 2). In list 1 contains the 
diseases that should be declared to the World Organisation for Animal Health, or those that 
were not detected in national territory, or those whose distribution is delimited to 
geographical zones in the country. In list 2 are the diseases that are considered as important 
for the World Organisation for Animal Health, or those that are distributed at length in the 
national territory.  
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According to the surveillance programmes, if there is any suspicion about the presence of the 
diseases specified in list 1, the farming centre holder should inform the Fisheries Services 
within 48 hours of the outbreak being discovered.. After this the measures specified in these 
programmes should be implemented. This regulation also regulates on the surveillance 
programmes, farming and experimental centres, transport of the species and their samples, 
treatments to deal with diseases, and diagnostic laboratories, among other issues. There are 
specifications about the introduction of high risk diseases from the import of hydrobiological 
species and the import of eggs, as well as the certificates required to introduce species and 
eggs into the country. 
The Sanitary Regulation has been modified eight times, mainly after the ISA crisis. The latest 
version is the most complete and is dated September 2011. In this version new requirements 
have been introduced for the aquaculture sector after the sanitary crisis. For example, the 
fallowing period of farming centres, the productive cycle of species and the hygienic measures 
along the value chain of aquaculture have all been specified. Today, anybody who has 
substantiated suspicion about the outbreak of a disease should inform the authority (Fisheries 
Service). In addition, a third list of the disease classification was added. In this list 3 are 
diseases that are not considered in list 1 and list 2, and that were diagnosed in the country. 
These diseases are those producing variable mortality; also their complete epidemiology 
cannot be completely described. In this sense the possibilities of discovering diseases and 
dealing with them have been expanded. 
Regarding environmental regulations, in 2001 the decree N°320 set the Environmental 
Regulation RAMA with the aim of preserving the environmental equilibrium in places where 
aquaculture activities are performed (Chilean National Congress Library, 2001). This regulation 
states that the concession holder is responsible for this environmental equilibrium, and it 
applies to all types of aquaculture activities. Thus, everybody performing aquaculture activities 
is responsible for the protection of the environment in which those activities may cause 
negative impacts. This regulation specifically refers to the conditions to operate farming 
centres, specifying that these centres should have contingency plans if their activities 
negatively affect the environment. Also it regulates the escape of species and the 
environmental information required to perform aquaculture activities. 
The Environmental Regulation has been modified six times, mainly after the ISA crisis. The 
latest version is the most complete and is dated February 2012. This version involves, among 
other issues, specifications on Environmental Reports, how to clean equipment used in 
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aquaculture and the effects of this cleanliness to the environment, the washing and cleanliness 
of nets, for example, it is explicit that when a net is removed it should be immediately kept in 
an hermetic container. The transport of nets should also be in hermetic containers. This 
regulation also gives specifications on the washing and cleanliness of culture equipment when 
it is performed on land, and gives specifications on the washing and cleanliness of culture 
equipment in naval artifacts such as boats and pontoons. Also it specifies when cleaning insitu 
is viable. 
In 2006 the decree N°345 approved the regulation on hydrobiological plagues. The aim of this 
regulation was to set measures to control and prevent the introduction of species that were 
considered as hydrobiological plagues, as well as isolating them if they are in the country, 
prevent their spread and eradicate them. The regulation defined the species that are 
considered as hydrobiological plagues. It is understood that a hydrobiological plague is a 
population of an hydrobiological specie that, given its density in a territory, could cause 
negative effects on human health and fishing and aquaculture activities, with negative 
economic impacts for those activities (Chilean National Congress Library, 2006b). In 2011 (after 
the ISA crisis) the Undersecretary of Fishing modified this regulation, including the 
specification that people should declare fishing equipment when they get into the country. 
Also, there is a need to adopt disinfection measures of fishing equipment and boats. These 
measures were set on the detection of the Didymosphenia geminata microalga in the country, 
whose appearance is related to the introduction of fishing equipment into the country. 
The sanitary crisis faced by the salmon industry between 2007 and 2010 caused fundamental 
changes in the industry’s regulatory framework (see Chapter 6 for details). The changes in the 
regulatory framework are reflected in two phases. In the first phase, the Ministry of Economy 
through the Fisheries Service formed a panel to solve the immediate problems caused by the 
ISA virus. A contingency plan was designed for the industry, and several measures were 
proposed to stop the dissemination of the virus and high levels of fish mortality. Also in this 
phase the Association of Salmon Industry (SalmonChile) adopted an additional 44 measures 
that were focalised on the virus spread. 
In the second phase a more fundamental change took place. It refers to the modification of the 
General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture. For this, a roundtable, which included public actors 
and one semi-public organisation (Fundación Chile), was created to negotiate with the 
different actors. In March 2009 the project law to reform the General Law of Fishing and 
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Aquaculture reached the Congress. However, the outcome could not be announced before 
2010. 
 
5. 2010-Onwards: 
After 15 months of parliamentary process, the new General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture 
was published in April 2010 (Law N°20484) as the outcome of the reformation process. From 
this Law a set of regulations was created in order to operationalise it. Since the modification of 
the law was aimed at improving the sanitary and environmental framework of the salmon 
industry and aquaculture sector, the Sanitary Regulation (RESA) and Environmental Regulation 
(RAMA) were modified. 
In terms of organisations the Law N°20597 created the National Aquaculture Commission in 
2012. This Commission was created with the aim of advising the government in proposals and 
evaluations of measures and programmes required to implement the National Aquaculture 
Policy. Among the members of this Commission are aquaculture associations, service 
associations and representatives of farming centres workers; all of them were appointed by 
the President. Also it was pointed out by this law that from now the position of Undersecretary 
of Fishing changes to the position of Undersecretary of Fishing and Aquaculture, and he will 
chair this Commission. Finally it was set that the names of the Undersecretary of Fishing and 
Fisheries Service were changed to Undersecretary of Fishing and Aquaculture and Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Service respectively (Chilean National Congress Library, 2012b). 
The following figures show the hierarchy of organisations and regulations for the salmon 
industry, and production versus regulations in the Chilean salmon industry, respectively. 
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Figure B.1: Hierarchy of Organisations and Regulations for the salmon industry (and 
aquaculture) 
Source: Own elaboration based on several regulations from the Chilean National Congress Library. 
 
 
Figure B.2: Production and Regulations in the Chilean salmon industry 
Note: GLFA: General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture; Env.Reg: Environmental Regulation; San.Reg: Sanitary 
Regulation; GLFA-2: Newly General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture. 
Source: Own elaboration based on FAOSTAT and Chilean National Congress Library (1989, 2001, 2002, 2010d). 
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